Opinion
E072450
03-17-2020
THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. DWIGHT CHRISTOPHER WILLIAMS, Defendant and Appellant.
Aaron J. Schechter, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant. Xavier Becerra, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant Attorney General, and David E. Madeo and Viet H. Nguyen, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. (Super.Ct.No. 19CJ000192) OPINION APPEAL from the Superior Court of San Bernardino County. Patrick L. Christianson, Temporary Judge. Dismissed as moot. Aaron J. Schechter, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant. Xavier Becerra, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant Attorney General, and David E. Madeo and Viet H. Nguyen, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
I. INTRODUCTION
Defendant and appellant, Dwight Christopher Williams, was found by the trial court to be in violation of his post release community supervision (PRCS) terms. Defendant was reinstated to PRCS and ordered to serve 170 days in county jail. Defendant was released from jail on April 24, 2019, and was scheduled to be discharged from PRCS on October 10, 2019.
On appeal, defendant argues there was insufficient evidence to find him in violation of the terms of PRCS. We disagree and dismiss as moot.
II. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
The facts concerning defendant's underlying offense are taken from the probation report.
On December 31, 2012, defendant woke up his sleeping girlfriend before punching her in the face and knocking her to the ground. Defendant then got on top of her and choked her, stating he was an assassin and was going to kill her.
The San Bernardino County District Attorney charged defendant with attempted murder (Pen. Code, §§ 664, 187, subd. (a)) (count 1), criminal threats, (§ 422) (count 2), and assault by means of force likely to produce great bodily injury (§ 245, subd. (a)(4)) (count 3). The information further alleged that defendant had two prior prison offenses.
All further statutory references are to the Penal Code unless otherwise indicated. --------
On May 14, 2013, defendant pleaded guilty to count 3. Pursuant to a plea agreement, counts 1 and 2 were dismissed. Pronouncement of judgment was withheld, and defendant was placed on probation for three years. The terms of his probation required him to keep his probation officer informed on his place of residence and to follow all reasonable directives from his probation officer.
On October 11, 2016, defendant admitted to violating the terms of his probation. Probation was terminated, and defendant was sentenced to three years in prison, which was deemed served. The trial court placed defendant on PRCS for three years, which was scheduled to end on October 10, 2019.
On January 23, 2019, the People petitioned to revoke defendant's PRCS. On March 27, 2019, the trial court held a hearing, after which it found defendant in violation of the terms of his PRCS. It then reinstated PRCS and ordered defendant to serve 170 days in county jail. He was released on April 24, 2019.
Defendant timely appealed the decision finding him in violation of the terms of PRCS prior to being released from jail.
III. DISCUSSION
Defendant argues that there was insufficient evidence for the trial court to find that defendant violated the terms of his PRCS. The People argue that regardless of the sufficiency of the evidence, defendant's appeal is moot because he was released from prison and scheduled to have his PRCS terminated prior to this decision, meaning this court can provide him no relief. We find the appeal moot.
"'"[W]hen, pending an appeal from the judgment of a lower court, and without any fault of the [opposing party], an event occurs which renders it impossible for this court, if it should decide the case in favor of [defendant], to grant him any effectual relief whatever, the court will not proceed to a formal judgment, but will dismiss the appeal"' as moot." (People v. DeLeon (2017) 3 Cal.5th 640, 645 (DeLeon).) Where, as here, a defendant has completed his jail term and his PRCS supervision has ended, an "appeal is technically moot because a reviewing court's resolution of the issues could offer no relief regarding the time he spent in custody or the parole term that has already terminated." (Ibid.) Thus, normally defendant's appeal would be moot.
Nevertheless, defendant contends that this appeal should be heard. Relying on People v. Gonzalez (2017) 7 Cal.App.5th 370 (Gonzalez), defendant argues that this appeal is not moot because the finding that defendant violated the terms of his PRCS could have disadvantageous collateral consequences should he be convicted of a new offense.
However, the California Supreme Court rejected this argument and disapproved of Gonzalez in DeLeon, supra, 3 Cal.5th 640. In that case, the trial court found that defendant DeLeon had violated his parole, sentenced him to 180 days in custody and reinstated his parole. (DeLeon, at p. 644.) Before the appeal was complete, DeLeon had completed his jail term and his parole supervision. (Id. at p. 645.) DeLeon argued that the issue was "not moot because he face[d] disadvantageous collateral consequences from the fact that he was found in violation of parole." (Id. at p. 645.)
Rejecting this argument, the California Supreme Court held that "[t]he trial court's finding that DeLeon violated his parole does not involve the same collateral consequences that attach to a criminal conviction. Future consequences will not arise unless there is additional criminal conduct. Even then, his parole violation is just one of many factors a court may consider in deciding whether to grant probation, or what sentence to impose. Under these circumstances, DeLeon's parole violation does not constitute a disadvantageous collateral consequence for purposes of assessing mootness. We disapprove contrary language in [Gonzalez], supra, 7 Cal.App.5th at pages 380-381 . . . ." (DeLeon, supra, 3 Cal.5th at p. 646.)
Defendant argues that this portion of DeLeon is dicta because the Supreme Court went on to hear the merits of the case despite its technical mootness. We disagree with this view. The Supreme Court's finding that DeLeon's appeal was technically moot was not dicta. It was that determination that obligated the court to either dismiss the appeal or decide it on its merits and explain why it was doing so. The court chose to hear the case on its merits and explained why it chose to do so despite its mootness.
However, even if this analysis was dicta, lower courts consider California Supreme Court dicta highly persuasive. (People v. Brown (2000) 77 Cal.App.4th 1324, 1336.) The Supreme Court's explicit disapproval of Gonzalez, and its specific holding that a violation of PRCS does not constitute a disadvantageous collateral consequence, is directly on point, and we are persuaded that this is the correct approach.
Defendant's appeal is therefore moot. Nevertheless, defendant urges us to use our discretion to hear the case anyway, because the issue raised "is likely to recur, might otherwise evade appellate review, and is of continuing public interest." (People v. Morales (2016) 63 Cal.4th 399, 409 (Morales).) As discussed previously, the Supreme Court did exactly that in DeLeon, opting to consider the issue raised there despite the technical mootness. (DeLeon, supra, 3 Cal.5th at p. 646.) Defendant requests that we do the same.
We decline to do so. The California Supreme Court exercised its discretion in DeLeon because the central question raised there was "what procedure should govern parole revocation proceedings under the Realignment Act"? (DeLeon, supra, 3 Cal.5th at p. 646.) This issue met the relevant criteria for the court to address because it was an important question of procedural due process and statutory interpretation that would affect proceedings throughout the state and would necessarily recur in cases other than DeLeon's.
No such issue is presented here. The only argument raised by defendant is that the trial court did not have sufficient evidence to find him in violation of the terms of his PRCS. This is necessarily a fact-specific question, as it involves a review of the specific evidence relied on by the trial court in defendant's case. Any decision on the merits in defendant's case would not change the law or have any larger impact on any other defendants. Thus, defendant raises no larger procedural or substantive issues that would constitute a "continuing public interest." (Morales, supra, 63 Cal.4th at p. 409.)
Because any ruling would have very little bearing on any future similar case, and would also fail to provide defendant himself with any relief, this appeal is moot and must be dismissed.
IV. DISPOSITION
The appeal is dismissed as moot.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
FIELDS
J. We concur: CODRINGTON
Acting P. J. RAPHAEL
J.