Opinion
March 25, 1975.
Editorial Note:
This case has been marked 'not for publication' by the court.
John P. Moore, Atty. Gen., John E. Bush, Deputy Atty. Gen., David A. Sorenson, Janet Lee Miller, Asst. Attys. Gen., Denver, for plaintiff-appellee.
Rollie R. Rogers, Colorado State Public Defender, Lee Belstock, Carol L. Gerstl, Deputy Public Defenders, Denver, for defendant-appellant.
SMITH, Judge.
On May 23, 1974, defendant entered a plea of guilty to first degree assault upon a police officer, s 18--3--202(1)(e), C.R.S.1973 (1971 Perm.Supp., C.R.S.1963, 40--3--202(1)(e)), and was sentenced to serve a term of not less than 20 nor more than 30 years in the state penitentiary. First degree assault is a class 3 felony and is punishable by imprisonment for not less than five nor more than 40 years. Section 18--1--105(1), C.R.S.1973 (1971 Perm.Supp., C.R.S.1963, 40--1--105). He appeals pursuant to s 18--1--409(2), C.R.S.1973 (1971 Perm.Supp., C.R.S.1963, 40--1--509(1)), which allows appellate review of sentences for felony convictions where the minimum sentence imposed exceeds the statutory minimum by more than three years. We affirm.
The presentence report discloses that defendant committed the assault on May 4, 1974, while attempting to evade arrest after committing an armed robbery. Officers eventually stopped defendant's fleeing vehicle, whereupon defendant at close range fired a shot at an approaching officer. Defendant's shot fortunately missed its mark. The officer then returned defendant's gunfire, wounding the defendant. Defendant again sped away, but after additional pursuit was soon apprehended.
Defendant has a long criminal record including crimes of violence and parole violations. He has twice been incarcerated in the Colorado state penitentiary and has also served two terms in federal institutions. At the time of this particular offense, defendant was on parole from Leavenworth Federal Penitentiary where he had been incarcerated for a bank robbery and had absconded from parole supervision. The presentence report described defendant as a 47-year-old alcoholic and habitual criminal, with an extremely deprived social and family background since childhood, and concludes, in essence, that there is little hope for his rehabilitation.
Section 18--1--409(1), C.R.S.1973 (1971 Perm.Supp., C.R.S.1963, 40--1--509), provides that the following factors be considered upon appellate review of sentence for a felony: (1) The nature of the offense; (2) the character of the offender; (3) the public interest; (4) the manner in which the sentence was imposed; and, (5) the sufficiency and accuracy of the information upon which the sentence was based. A thorough review of the record in this case demonstrates that all of the above factors support the sentence imposed by the trial court.
A sentencing court should attempt to impose a sentence which is 'tailored' to the defendant. In so doing, the court should review the defendant's entire record. People v. Alvarez, Colo., 530 P.2d 506; People v. Lichtenwalter, Colo., 520 P.2d 583. Here, considering defendant's five felony convictions, and his continuous inability to accept any responsibilities, the sentence is appropriate. See People v. Euresti, Colo., 529 P.2d 1319, and ABA, Standards Relating to Sentencing Alternatives and Procedures s 2.2 (1968).
Defendant contends that the trial court erred in denying him credit for presentence jail time. We note in passing that the maximum sentence given defendant plus his presentence jail time does not exceed the maximum allowable sentence. Section 16--11--306, C.R.S.1973 (1971 Perm.Supp., C.R.S.1963, 39--11--306), requires that a trial court consider a defendant's presentence confinement when imposing sentence but does not compel that any sentence imposed must be reduced by the amount of presentence time spent in custody. See People v. Johnson, Colo., 523 P.2d 1403; People v. Nelson, Colo., 510 P.2d 441; People v. Jones, 176 Colo. 61, 489 P.2d 596. Here, the trial judge considered defendant's presentence time and expressly refused to give him credit. In light of the circumstances here, such refusal was not an abuse of discretion.
Judgment affirmed.
RULAND and BERMAN, JJ., concur.