People v. Williams

Full title: THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. LEONARD…

Court: APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT FIRST DIVISION

Date published: Jun 30, 2014

2014 Ill. App. 130935 (Ill. App. Ct. 2014)

Opinion

No. 1-13-0935

06-30-2014

THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. LEONARD WILLIAMS, Defendant-Appellant.

CUNNINGHAM

NOTICE: This order was filed under Supreme Court Rule 23 and may not be cited as precedent by any party except in the limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(1).

Appeal from the

Circuit Court of

Cook County.

No. 07 CR 13744

Honorable

Stanley Sacks,

Judge Presiding.

JUSTICE delivered the judgment of the court.

Presiding Justice Connors and Justice Delort concurred in the judgment.

ORDER

¶ 1 Held: The trial court's imposition of new concurrent 22-year sentences for defendant's conviction of armed robbery and aggravated vehicular hijacking at a resentencing hearing should not be vacated or reduced as a matter of law; the trial court did not abuse its discretion in resentencing defendant to identical sentences that were imposed at the original sentencing hearing; mittimus ordered to be corrected to reflect the accurate description of the offense for which defendant was convicted. ¶ 2 Following a bench trial in the circuit court of Cook County, defendant Leonard Williams was convicted of armed robbery, aggravated vehicular hijacking and aggravated battery. Subsequently, he was sentenced to concurrent terms of 22 years of imprisonment for armed robbery and aggravated vehicular hijacking, and 5 years of imprisonment for aggravated battery. On direct appeal, this court affirmed the defendant's convictions, but vacated his sentences for armed robbery and aggravated vehicular hijacking and remanded the cause for resentencing on those two offenses. On remand, the circuit court imposed two new concurrent 22-year sentences for armed robbery and aggravated vehicular hijacking. On appeal from resentencing, the defendant argues that: (1) his new 22-year concurrent sentences should be vacated because they are more severe than the original sentences, in violation of statutory requirements; (2) the trial court abuse its discretion in resentencing him to concurrent 22-year prison terms, where it refused to consider that any error had resulted in its original sentencing, failed to give any weight to the mitigating evidence, and considered improper factors in aggravation; and (3) the mittimus should be corrected to reflect the accurate offenses for which he was convicted. For the following reasons, we affirm the judgment of the circuit court of Cook County.

¶ 3 BACKGROUND

¶ 4 The relevant underlying facts of this case are set forth in this court's August 14, 2012 opinion on direct appeal (People v. Williams, 2012 IL App (1st) 100126), which we summarize and reproduce as follows. On June 10, 2007, Chicago police officers responded to a call to investigate a car stripping in progress at 5345 South Hoyne Avenue in Chicago, Illinois. As a result, the police arrested the defendant, along with codefendant Courtney Robinson (codefendant Robinson), near the crime scene. Thereafter, on July 5, 2007, the defendant was charged with armed robbery (count I), aggravated vehicular hijacking (count II), aggravated unlawful use of a weapon (counts III to VI), unlawful use of a weapon by a felon (counts VII and VIII), aggravated battery (counts IX and XII), and aggravated unlawful restraint (count XIII). ¶ 5 On May 1, 2009, defense counsel filed a "motion to suppress identification and quash arrest" (motion to suppress), which the trial court denied following a suppression hearing. ¶ 6 On November 6, 2009, a bench trial commenced during which Tremon Moore (Tremon) testified for the State that he was a 37-year-old postal worker and Dione Montgomery (Dione) was his girlfriend of nine years. On June 10, 2007, at about 11 p.m., he and Dione were at 1300 West 64th Street near Ogden Park in Chicago. Dione was seated in the passenger seat of her car, which was parked directly behind Tremon's car. Tremon was standing at the rear part of his vehicle when a man in a "dark hoody" approached him, drawing a silver revolver and demanding that Tremon empty his pockets. Tremon's pockets contained his mobile telephone, keys, wallet, a pocket Bible and some cash. At that same moment, a second man, wearing a "white hoody" and red bandanna over the lower part of his face, approached Dione's car. Although the second man's face was partly covered by a bandanna, Tremon could still "pretty much" see his face and identified the defendant in court as the man with the white hoody. The man in the dark hoody then placed Tremon into the backseat of Tremon's vehicle, while he sat in the front passenger seat. The defendant then entered the driver's seat of Tremon's vehicle and drove away. Shortly after the trio left the scene of the carjacking in Tremon's vehicle, the car's engine suddenly shut off due to its antitheft system. Tremon then explained to the two offenders that he needed to reset the alarm system, after which the man in the dark hoody, who was then sitting in the front passenger seat of the car, exited the vehicle and forced Tremon to change seats with him. As Tremon reentered the vehicle to sit in the front passenger seat, the man in the dark hoody struck him on the side of his head with the barrel of a gun, causing a gash. Tremon then reached under the steering wheel of the car and reset the code for the alarm system, which then allowed the defendant to restart the car and continue driving. As they approached the intersection of 61st Street and Loomis Boulevard, the defendant pulled over to the side of the road and allowed Tremon to escape by climbing out of a side window of the car so as not to reactivate the antitheft alarm. The defendant and the man with the dark hoody drove away in Tremon's car. Tremon then called the police. Later, he went to the hospital where he received three staples to close his head wound. On June 11, 2007, at about 9 p.m., Tremon positively identified the defendant from a police lineup as one of the two offenders who had robbed him. Tremon testified that it was only when he viewed the police lineup that he first recognized the defendant, also known as "Little Earl," as someone he had known from "a previous card game or something." He did not recognize the defendant during the commission of the crime. At trial, Tremon positively identified his wallet, identification card and Bible from the photographs presented by the State of items recovered from the scene after the police arrested the offenders. On cross-examination, Tremon acknowledged that he informed the police that one of the offenders said, "Oh Lord, we are going to have to kill him," while he and the two offenders were in Tremon's car. However, Tremon could not recall which offender made the statement. ¶ 7 Dione's testimony was substantially the same as Tremon's testimony regarding the events leading up to the crime and the initial encounter between Tremon and the man with the dark hoody. Dione testified that a man with a white hoody and red bandanna across his face, whom she identified in court as the defendant, approached Dione's car and pointed a shiny silver gun at her head. The defendant then asked Dione whether she had a cellular telephone, picked up her car keys, looked at them and then dropped them. The two offenders then put Tremon into the backseat of Tremon's car and the defendant drove the trio away. Subsequently, Dione drove to a police station to report the crime, where she was reunited with Tremon. She observed that Tremon was bleeding and that he later received medical treatment at a hospital. On June 11, 2007, at about 9 p.m., Dione and Tremon viewed a police lineup separately. Dione testified that she had positively identified the defendant from the police lineup as one of the offenders. At trial, Dione testified that she had positively identified a photograph of a gun as the one the defendant had pointed at her during the crime. On cross-examination, she stated that she could not recall whether she had positively identified the defendant at the police lineup as one of the offenders and acknowledged that the first time she identified the defendant as her assailant was during her direct testimony at trial. ¶ 8 Officer Timothy Moran (Officer Moran)'s trial testimony was substantially similar to his testimony at the pretrial hearing on the motion to suppress, which stated that at about 11:15 p.m. on June 10, 2007, he and his partners were assigned to respond to an anonymous 911 call of a car stripping in progress at 5345 South Hoyne Avenue in Chicago, Illinois. Upon arrival at the location, Officer Moran observed a car elevated on four milk crates with its tires missing and its hood and trunk open in the rear lot of an abandoned residence. The police officers ran a check of the license plate of the vehicle and discovered that it was reported to have been taken in a vehicle hijacking earlier in the evening. Approximately one minute later, two black men walked from a nearby alleyway toward the vehicle. As the two men approached the vehicle, Officer Moran and his partners announced their presence, at which point the two men, one of whom was later identified as the defendant, fled back to the alleyway. The police officers then chased the suspects on foot. During the chase, Officer Moran observed the defendant reach into his waistband and toss "a shiny object" to the ground. Subsequently, Officer Moran apprehended the defendant and recovered a handgun at the location where the "shiny object" was tossed by the defendant during the chase. Pursuant to a custodial search of the defendant's persons, Officer Moran found a remote starter and car keys to the hijacked vehicle. The police officers also found a wallet, driver's license, and miscellaneous documents belonging to Tremon next to the alleyway where the defendant's handgun was recovered. ¶ 9 At the close of the State's evidence, defense counsel made a motion for a finding of not guilty or judgment of acquittal. The trial court found the defendant not guilty of aggravated unlawful use of a weapon (counts III to VI) and not guilty of unlawful use of a weapon by a felon (counts VII and VIII), on the ground that the State had failed to submit any evidence of the defendant's prior felony conviction for armed robbery, as charged in those counts. Further, the trial court also found the defendant not guilty of aggravated unlawful restraint (count XIII), because it was "part and parcel of the armed robbery." The trial court then denied the defendant's motion as to all other counts. ¶ 10 The defense presented the testimony of the defendant's relatives, Lakesha Williams (Lakesha), Kameshia Haywood (Kameshia), Christopher Williams (Christopher) and Andre Williams (Andre), who testified that they knew Tremon and that there had been numerous social gatherings at Lakesha's home where Tremon and the defendant were present. The social gatherings at Lakesha's home usually involved playing card games. Kameshia and Christopher specifically testified that they had seen Tremon and the defendant at Lakesha's house within seven days of the carjacking. However, on cross-examination, Christopher was unable to recall when the carjacking occurred. Andre testified that he saw both Tremon and the defendant present at a card game at Lakesha's home within seven days of the June 10, 2007 carjacking. ¶ 11 Following closing arguments, the trial court struck all testimony regarding Tremon's prior conviction, noting that the evidence had failed to establish such a conviction. The trial court then reviewed the evidence adduced at trial and ruled that the circumstantial evidence alone, without Tremon's identification of the defendant as the perpetrator, was more than sufficient to prove the defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt for armed robbery (count I), aggravated vehicular hijacking (count II) and aggravated battery (count IX). The trial court noted that all other counts of aggravated battery merged into count IX. ¶ 12 On December 23, 2009, the trial court denied the defendant's motion for a new trial. On that same day, December 23, 2009, the trial court sentenced the defendant to concurrent terms of 22 years of imprisonment for armed robbery and aggravated vehicular hijacking, and 5 years of imprisonment for aggravated battery. In imposing the sentences for armed robbery and aggravated vehicular hijacking, the trial court included a 15-year firearm sentencing enhancement for each of those offenses under sections 18-2(a)(2), (b) and 18-4(a)(4), (b) of the Criminal Code of 1961 (the Code) (720 ILCS 5/18-2, 18-4 (West 2000)). ¶ 13 On direct appeal, the defendant argued that: (1) defense counsel provided ineffective assistance of counsel at every stage of the criminal proceedings; and (2) a new sentencing hearing was warranted where the 15-year sentencing enhancements imposed by the trial court were void or, in the alternative, the sentence imposed should be reduced. On August 14, 2012, this court affirmed the defendant's convictions for armed robbery, aggravated vehicular hijacking and aggravated battery. Williams, 2012 IL App (1st) 100126, ¶ 58. However, this court vacated the defendant's sentences for armed robbery and aggravated vehicular hijacking, finding that those offenses were committed on June 10, 2007, after the 15-year firearm sentencing enhancement for armed robbery and aggravated vehicular hijacking were found to be unconstitutional in People v. Hauschild, 226 Ill. 2d 63 (2007) and People v. Andrews, 364 Ill. App. 3d 253 (2006), but before the Illinois legislature cured the constitutional infirmities by enacting Public Act 95-688 (See Pub. Act 95-688, § 4 (eff. Oct. 23, 2007)). Williams, 2012 IL App (1st) 100126, ¶ 56. This court then remanded the cause for resentencing under statutory provisions that predated the invalid statutes on the armed robbery and aggravated vehicular hijacking convictions. Id. ¶ 14 On remand, on February 21, 2013, the trial court, presided over by the same judge who originally sentenced the defendant, resentenced the defendant to concurrent 22-year prison terms for the offenses of armed robbery and aggravated vehicular hijacking, to be served concurrently with the 5-year sentence for aggravated battery which had been affirmed on direct appeal. ¶ 15 On February 22, 2013, the trial court denied the defendant's motion to reconsider the new sentences. The defendant then filed a timely notice of appeal.

¶ 16 ANALYSIS

¶ 17 We determine the following issues: (1) whether the defendant's new concurrent 22-year sentences for armed robbery and aggravated vehicular hijacking should be vacated; (2) whether the trial court abused its discretion in resentencing him to concurrent 22-year prison terms; and (3) whether the mittimus should be corrected. ¶ 18 We first determine whether the defendant's new concurrent 22-year sentences for armed robbery and aggravated vehicular hijacking should be vacated as a matter of law. ¶ 19 The defendant argues that his new concurrent 22-year sentences for armed robbery and aggravated vehicular hijacking should be vacated because they were more severe than the sentences originally imposed by the trial court for those two offenses and, thus, violated section 5-5-4 of the Unified Code of Corrections (the Code of Corrections) (730 ILCS 5/5-5-4 (West 2010)). Specifically, he contends that because his original concurrent 22-year sentences for armed robbery and aggravated vehicular hijacking were vacated by this court on direct appeal, on the basis that the 15-year firearm sentencing enhancement for each of those convictions was unconstitutional, the trial court's imposition of concurrent 22-year sentences on resentencing should be vacated because it impermissibly increased the "base" sentences of 7 years of prison for each underlying offense (22 years - 15 years = 7 years). He further argues that increasing the the "base" 7-year sentences was not justified because, at the resentencing hearing, the State did not present any evidence in aggravation, no evidence of any new conduct on the part of the defendant was presented, and the defendant presented compelling evidence in mitigation. Although the new 22-year sentences imposed by the trial court on resentencing did not increase the total number of years that the defendant is required to spend in prison, he argues that they "still increased the punishment for the specific offenses themselves." The defendant acknowledges that he failed to include this claim in his motion to reconsider sentence the new sentences, but argues that a void sentence may be challenged at any time under plain error. ¶ 20 The State counters that the trial court did not err in resentencing the defendant on remand to concurrent 22-year terms for armed robbery and aggravated vehicular hijacking. The State argues that because the defendant's original sentences for those offenses were vacated and voided in their entirety on direct appeal, where the unconstitutional 15-year firearm enhancements were an integral part of his original sentences, no valid sentences existed for the trial court to "increase" on remand. Thus, the State argues, the trial court was not limited on remand to a sentencing cap of a 7-year "base" sentence for each offense. The State further contends that, comparing his original sentences and new sentences, the defendant did not receive "harsher" sentences on resentencing than what he originally received. The State maintains that, because the defendant's original sentences for the two offenses at issue were rendered void and the trial court did not "increase" his sentence on remand, no "presumption of judicial vindictiveness" was triggered. The State argues that, even if the defendant had received "harsher" sentences on remand, he could not establish actual vindictiveness by the trial court. ¶ 21 As a preliminary matter, the defendant acknowledges that he failed to include this issue in his motion to reconsider the new sentences, but argues that this issue is not forfeited because a challenge to a sentence that is imposed in violation of a statute may be raised at any time. Generally, a defendant forfeits sentencing issues when he does not object at the sentencing hearing, or include them in a written motion to reconsider the sentence. People v. Moore, 365 Ill. App. 3d 53, 67 (2006). A sentence that does not comport with applicable statutory guidelines is beyond the power of a trial court and, therefore, void. People v. Strawbridge, 404 Ill. App. 3d 460, 470 (2010). However, a void sentence may be challenged at any time. Id. Moreover, "the imposition of an unauthorized sentence affects substantial rights and [] plain error review extends to such matters." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., quoting People v. Calhoun, 377 Ill. App. 3d 662, 667 (2007). Thus, because the defendant argues that his new sentences violate the provisions of section 5-5-4 of the Code of Corrections (730 ILCS 5/5-5-4 (West 2010)), we will review this issue. ¶ 22 The defendant urges us to review this issue de novo, arguing that "the issuance of a harsher sentence upon remand implicates due process of law" and the review of the new sentences "involves a discussion and application of statutory authorities." The defendant cites People v. Kilpatrick, 167 Ill. 2d 439 (1995) and People v. Moore, 177 Ill. 2d 421 (1997), for support. The State's brief offers no contrary contention to a de novo review of this issue. While we find neither Kilpatrick nor Moore supports the defendant's contention of de novo review because neither applies a de novo standard of review, we agree with the defendant that the issue is best resolved as a question of law—either as a matter of statutory construction or a matter of constitutional protection. ¶ 23 At the original sentencing hearing, on December 23, 2009, the trial court sentenced the defendant to concurrent terms of 22 years for his armed robbery and aggravated vehicular hijacking convictions, and 5 years of imprisonment for the aggravated battery conviction. In imposing the sentences for armed robbery and aggravated vehicular hijacking, the trial court included a 15-year firearm sentencing enhancement for each of those offenses under sections 18(a)(2), (b) and 18-4(a)(4), (b) of the Code (720 ILCS 5/18-2, 18-4 (West 2000)). On direct appeal, this court vacated the defendant's sentences for armed robbery and aggravated vehicular hijacking, finding that the 15-year firearm sentencing enhancements were unconstitutional at the time those two offenses were committed. Williams, 2012 IL App (1st) 100126, ¶ 56. This court then remanded the cause for resentencing under statutory provisions that predated the invalid statutes on the armed robbery and aggravated vehicular hijacking convictions. Id. On remand for resentencing, the trial court reviewed an updated presentence investigation report (PSI report), heard new evidence in mitigation, heard the parties' arguments, and resentenced the defendant to concurrent 22-year prison terms for the offenses of armed robbery and aggravated vehicular hijacking, to be served concurrently with the 5-year sentence for aggravated battery which had been affirmed on direct appeal. ¶ 24 The defendant argues that his new concurrent 22-year prison terms should be vacated because they are more severe than the original sentences imposed for the same two offenses and, thus, violated the statutory prohibition on increasing sentences upon remand for resentencing. See 730 ILCS 5/5-5-4 (West 2010). In essence, he contends that because his original concurrent 22-year sentences for armed robbery and aggravated vehicular hijacking were vacated by this court on direct appeal on the basis that the 15-year firearm enhancements were unconstitutional, resentencing on remand was capped at the "base" sentences of 7-year terms for each underlying offense. To support his position that his 22-year sentence is an unlawful increase from the 7-year nonenhanced portions of his original sentences, the defendant relies upon the holdings in Kilpatrick and Moore. ¶ 25 Section 5-5-4(a) of the Code of Corrections provides:

"Where a conviction or sentence has been set aside on direct review or on collateral attack, the court shall not impose a new sentence for the same offense or for a different offense based on the same conduct which is more severe than the prior sentence less the portion of the prior sentence previously satisfied[,] unless the more severe sentence is based upon conduct on the part of the defendant occurring after the original sentencing." 730 ILCS 5/5-5-4(a) (West 2010).

¶ 26 The "purpose of section 5-5-4 of the [Code of Corrections] is to ensure the due process rights set forth in Pearce by preventing vindictiveness in resentencing a defendant for having exercised his appeal rights or his right to file a post-judgment motion." People v. Woolsey, 278 Ill. App. 3d 708, 710 (1996), citing North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711 (1969); see also People v. Baze, 43 Ill. 2d 298 (1969) (following Pearce). Where a defendant is resentenced because his original sentence was illegal, there is no basis for attributing the new sentence to judicial vindictiveness for exercising his appeal rights, and, thus "Pearce and section 5-5-4 of the [Code of Corrections] are not implicated." Woolsey, 278 Ill. App. 3d at 710. Therefore, "section 5-5-4 of the [Code of Corrections] only applies to an original sentence within statutory limits imposed upon an erroneously obtained conviction or to an original sentence within statutory limits later held to have been obtained or aggravated in error" and, conversely, "does not apply to the correction of an illegal sentence." Id. ¶ 27 This court has previously addressed and rejected a claim substantially identical to the one before us. See People v. Barnes, 364 Ill. App. 3d 888 (2006). We note that Barnes concerned section 5-4.5-50(d)—then, section 5-8-1(c) of the Code of Corrections—which provides, regarding post-sentencing motions in the trial court, that a "court may not increase a sentence once it is imposed." 730 ILCS 5/5-4.5-50(d) (West 2010). We also note that section 5-5-4 and former section 5-8-1(c) have been read in pari materia as they share the common purpose of implementing the Pearce rationale against judicial vindictiveness. Moore, 177 Ill. 2d at 431-33. In Barnes, a defendant was originally sentenced to 25 years of imprisonment for attempted first-degree murder, or 10 years for the underlying offense with a 15-year firearm enhancement but, upon the grant of a post-sentencing motion noting correctly that the particular enhancement had been held unconstitutional, was resentenced to 17 years of imprisonment. Barnes, 364 Ill. App. 3d at 897-98. The Barnes defendant contended that the new 17-year sentence violated the then effective section 5-8-1(c). Id. at 897. We noted that this contention "necessarily presumes that the trial court's recognition of the invalidity of the enhancement statute left a valid 10-year sentence which could not then be increased. We do not agree with this presumption." Id. The Barnes court noted that, while the trial court had referred to the original sentence in terms of its component parts of 10 years and a 15-year enhancement, nothing in the actual pronouncement of that sentence suggested "that the penalty imposed for attempted murder consisted of distinct, independent prison terms rather than a single 25-year sentence." Id. Lastly, in imposing the original sentence, the trial court in Barnes erroneously believed that a 15-year sentence enhancement was mandated by statute, and this "mistake of law *** rendered the sentence entered on the charge voidable." Id. at 898. The Barnes court then reasoned that "only valid sentences may serve as the baseline for assessment of compliance with prohibitions against increase," and held that because the defendant's original sentence was properly vacated upon his motion for resentencing, the imposition of a 17-year prison term on resentencing was not an impermissible violation of the prohibition against sentence increases. Id., citing People v. Garcia, 179 Ill. 2d 55, 73 (1997) (holding the defendant's original sentence to be void and therefore found the defendant's contentions of violation of the no-increase provision to be "inapplicable because they are premised on the erroneous assumption that there is a valid sentence to increase"); see also People v. Arna, 168 Ill. 2d 107, 113 (1995) (because order imposing concurrent terms was void, the appellate court was not prohibited from increasing the defendant's sentence on review). ¶ 28 Applying the principles of Pearce, Woolsey, Barnes, Garcia and Arna to the case at bar, we find that the defendant's original sentences for armed robbery and aggravated vehicular hijacking were vacated on direct appeal and, thus, void in their entirety. Because the original sentences for the two offenses in question were found to be invalid, and "only valid sentences may serve as the baseline for assessment of compliance with prohibitions against increase" (Barnes, 364 Ill. App. 3d at 898), concerns about judicial vindictiveness under Pearce and section 5-5-4 of the Code of Corrections were not implicated. Thus, we reject the defendant's contentions that the new concurrent 22-year sentences for his armed robbery and aggravated vehicular hijacking convictions violated the prohibition against sentence increases under section 5-5-4 of the Code of Corrections, where his arguments are premised on the erroneous assumption that there were valid sentences to which the trial court applied an increase on remand. ¶ 29 Nonetheless, the defendant cites Kilpatrick and Moore, in support of his arguments that the new sentences for his armed robbery and aggravated vehicular hijacking convictions were an impermissible increase of the unenhanced portions of his original sentences. We find Kilpatrick and Moore to be factually distinguishable from the instant case. Those cases involved circumstances in which the trial court originally imposed consecutive sentences, then later erroneously resentenced the defendant to either a single longer sentence, or multiple sentences of greater duration that were ordered to run concurrently. Kilpatrick, 167 Ill. 2d at 441 (defendant originally sentenced to consecutive sentences of six years for home invasion and nine years for attempted murder, but upon reconsideration, was resentenced to a single 15-year sentence for both offenses); Moore, 177 Ill. 2d at 425 (defendant was originally sentenced to 12 years and 18 years on two separate sex offense convictions, to run consecutively and, upon remand, he was sentenced to concurrent terms of 30-year sentences on each conviction). "When initially consecutive sentences are corrected to run concurrently, they are not void, and the imposition of a greater sentence for any single conviction would be impermissible ***." (Emphasis added.) People v. Horton, 314 Ill. App. 3d 1039, 1043 (2000). Because the concerns regarding an originally imposed consecutive sentence are not present in the case at bar, we find the defendant's reliance on Kilpatrick and Moore to be misplaced. Thus, we find unpersuasive, the defendant's characterization of the unenhanced portions of the original sentences as anything but an integral part of the entire armed robbery and aggravated vehicular hijacking sentences that had been vacated and deemed void on direct appeal. Likewise, we reject the defendant's citation to Wasman v. United States, 468 U.S. 559 (1984), Strawbridge, 404 Ill. App. 3d 460, and People v. Yarbar, 43 Ill. App. 3d 668 (1976), where in those cases, the original sentences had not been vacated as void, and Strawbridge and Wasman involved either the vacatur or reversal of the defendant's conviction. ¶ 30 Further, we find the defendant's reliance on People v. Blanck, 286 Ill. App. 3d 583 (1997), in support of his arguments that section 5-5-4(a) applied to bar the "increase" in sentencing on remand, to be misplaced. In Blanck, the defendant was convicted of aggravated criminal sexual assault and aggravated kidnapping, and was sentenced to a consecutive 60-year extended prison term and a 13-year unextended prison term, respectively. Id. at 584. On appeal, this court reversed the aggravated criminal sexual assault conviction and remanded for resentencing on the aggravated kidnapping conviction, directing the trial court to determine whether that offense could now receive an extended-term sentence since there was no longer a superseding greater offense. Id. On remand, the trial court resentenced the defendant to an extended 30-year term for aggravated kidnapping. Id. at 584-85. On appeal from resentencing, this court held that a sentence in excess of the original 13 years violated section 5-5-4(a) of the Code of Corrections. Id. at 585-86. However, nowhere in Blanck did this court state that an enhanced sentence for one offense is actually two separate sentences that legally rise or fall separately. In other words, Blanck's holding that an extended term could not be added on resentencing does not support the very different proposition proffered by the defendant in the case at bar: that where an enhancement was erroneously imposed at original sentencing, the resentencing court is limited to the unenhanced portion of the original sentence. Thus, we reject the defendant's arguments on this basis. Therefore, on remand for resentencing, the trial court was not limited to a sentencing cap of 7 years for each offense, and it is undisputed that the new 22-year sentences fell within the "sentencing range of 6 to 30 years for armed robbery" (720 ILCS 5/18-2(b) (West 1999) and "7 to 30 years for aggravated vehicular hijacking" (720 ILCS 5/18-4(b) (West 1999)). Because we find that the facts in the case at bar did not implicate section 5-5-4(a) of the Code of Corrections, we need not address the parties' arguments regarding whether the defendant presented evidence of new "conduct" under the provision, nor whether evidence of vindictiveness exists on the record. Accordingly, we hold that the trial court's imposition of new concurrent 22-year sentences for armed robbery and aggravated vehicular hijacking should not be vacated or reduced as a matter of law. ¶ 31 We next determine whether the trial court abused its discretion in resentencing him to concurrent 22-year prison terms for armed robbery and aggravated vehicular hijacking convictions. ¶ 32 The defendant argues that he was denied a fair resentencing hearing on remand because the trial court refused to consider whether a different sentence was warranted and refused to acknowledge that it had committed error in the original sentencing. He further contends that the imposition of new 22-year sentences by the trial court was erroneous and excessive, where the court never mentioned any of the mitigating evidence presented on his behalf and the court relied on several improper aggravating factors. ¶ 33 The State counters that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in resentencing the defendant to concurrent 22-year prison terms for armed robbery and aggravated vehicular hijacking, because the court was entitled to sentence him on remand to an extended-term range of 6 to 60 years in prison as a result of his criminal history, which included at least two prior Class X felony convictions within 10 years of the instant offenses. The State further argues that the defendant failed to establish that the court had "ignored" the mitigating evidence that he presented at resentencing, or that any of the aggravating factors on which the court relied was improper. The State contends that, even if the court had improperly considered a factor in aggravation, remandment for a third sentencing hearing is not required because it can be determined from the record that the weight placed on the aggravating factor was so insignificant that it did not lead to a greater sentence. ¶ 34 As a preliminary matter, although the defendant argued in his motion to reconsider the new sentences that they were excessive, he acknowledges that he did not include in the motion claims that he was deprived of a fair resentencing hearing or that the court considered improperly aggravating factors in fashioning the new sentences. The State argues that these issues are forfeited for review on appeal and that the plain error doctrine does not apply to reach the forfeited issues. However, we find that application of the forfeiture rule is less rigid where the basis of the objection is the trial court's conduct. People v. Dameron, 196 Ill. 2d 156, 171 (2001); People v. Smith, 176 Ill. 2d 217, 237 (1997); see People v. Saldivar, 113 Ill. 2d 256, 266 (1986) ("[t]o preserve any error of the court made at [sentencing], it was not necessary for [defense] counsel to interrupt the judge and point out that he was considering the wrong factors in aggravation"). Therefore, we choose to examine these issues on appeal. ¶ 35 The defendant urges this court to review his sentencing claims de novo. The State implicitly opposes the application of the de novo review, by citing only to case law that supports the application of an abuse of discretion standard. We decline the defendant's invitation to employ a de novo review of his sentencing claims. It is well-settled that the trial court is vested with considerable discretion in imposing a sentence, and a sentence will not be modified on appeal absent an abuse of discretion because the trial judge, "having observed the defendant and the proceedings, is in a much better position to consider factors such as the defendant's credibility, demeanor, moral character, mentality, environment, habits, and age." People v. Snyder, 2011 IL 111382, ¶ 36; People v. Alexander, 239 Ill. 2d 205, 212-13 (2010). A sentence imposed by the trial court, which is within the statutory range, is entitled to great deference on appeal. People v. Garcia, 296 Ill. App. 3d 769, 781 (1998). In imposing a sentence, the trial court "should consider the gravity of the offense, the circumstances of commission, the protection of society and the rehabilitation of the offender." Id. On review, it is presumed that the trial court properly considered all mitigating factors and rehabilitative potential before it, and the burden is on the defendant to affirmatively show the contrary. Id. However, a reviewing court may not substitute its judgment for that of the trial court merely because it would have weighed the sentencing factors differently. Id. An abuse of discretion will be found where the sentence is "at great variance with the spirit and purpose of the law or manifestly disproportionate to the nature of the offense." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Snyder, 2011 IL 111382, ¶ 36. ¶ 36 In the case at bar, on direct appeal, this court vacated the defendant's sentences for armed robbery and aggravated vehicular hijacking, finding that the 15-year firearm sentencing enhancements were unconstitutional at the time those two offenses were committed. Williams, 2012 IL App (1st) 100126, ¶ 56. This court then remanded the cause for resentencing under statutory provisions that predated the invalid statutes on the armed robbery and aggravated vehicular hijacking convictions. Id. Under the preamended versions of the relevant statutes, which were in effect prior to January 1, 2000, the defendant was subject to a Class X felony sentencing range of 6 to 30 years for the armed robbery offense (720 ILCS 5/18-2(b) (West 1999)) and a Class X felony sentencing range of 7 to 30 years for aggravated vehicular hijacking (720 ILCS 5/18-4(b) (West 1999)). Because the defendant was convicted of prior Class X felony offenses within 10 years of his convictions for the present offenses, he was also eligible for an extended-term sentence of up to a maximum of 60 years for each of the offenses. See 730 ILCS 5/5-8-2(a) (West 2010); 730 ILCS 5/5-5-3.2(b)(1) (West 2010). ¶ 37 During resentencing on remand, the trial court noted that it had reviewed an updated PSI report. The State summarized this court's August 14, 2012 opinion on direct appeal. The State asked the trial court not to reduce the sentences originally imposed, by arguing that they fell within the statutory sentencing range and that they were appropriate based on the facts of the case and the defendant's criminal history. In mitigation, defense counsel pointed out that, based on the updated PSI report, the defendant was raised by a single mother, that he has a close relationship with his two siblings, and that he is the father of two children. Defense counsel noted that the defendant became a high school dropout when he was incarcerated in 2001, but that he obtained a GED while in custody. The defendant had previously worked as a janitor, and had a substance abuse problem at the age of 17. Since his incarceration in 2007, he has participated in a "redirection" program at the correctional facility. Defense counsel noted that the defendant has career aspirations, that he had been writing a book since his incarceration, and that the defendant would like to be put into a drug rehabilitation program by recommendation from the court. Defense counsel then paraphrased a letter written by the defendant, in which he stated that he "never wanted to change his life until now" and that he wanted to take responsibility for his life and care for his two daughters. Defense counsel then asked the court to impose concurrent sentences of 19 years in prison, to which the trial court remarked that this, in effect, would give the defendant a "free crime" because he would complete the sentences at the same time as a separate 19-year sentence for aggravated vehicular hijacking that Judge Walsh had imposed upon him for an unrelated case in November 2010. In allocution, the defendant stated that he was trying to change, that he wanted to better himself, that he wanted to "get out to my kids," and he asked the court to impose concurrent terms of 19 years in prison. During the defendant's allocation, the trial court interrupted his remarks by saying that "[s]omeone so concerned about their kids would not be out there sticking people up with guns and carjacking their cars. So don't tell me about your kids," and "Don't apologize to me. Apologize to your family and your kids." ¶ 38 The trial court then commented that the defendant was "one more armed robbery away from [a] mandatory life sentence"; that "the first nine year bit [for a previous armed robbery conviction] didn't affect [him] in the slightest"; that he had "a problem with taking stuff from people at gunpoint," which is about "a half an inch away" from murder because the victim could easily be shot if he resists; that the defendant had committed two more crimes since his release from a 9-year prison sentence for armed robbery—the crimes in the instant case and a case before Judge Walsh for which she sentenced him to 19 years in prison. ¶ 39 The trial court then made the following remarks about the defendant's original sentences:

"The case before me, to tell you the truth, I didn't really consider that enhancement at all. Coincidentally 22 comes out to 7 plus 15, but you were looking at 7 to 60 at the time. Seven minimum to 60 maximum. Mr. Williams, if I gave you that kind of time, you would have been doing 30 calendars inside. So when the Appellate Court talks about the enhancement, that really played no role in my sentence whatsoever, because you were looking at 7 to 60 as it was. And I think that when a guy gets nine years for armed robbery gets out and does another in this case aggravated hijacking of a guy's car at gunpoint, *** [the 22-year] sentence is
not harsh. It's lenient, in my opinion. I might have been a little bit hard on you about your kids, Mr. Williams, but the point *** is, if you were so concerned about your kids, you would not be out there sticking people up at gunpoint. Because you have to know that if you get caught, you won't be seeing your kids for a period of time. *** And stick up men are oftentimes recidivists. They get the money, whether they get a car or money, whatever they get from the guy, and then like in your case there's two more stick ups after that first one, where you got nine years the first time. It's only a matter of time before you kill someone, Mr. Williams. *** When you get out and if you see somebody with something you would like to have, if you want it, get out and get a job and earn it. ***
As I said before 22 years is coincidental. It happens to be 7 plus 15. I thought the sentence of 22 years was very fair under the circumstances for a guy that just got off of doing a nine year bit for armed robbery for taking a guy's car at gunpoint. *** [W]hen you do bad things, there are bad consequences. *** When you've got a gun pointed at a guy, Hey, Man, give me that car. If he doesn't give you the car, bad things are going to happen. That's why you take the gun along with you to make sure things happen the way you want them to happen. If they don't happen the way you want them to happen, then bad things happen when people don't give you their property.

***
I think this guy was driven around in this car with you in it at gunpoint for a period of time. A girl with him also. At least on the street. She wasn't in the car eventually, I don't think.
You were sentenced to arm[ed] robbery and aggravated vehicular hijacking. As I said before and I'll say it again, the Appellate Court didn't want to consider that, the 22 years was just coincidental. This happened to be seven plus 15 is 22. My intent was to sentence the man to 22 years. That's what I did, which I think and still do believe now that 22 years is not unreasonable, excessive, or unduly severe for a guy who did a nine year bit before that for armed robbery goes out and commit [sic] one more before me, and one more before [Judge Walsh]. *** Because you were looking at 7 minimum to 60 years tops. Sixty years would have put you on the street 30 years *** on a 22 year bit you do 11 calendars inside. Maybe even a little bit less. I don't think that's a lot of time for a guy who does one armed robbery, gets out, does one more, and then one more besides that before it went before Judge Walsh.
I appreciate the opinion that Judge Cunningham wrote. I agree with it totally. But as I said my sentence is not based on the enhancement at all. It was based on the fact that I thought that that sentence was appropriate with the range of 7 minimum and 60
years maximum, you already did a nine year bit on the previous one."

The trial court then resentenced the defendant to concurrent 22-year terms for his armed robbery and aggravated vehicular hijacking convictions. ¶ 40 The defendant first argues that he was denied a fair resentencing hearing on remand because, despite the fact that the trial court had impermissibly imposed a 15-year firearm enhancement for each of the two offenses in question during the original sentencing hearing, the fact that the trial court on remand for resentencing reimposed the same 22-year concurrent sentences, even without the enhancements, suggests that the court gave undue weight to the original sentences. He contends that the trial court was singularly focused on reimposing identical sentences upon him on remand, by refusing to acknowledge that it had committed error in the original sentencing and by refusing to consider whether a different length of sentence was warranted. The defendant argues that the trial court's refusal at resentencing to consider that its original sentences were entered in error, precluded the court from conducting a proper resentencing hearing because it shifted its focus on justifying its prior sentencing decision rather than on determining what was an appropriate term of imprisonment for him under the applicable sentencing range. Thus, he argues, he was deprived of a new sentencing hearing that was ordered by this court on direct appeal, which alone requires that his new sentences be vacated. ¶ 41 Based on our review of the transcript of the resentencing hearing in its entirety, we reject the defendant's contention that he failed to receive a fair resentencing hearing on remand. At resentencing, defense counsel argued in mitigation on behalf of the defendant, including the reading of a letter written by the defendant, and the trial court heard the defendant's statements in allocution. See 730 ILCS 5/5-4-1 (West 2013). The trial court also reviewed an updated PSI report regarding the defendant prior to imposing the new sentences. Id. In imposing new concurrent 22-year sentences, the trial court found that, despite the defendant's criminal history of a previous armed robbery conviction for which he served a 9-year sentence, the defendant remained undeterred by his prior conviction and subsequently committed armed robbery and aggravated vehicular hijacking in this case and in another unrelated case which was adjudicated by Judge Walsh. See 730 ILCS 5/5-5-3.2 (West 2013) (factors in aggravation). The trial court also considered the seriousness of the defendant's conduct, which the court characterized as "half an inch away" from murder because the victim or others in the public could easily have been shot. While the trial court made comments defending his original sentencing decisions, such comments in and of themselves did not suggest that the defendant was deprived of a fair resentencing hearing. Instead, the trial court found that the imposition of concurrent 22-year sentences on remand, rather than the 19-year sentences as requested by defense counsel and the defendant, was fair under the circumstances and was not unreasonable, excessive or unduly severe in light of his criminal background. We further find the defendant's cited cases, People v. McCumber, 148 Ill. App. 3d 19 (2002) and People v. Willis, 231 Ill. App. 3d 1056 (1992), to be factually distinguishable, where, in those cases, the resentencing courts improperly imposed an identical sentence on remand despite the appellate court's determination that the new sentence must be imposed without consideration of the improper aggravating factors. While this court on direct appeal directed the resentencing court to impose new sentences under the preamended versions of the relevant statutes, aggravating factors such as the extent of the defendant's conduct in committing the crimes, the nature of the offenses, and his criminal history, remained viable factors for consideration at resentencing. The defendant's argument seems to suggest that only facts in mitigation which would reduce his sentences should have been considered upon resentencing. If this is in fact his argument, it is misplaced. Thus, we find that the defendant was not denied a fair resentencing hearing on remand. ¶ 42 The defendant next argues that the trial court erred in failing to consider any evidence in mitigation or the facts of this case at resentencing, which resulted in the imposition of excessive sentences. Specifically, he contends that the trial court failed to consider any new or "preexisting mitigating evidence" that was presented on his behalf, and that the court overlooked compelling evidence showing that he had been using his time in incarceration "as a means to better himself." The defendant also contends that the trial court was unwilling to listen to his attempts to explain his change in character, by interrupting him during his statements in allocution and stating that the court did not want to hear about his concern for his children. The defendant argues that the trial court's failure to consider any of the mitigating evidence violated the mandates of the Illinois Constitution that all penalties be determined according to the seriousness of the offense and the defendant's rehabilitative potential. Moreover, the defendant argues that, at resentencing, the trial court failed to consider the facts of the case, which would have shown that "there was nothing particularly aggravating about [his] role in these events." ¶ 43 Based on our review of the record, we reject the defendant's arguments that the trial court failed to consider any mitigating evidence. The Illinois Constitution requires that penalties be determined both according to the seriousness of the offense and with the objective of restoring the offender to useful citizenship. Ill. Const. 1970, art. I, § 11. "This constitutional mandate calls for the balancing of the retributive and rehabilitative purposes of punishment." People v. Quintana, 332 Ill. App. 3d 96, 109 (2002). The record reveals that the defense was afforded the opportunity to present the defendant's written letter and his statements in allocution, and that defense counsel argued in mitigation on his behalf during resentencing. While the trial court interrupted the defendant's remarks during allocution, the court's comments show that the court considered, but rejected, his claims that he had changed for the better or that he was concerned about his children. In imposing a sentence, the trial court "is not required to detail precisely for the record the exact process by which [it] determined the penalty[,] nor is [it] required to articulate [its] consideration of mitigating factors nor is [it] required to make an express finding that defendant lacked rehabilitative potential." Id; see Garcia, 296 Ill. App. 3d at 781 (a trial court is presumed to have properly considered all mitigating factors and rehabilitative potential before it, and the burden is on the defendant to affirmatively show the contrary). The record makes it clear that the trial court considered the mitigation factors offered by the defendant. The fact that the court rejected the defendant's request for a specific sentence further supports the view that the court gave consideration to the defendant's arguments, then rejected them. That is the trial court's prerogative. See generally Quintana, 332 Ill. App. 3d at 109 ("[t]he seriousness of the crime is the most important factor in determining an appropriate sentence, not the presence of mitigating factors ***, and the statute does not mandate that the absence of aggravating factors requires the minimum sentence be imposed"). ¶ 44 Moreover, we reject the defendant's arguments that the trial court failed to consider the facts of the case in imposing the new sentences at resentencing, despite the fact that the court had properly considered the facts before imposing what it believed to be the minimum sentences during the original sentencing hearing. The defendant argues that the trial court did not recall much of the facts of the case at resentencing, which would have shown that "there was nothing particularly aggravating about [his] role in these events," and that such failure to consider the facts of the case was an abuse of discretion because it led to the imposition of excessive sentences on remand. We find that although the trial court mentioned only a general summary of the facts of the case during resentencing, this limited review does not mean that the court was ignorant of the full extent of the underlying facts of the case or the extent of the defendant's role in the commission of the crimes. Indeed, the trial court did not impose, but could have imposed, harsher sentences upon the defendant. We will not substitute our judgment for that of the trial court merely because we may have weighed the sentencing factors differently. See Garcia, 296 Ill. App. 3d at 781. ¶ 45 The defendant next argues that the trial court abused its discretion in resentencing him to 22-year sentences because it relied on improper factors in aggravation. Specifically, he contends that the trial court relied on the presence of a gun as an aggravating factor, which was improper in light of the fact that the firearm enhancement could not be applied to the offenses, and the presence of a gun was already an inherent element in the underlying offenses for which he was convicted. He further argues that his criminal history, which was a proper aggravating factor, was misused by the trial court and, when balanced with the mitigating evidence, did not warrant the imposition of the 22-year sentences. ¶ 46 The State counters that the trial court did not rely on improper aggravating factors and that no "double enhancement" occurred in resentencing the defendant to concurrent 22-year prison terms. The State argues that, even if the court improperly considered a factor in aggravation, remandment for a third sentencing hearing is not required where it can be determined from the record that the weight placed on the aggravating factor was so insignificant that it did not lead to a greater sentence. The State contends that, instead, the trial court relied on other proper aggravating factors in fashioning the new sentences. ¶ 47 We find that, in imposing the new sentences, the trial court did not improperly consider, as an aggravating factor, the fact that the defendant carried a firearm during the commission of the crimes in the case at bar. At resentencing, the trial court remarked that the defendant had "a problem taking stuff from people at gunpoint," that the victim and others in the public could have been shot, that "stick up men are oftentimes recidivists," and that bad consequences occur "[w]hen you've got a gun pointed at a guy." We read these remarks in context of the entirety of the trial court's overall statements. When read in that light, no improper consideration regarding the defendant's use of a firearm during the crimes is evident. We further reject the defendant's argument that the trial court's emphasis on the presence of the gun shows how the court was "unwilling to comply" with this court's directives to resentence him without the firearm enhancement under the applicable statutes. Rather, it is clear from the record that the trial court resentenced the defendant under the preamended versions of the relevant statutes, as dictated by this court's mandate on direct appeal. ¶ 48 Likewise, we reject the defendant's contention that the trial court's "belief that the presence of the gun created a heightened risk of danger that required a more severe sentence was an improper double enhancement because the presence of the firearm was already punished by the offenses for which [he] was convicted"—armed robbery and aggravated vehicular hijacking. A double enhancement occurs when a single factor is used both as an element of an offense and as a basis for imposing a harsher sentence than might otherwise have been imposed. People v. Guevara, 216 Ill. 2d 533, 545 (2005). However, the prohibition against double enhancement is not intended to be so rigid as to "restrict[] the function of a sentencing judge by forcing him to ignore factors relevant to the imposition of sentence." People v. Saldivar, 113 Ill. 2d 256, 268 (1986). Rather, a reasoned determination of a proper penalty to be imposed depends on many relevant factors, including the defendant's demeanor, habits, age, mentality, credibility, general moral character, and social environment, and must be based on the nature and circumstances of the offense, including the nature and extent of each element of the offense as committed by the defendant. (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id. at 268-69. As discussed, the trial court's remarks at issue did not show that the court improperly considered the involvement of a firearm during robbery and carjacking as an aggravating factor in imposing the 22-year sentences. Rather, our review of the record shows that the trial court properly considered the nature and consequences of robbing victims at gunpoint, which, along with the court's consideration of his prior violent offenses, established that he was a dangerous recidivist. See 730 ILCS 5/5-5-3.2 (West 2013) (defendant's history or criminal activity is a proper factor in aggravation). At no point during the resentencing hearing did the trial court state that the risk of serious injury of death associated with the presence of the firearm required the court to impose a more severe sentence. Here, the trial court considered many aggravating factors—such as the defendant's criminal record, evidence of his high rate of recidivism, low potential for rehabilitation, and flawed judgment that result in "bad consequences"—as factors that contributed to the length of his new sentences. Thus, we reject the defendant's arguments on this basis. ¶ 49 The defendant further argues that his criminal history, which was a proper aggravating factor, was misused by the trial court and, when balanced with the mitigating evidence, did not warrant the imposition of the 22-year sentences. Specifically, he posits that the trial court merely assumed, without any evidence, that guns were involved in the defendant's other prior convictions, and that the assumptions "could very well have been incorrect." He also contends that the trial court mistakenly stated that his most recent conviction, which was unrelated to the case at bar, was for an armed robbery offense, rather than the offense of aggravated vehicular hijacking. He maintains that his new 22-year sentences were a "drastic leap" from a 9-year sentence imposed upon him for a prior conviction for armed robbery in 2000. Moreover, the defendant argues that the trial court improperly stated that sentencing him to concurrent 19-years, as requested by defense counsel and the defendant at resentencing, would amount to a "free crime." ¶ 50 Based on our review of the record, we find that the trial court properly considered the defendant's criminal history as a factor in aggravation. See 730 ILCS 5/5-5-3.2 (West 2010) (factors in aggravation include defendant's history of prior delinquency or criminal activity). First, although the trial court mistakenly stated that the defendant was convicted of armed robbery, rather than aggravated vehicular hijacking, in an unrelated case before Judge Walsh in 2010, such error did not detract from the court's findings that the defendant was a recidivist who liked to take property belonging to another, by force. On remand, the trial court had reviewed the updated PSI report, which does accurately reflect that, in 2010, Judge Walsh sentenced the defendant to 19 years of prison for aggravated vehicular hijacking and that the 19-year sentence was to run concurrently with the sentences in the case at bar.¹ Second, because the record shows that the 19-year sentence in the unrelated aggravated vehicular hijacking case was ordered by Judge Walsh to run concurrently with the sentences in the case at bar, it was not unreasonable for the trial court to find that sentencing him to new 19-year sentences for the instant offenses on remand, as requested by the defense, would amount to a "free crime." We also reject the defendant's arguments that the trial court "could very well have been incorrect" to assume that the defendant's prior convictions involved the use of a firearm. A review of documents reflecting the defendant's criminal record, which were attached to the updated PSI report, reveals that he was sentenced to 19 years of prison by Judge Walsh for the charge of "AGG VEHICLE HIJACKING/FIREARM" in 2010. Although the records do not indicate whether the defendant's 2000 conviction for armed robbery involved the use of a firearm, this has no bearing upon the trial court's findings that the defendant remained undeterred by having to serve a 9-year prison sentence for the 2000 armed robbery conviction and that he exhibited a high rate of recidivism. We further reject the defendant's contention that the new 22-year sentences were a "drastic leap" from his previous 9-year sentence for armed robbery in 2000. We decline to compare the defendant's sentences in this case to that of another unrelated case, nor will we substitute our judgment for that of the trial court merely because we may have weighed the sentencing factors differently. See Garcia, 296 Ill. App. 3d at 781; see also People v. ex rel. City of Chicago v. Le Mirage, Inc., 2013 IL App (1st) 093547, ¶ 141 (quoting People v. Fern, 189 Ill. 2d 48, 55 (1999) ("The fact that a lesser sentence was imposed in another case has no bearing on whether the sentence in the case at hand is excessive on the facts of that case")). Therefore, we reject the defendant's arguments that the trial court relied on improper aggravating factors in resentencing him. Accordingly, we hold that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in resentencing the defendant to concurrent 22-year terms for armed robbery and aggravated vehicular hijacking, which fell within the statutory sentencing ranges. ¶ 51 In light of our holding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in resentencing the defendant to concurrent 22-year prison terms, we reject the defendant's arguments that defense counsel provided ineffective assistance of counsel for failing to object to the trial court's errors during the resentencing hearing and to include those errors in the motion to reconsider the new sentences. The defendant cannot establish that he suffered any prejudice, where the trial court did not abuse its discretion in imposing the new sentences. See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984) (a defendant establishes ineffective assistance of counsel by showing (1) his counsel's representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness; and (2) there exists a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different); see People v. Bailey, 364 Ill. App. 3d 404, 409 (2006) (because defendant's sentence was not impermissibly disparate to that of her codefendants, she was not prejudiced by counsel's failure to raise the issue in a motion to reconsider sentence, and such failure did not constitute ineffective assistance of counsel). ¶ 52 We next determine whether the mittimus should corrected. The defendant argues, and the State concedes, that the mittimus, which currently states that he was convicted of "AGG VEHICLE HIJACKING/FIREARM," should be corrected to reflect a conviction for "aggravated vehicular hijacking" pursuant to the preamended statute under which he was resentenced. See 720 ILCS 5/18-4 (West 1999). We agree and order that the description in the mittimus be corrected to read: "AGG VEHICLE HIJACKING." See People v. Harper, 387 Ill. App. 3d 240, 244 (2008) (appellate court has authority to correct a defendant's mittimus without remanding the matter to the trial court). ¶ 53 For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the judgment of the circuit court of Cook County, and direct the clerk of the circuit court to correct "Count 002" of the mittimus to reflect an offense description of "AGG VEHICLE HIJACKING." ¶ 54 Affirmed; mittimus corrected.

1 The 19-year sentence was imposed by Judge Walsh in an unrelated aggravated vehicular hijacking case, after the trial court in the case at bar had imposed the original sentences upon the defendant, but before the trial court had resentenced the defendant on remand.