Opinion
2010-05316
12-03-2014
The PEOPLE, etc., respondent, v. Ronald WILSON, appellant.
Lynn W.L. Fahey, New York, N.Y. (Melissa S. Horlick of counsel), for appellant, and appellant pro se. Richard A. Brown, District Attorney, Kew Gardens, N.Y. (John M. Castellano, Johnnette Traill, Nicoletta J. Caferri, and Laura T. Ross of counsel), for respondent.
Lynn W.L. Fahey, New York, N.Y. (Melissa S. Horlick of counsel), for appellant, and appellant pro se.
Richard A. Brown, District Attorney, Kew Gardens, N.Y. (John M. Castellano, Johnnette Traill, Nicoletta J. Caferri, and Laura T. Ross of counsel), for respondent.
REINALDO E. RIVERA, J.P., SYLVIA O. HINDS–RADIX, COLLEEN D. DUFFY, and HECTOR D. LaSALLE, JJ.
Opinion Appeal by the defendant from a judgment of the Supreme Court, Queens County (Holder, J.), rendered May 25, 2010, convicting him of attempted murder in the second degree, attempted robbery in the first degree, burglary in the second degree (two counts), criminal possession of a weapon in the second degree (two counts), and assault in the second degree, upon a jury verdict, and imposing sentence. The appeal brings up for review the denial, after a hearing (Braun, J.), of that branch of the defendant's omnibus motion which was to suppress his statements to law enforcement officials.
ORDERED that the judgment is affirmed.
Contrary to the defendant's contention, the Supreme Court properly denied that branch of his omnibus motion which was to suppress his videotaped statement to an assistant district attorney. The statement was made after the readministration of Miranda warnings (see Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 ), and was attenuated from his earlier statements to police, which had been taken in violation of his Miranda rights, as there was a definite and pronounced break in the questioning (see People v. Paulman, 5 N.Y.3d 122, 130, 800 N.Y.S.2d 96, 833 N.E.2d 239 ; People v. Foddrell, 65 A.D.3d 1375, 887 N.Y.S.2d 590 ; People v. Sepulveda, 52 A.D.3d 539, 540, 859 N.Y.S.2d 475 ; People v. Vachet, 5 A.D.3d 700, 702, 773 N.Y.S.2d 455 ).
The Supreme Court did not err in refusing to permit the defendant to elicit from the People's police witness the purportedly exculpatory statements he made in his written statement. A defendant may not avoid taking the witness stand and avoid being cross-examined by presenting his story through the hearsay testimony of another witness (see People v. Hughes, 228 A.D.2d 618, 619, 645 N.Y.S.2d 493 ; People v. Williams, 203 A.D.2d 498, 610 N.Y.S.2d 596 ; People v. Dvoroznak, 127 A.D.2d 785, 512 N.Y.S.2d 180 ). Furthermore, the defendant failed to demonstrate that the self-serving hearsay statements were admissible under any exception to the hearsay rule (see People v. Hughes, 228 A.D.2d at 619, 645 N.Y.S.2d 493 ; see also People v. Morgan, 76 N.Y.2d 493, 561 N.Y.S.2d 408, 562 N.E.2d 485 ; People v. Shortridge, 65 N.Y.2d 309, 491 N.Y.S.2d 298, 480 N.E.2d 1080 ; People v. Morrow, 204 A.D.2d 356, 612 N.Y.S.2d 604 ; People v. Cuevas, 138 A.D.2d 620, 526 N.Y.S.2d 206 ; People v. Rodriguez, 121 A.D.2d 660, 504 N.Y.S.2d 53 ).
The defendant's remaining contentions, including those raised in his pro se supplemental brief, are without merit.