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People v. Williams

COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT (Sacramento)
Jan 31, 2020
No. C082816 (Cal. Ct. App. Jan. 31, 2020)

Opinion

C082816

01-31-2020

THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. RAPHAEL WILLIAMS, Defendant and Appellant.


NOT TO BE PUBLISHED California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. (Super. Ct. No. 16FE006420)

Defendant Raphael Williams pleaded no contest to corporal injury to the mother of his children (Pen. Code, § 273.5, subd. (a)) and was granted the stipulated disposition of five years formal probation. On appeal, he contends an electronic search condition of probation is invalid under People v. Lent (1975) 15 Cal.3d 481 (Lent) and is unconstitutionally overbroad.

Undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.

We conclude the electronics search condition is invalid under a recent decision of the California Supreme Court (In re Ricardo P. (2019) 7 Cal.5th 1113 (Ricardo P.)). We shall strike the condition.

BACKGROUND

We take the facts of defendant's crime from the factual basis of his plea.

Around March 27, 2016, defendant attacked the victim, with whom defendant has four children. As a result of the attack, the victim sustained a minor laceration to her nose, a swollen upper lip, contusions on her forehead, and bruises and redness all over her body.

The defense objected to the proposed probation condition number 13 that reads as follows:

"Defendant shall submit his/her person, place, property, automobile, electronic storage devices, and any object under his/her control, including but not limited to cell phones and computers, to search and seizure by any law enforcement officer or probation officer, any time of the day or night, with or without a warrant, with or without his/her presence or further consent.

"Defendant, being advised of his/her statutory constitutional and statutory rights pursuant to . . . section 1564 et seq. in this regard, and having accepted probation, is deemed to have waived same and also specifically consented to searches of his/her electronic storage devices.

"Defendant shall provide access to any electronic storage devices and data contained therein, including disclosing and providing any and all information necessary to conduct a search."

The defense asserted the condition was invalid under Lent, supra, 15 Cal.3d 481, a violation of the Electronic Communications Privacy Act (§§ 1546, et. seq. (ECPA)) and the wiretap statute (§ 631), was unconstitutionally overbroad, and violated the Fifth Amendment self-incrimination privilege.

The trial court also imposed a general search condition that does not reference searches of electronic devices. Defendant did not object to this condition at trial and does not contest it on appeal.

The prosecution filed points and authorities in support of the electronic search condition. Attached to the statement was a declaration from Sean E. Smith, a detective with the Sacramento County Sheriff's Department. The declaration provides Detective Smith's training experience that included training in and experience investigating cyber crimes, computers, and electronic device forensics. The declaration contains assertions regarding examples of electronic evidence found in investigations of various types of crimes and the need to examine electronic devices. Detective Smith asserts those who commit domestic violence offenses often violate restraining, protective, or no-contact orders, and evidence of violations can often be found on electronic devices. The offender may also try to communicate with the victim through electronic devices and may use various programs to avoid detection.

The trial court imposed the condition without modification.

DISCUSSION

Defendant contends the electronics search condition is invalid under Lent, supra, 15 Cal.3d 481 and unconstitutionally overbroad. In accordance with Ricardo P., supra, 7 Cal.5th 1113, we must agree with the first contention and decline to address the constitutional argument.

"The Legislature has placed in trial judges a broad discretion in the sentencing process, including the determination as to whether probation is appropriate and, if so, the conditions thereof. [Citation.]" (Lent, supra, 15 Cal.3d at p. 486.) Consequently, we review conditions of probation for abuse of discretion. (People v. Olguin (2008) 45 Cal.4th 375, 379 (Olguin).) "A condition of probation will not be held invalid unless it '(1) has no relationship to the crime of which the offender was convicted, (2) relates to conduct which is not in itself criminal, and (3) requires or forbids conduct which is not reasonably related to future criminality.' [Citation.]" (Lent, at p. 486.) The Lent "test is conjunctive—all three prongs must be satisfied before a reviewing court will invalidate a probation term. [Citations.] As such, even if a condition of probation has no relationship to the crime of which a defendant was convicted and involves conduct that is not itself criminal, the condition is valid as long as the condition is reasonably related to preventing future criminality. [Citation.]" (Olguin, at pp. 379-380.)

In Ricardo P., the minor was granted probation after admitting to two counts of burglary; one condition of probation was that he "submit to warrantless searches of his electronic devices, including any electronic accounts that could be accessed through these devices." (Ricardo P., supra, 7 Cal.5th at p. 1115.) While the minor did not use electronic devices in committing the burglaries, the juvenile court "imposed the condition in order to monitor his compliance with separate conditions prohibiting him from using or possessing illegal drugs." (Ibid.) The Court of Appeal concluded the condition was permissible under Lent, supra, 15 Cal.3d 481 because it was reasonably related to enhancing the minor's supervision while on probation, but also concluded it was unconstitutionally overbroad. (Ricardo P. at p. 1116.) Our Supreme Court concluded the condition was invalid under Lent. (Ricardo P. at p. 1116.)

Agreeing with the Court of Appeal's conclusion the first two prongs of the Lent test were satisfied, the court disagreed with its conclusion regarding the third prong and held the challenged condition was invalid under Lent, supra, 15 Cal.3d 481 because there was no reasonable relationship between the condition and future criminality. As the court explained, Lent "contemplates a degree of proportionality between the burden imposed by a probation condition and the legitimate interests served by the condition." (Ricardo P., supra, at p. 1122.) The condition significantly burdened the minor's privacy interests, given how much sensitive and confidential information can be accessed on devices such as cell phones. (Id. at p. 1123.) The only rationale provided by the trial court in support of placing such a significant burden on the minor's privacy was evidence the minor previously used marijuana and its observation that minors often brag about using marijuana or other drugs by posting online pictures of themselves with drugs or paraphernalia. (Id. at p. 1122.) Rejecting this rationale, our Supreme Court stated: "If we were to find this record sufficient to sustain the probation condition at issue, it is difficult to conceive of any case in which a comparable condition could not be imposed, especially given the constant and pervasive use of electronic devices and social media by juveniles today. In virtually every case, one could hypothesize that monitoring a probationer's electronic devices and social media might deter or prevent future criminal conduct. For example, an electronics search condition could be imposed on a defendant convicted of carrying an unregistered concealed weapon on the ground that text messages, e-mails, or online photos could reveal evidence that the defendant possesses contraband or is participating in a gang. [Citation.] Indeed, whatever crime a juvenile might have committed, it could be said that juveniles may use electronic devices and social media to mention or brag about their illicit activities." (Id. at p. 1123.)

The court also rejected the Court of Appeal's reliance on Olguin, which upheld a requirement that the probationer notify the probation officer about pets at his residence as reasonably related to enabling the officer to supervise the defendant in order to prevent future criminality. (Ricardo P., supra, at p. 1124; see Olguin, supra, 45 Cal.4th at pp. 380-382.) "Compared to the minimally invasive pet notification requirement in Olguin," our Supreme Court explained, "requiring a probationer to surrender electronic devices and passwords to search at any time is far more burdensome and intrusive, and requires a correspondingly substantial and particularized justification." (Ricardo P., at p. 1125.) The court concluded there was no such justification for the electronics search condition imposed upon the minor, holding, "the electronics search condition here is not reasonably related to future criminality and is therefore invalid under Lent." (Id. at p. 1128.) The court was also careful to point out: "Our holding does not categorically invalidate electronics search conditions. In certain cases, the probationer's offense or personal history may provide the juvenile court with a sufficient factual basis from which it can determine that an electronics search condition is a proportional means of deterring the probationer from future criminality. [Citations.]" (Id. at pp. 1128-1129.)

Before turning to the facts of this case, we also note "a probation condition that would be reasonable and permissible for a minor under juvenile court supervision may ' "be unconstitutional or otherwise improper for an adult probationer." ' [Citation.]" (People v. Bryant (2017) 10 Cal.App.5th 396, 402-403, cited with approval in Ricardo P.) " 'This is because juveniles are deemed to be "more in need of guidance and supervision than adults, and because a minor's constitutional rights are more circumscribed." [Citation.]' [Citations.]" (Bryant at p. 402.) For the same reason, an electronics search condition imposed on an adult that would run afoul of Ricardo P. if the defendant was a minor is necessarily impermissible.

Here, there is no evidence in the record indicating defendant's crimes involved the use of any electronic devices, and the use of such devices is not illegal. Thus, Lent's first two prongs are satisfied. (Lent, supra, 15 Cal.3d 481.) As in Ricardo P., the electronic search condition in this case also fails Lent's third prong. There is no evidence defendant used a computer, cell phone, or similar electronic devices in any way related to his crime. Defendant was sentenced on the day of the plea and there is no probation report, so there is no evidence of him using such devices in prior criminal acts. Assuming the sworn declaration from Detective Smith could be considered expert testimony upon which a court could base findings supporting the condition, it does not support a condition as applied to the facts of this case. The declaration does not tie Detective Smith's observations to any particular facts about defendant, his personal history or his crimes, being instead generic testimony about types of crimes, the nature of electronic devices, and the utility of evidence from them in other cases. The Supreme Court's rejection of the trial court's observations regarding minors posting their drug use online demonstrates that generic evidence like this generally will not support finding an electronics search condition valid under Lent's third prong. (Lent, supra, 15 Cal.3d 481.) Given the heavy burden an electronic search condition imposes on the probationer's privacy interests, the evidence supporting a finding under Lent's third prong must relate directly to the defendant, his or her personal history or his or her crime rather than the type of generic evidence presented here. Just as in Ricardo P., supra, 7 Cal.5th 1113, given the prevalence of electronic devices and their widespread use in communication, the type of generic evidence presented through Detective Smith's statement would justify imposition of an electronic search in virtually every case.

Detective Smith's statement also contained sections providing examples of electronic evidence in drug cases, fraud, identity theft, and financial crimes, sex offenses, human trafficking, pimping, and pandering, and gang cases, along with domestic violence and weapons offenses.

Since there is no evidence supporting a finding the electronics search condition imposed in this case is reasonably related to defendant's future criminality, it is invalid under Lent, supra, 15 Cal.3d 481 and Ricardo P., supra, 7 Cal.5th 1113 and must be stricken.

DISPOSITION

The judgment (order of probation) is modified to strike the electronics search condition (condition number 13).

/s/_________

HOCH, J. We concur: /s/_________
MURRAY, Acting P. J. /s/_________
KRAUSE, J.


Summaries of

People v. Williams

COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT (Sacramento)
Jan 31, 2020
No. C082816 (Cal. Ct. App. Jan. 31, 2020)
Case details for

People v. Williams

Case Details

Full title:THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. RAPHAEL WILLIAMS, Defendant and…

Court:COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT (Sacramento)

Date published: Jan 31, 2020

Citations

No. C082816 (Cal. Ct. App. Jan. 31, 2020)