Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County, Benny Osorio and Hayden Zacky, Judges. Affirmed. No. MA044271
Janet J. Gray, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
No appearance for Plaintiff and Respondent.
ZELON, J.
On the morning of December 12, 2008, Victor Aburto was asleep in his upstairs bedroom when he was awakened by loud banging. When he opened his door to investigate, he saw a thin African-American man in a blue shirt standing outside his bedroom. Frightened, Aburto grabbed a baseball bat for protection and chased both the man and his companion from the residence. Police were called and shortly thereafter apprehended defendant Paul Earl Williamson and codefendant Marquis Deshon Williams, both of whom Aburto identified as having been inside his home that morning. There were signs of forced entry in the garage, but nothing had been taken from Aburto’s home. On December 23, 2008, the date of his preliminary hearing, Williamson entered into a negotiated agreement, in which he would plead no contest to residential burglary, in return for which the complaint would be amended to strike the penalty enhancement, and Williamson would be sentenced to the lower state prison term of two years, without the 15 percent limitation for conduct and worktime credits. Williamson stated he understood and accepted these terms of his plea agreement.
At the time Williamson entered his plea, he was orally advised of his constitutional rights and the nature and consequences of his plea. The trial court told Williamson that his maximum state prison exposure was six years, but that he would be sentenced to two years. The court reiterated that because of the People’s amendment, the residential burglary was no longer a “violent felony.” However, as “a serious felony” it constituted a “strike,” which could enhance a future sentence should Williamson again be convicted of a felony. Williamson stated he understood and accepted the terms of the agreement.
In accordance with the negotiated agreement, Williamson pleaded no contest to residential burglary. His defense counsel joined in the waivers of Williamson’s constitutional rights and concurred in the plea and admission. The court expressly found Williamson’s waivers and plea were voluntary, knowing and intelligent. The court found, and defense counsel stipulated to, a factual basis for Williamson’s plea. The court continued the matter for sentencing and Williamson agreed to be sentenced before a different bench officer.
On January 14, 2009, Williamson appeared with defense counsel for sentencing. The sentencing court stated it had read the plea hearing transcript, and then summarized for Williamson the terms of his negotiated agreement. Williamson began to question his two-year sentence and the fact that his conviction qualified as a strike. The court interrupted Williamson and told him to confer with his attorney. Williamson spoke with defense counsel who asked that the matter be placed on second call. Before allowing Williamson more time to consult his attorney, the court explained that it would hear, but under the circumstances would probably not grant, a motion by Williamson to withdraw his plea.
When proceedings resumed, the sentencing court imposed a two-year sentence in accordance with the plea agreement. Williamson received presentence custody credit of 55 days (37 actual days and 18 days of conduct credit). The court ordered Williamson to pay a $20 security assessment, a $10 crime prevention fund fine and a $200 restitution fine. A parole revocation fine was imposed and suspended pursuant to section 1202.45. Williamson was also ordered to pay $215.39 in direct restitution to the victim. At the conclusion of the hearing, Williamson told the court he “didn’t understand” the terms of his negotiated plea. The court reminded Williamson of his right to appeal. When Williamson did file his notice of appeal, the court granted his request for a certificate of probable cause, in which, Williamson claimed defense counsel misled him into believing he would be sentenced to six years in state prison if he rejected the plea offer; he was not eligible for a lesser sentence because the charge was a violent felony; because he had no defense, he would not prevail at trial; and he could not withdraw his plea. Williamson also claimed the sentencing court “cut [him] off” when he attempted to withdraw his plea. Williamson did not claim he did not understand or was never advised of the terms and consequences of his plea agreement.
We appointed counsel to represent Williamson on appeal. After examination of the record counsel filed an opening brief in which no issues were raised. Pursuant to People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436, counsel asked this court to independently review the entire record on appeal for arguable issues.
On July 24, 2009, we advised Williamson he had 30 days within which to personally submit any contentions or issues he wished us to consider. No response has been received to date. In view of the three-week period between the plea and sentencing hearings and the disparity between the terms of the plea agreement and the probable consequences of going to trial, Williamson’s change of heart regarding his negotiated plea was nothing more than a case of buyer’s remorse. Post-plea apprehension about the anticipated sentence provides no reason for setting aside the plea. (See People v. Huricks (1995) 32 Cal.App.4th 1201, 1208.)
The judgment is affirmed.
We concur: WOODS, Acting P. J. JACKSON, J.