Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of San Diego County No. SCD188228, John L. Davidson, Judge. Affirmed.
McINTYRE, J.
Alvin Anthony Williams appeals a judgment arising out of his conviction of second degree murder, contending that the trial court erred in failing to instruct the jury regarding the misdemeanor manslaughter theory of involuntary manslaughter and there was insufficient evidence to support a finding of the implied malice element of second degree murder. We find his arguments unavailing and affirm the judgment.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
In early December 2004, Williams began staying in the home of his uncle, Alvin Davis. On the morning of December 4, Williams was arrested after he aggressively confronted other people at a shopping center and acted uncooperatively toward officers who responded to a call for assistance. After he was placed in a patrol car, Williams repeatedly said that it was "judgment day" and that it was "his time to die." Based on Williams's erratic behavior, police took him to a county mental health facility for evaluation. After his admission, Williams gave a urine sample that later tested positive for the presence of methamphetamines, cocaine and marijuana.
Late in the evening of that same day, San Diego police officers found Davis's dead body, face down, in a hallway of his home; Davis's pants were pulled down slightly below his knees, although they were still fastened in the front and zipped, his face had a blood trail that ran from his nose to his ear despite the face-down position of the body, his back had an unexplained abrasion, and the tip of his nose had a rug burn. There was blood near the body and on the living room carpet some distance away, the telephone line had been disconnected, and the bedroom near the body was in disarray.
The forensic pathologist who examined the body found numerous injuries to Davis's head, including hemorrhaging and bruising of both eyes, swelling of the lips, a large, deep hemorrhage on the left cheek, an even larger hemorrhage on the top left side, and two bruises on the right side, one on the forehead and one on the upper back of the scalp. The body also had substantial bruising on both sides of the neck that was consistent with strangulation and bruises on the right arm, shoulder and armpit. The pathologist opined that the death was a homicide, resulting from "blunt force head and neck injuries" followed by cardiac arrest, and that Davis had been dead for at least 24 hours.
Police detectives interviewed Williams on December 5 after he was discharged from the mental health facility. Williams expressed surprise when the detective told him of Davis's death and indicated that Davis had been at home, alive, when he left the home and that he had not been back since then. He told the officers that Davis had allowed him to take one of Davis's cars so that he could go to the store, but that he had driven it around town, to visit friends and family, instead. During the interview, Williams expressed frustration that the police had not spoken to him earlier about Davis's death and referred to the fact that Davis had "[gotten] killed," although the detective had previously told him that the cause of death was unknown. Williams also acknowledged to the officers that Davis had been "a very sick man."
One of the detectives noticed some blood on the back of Williams's shirt and on one of Williams's shoes and asked to keep Williams's clothing for investigative purposes. Williams indicated that the blood could not have been his uncle's and agreed to turn over his clothing. DNA tests indicated that Davis was the "most likely" source of bloodstains that were found on the right front pocket of Williams's vest, on the ankle and heel areas of one of Williams's socks and on the inside of one of Williams's shoes.
Although Williams consistently maintained that he had nothing to do with Davis's death, he was ultimately arrested and charged with murder. At his first trial, the court declared a mistrial after the jury was unable to reach a unanimous verdict.
On retrial, the prosecution sought to establish that Williams was guilty of first degree murder on a felony murder theory (premised on the contention that Williams caused Davis's death during the commission of a carjacking). It introduced evidence of the facts described above, as well as evidence that Davis was very overweight, had high blood pressure and an enlarged heart, had had a kidney transplant and a knee replacement within the year preceding his death and was taking multiple medications, including a blood thinner. Various witnesses also testified that Davis was very protective of his cars and rarely allowed anyone else to drive them, and his girlfriend testified that he had indicated he was not going to let Williams take his car on the evening in question.
The primary focus of the defense was establishing that Davis's injuries could have resulted from a fall rather than from a physical attack by another person. For example, defense counsel cross-examined the forensic pathologist at length regarding the nature of the injuries, particularly the absence of any subdural hematomas or any fracture in the larynx and the fact that the injuries were largely to soft tissue. He also elicited testimony that Davis's medical condition or medications might have made him prone to having nose bleeds or susceptible to more extensive bruising and presented a defense forensic expert who testified that none of the bloodstains on Williams's clothes or in various places in the house were impact blood spatters. In closing arguments, defense counsel contended that Williams and Davis were close, that Williams had no motive to kill Davis, that there was no evidence that Williams showed physical signs of having been involved in an assault on Davis (who was a black belt in karate) and that Davis's death resulted from natural causes rather than an assault.
The court instructed the jury on felony murder, second degree murder, voluntary manslaughter, involuntary manslaughter and carjacking. The jury acquitted Williams of first degree murder and carjacking, but convicted him of second degree murder. Williams thereafter admitted three prior prison term enhancement allegations and the court sentenced him to 18 years to life in prison. Williams appeals.
DISCUSSION
1. General Principles
In California, criminal homicide is divided into two classes: murder and manslaughter. (People v. Rios (2000) 23 Cal.4th 450, 460.) The distinguishing feature is that murder includes the element of malice, while manslaughter does not. (Ibid.) Malice may be express or implied; it is express when the perpetrator manifests a deliberate intention to unlawfully take away the life of another and is implied "when no considerable provocation appears, or when the circumstances attending the killing show an abandoned and malignant heart." (Pen. Code, § 188.)
Manslaughter is the unlawful killing of a human being without malice aforethought. (Pen. Code, § 192; see also People v. Barton (1995) 12 Cal.4th 186, 199.) Voluntary manslaughter occurs where the perpetrator has the intent to kill, but commits the act in a sudden quarrel or heat of passion (Pen. Code, § 192, subd. (a)), or based on an unreasonable but good faith belief of the need to do so for self defense. (People v. Barton, supra, 12 Cal.4th at p. 199.) By contrast, involuntary manslaughter is an unintentional killing that occurs "in the commission of an unlawful act, not amounting to a felony; or in the commission of a lawful act which might produce death, in an unlawful manner, or without due caution and circumspection." (Pen. Code, § 192, subd. (b); People v. Lewis (2001) 25 Cal.4th 610, 645.)
2. Did the Court Commit Prejudicial Error in Failing to Instruct on Misdemeanor Manslaughter?
A. Duty to Instruct
Even in the absence of a formal request, a trial court is obligated to instruct the jury on all general principles of law relevant to the issues raised by the evidence. (People v. Blair (2005) 36 Cal.4th 686, 744.) Thus, the court must instruct its jury on all the elements of the charged offenses (People v. Cummings (1993) 4 Cal.4th 1233, 1311), as well as on any lesser included offenses for which there is evidentiary support, i.e., lesser included offenses of a greater offense as to which the evidence may or may not establish all of the elements. (People v. Breverman (1998) 19 Cal.4th 142, 154 [the court must instruct on lesser included offenses supported by the evidence, even over the defendant's objection].) Likewise, the court must give instructions on each theory of a lesser included offense that is supported by the evidence. (Ibid.) The purpose of this rule is to protect a jury from being forced into having to make an "unwarranted all-or-nothing choice" that might result in a verdict (whether a conviction or an acquittal) that it otherwise would not have reached. (People v. Hughes (2002) 27 Cal.4th 287, 365; see People v. Woods (1992) 8 Cal.App.4th 1570, 1589.)
B. The Involuntary Manslaughter Instruction
CALCRIM 580 provides in relevant part:
"When a person commits an unlawful killing without malice aforethought and does not intend to kill and also does not act with conscious disregard for human life, then the crime is involuntary manslaughter.
"The difference between other homicide offenses and involuntary manslaughter depends on whether the person was aware of the risk to life that his or her actions created and consciously disregarded that risk. An unlawful killing caused by a willful act done with full knowledge and awareness that the person is endangering the life of another, and done in conscious disregard of that risk, is either voluntary manslaughter or second degree murder. An unlawful killing resulting from a willful act committed without an intent to kill and without conscious disregard of the risk to human life is involuntary manslaughter.
"The defendant also committed involuntary manslaughter if:
"1. [He] (committed a crime that posed a high risk of death or great bodily injury because of the way in which it was committed) [or] committed a lawful act, but acted with criminal negligence; and
"2. [His] acts unlawfully caused the death of another person."
Here, the trial court gave this instruction, with the italicized language omitted, to the jury, a matter that Williams contends constituted prejudicial error. The Attorney General responds that Williams has waived the argument because he did not raise any objection to the instruction in the proceedings below.
C. Waiver
Generally, a defendant who believes that an instruction is erroneous or requires clarification must request correction or clarification of the instruction to avoid waiving the issue on appeal. (People v. Coddington (2000) 23 Cal.4th 529, 584, overruled on another ground in Price v. Superior Court (2001) 25 Cal.4th 1046, 1069, fn. 13.) The appellate courts will nonetheless entertain a defendant's challenge to an instructional error that affects his or her substantial rights, even if the error was not raised in the trial court. (Pen. Code, § 1259; People v. Coffman (2004) 34 Cal.4th 1, 103, fn. 34.) Substantial rights are equated with a miscarriage of justice, which results if it is reasonably probable the defendant would have obtained a more favorable result had the jury been properly instructed. (Cal. Const., art. VI, § 13; People v. Christopher (2006) 137 Cal.App.4th 418, 426-427; People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818, 836.) The determination of whether the modification of the instructions constituted an error that affected Williams's substantial rights essentially requires an examination of the issue on its merits, which we will proceed to analyze.
D. The Merits
As noted above, the law requires that the court instruct the jury, sua sponte, on each theory of involuntary manslaughter that is supported by the evidence presented at trial. Thus, a court must instruct on the "misdemeanor manslaughter" theory of involuntary manslaughter where there is evidence to support that the defendant committed a misdemeanor battery that was, unbeknownst to him, dangerous to human life or safety given the circumstances and thereby unintentionally caused the death of his victim. (See People v. Lee (1999) 20 Cal.4th 47, 61; People v. Cox (2000) 23 Cal.4th 665, 674.)
The Attorney General contends that the evidence did not support the giving of the misdemeanor theory of involuntary manslaughter in this case because the nature of Davis's injuries was inconsistent with the occurrence of mere misdemeanor battery. Given the jury's implicit rejection of the contention that Davis's injuries were caused by him falling and the fact that the natural causes argument constituted the sum and substance of Williams's defense at trial, this argument has facial appeal. However, we need not resolve the issue of whether the court erred in omitting the italicized portion of the instruction based on the evidence presented because we in any event conclude that any such error was not prejudicial.
The court specifically instructed the jury that "[a]n unlawful killing caused by a willful act done with full knowledge and awareness that the person is endangering the life of another[,] and done in conscious disregard of that risk[,] is either voluntary manslaughter or second degree murder" and that an unlawful killing resulting from a willful act completed without the intent to kill or a conscious disregard of the risk to human life was involuntary manslaughter. After being so instructed, the jury convicted Williams of second degree murder, thus finding that he acted with full knowledge and awareness that he was endangering Davis's life and in conscious disregard of that risk (i.e., implied malice).
The jury was not faced with the all-or-nothing choice of having to either convict Williams of voluntary manslaughter or acquit him altogether; in fact, it made neither of those choices, but instead found that Williams acted with implied malice. Based on this finding, there is no reasonable probability that the jury would have convicted Williams of involuntary manslaughter even if the court had given the italicized portion of the involuntary manslaughter instruction and thus any error in failing to give that portion of the instruction was not prejudicial. (See People v. Barnett (1998) 17 Cal.4th 1044, 1155-1156 [the court's failure to instruct on involuntary manslaughter was harmless error where the jury was instructed regarding other lesser included homicide offenses, but convicted the defendant of first degree murder, thus finding that the defendant acted with malice aforethought and that his methamphetamine use did not prevent him from forming that mental state]; also People v. Earp (1999) 20 Cal.4th 826, 886 [similar].)
3. Insufficiency of the Evidence to Support a Finding of Implied Malice
Williams also contends that the evidence presented at trial was insufficient to support the jury's finding of implied malice. A person acts with implied malice if (1) he intentionally commits an act, the natural consequences of which are dangerous to human life; (2) at that time, he knows that his act is dangerous to human life; and (3) he deliberately acts with conscious disregard for life. (People v. Nieto Benitez (1992) 4 Cal.4th 91, 102.) Thus, to support Williams's conviction of second degree murder, the evidence must have been sufficient to support a finding that he engaged in conduct he knew endangered Davis's life. (People v. Knoller (2007) 41 Cal.4th 139, 143; People v. Watson (1981) 30 Cal.3d 290, 297 [recognizing that the standard is subjective rather than objective].) Williams seeks to have his second degree murder conviction reduced to involuntary manslaughter based on the assertion that there was no evidence at trial to establish he knew of Davis's heart condition prior to Davis's death and thus there was no basis for the jury's finding that he knew his infliction of injury on Davis was dangerous to Davis's life. We disagree.
The evidence at trial was undisputed that Williams had a long-time relationship with Davis and had recently started staying in Davis's home, as he had done on occasion in the past. Davis was very overweight and Williams knew that he had high blood pressure and a transplanted kidney and that he gave himself injections and had to take "a lot of pills" to address his multiple ailments. Further, Williams admitted to the detectives who interviewed him after his release from the county mental health facility that Davis had been "a very sick man" prior to his death.
Although this evidence is completely circumstantial, it is sufficient to support the jury's finding that Williams was aware of Davis's precarious health on the night that Davis died. Accordingly, we reject Williams's argument that the evidence was only sufficient to support an involuntary manslaughter conviction.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
WE CONCUR: McCONNELL, P. J., NARES, J.