The bank teller received biannual training on the responsibility of bank tellers during bank robberies and employed that training to provide police with a thorough and accurate description of defendant's race, gender, and clothing (see People v Range, 199 A.D.3d 1356, 1357 [4th Dept 2021], lv denied 37 N.Y.3d 1164 [2022]). Consequently, the court's determination is "supported by 'sufficient evidence' in the record" (Lopez, 85 A.D.3d at 1642, quoting People v Yukl, 25 N.Y.2d 585, 588 [1969], cert denied 400 U.S. 851 [1970]; see People v Williams, 115 A.D.3d 1344, 1345 [4th Dept 2014]). Defendant's contention that the conviction is not supported by legally sufficient evidence on the issue of identity is not preserved for our review (see generally People v Gray, 86 N.Y.2d 10, 19 [1995]).

Here, the court credited the testimony of the officer that he smelled fresh, unburned marihuana emanating from the vehicle through its open windows, and that he was trained and experienced in detecting marihuana. We discern no basis to disturb the court's credibility assessment of the officer inasmuch as " ‘[n]othing about the officer['s] testimony was unbelievable as a matter of law, manifestly untrue, physically impossible, contrary to experience, or self-contradictory’ " ( People v. Williams , 115 A.D.3d 1344, 1345, 982 N.Y.S.2d 675 [4th Dept. 2014] ). We also reject defendant's contention that the officer was not justified in pursuing him when he fled.

Here, the court credited the testimony of the officer that he smelled fresh, unburned marihuana emanating from the vehicle through its open windows, and that he was trained and experienced in detecting marihuana. We discern no basis to disturb the court's credibility assessment of the officer inasmuch as " '[n]othing about the officer['s] testimony was unbelievable as a matter of law, manifestly untrue, physically impossible, contrary to experience, or self-contradictory' " (People v Williams, 115 AD3d 1344, 1345 [4th Dept 2014]). We also reject defendant's contention that the officer was not justified in pursuing him when he fled.

" ‘The suppression court's credibility determinations and choice between conflicting inferences to be drawn from the proof are granted deference and will not be disturbed unless unsupported by the record’ " ( People v. Twillie, 28 A.D.3d 1236, 1237, 813 N.Y.S.2d 626, lv. denied 7 N.Y.3d 795, 821 N.Y.S.2d 825, 854 N.E.2d 1290 ). Based on our review of the testimony at the hearing, we perceive no basis to disturb the suppression court's determination to credit the testimony of the police officers (see People v. Williams, 115 A.D.3d 1344, 1345, 982 N.Y.S.2d 675 ; Bush, 107 A.D.3d at 1582, 966 N.Y.S.2d 720 ). We reject defendant's contentions that the initial encounter constituted a level-three forcible stop, and that the officers lacked the requisite reasonable suspicion that he was involved in a crime (see generally People v. Moore, 6 N.Y.3d 496, 498–499, 814 N.Y.S.2d 567, 847 N.E.2d 1141 ; People v. De Bour, 40 N.Y.2d 210, 223, 386 N.Y.S.2d 375, 352 N.E.2d 562 ).

" The suppression court's credibility determinations and choice between conflicting inferences to be drawn from the proof are granted deference and will not be disturbed unless unsupported by the record' " (People v Twillie, 28 AD3d 1236, 1237, lv denied 7 NY3d 795). Based on our review of the testimony at the hearing, we perceive no basis to disturb the suppression court's determination to credit the testimony of the police officers (see People v Williams, 115 AD3d 1344, 1345; Bush, 107 AD3d at 1582). We reject defendant's contentions that the initial encounter constituted a level-three forcible stop, and that the officers lacked the requisite reasonable suspicion that he was involved in a crime (see generally People v Moore, 6 NY3d 496, 498-499; People v De Bour, 40 NY2d 210, 223).

Here, an officer who interviewed defendant testified at the suppression hearing that defendant was not threatened or promised anything in order for him to waive his Miranda rights, and the officer did not promise defendant that, if he cooperated, the officer would help him gain admission into a Drug Court program. The court did not credit defendant's testimony that the officers who questioned him promised to help him "with the judge and something about Drug Court," and we give deference to the court's resolution of issues of credibility (see generally People v. Prochilo, 41 N.Y.2d 759, 761, 395 N.Y.S.2d 635, 363 N.E.2d 1380 ; People v. Williams, 115 A.D.3d 1344, 1345, 982 N.Y.S.2d 675 ). In any event, even crediting defendant's testimony, we agree with the People that the statements by the officers were not deceptive or coercive (see People v. Sabines, 121 A.D.3d 1409, 1411, 995 N.Y.S.2d 377, lv. denied 25 N.Y.3d 1171, 15 N.Y.S.3d 302, 36 N.E.3d 105 ; see generally Thomas, 22 N.Y.3d at 641–642, 985 N.Y.S.2d 193 ).

denied14 N.Y.3d 794, 899 N.Y.S.2d 125, 925 N.E.2d 928). Contrary to defendant's further contention, the testimony from police officers at the suppression hearing was not “ ‘unbelievable as a matter of law, manifestly untrue, physically impossible, contrary to experience, or self-contradictory’ ” (People v. Bush, 107 A.D.3d 1581, 1582, 966 N.Y.S.2d 720, lv. denied22 N.Y.3d 954, 977 N.Y.S.2d 186, 999 N.E.2d 551). “ ‘The suppression court's credibility determinations and choice between conflicting inferences to be drawn from the proof are granted deference and will not be disturbed unless unsupported by the record’ ” (People v. Twillie, 28 A.D.3d 1236, 1237, 813 N.Y.S.2d 626, lv. denied7 N.Y.3d 795, 821 N.Y.S.2d 825, 854 N.E.2d 1290) and, here, there is no basis in the record to disturb the suppression court's determination to credit the testimony of the police officers ( see People v. Williams, 115 A.D.3d 1344, 1345, 982 N.Y.S.2d 675; Bush, 107 A.D.3d at 1582, 966 N.Y.S.2d 720). It is hereby ORDERED that the judgment so appealed from is unanimously affirmed.

Here, the police officers testified regarding their training on the identification of marihuana and, on appeal, defendant does not challenge their training but instead challenges only their credibility. We discern no basis to disturb the court's credibility assessments of the officers inasmuch as " [n]othing about the officer[s'] testimony was unbelievable as a matter of law, manifestly untrue, physically impossible, contrary to experience, or self contradictory' " (People v Williams, 115 AD3d 1344, 1345). Furthermore, the court did not abuse its discretion in curtailing defense counsel's cross-examination of the officers because defense counsel's attempts to establish certain "contradictions in time" were not relevant to the suppression issues before the court (see generally People v Colvin, 112 AD3d 1348, 1348-1349, lv denied 22 NY3d 1155; People v Agostini, 84 AD3d 1716, 1717, lv denied 17 NY3d 857; People v Rutley, 57 AD3d 1497, 1497, lv denied 12 NY3d 821).