Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County, Ct. No. MA048180, Kathleen Blanchard, Judge.
Siri Shetty, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
No appearance for Plaintiff and Respondent.
KLEIN, P. J.
Edreese Antoine Williams appeals from the judgment entered following his plea of no contest to pimping (Pen. Code, § 266h, subd. (a)) and his admissions that he previously had suffered a felony conviction pursuant to the Three Strikes law (§§ 667, subds. (b)-(i), 1170.12, subds. (a)-(d)) and had suffered three felony convictions for which he served prison terms within the meaning of section 667.5, subdivision (b). The trial court sentenced Williams to 15 years in prison. We affirm.
All further statutory references are to the Penal Code unless otherwise indicated.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
The facts have been taken from the transcript of the preliminary hearing.
Los Angeles Police Officer Jennifer Jedynak works in the vice unit. She investigates “prostitution, prostitution-related crimes, alcohol[ic] beverage control crimes, ” such as the “illegal purchase of alcohol by minors, ” and crimes resulting from “gambling.”
On January 8, 2009, Jedynak, working with other officers from the Van Nuys Police Station, participated in an investigation which resulted in the arrest of Williams and Darcia Johnson. Jedynak, posing as a prostitute, first came into contact with Williams and Johnson at approximately 7:00 p.m. on the northeast corner of Sepulveda Boulevard and Vose Street, an intersection in an area known for “a high level of prostitution and prostitution activity.” Jedynak was first approached by Williams, who asked her what her name was, then told her that his name was Edreese. After telling Jedynak that she was pretty, Williams introduced her to Johnson and told Jedynak that Johnson was “his girl.” After engaging in some small talk, Williams asked Jedynak if she was “working, ” which is “street vernacular for asking if [one is] a prostitute.” When Jedynak told Williams that she was, he asked her if she had worked before and indicated that he would like to be able to contact her. As he slowly walked away from Johnson, Williams asked Jedynak if she was “with anybody” and, when she said that she was not, he attempted to “get [her] back to his car... to talk to him.” After stating that he was much nicer than a typical Los Angeles guy because he was from the Bay Area, Williams told Jedynak that she was “going to be his girlfriend and he was going to school [her] on how to do a date.” To Jedynak, Williams’s comment meant that she was going to “be one of his girls working for him and that he would teach [her] how to be a prostitute.”
Jedynak began to become a little apprehensive and she told Williams that she would talk to him later because she needed to go make some money. Williams told Jedynak that when she was finished, she should come back to the intersection. He indicated that he would, in the meantime, purchase for Jedynak a phone so that he could contact her “[a]nd that his girl has a phone because when she goes out on a date, he calls her to make sure she’s okay because [, ] as he put it, ‘[she’s] the money maker’ and he’s all about safety.” Williams asked Jedynak if she had a condom and when she said that she did not, he “jogged over to his car... and returned with a condom.” At that point Johnson had rejoined Williams and Jedynak. Williams told Johnson to “take [Jedynak] out to the corner and school [her] on what to do.”
Johnson gave Jedynak some tips regarding work as a prostitute. She told Jedynak to continuously walk around because “if the police saw [her] standing too long in one spot... they would... arrest [her].” In addition, Johnson told Jedynak to hide the condom in her bra so that it was not visible to police officers. At that point, Jedynak told Johnson that she believed a man in a parked car was trying to talk to her and she walked over to the driver’s side window of an unmarked car in which her sergeant was sitting. Acting as though she were going on “a date, ” Jedynak walked over to the passenger side of the car and got in. As they drove around the block, Jedynak telephoned the other officers in the area, apprised them of the situation and wrote down some notes regarding what had transpired. Her sergeant then dropped her off at the intersection of Vose and Sepulveda.
After she had gotten out of the car, Jedynak was approached by Williams. He told Jedynak to “come back to his car... [because] [h]e wanted to talk to [her] further.” As Jedynak slowly began to walk in the direction of Williams’s car, she asked him what he wished to talk about. “At that point [Williams] became aggressive.... [¶] [] His posture changed. He took what [Jedynak]... consider[ed] a more squared-off fighting stance... as a form of intimidation.” When she asked him if she would have to give him all of her money, he told her that she would not, but then proceeded to give her a list of prices she was to charge for various sex acts. She was to give whatever money she earned to Williams to “ ‘hold’ ” and, at the end of the evening they would “ ‘tally it up.’ ”
Jedynak continued to ask questions and, at one point made a comment about her “birth father.” In response, Williams told Jedynak, “ ‘I’m your daddy now.’ ” Jedynak explained that when one says they are your “daddy, ” it means, in street vernacular, that they are your pimp. When Jedynak continued to ask questions regarding how much she would get, Williams stated, “ ‘Man, this bitch is already out of pocket.’ ” Jedynak indicated that Williams’s comment meant that she was “being disrespectful, ” that she was “getting out of line and that [she] was already part of his employ.” Williams approached Jedynak again “in a manner [intended] to intimidate [her].” As he did so, he told Jedynak that “he was gonna take care of everything that [she] needed and take care of [her].” At that point, Jedynak “gave [her] signal to have [her] undercover and uniform[ed] officers” come out and, for her safety, make their presence known.
Based on her background, training and experience, Jedynak was of the opinion that Williams wished her to “work for him” and “earn money for him as a prostitute.” Jedynak had noted that Johnson had tattooed on her left shoulder “ ‘Edreese’s Bottom.’ ” Jedynak explained that “[g]irls working for pimps commonly [get tattoos of] their pimp’s name” as a show of loyalty. In addition, “[b]eing a bottom girl means that [one is] the bread winner, the money maker. You are the one that’s making the most money” for your pimp. Jedynak indicated that Johnson’s tattoo, which was “extremely large, ” was intended to keep the number one girl from “running off to another pimp.” It was also a way to “advertise for other girls[, ]” who might wish to work as prostitutes, that they should work for Williams.
At approximately 2:00 p.m. on January 3, 2010, Los Angeles Deputy Sheriff Joseph Mesa was driving south on Sierra Highway when he saw Williams and Johnson at the Sierra Liquor Store on the highway, close to Avenue M. Johnson was standing near a pay phone and Williams was “by his vehicle, which was parked in front of the liquor store.” According to Mesa, there are “day rate motels” in the area and that portion of the highway is known for prostitution. Johnson was “dressed in apparel consistent with the reputation of that part of Sierra Highway” and she was “staring into traffic” while Williams was “shouting something out to” her.
Mesa saw Williams again on February 2, 2010. Mesa was driving south on Sierra Highway when Williams, who was alone in his car, pulled out of the Aloha Hotel and behind the deputy. When Mesa drove into a Shell gas station, Williams pulled in behind him and parked. Mesa pulled out of the Shell station and “proceeded westbound on Avenue M.” He made a U-turn, drove back down Avenue M and pulled into the parking area of an AM/PM store, which is directly across the street from the Shell station. From there, Mesa could clearly see Williams, who had moved his car to the other side of the gas station.
After approximately 10 minutes, Johnson walked across the gas station parking lot and got into Williams’s car. Williams then drove out of the gas station and headed north on Sierra Highway. Deputies from Mesa’s unit saw Williams pull over on the highway and they conducted a traffic stop. Both Williams and Johnson were searched. The search of Johnson revealed “a white capsule” filled with a substance which resembled cocaine and two condoms in purple packaging. In Williams’s car the deputies found “a condom in the same [purple] packaging that” they had found on Johnson’s person.
When Mesa arrived at the scene, he gave to Johnson her Miranda rights. Johnson waived her rights and told Mesa that she was a prostitute and had spent the night working on Sierra Highway. She stated that she lived with Williams at his house and that she provided food for the home. She had been with Williams throughout the night and had sent and received several text messages on the cell phone she shared with Williams. One message read: “ ‘Hey, can you get me and jazz a job? We need to get $300.’ ” Another message stated: “ ‘I’m at the Shell.’ ” Williams, too, had received at least one text message. The message said, “ ‘What’s up, Dreez? It’s me. Chris. Do you have a room?’ ”
Miranda v. Arizona (1966) 384 U.S. 436.
Believing that Williams was in violation of his parole, Los Angeles County Deputy Sheriff Troy Bowser participated in his arrest and the arrest of Johnson on Sierra Highway. After making the arrests, Bowser and other deputies went to Williams’s home at 2235 West Avenue J-8, Apartment H. There, the deputies found an adult woman, who identified herself as Williams’s wife and the mother of his child. When Williams’s wife was asked who lived at the apartment, she stated that she, Williams, their young daughter and Darcia Johnson lived there.
When the deputies searched the apartment, they found, among other things, “some documents printed off of the internet” which “detailed... California’s Penal Code laws regarding pimping and pandering.... [In addition] there was a letter which appeared to be from [Williams’s] wife, ... expressing concerns over [his] relationship [with] and... involvement in [the] pimping of Miss Johnson.” The letter was found on a “computer desk” set up against a wall in the bedroom, adjacent to the bed. The deputies also recovered from Williams’s bedroom a photocopy of a seven-page Los Angeles Police Department report and “[a]n entire trash bag full of mail[, ]” most of which consisted of letters between Williams’s wife and Williams while he was in prison.
2. Procedural history.
Following a preliminary hearing, in an information filed on March 2, 2010, Williams was charged with conspiracy to commit prostitution (§§ 182, subd. (a)(1), 647, subd. (b)) (count 1), pandering by encouraging (§ 266i, subd. (a)(2)) (count 2), pimping on or about January 3, 2010 (§ 266h, subd. (a)) (count 3), and pimping on or about February 2, 2010 (§ 266h, subd. (a)) (count 4). It was further alleged that Williams had previously suffered convictions for three counts of robbery (§ 211) within the meaning of the Three Strikes law (§§ 667, subds. (b)-(i), 1170.12, subds. (a)-(d)) and had suffered two convictions for robbery (§ 211) and one conviction for the unlawful possession of a firearm (§ 12021, subd. (a)(1)) for which he served prison terms within the meaning of section 667.5, subdivision (b).
In the same information, Johnson was charged with conspiracy to commit prostitution and two counts of loitering to commit prostitution. At proceedings held on July 8, 2010, the case against Johnson was dismissed “in its entirety.”
At proceedings held on April 30, 2010, counsel for Williams made a section 995 motion to set aside the information. After hearing argument by the parties, the trial court recognized that, although there is a split in authority, section 266i clearly “covers a case where a defendant solicits one whom he believes presently to be a prostitute to change her business relations.” The trial court continued, “And according to the transcript that I read, ... evidence was presented at the preliminary hearing [indicating] Mr. Williams [was] trying to get the undercover officer to work for him, and he would be her daddy, so to speak. And he would collect all the money and split it three ways. He would provide her with security and a cell phone. [¶] I think sufficient evidence was presented. Motion is denied.”
At the same proceedings, Williams indicated that he “tried to have a Marsden hearing twice with [his present counsel].” Williams continued, “I would have had another one today, but that’s not working.” In response, the trial court stated, “Because you haven’t stated a legal basis for it.”
People v. Marsden (1970) 2 Cal.3d 118.
In view of the trial court’s rulings on his Marsden motions, Williams decided to represent himself pursuant to Faretta v. California (1975) 422 U.S. 806. At Williams’s request, the trial court explained to him that, should he choose to represent himself at trial, he would receive no assistance from cocounsel or the trial court. The court stated: “[I]f you represent yourself, I, just like any other judge in this building, will hold you to the same exact standard that a lawyer is held to. I am not going to give you any preferential treatment. On the other hand, I am not going to discriminate against you because you are representing yourself. I am going to hold you to that same standard as a lawyer.” The trial court then indicated that, although it would not appoint cocounsel, it would appoint stand-by counsel to take over the case should the court terminate Williams’s in propria persona status.
After the trial court and Williams reviewed the appropriate form and Williams initialed the boxes indicating he understood the consequences of proceeding in propria persona, the trial court addressed Williams and stated: “Do you understand that your case will be prosecuted by an experienced trial attorney, a prosecutor who has done a lot of trials, and you will not be entitled to any special consideration or assistance by the court during the course of the trial?” [¶] Do you understand that?” Williams responded, “Yes.” However, after further discussion, during which the trial court explained to Williams that he would receive no special treatment by the court or prison staff, the trial court asked Williams, “Now with all of that in mind, do you still wish to represent yourself?” Williams responded, “No. The way you put it, no.” The trial court stated, “I am not putting it any way. I am telling you how it is. It’s all on the form.”
On June 30, 2010, counsel for Williams made a motion to suppress the evidence found as a result of Williams’s arrest and the search of his home on February 2, 2010. At the hearing held on the section 1538.5 motion, Los Angeles Sheriff’s Deputy Troy Bowser testified that he participated in an investigation which resulted in the arrest of Williams and Johnson. Another deputy, Mesa, stated that he had observed Williams and Johnson “in his personal vehicle conducting what he believed to be criminal activity. Deputy Mesa responded to the station, took a Department-owned... surveillance vehicle [and Bowser] took another surveillance vehicle. [They] gathered... deputies and responded to the location with the intent of [watching Williams and Johnson] and conducting any appropriate stop.” While participating in the investigation, Bowser knew that Williams was on “active parole for robbery.” Williams was ultimately detained and a number of deputies searched both his vehicle and his home to determine whether he was in compliance with the terms of his parole.
After the People presented their evidence, counsel for Williams argued that his client had been the subject of three parole searches within a month’s time and that, other than the last search, law enforcement officers had found no evidence of any violations. Counsel stated: “To say that a parolee is subject to a warrantless search is not to say that his privacy interest is so diminished that random searches or searches unrelated to proper parole supervision purposes are reasonable and constitutionally permissible. [¶] [Williams] was harassed by these searches [a]nd, for that reason, the motion [to suppress the evidence found] should be granted.”
In response, the People indicated that “[t]here [was] no evidence that there [had been] three parole searches in the space of a month.” The prosecutor stated: “That’s a misstatement by counsel. There is, in fact, no evidence as to when parole [officers] may have done a separate and independent investigation.... [¶] What we have here is [a] deputy [who] received information regarding prostitution, pimping and pandering activity between these people.... Events [were] observed on February 2nd. [Williams’s] parole status has not changed.”
After hearing argument by the parties, the trial court denied Williams’s motion to suppress evidence. The court stated: “This [was] an ongoing investigation. The court has heard evidence that there was a search on December 28 and a subsequent search on February 2nd. Even if the... agent from Parole or [the] Department of Corrections searched the defendant on other areas, on other issues[, it] doesn’t necessarily make this [a] harassment type of search.... [F]rom the evidence I heard, it was based on an ongoing investigation.”
Trial was set to begin on July 7, 2010. After the trial court indicated that jury selection could begin the following day, counsel for Williams indicated that Williams again wished “to exercise his Faretta rights and proceed [in] pro per....” After determining that counsel was ready to begin jury selection, the trial court addressed Williams and stated: “Mr. Williams, if I relieved your attorney and allowed you to represent yourself, would you be able to begin your trial immediately[, ] meaning that we do the 402 motions this afternoon and you begin picking a jury at 10:00 a.m. tomorrow?” The following colloquy then occurred: “[Williams]: Your Honor, with all due respect, this case requires a little––I have to like really delve––get deep into the law library. I need a two week‘s furtherance to at least satisfy my pro per status, Ma’am. [¶] The Court: So, Mr. Williams, what you’d be asking is to act as your own attorney and requiring a continuance as well[.] [I]s that correct? [¶] [Williams]: Please, Ma’am. [¶] The Court: Okay. And I have looked through the minute orders here, and I do see a number of things. First of all, I see that Mr. Williams caused a disruption during his preliminary hearing in front of Judge Chung on February 23rd, 2010 [and] I do note that a Marsden [motion] was heard and denied as to defendant Williams in front of Judge Zacky on April 28, 2010. [In addition, ] I note that on March 30th, 2010, that the defendant... requested to go pro per. He went through the Faretta waivers with Judge Zacky in open court and then elected to withdraw his request to proceed pro per. [¶]... [¶] At any rate, at this point, I am going to respectfully deny Mr. Williams’[s] request to proceed pro per at this stage where [he has] already been sent here for trial from master calendar. All sides are ready and defendant Williams is indicating that not only would he want to proceed pro per, but he would require a continuance in order to do so. I find that [the] request is made to further delay the proceedings especially in light of the history of the defendant’s conduct in court and also the motion that was previously made and then withdrawn on his behalf.” The trial court advised Williams, “[B]ecause you do have an attorney who is representing you and your trial is about to begin, [I suggest] that you work with your attorney as opposed to against him and [that] you conduct yourself appropriately in [the] courtroom.”
Following a lengthy discussion regarding the admissibility of certain evidence, the trial court determined that Johnson was available to the People “as a witness in Mr. Williams’[s] trial” and could not be considered a coconspirator with regard to a charge of conspiracy to commit prostitution. After the court made its ruling, counsel for Williams stated: “I’m asking the court to dismiss count one against my client. There’s no coconspirator for him to conspire with....” In response, the trial court stated: “All right.... [U]pon reading the cases, Mr. Williams is not similarly situated under the case law as Ms. Johnson is. The distinction is that the pimp actually can be charged with the conspiracy; it’s simply that the prostitute can’t because the pimp basically would be exposed to a felony in any event. It’s just a matter of you can’t elevate the prostitution conduct to a felony in that regard.”
After the trial court denied Williams’s counsel’s motion to dismiss the count alleging conspiracy to commit prostitution, counsel requested a continuance and the prosecutor indicated that he was amenable to counsel’s motion. However, when the trial court explained to Williams that he had a right to a speedy trial, then asked him if he would waive that right, Williams responded, “Your honor, I’d like to exercise my Faretta rights right now and speak with you about that once that’s enacted.” When the trial court indicated that it was “not going to entertain [Williams’s] Faretta motion[, ]” Williams stated that he wished to begin trial the following day. He added, however that he “would like to exercise [his] Faretta rights... as well[.]” Williams indicated that he believed “[t]his [was] a malicious prosecution... going on here.” The trial court once again denied Williams’s Faretta motion as untimely and, as Williams refused to waive time, discussed with counsel additional evidentiary issues which might arise during trial.
After the People presented their case, defense counsel made a motion for a judgment of acquittal pursuant to section 1118.1. Counsel stated that “[t]he prosecution [had] not made out a prima facie case on [the] allegations.” The trial court indicated that it had heard all the evidence in the case and that the motion was “respectfully denied.”
Before the trial court instructed the jury, the court indicated that it had been “alerted to the fact that there [was] a possible resolution in [the] case.” The court addressed Williams and stated: “It’s my understanding that the People’s offer to you is that if you are willing to plead to count three, which is the pimping count[, ] and admit one strike against you and admit that you served three prior prison terms, then you’ll be sentenced to 15 years in the state prison. That will be the high term of six years as to count three, doubled because of the strike, and then the three additional years for the prior prison terms.”
Once it was determined that Williams would not be required to register as a sex offender, he indicated that he wished to “take advantage of [the] offer from the prosecution[.]” After Williams waived his right to a jury trial, his right to confront and cross-examine the witnesses against him, his right to use the subpoena power of the court to present a defense and his right to remain silent, he pleaded no contest to pimping in violation of section 266h, subdivision (a), admitted that he previously had been convicted of robbery in violation of section 211 within the meaning of the Three Strikes law (§§ 667, subds. (b)-(i), 1170.12, subds. (a)-(d)) and admitted that he had been convicted of three felonies for which he served prison terms within the meaning of section 667.5, subdivision (b).
The trial court then, “having questioned [Williams] concerning [his] constitutional rights[, ]” found that he had “expressly, knowingly, understandingly, and intelligently waived [them].” The court continued, “I find that [Williams’s] plea and his admissions are freely and voluntarily made with an understanding of the nature and consequences thereof. I find there’s a factual basis for the plea and the admissions based on counsel’s stipulation. I accept [Williams’s] plea of no contest and his admissions and find him guilty thereon.” All remaining counts and allegations were then dismissed.
With regard to his conviction of pimping in violation of section 266h, subdivision (a), the trial court imposed the high term of six years in state prison, then doubled the term to 12 years pursuant to the Three strikes law (§§ 667, subds. (b)-(i), 1170.12, subds. (a)-(d)). For each of his three prior prison terms (§ 667.5, subd. (b)), the trial court imposed consecutive one-year terms. In total, Williams was sentenced to 15 years in state prison. In addition to the prison term, the trial court imposed a $3,000 restitution fine (§ 1202.4, subd. (b)), a stayed $3,000 parole revocation restitution fine (§ 1202.45), a $30 court security fee (§ 1465.8, subd. (a)(1)) and a $30 criminal conviction assessment (Gov. Code, § 70373). Williams was given presentence custody credit for 165 days actually served and 164 days of good time/work time, or a total of 329 days.
Williams filed a timely notice of appeal on September 9, 2010.
This court appointed counsel to represent Williams on appeal on December 10, 2010.
CONTENTIONS
After examination of the record, counsel filed an opening brief which raised no issues and requested this court to conduct an independent review of the record.
By notice filed April 12, 2011, the clerk of this court advised Williams to submit within 30 days any contentions, grounds of appeal or arguments he wished this court to consider. No response has been received to date.
REVIEW ON APPEAL
We have examined the entire record and are satisfied counsel has complied fully with counsel’s responsibilities. (Smith v. Robbins (2000) 528 U.S. 259, 278-284; People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436, 443.)
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
We concur: KITCHING, J.ALDRICH, J.