Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of San Diego County Nos. 195651, 199897, Roger W. Krauel, Judge. Affirmed.
IRION, J.
A jury convicted Reggie Ray Williams of forcible oral copulation (Pen. Code, § 288a, subd. (c)(2)), false imprisonment by violence or menace (§§ 236, 237, subd. (a)), resisting a peace officer (§ 148, subd. (a)(1)), battery (§ 242), violating a protective order (§ 273.6, subd. (a)), and two counts of inflicting injury on a cohabitant resulting in a traumatic condition (§ 273.5, subd. (a)). In a subsequent proceeding, the trial court found true allegations that Williams was on bail when he committed certain of the offenses (§ 12022.1, subd. (b)), that he previously had been convicted of inflicting injury on a cohabitant (§ 273.5, subd. (e)(1)), and that he previously had been convicted of a serious felony (§ 667, subd. (a)(1), 668, 1192.7) and a strike offense (§ 667, subds. (b)-(i), 1170.12, 668). The trial court sentenced Williams to 11 years four months in state prison.
All statutory references are to the Penal Code unless otherwise indicated.
Williams appeals. He argues that his convictions must be reversed because the trial court: (i) violated his right to a fair trial by admitting a prosecution witness's testimony after she had been placed in custody pending trial; and (ii) violated his Fifth Amendment rights by admitting Williams's audiotaped statement to police even though Williams was intoxicated when he made the statement. Williams also argues that his conviction for resisting a peace officer must be reversed because it is not supported by substantial evidence. As discussed below, we find Williams's contentions to be without merit and affirm.
FACTS
On December 16, 2005, Williams got into an argument with his former girlfriend, Kisha Island, in an apartment where they were living. During the argument Williams tried to hit Island with a table; Island blocked the blows with her leg. Island received a bruise on her leg. At the time of the altercation, a restraining order prohibited Williams from being in contact with Island.
On June 23, 2006, Williams got into an argument with his fiancée, Monica Macera, in a condominium where they both lived. Macera testified that during the argument, she yelled at Williams and cornered him, but that Williams did not assault her. Macera further testified that she was injured during the confrontation, but that her injuries were sustained when she "fell against [a] cabinet on the wall." Macera, however, called the police shortly after the incident and told the officers who responded that Williams "punched her in the face with his right hand." The officers observed that Macera had a large, "[d]ark purplish" abrasion near her left eye.
After the incident with Macera, Williams moved into a room at the Ace Budget Motel. A few days later, Island visited Williams to see if he would give her some money for their daughter. When she arrived, Island saw that Williams was drinking and using drugs. Island began to leave, but Williams grabbed her and would not let go. Williams expressed a desire for sex, but Island refused because Williams was "sloppy drunk."
Williams forced Island to suck on his penis, making her gag. Williams also pushed his penis against her, trying unsuccessfully to insert it into her vagina. Island stated that she wanted to leave, but Williams told her to "shut up." Island's friend, who had driven Island to the hotel, returned to pick her up. When he knocked on the door, Williams "had [Island] behind the door" and put his hand over Island's mouth telling her not to say anything. Williams then told the friend that Island was not there, and the friend left.
When Williams later laid down on the bed, Island grabbed a T-shirt and ran out of the room, calling for help. Williams attempted to chase her but fell. Island got the attention of a nearby police officer. After the officer called for assistance, Island told a second officer that she had been sexually assaulted. Officers then arrested Williams. During the arrest, Williams resisted, attempting to perform a "shoulder block" to the arresting officer's chest.
DISCUSSION
I.
Williams Forfeited Any Claim As To the Admission of the Victim's Testimony and, in Any Event, that Testimony Did Not Violate Williams's Right to a Fair Trial
Williams contends that the trial court erred in permitting Island to testify at his trial because Island was placed in custody to ensure her availability as a witness. We evaluate this contention after setting forth the relevant procedural history.
A. Procedural History
Prior to trial, the prosecution moved the trial court to allow evidence of Island's statement to police that Williams "just raped me." The prosecutor emphasized that the statement would only be needed (and admissible) if Island was unavailable to testify and noted that Island "has been ordered by Judge Szumowski to appear on the 26th" for trial. However, the motion was "premised" upon Island not appearing because Island "has less than [a] 100 percent track record of showing up in the past," and the "only way she showed up to court [previously] is either under arrest or somebody from the district attorney's office taking her to court." Williams's counsel contended that the statement should not be admitted if Island did not appear because there was a "strong" need for Williams to be able to confront his accuser in the case because "of the prior relationship between the two."
On November 26, the court entered a minute order that notes that a jury panel had been reserved for trial the next day. The minutes also note that "Kisha Island [was] ordered to appear today on 10/18/07 by Judge Szumowski [and] did not appear. Court orders a warrant to be issued forthwith for $25,000."
The next day's minutes contain the following notation: "Mr. Kennedy's [the prosecutor's] request to remand witness Keisha [sic] Island into custody is granted. Witness Kisha Island . . . is remanded into the custody of the sheriff with bail set at $25,000. Sheriff is ordered to produce witness Kisha Island on 11/27/07 at 1:30 p.m. in Dept. 57." On November 27, the trial court informed counsel that there would no longer be an issue regarding Island's statements "because she will be present." The court added that it would ask the jury a "voir dire question about will you be able to evaluate this person's testimony and disregard the fact that she's in custody." Island testified on November 27 and 28.
B. Analysis
Williams argues Island's testimony was "coerced" and, consequently, its admission deprived him of his right to a fair trial. In making this contention, Williams recognizes that he does not have standing to argue that the trial court's actions violated Island's statutory or constitutional rights. Williams emphasizes instead that the admission of Island's testimony violated his own right to a fair trial.
We reject Williams's contention on two separate grounds. First, Williams's contention fails because it was forfeited by his failure to object in the trial court. (See Evid. Code, § 353 ["A verdict or finding shall not be set aside . . . by reason of the erroneous admission of evidence unless: (a) There appears of record an objection to or a motion to exclude or to strike the evidence that was timely made and so stated as to make clear the specific ground of the objection or motion"].) During trial, Williams made no objection to either Island's testimony or the trial court orders issuing a warrant for her arrest and authorizing her detention until she completed her testimony. (People v. Seijas (2005) 36 Cal.4th 291, 302 (Seijas) ["In accordance with [Evidence Code section 353], we have consistently held that the 'defendant's failure to make a timely and specific objection' on the ground asserted on appeal makes that ground not cognizable"].)
Williams does not dispute that he failed to object in the trial court proceedings but contends this contention is not forfeited because an allegation of a "violation of due process" cannot be forfeited by a failure to object in the trial court. For this argument, Williams cites People v. Partida (2005) 37 Cal.4th 428, 433 (Partida). Partida, however, refutes rather than supports Williams's contention.
In Partida, supra, 37 Cal.4th at page 431, our Supreme Court held that "[a] defendant may not argue on appeal that the court should have excluded the evidence for a reason not asserted at trial." The court also announced a narrow exception to the forfeiture rule, that "[a] defendant may, however, argue that the asserted error in overruling the trial objection had the legal consequence of violating due process." (Ibid.) Here, Williams did not object to Island's appearance as a witness on any ground and thus his claim that her testimony violated his constitutional rights is forfeited on appeal. (Ibid.; Seijas, supra, 36 Cal.4th at p. 302.)
Even if Williams had preserved his contention that Island's testimony violated his right to a fair trial, we would reject it. There is nothing in the record that suggests that Island's trial testimony was so unreliable that its admission violated Williams's right to a fair trial. The detention of witnesses for the purpose of ensuring the availability of their testimony is a regrettable but sometimes necessary aspect of criminal trials — required to ensure fairness for both the prosecution and the defense. (See, e.g., U.S. Const., amend. V [requiring defendant be provided "compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor"].) In California, section 1332 empowers trial courts to detain a material witness for either party so that the witness's testimony will be available at trial. We are aware of no court that has held that the invocation of section 1332 (or analogous statutes) to ensure a witness's attendance at trial renders the subsequent trial unconstitutional. Williams cites no such authority.
Section 1332 contains a number of safeguards designed to protect a witness from unreasonable detention. A witness is also protected from unreasonable detention under the California Constitution and, if facing detention under section 1332, "should have counsel, either retained or appointed." (In re Francisco M. (2001) 86 Cal.App.4th 1061, 1076.) The record does not establish whether these procedural safeguards were honored in the instant case.
The sole California authority that Williams relies on is People v. Douglas (1990) 50 Cal.3d 468 (Douglas). That case, however, does not support Williams's contention, as it holds that where a detained witness is available at trial for cross examination and impeachment (as Island was here), that testimony does not violate the defendant's right to a fair trial. (Id. at p. 503.) The other case cited by Williams, Bradford v. Johnson (E.D. Mich. 1972) 354 F.Supp. 1331 (Bradford), is easily distinguished. In that case, the witness was subjected to torture at the hands of the authorities while in custody and thus, the court ruled, the witness's testimony violated minimum constitutional guarantees for the reliability of trial testimony. (Bradford, supra, 354 F.Supp. at p. 1335 [holding that while the defendant does not have standing to challenge the violation of a witness's Fifth Amendment rights, where the witness's testimony "is the result of torture the Court ought to scrutinize the method of incrimination to insure the defendant that there was fairness in his prosecution"]; Douglas, supra, 50 Cal.3d at p. 501 [recognizing that "in the numerous cases following Bradford, few, if any, have ordered suppression of trial testimony that was not itself shown to be unreliable or coerced"].) Here there is no indication of any coercion of the witness apart from the fact of her being placed in custody — something that, as we have noted, does not, by itself, render trial proceedings constitutionally deficient. Consequently, we reject Williams's contention.
As explained in Bradford, supra, 354 F.Supp. at page 1336: "[The witness] was physically tortured before arraignment. He appeared at arraignment visibly beaten and was returned by the magistrate to the custody of his torturers. He was tortured until he confessed and incriminated petitioner. He was promised cessation of his torture only after he incriminated another, in addition to himself. When he recanted his incrimination of petitioner he was tortured again until he returned to the incrimination of petitioner. This abuse came from persons in each strata of law enforcement to which Payne could turn for protection — the city police, the county sheriff, the state police. In addition, he was threatened by an assistant prosecutor. This was done with the knowledge of a judicial officer, the magistrate."
II.
The Trial Court's Finding that Williams's Statements to Police Were Voluntary Is Supported by the Record
Williams contends that the trial court erred in admitting evidence of his audiotaped interview with police. Williams argues that even though he is heard on the tape receiving Miranda warnings and subsequently agreeing to speak to police, his statements were involuntary because he was intoxicated at the time of the interview.
Miranda v. Arizona (1966) 384 U.S. 436.
Prior to trial, Williams moved to exclude his taped interview with police on the ground that his statements were involuntary and thus obtained in violation of his Fifth Amendment right to remain silent. At a hearing on the motion, Williams testified that prior to his interview he consumed alcohol and cocaine and that his condition as a diabetic aggravated the effect of these intoxicating substances.
The prosecution presented an audio tape of the interview and an accompanying transcript. At the beginning of the audio tape, the interviewing detective informs Williams of his Miranda rights and asks him, "Do you understand each of these rights as I've explained it?" Williams responds, "Yes, sir, I do." The detective then asks, "Having in mind and understanding your rights as I've told you, are you willing to talk to me?" Williams responds, "You've got it."
At the conclusion of the hearing, the trial court denied the defense motion. The court stated that "in reviewing the tape and hearing the evidence," it found no evidence of police coercion. The court also found "that the defendant was mentally competent to understand what was being asked and what he was saying." The court added that Williams "may have been under the influence, but it wasn't to a point of him not having any cognitive ability. I found that based on the way he was answering questions and how he formed his sentences that he was sufficiently aware of what was going on and what he was saying and what had occurred so that his statements were not involuntary."
On appeal, we review independently the trial court's legal determinations of whether a defendant's statements were voluntary, and whether his Miranda waivers were knowingly, intelligently and voluntarily made. (People v. Rundle (2008) 43 Cal.4th 76, 115 (Rundle).) We evaluate the trial court's factual findings regarding the circumstances surrounding the defendant's statements and waivers, and " ' "accept the trial court's resolution of disputed facts and inferences, and its evaluations of credibility, if supported by substantial evidence." ' " (Ibid.) Similarly, the "factual findings by the trial court as to the circumstances surrounding an admission or confession, including ' "the characteristics of the accused and the details of the interrogation" ' " are "subject to review under the deferential substantial evidence standard." (People v. Williams (1997) 16 Cal.4th 635, 660 (Williams), italics added; People v. Jones (1998) 17 Cal.4th 279, 296 [" ' "the trial court's findings as to the circumstances surrounding the confession — including 'the characteristics of the accused and the details of the interrogation' [citation] — are clearly subject to review for substantial evidence" ' "]; People v. Guerra (2006) 37 Cal.4th 1067, 1093 [same].)
Applying this standard of review, we see no basis for reversal of the trial court's finding that Williams's statements were voluntary. Even if we accept Williams's testimony that he was intoxicated at the time of the interview, our Supreme Court "has repeatedly rejected claims of incapacity or incompetence to waive Miranda rights premised upon voluntary intoxication or ingestion of drugs, where," as here, "there is nothing in the record to indicate that the defendant did not understand his rights and the questions posed to him." (People v. Clark (1993) 5 Cal.4th 950, 988; People v. Breaux (1991) 1 Cal.4th 281, 301 [rejecting contention that Miranda waiver was involuntary based, in part, on assertion of ingestion of drugs].)
Williams notes in his reply brief that the prosecution presented evidence at trial that Williams had a blood alcohol level of .21 and tested positive for cocaine and anti-depressants.
Williams contends that the record in the instant case does contain evidence, in addition to his testimony regarding the ingestion of drugs and alcohol, to suggest that he did not understand his rights and the questions posed. Specifically, he points to various portions of the transcript of the police interview that he characterizes as "rambling" or "quite nonsensical" to support this assertion.
Williams's arguments, however, amount to little more than a statement of disagreement with the conclusion reached by the trial court as to the appropriate inference to draw from the questions and answers in the audiotaped interview and the "characteristics of the accused" at the time of the interview. Our independent review of the taped interview and the other record evidence shows abundant evidentiary support for the trial court's finding that Williams, while intoxicated, was able to fully comprehend and respond to the questions posed.
In the final analysis, the contention Williams raises was for the trial court to resolve in the first instance and that court's findings cannot be disturbed on appeal unless shown to be unsupported by substantial evidence. (See People v. Hendricks (1987) 43 Cal.3d 584, 591 [upholding trial court's finding, arrived at after "review of the tape recording of the interview," that alcohol consumption did not invalidate defendant's consent to answer questions where the finding was "not palpably erroneous, and indeed is strongly supported by the undisputed fact that defendant was able to comprehend and answer all the questions posed to him"]; Williams, supra, 16 Cal.4th at p. 660; Rundle, supra, 43 Cal.4th at p. 115.) Williams makes no such showing here. Consequently we reject his contention. (See Hendricks, at p. 591; see also People v. Jackson (1989) 49 Cal.3d 1170, 1189 ["Insofar as defendant is claiming that he was incapacitated to waive his rights because of his ingestion of PCP and other drugs, he also cannot prevail. As we stated in . . . Hendricks [at p.] 584, '[the] mere fact of voluntary consumption of alcohol does not establish an impairment of capacity,' and here, as in Hendricks, the evidence showed that defendant was able to comprehend and answer all the questions that were posed to him"]; People v. Taylor (1980) 112 Cal.App.3d 348, 361 [upholding admission of defendant's statements even though at the time of the interview, defendant "was in a heavy state of somnolence and was heavily under the influence of drugs" to the degree that the defendant "would occasionally nod, fall asleep" and twice had to be awakened by the interviewing officer].)
Williams also contends that the trial court's errors in admitting his statement and Island's testimony, even if not sufficient to independently warrant reversal, require reversal when considered as "cumulative error." As we have concluded that the trial court did not err in either respect, we, of course, reject this contention.
III.
Williams's Conviction for Resisting an Officer Is Supported by Substantial Evidence
Williams contends that his conviction for resisting a police officer in violation of section 148, subdivision (a)(1) must be reversed because there is insufficient evidence to support the jury's verdict. We address this contention after setting forth the testimony related to this offense.
A. Pertinent Testimony
After Island fled from Williams's hotel room, she encountered San Diego Police Officer Efren Peregrina and told him that she had been in an altercation with her boyfriend, Williams. Peregrina decided to interview Williams and requested a second officer to assist. Deputy Sheriff Thomas Seiver responded to the call. Seiver interviewed Island, who stated that Williams had sexually assaulted her; Seiver then proceeded to the motel room to speak with Williams. Seiver entered Williams's hotel room and asked Williams to sit on the bed while he spoke with him. When Seiver related Island's allegation to Williams, Williams did not respond, except to mutter "that bitch, that bitch" and other profanity. Seiver decided to arrest Williams, who was over six feet tall and almost 300 pounds. Seiver, who is 5'9" and 210 pounds, testified as follows:
"It didn't go very well. I arrested him — I put handcuffs on him. I had him sit down on the bed. And while I was getting some general information, questions, Mr. Williams just kind of took it upon himself to stand up and try to do a shoulder block into the center of my chest going for the door, it appeared. So I attempted to trip him, and we fell down in the room with Mr. Williams on top of me."
While Williams was on top of Seiver, Williams "was yelling and cursing at [him]" and "making a downward head movement toward [him] as if he was . . . trying to bite [Seiver]." Another officer pulled Williams off Seiver and placed Williams on the ground outside of the hotel room. On cross-examination, Seiver added that the incident began when Williams got up "quickly" off the bed, angling his body "towards" him "with his shoulder."
When asked about the incident, Williams testified that during Seiver's questioning, Williams "got irritable and . . . attempted to get up off the bed." In doing so, Williams testified he "catapulted [him]self up" — an action he then demonstrated for the jury. He asserted that he did so simply to get up from a seated position and was not attempting to butt or shoulder block Officer Seiver.
B. Analysis
Section 148, subdivision (a)(1) proscribes a misdemeanor offense for "[e]very person who willfully resists, delays, or obstructs any . . . peace officer . . . in the discharge or attempt to discharge any duty of his or her office or employment . . . ." Williams contends that the evidence did not support a conviction under this statute because it shows only that Williams, who was never specifically told to remain seated on the bed, stood up, causing both him and Seiver to accidentally fall together. Williams asserts: "Standing up did not resist, obstruct, or delay the officer, and appellant's falling on the officer was admittedly caused by Seiver, who tripped and fell."
In evaluating a challenge to the evidence supporting a jury's verdict, "we review the whole record in the light most favorable to the judgment below to determine whether it discloses substantial evidence — that is, evidence that is reasonable, credible and of solid value — from which a reasonable trier of fact could find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt." (People v. Snow (2003) 30 Cal.4th 43, 66.) Reversal is not warranted "unless it appears 'that upon no hypothesis whatever is there sufficient substantial evidence to support [the conviction].' " (People v. Bolin (1998) 18 Cal.4th 297, 331.) In performing our review of the record, we are limited by the fact that it " ' "is the exclusive province of the trial judge or jury to determine the credibility of a witness and the truth or falsity of the facts on which that determination depends." ' " (People v. Smith (2005) 37 Cal.4th 733, 739.) We are, thus, not permitted "to reweigh the evidence or redetermine issues of credibility" (People v. Martinez (2003) 113 Cal.App.4th 400, 412), and even the "uncorroborated testimony of a single witness is sufficient to sustain a conviction, unless the testimony is physically impossible or inherently improbable." (People v. Scott (1978) 21 Cal.3d 284, 296.)
Applying the deferential standard of review to the record in this case, we must reject Williams's contention. While Williams's paints one possible interpretation of the facts, it is far from the only reasonable conclusion that the jury could draw from the evidence presented. The evidence could also support the opposite conclusion — that Williams, in an ill-conceived effort to escape, attempted to knock Seiver backwards with his shoulder and escape through the hotel room door. Seiver testified that Williams got up "quickly," angling his body "towards" Seiver "with his shoulder," trying to "do a shoulder block into the center of [his] chest" and appeared to be "going for the door." Seiver then tripped Williams, causing them both to fall with Williams "yelling and cursing" at Seiver, and Williams appeared to be trying to bite him until another officer intervened. This evidence supported a reasonable conclusion that Williams "willfully resist[ed] . . . or obstruct[ed]" Seiver in the discharge of his duty, and thus violated section 148, subdivision (a)(1). (Ibid.) Consequently, we have no authority to disturb the jury's verdict in this regard.
DISPOSITION
Affirmed.
WE CONCUR: HUFFMAN, Acting P. J., O'ROURKE, J.
It is also unclear whether the trial court considered the applicability of Code of Civil Procedure section 1219, subdivision (b). As Williams notes, that section states, "[n]otwithstanding any other law, no court may imprison or otherwise confine or place in custody the victim of a sexual assault . . . for contempt when the contempt consists of refusing to testify concerning that sexual assault." (Ibid.) Williams's contentions, however, do not depend on a resolution of these questions. Williams concedes in his briefing, and we agree, that he does not have standing to raise a claim as to any violation of Island's rights. Further, any claim that Williams could assert on Island's behalf is forfeited by his failure to raise it in the trial court.
The court concluded that "[t]he in-court testimony of a witness obtained by these means when he must surrender himself immediately after testifying to those persons who tortured him, does not comport with due process." (Bradford, supra, 354 F.Supp. at p. 1336.) There is nothing in the instant case that is analogous to these facts.