Not every improper reference entitles a defendant to a new trial since such evidence can be harmless. People v. Wilson, 32 Ill. App. 3d 842, 847 (1975). Where it appears impossible to reasonably anticipate any different result on retrial, such improper testimony is harmless.
Rather, Helen and Christina testified as surviving victims describing their own personal backgrounds. See, e.g., People v. Wilson, 32 Ill. App. 3d 842, 847 (1975) (rejecting argument brought under Bernette, in part, because the complained-of testimony did not involve family members of a deceased victim). In addition, Barul's testimony that she was married to Dipak was necessary to establish her relationship to Dipak, and her testimony that she had children was necessary to explain why she left the liquor store in the afternoon.
Instead, defendant moved for a mistrial, which we believe was properly denied. (See People v. Wilson (1975), 32 Ill. App.3d 842, 845, 336 N.E.2d 92.) In addressing a similar situation, the supreme court held the failure to produce a police report did not necessitate a new trial.
• 8 The decision to limit the scope of cross and recross-examination is within the discretion of the trial court, and such a decision will not be reversible error unless it involved a clear abuse of discretion resulting in manifest prejudice to the defendant. (See People v. Wilson (1975), 32 Ill. App.3d 842, 336 N.E.2d 92.) In this instance, the record shows that the trial judge felt that evidence that the motion to suppress had been filed was not probative of whether Orange's confession was credible.
Defendant must make a preliminary showing of the existence of such statements. ( People v. Galvin (1970), 49 Ill.2d 37, 273 N.E.2d 356; People v. Wilson (1975), 32 Ill. App.3d 842, 336 N.E.2d 92.) Additionally, it must be shown that the statement is in the witness' own words or substantially verbatim. ( People v. Durso (1968), 40 Ill. 242, 239 N.E.2d 842, cert. denied (1969), 393 U.S. 1111, 21 L.Ed.2d 807, 89 S.Ct. 923.)
Assuming, arguendo, that the report was properly requested but not disclosed, the failure of defendant to seek any redress on this basis, constitutes a waiver thereof. People v. Dees, 46 Ill. App.3d 1010, 361 N.E.2d 1125; People v. Wilson, 32 Ill. App.3d 842, 336 N.E.2d 92; People v. Myers, 20 Ill. App.3d 83, 312 N.E.2d 741; People v. Lanier, 98 Ill. App.2d 89, 240 N.E.2d 288. Next defendant contends that there was error in the admission of testimony by Sheldon concerning the two prior drug transactions on August 15, and a third prior transaction early in the day on August 19. Further, that it was error for Sheldon to testify that, immediately following the instant charged drug transaction, defendant discussed with Sheldon a possible future drug sale.
Absent an appropriate motion by defendant for a continuance and for the production of the report or an explanation of the failure to so produce it, it cannot be said that the trial court abused its discretion in failing to order such actions, sua sponte. ( People v. Sanders, 36 Ill. App.3d 518, 344 N.E.2d 479; People v. Wilson, 32 Ill. App.3d 842, 336 N.E.2d 92; People v. Embry, 12 Ill. App.3d 332, 297 N.E.2d 604.) Moreover, while it was clear that the police report was once in existence, at the time of trial the State denied having the report.
Based on the disparity between the above version of the defendant's presence on April 23, 1971, and the one he gave to the investigators and the State's Attorney at the police station on May 3, 1971, we believe that the prosecutor's comments were addressed to the credibility of Richard Banks and did not constitute reversible error. We also feel that the defendant's criticism of the prosecutor's remarks concerning the victim's family is untenable. Although references to the surviving family of a deceased in a murder case have been condemned in prior adjudications ( e.g., People v. Wilson, 51 Ill.2d 302, 306, 281 N.E.2d 626, 628; People v. Bernette, 30 Ill.2d 359, 371-72, 197 N.E.2d 436, 443-44), a defendant is not automatically entitled to a new trial merely because a prosecutor comments on this subject in his closing argument since, dependent upon the facts, such a statement can be harmless. ( E.g., People v. Jordan, 38 Ill.2d 83, 91-93, 230 N.E.2d 161, 166; People v. Wilson, 32 Ill. App.3d 842, 847, 336 N.E.2d 92, 96.) Here, while Samuel Brown's family did not witness his death, their testimony at trial was principally addressed to the place and circumstances surrounding the discovery of Brown's body.
However, the order does not operate when no written memorandum of the statement in question is made, and there is no requirement that all oral statements in the possession or control of the State be reduced to writing absent bad faith. People v. Manley (2d Dist. 1974), 19 Ill. App.3d 365, 369; People v. Wilson (2d Dist. 1975), 32 Ill. App.3d 842, 845. • 4 Viewing the circumstances of the conversation eliciting the information later used in rebuttal in this case, we find no bad faith in the prosecutor's failure to reduce the statement to written form.