Opinion
B159481.
7-14-2003
THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. CALVIN WILLIAMS, Defendant and Appellant.
Kent Douglas Baker, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant. Bill Lockyer, Attorney General, Robert R. Anderson, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Pamela C. Hamanaka, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Jaime L. Fuster and Victoria B. Wilson, Supervising Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
Calvin Williams appeals from a judgment declaring him a mentally disordered offender (MDO). (Pen. Code, § 2960 et seq.) He contends: (1) his commitment was based on an offense that does not qualify as an MDO offense; (2) the trial court improperly interpreted his prison records; and (3) the evidence is insufficient to show that his severe mental disorder was not in remission or could not be kept in remission without treatment. We affirm.
All statutory references are to the Penal Code.
Facts
In January 1996 appellant "attacked a hospital staff member . . . without any provocation." He punched the victim four or five times in the head. "The blows were very hard and made a loud thud sound." The victim suffered "a fractured nose and numerous contusions." In July 1997 appellant was convicted of battery with serious bodily injury. ( § 243, subd. (d).) He was sentenced to prison for four years.
In May 2000 appellant was paroled. The following month, he threatened an animal control officer who had asked him to produce a license for his girlfriends dog. Appellant "became angry [and] took an aggressive stance . . . ." He "pointed toward his head and stated, I hear voices in my head. . . . The voice says I should kill you. " In December 2000 appellant was convicted of making a terrorist threat and was sentenced to prison for three years.
Before appellant was released on parole for the terrorist threat conviction, the Board of Prison Terms certified him as an MDO. Appellant filed a petition in the trial court for a hearing on whether he met the MDO criteria. ( § 2966, subd. (b).) Appellant waived his right to a jury trial. In May 2002 the trial court determined that appellant met the MDO criteria only as to the 1996 battery. The court had a "reasonable doubt" whether appellant met the criteria as to the terrorist threat. The reasonable doubt was based on the opinions of three experts. They concluded that appellants severe mental disorder had not been a cause of or an aggravating factor in the making of the terrorist threat.
Discussion
I
The MDO law ( § 2960 et seq.) authorizes the involuntary treatment of mentally disordered prisoners who are released on parole. Several criteria must be met before a prisoner may be required to accept treatment. One criterion is as follows: "The [prisoners] severe mental disorder was one of the causes of or was an aggravating factor in the commission of a crime for which the prisoner was sentenced to prison." (§ 2962, subd. (b).) Appellant contends that, because the 2000 offense of making a terrorist threat failed to meet this criterion, the prior 1996 battery does not qualify as an MDO offense. He argues: "To use the offense underlying the initial grant of parole [the 1996 battery] as the qualifying MDO offense — even when a prisoner has been convicted of a much more recent crime — would allow an MDO certification to [be] made using ancient facts not reflecting an accuseds current abilities to cope in the real world. . . . The public needs to be protected, but how is this interest furthered if the facts of the most recent event, the best evidence of appellants threat to society, do not support an MDO finding?"
Appellant in effect is arguing that a prior offense cannot qualify as an MDO offense if a prisoner fails to meet the MDO criteria as to a more recent offense. The MDO law imposes no such restriction. It requires that the prisoners severe mental disorder was a cause of or an aggravating factor in "the commission of a crime for which the prisoner was sentenced to prison." ( § 2962, subd. (b), italics added.) "A crime" means, not just the most recent one, but any crime for which appellant has been sentenced to prison and for which he has not been finally discharged from parole. Appellants interpretation conflicts with the legislatures expressed intent "to protect the public" by providing "mental health treatment until the severe mental disorder . . . is in remission and can be kept in remission." ( § 2960.) The public would not be protected if prisoners in appellants situation were required to be released merely because their most recent offense did not meet the MDO criteria. A prisoner may be committed as an MDO only if "by reason of his or her severe mental disorder the prisoner represents a substantial danger of physical harm to others ." ( § 2962, subd. (d)(1).)
II
Appellant contends that the trial court "consulted resources outside the evidence received at trial and speculated as to the meaning of certain abbreviations in [his] prison records." The trial court interpreted the abbreviations as indicating appellants controlling discharge date on the 1996 battery. We need not consider appellants contention because there had been no final discharge on parole.
III
The trial court was required to find beyond a reasonable doubt that appellants "severe mental disorder is not in remission or cannot be kept in remission without treatment . . . ." ( §§ 2962, subd. (a), 2966, subd. (b).) Appellant contends that the evidence is insufficient to establish this criterion.
The substantial evidence rule applies to appellate review of MDO proceedings. (People v. Miller (1994) 25 Cal.App.4th 913, 919-920.) We review the record in the light most favorable to the judgment to determine whether it discloses "evidence that is reasonable, credible, and of solid value" such that a reasonable trier of fact could find beyond a reasonable doubt that appellant met the MDO criteria. (People v. Rodriguez (1999) 20 Cal.4th 1, 11, 971 P.2d 618.) We may not redetermine the credibility of witnesses or reweigh the evidence. All conflicts must be resolved in favor of the judgment. (People v. Poe (1999) 74 Cal.App.4th 826, 830.)
Five psychologists wrote detailed reports concluding that appellant has a severe mental disorder that is not in remission. The reports provide supporting facts for the psychologists opinions. For example, one psychologist wrote: "During the examination on March 6, 2002, [appellant] exhibited overt signs of a severe mental disorder, which included symptoms of mania, including rapid, pressured speech, loud and demonstrative speech, flight of ideas and intense affect. He reported that he had experienced auditory hallucinations several months ago, and referred to whispers currently. He has reported . . . ongoing complaints of hallucinations through the past three months, as well as mood instability and thoughts of suicide." The psychologists five reports constitute substantial evidence that appellants severe mental disorder was not in remission.
Appellant contends that the reports are inadmissible hearsay. But he stipulated that the reports be received in evidence. Because appellant failed to object on hearsay grounds to the admission of the reports, "any claim of error has been waived on appeal. [Citation.]" (People v. Gutierrez (2002) 28 Cal.4th 1083, 1158.)
The stipulation was authorized by section 2966, subdivision (b), which provides in relevant part: "The court may, upon stipulation of both parties, receive in evidence the affidavit or declaration of any psychiatrist, psychologist, or other professional person who was involved in the certification and hearing process, or any professional person involved in the evaluation or treatment of the petitioner during the certification process. The court may allow the affidavit or declaration to be read and the contents thereof considered in the rendering of a decision or verdict . . . ." The reports in effect were declarations of the psychologists who had prepared them. The statute does not require that the declarations be made under penalty of perjury.
Disposition
The judgment is affirmed.
We concur: COFFEE, J., and PERREN, J.