Opinion
F071034
05-18-2018
THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. CHRISTOPHER ALAN WILSON, Defendant and Appellant.
Lindsay Sweet, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant. Kamala D. Harris and Xavier Becerra, Attorneys General, Gerald A. Engler, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Michael P. Farrell, Assistant Attorney General, Catherine Chatman, Carlos A. Martinez and Daniel B. Bernstein, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. (Super. Ct. No. 1427666)
OPINION
THE COURT APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Stanislaus County. Joseph R. Distaso, Judge. Lindsay Sweet, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant. Kamala D. Harris and Xavier Becerra, Attorneys General, Gerald A. Engler, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Michael P. Farrell, Assistant Attorney General, Catherine Chatman, Carlos A. Martinez and Daniel B. Bernstein, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
Before Levy, Acting P.J., Poochigian, J. and Ellison, J.
-ooOoo-
Appellant Christopher Allan Wilson appeals from the denial of his petition for resentencing under Penal Code section 1170.18 seeking modification of the sentence imposed on his prior conviction for unlawfully driving or taking a vehicle (Veh. Code, § 10851). Appellant contends that his conviction under Vehicle Code section 10851 is eligible for resentencing under Proposition 47 and that the denial of his request violates principles of equal protection. For the reasons set forth below, we reverse and remand for further proceedings.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
On August 19, 2011, appellant pled nolo contendere to unlawfully driving or taking a vehicle under Vehicle Code section 10851. The prosecutor explained the factual basis for the plea as follows: "on January 6, 2011, in Modesto and Stanislaus County, the defendant stole a 1991 grey Honda Accord, with intent to deprive the said owner of title to and possession of said vehicle." Along with this charge, appellant was facing multiple additional charges and probation violations in copending cases. Appellant received a total sentence of three years four months for the Vehicle Code charge, which was suspended pending successful completion of a five-year probation term.
Appellant admitted to violating his probation on January 7, 2014, and again on August 22, 2014. As a result, appellant was sentenced in line with his previously suspended sentence for the Vehicle Code violation, as well as for his other prior matters.
On December 29, 2014, appellant petitioned for resentencing under Proposition 47 on his 2011 Vehicle Code conviction. Appellant filed a brief supporting the petition, but did not include any evidence regarding the value of the 1991 Honda Accord. The trial court denied appellant's petition, concluding that, although appellant was charged with auto theft under Vehicle Code section 10851, Proposition 47 did not "specifically list any Vehicle Code section" and including Vehicle Code section 10851 within the ambit of Proposition 47 would lead to absurd results by punishing joyriding more harshly than theft.
This appeal timely followed. In our initial opinion, we affirmed appellant's conviction. However, following an appeal to our Supreme Court, the case was remanded with instructions to reconsider our opinion in light of People v. Page (2017) 3 Cal.5th 1175 (Page).
DISCUSSION
Appellant argues that rules of statutory interpretation and the clear legislative intent behind Proposition 47 shows that Vehicle Code section 10851 is eligible for resentencing under Penal Code sections 1170.18 and 490.2. In addition, appellant argues that treating a conviction for theft of an automobile under Vehicle Code section 10851 as a felony while other similar property thefts are treated as misdemeanors under Penal Code section 490.2 violates equal protection principles.
In our prior opinion in this matter, we relied upon our decision in People v. Sauceda (2016) 3 Cal.App.5th 635, disapproved in part by Page, supra, 3 Cal.5th at page 1187, footnote 4, to conclude appellant's conviction under Vehicle Code section 10851 was not categorically defined as a theft offense and thus, the mere fact of conviction was insufficient to support resentencing. In Page, our Supreme Court explained that "Proposition 47 makes some, though not all, section 10851 defendants eligible for resentencing: A defendant convicted and serving a felony sentence under Vehicle Code section 10851, subdivision (a), for vehicle theft—taking a vehicle with the intent to permanently deprive the owner of possession—could (if the vehicle was worth $950 or less) receive only misdemeanor punishment pursuant to [Penal Code] section 490.2 and is thus eligible for resentencing under [Penal Code] section 1170.18." (Page, supra, 3 Cal.5th at p. 1184.) Under the Supreme Court's analysis, if a defendant can demonstrate conviction under the theft portion of Vehicle Code section 10851 relating to a vehicle worth less than $950, they are eligible for resentencing under Proposition 47.
In this case, the People concede appellant was convicted under the theft portion of Vehicle Code section 10851 but note appellant was provided no opportunity, given the ruling the conviction was categorically excluded from Proposition 47's provisions, to prove the value of the vehicle in question. (See Page, supra, 3 Cal.5th at p. 1188 [defendants bear the burden of demonstrating eligibility].) The People request a remand to provide appellant an opportunity to demonstrate eligibility for resentencing. We accept the People's request. As our Supreme Court has explained that certain individuals convicted under Vehicle Code section 10851 are eligible for resentencing under Proposition 47, appellant should be provided an opportunity to demonstrate eligibility under that legal framework. Because we agree to remand this matter, we do not need to review our prior conclusion that appellant cannot demonstrate an equal protection violation.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is reversed and the matter remanded to provide appellant an opportunity to demonstrate eligibility under Proposition 47.
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† Judge of the Superior Court of Fresno County, assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution.