( Id . at p. 143, 182 Cal.Rptr. 243.) The Harts rely principally on the similar case of People v. Williams (1992) 3 Cal.App.4th 1535, 5 Cal.Rptr.2d 372 ( Williams ). Williams sought to establish standing to challenge an apartment search by offering proof he lived there.

The use of a name or symbol on an object as circumstantial evidence of a relationship falls outside the hearsay rule when the evidence, viewed as a totality, requires no intrinsic employment of the name or symbol as a statement. In People v. Williams (1992) 3 Cal.App.4th 1535, 1537 (Williams), police officers executed a search warrant relating to an apartment, found contraband and three documents bearing the defendant's name, viz., a fishing license, a check, and a paycheck. When the defendant challenged the warrant, the trial court ruled that the documents constituted inadmissible hearsay evidence that the defendant was the apartment's tenant, and thus found the defendant lacked standing to attack the warrant.

Among other decisions, the Harts cite Brown-Forman Distillers Corp. v. Walkup Drayage & Warehouse Co. (1945) 71 Cal.App.2d 795, 798, 163 P.2d 878, to support their contention that "California law routinely accepts ... identifying information as circumstantial evidence of origin or identification." At oral argument, the Harts also relied on People v. Williams (1992) 3 Cal.App.4th 1535, 5 Cal.Rptr.2d 372 ( Williams ), in which the court considered the admissibility of a fishing license and two checks to prove the defendant resided in the apartment where the documents were found, and concluded that "regardless of the truth of any express or implied statement contained in those documents, they are circumstantial evidence that a person with the same name as the defendant resided in the apartment from which they were seized." ( Id. at p. 1542, 5 Cal.Rptr.2d 372.)

… The jury could infer that these items would not have been so located unless [the defendant] had either some dominion and control over the residence or a presence sufficient to give her an awareness of what was going on .…” (Ibid.) Similarly, in People v. Williams (1992) 3 Cal.App.4th 1535, the court determined that documentary evidence was admissible to prove residence or occupancy. In Williams, the defendant pled guilty to possession of cocaine for sale after his motion to suppress evidence was denied.

On the other hand, if the court determines that the search was not justified, it should grant the motion to suppress and conduct further proceedings as appropriate, consistent with this decision. (§ 1260; People v. LeBlanc, supra, 60 Cal.App.4th at pp. 167-170; People v. Clower (1993) 16 Cal.App.4th 1737, 1743 [ 21 Cal.Rptr.2d 38]; People v. Torres (1992) 6 Cal.App.4th 1324, 1335 [ 8 Cal.Rptr.2d 332]; People v. Williams (1992) 3 Cal.App.4th 1535, 1543 [ 5 Cal.Rptr.2d 372]; People v. Minor (1980) 104 Cal.App.3d 194, 199 [ 163 Cal.Rptr. 501].) "In its disposition of a criminal case the appellate court is not limited to the more common options of affirmance, reversal or modification of the judgment or order appealed from.

Despite the federal high court's change in terminology, some California cases have continued to use the word "standing" in discussing the Fourth Amendment. Among them are People v. Badgett (1995) 10 Cal.4th 330, 343, 351; People v. McPeters (1992) 2 Cal.4th 1148, 1172; People v. Satz (1998) 61 Cal.App.4th 322, 324-325; People v.Hannah (1996) 51 Cal.App.4th 1335, 1340; People v. Bell (1996) 43 Cal.App.4th 754, 765; People v. Scott (1993) 17 Cal.App.4th 405, 411, footnote 5; People v. Allen (1993) 17 Cal.App.4th 1214, 1219; People v. Madrid (1992) 7 Cal.App.4th 1888, 1895-1898; People v.Williams (1992) 3 Cal.App.4th 1535, 1543; People v. Moreno (1992) 2 Cal.App.4th 577, 587-588; People v. Ybarra (1991) 233 Cal.App.3d 1353, 1360; In re Marcellus L. (1991) 229 Cal.App.3d 134, 145; People v. Thompson (1990) 221 Cal.App.3d 923, 933; People v.Henderson (1990) 220 Cal.App.3d 1632, 1644; People v. Workman (1989) 209 Cal.App.3d 687, 695; People v. Dasilva (1989) 207 Cal.App.3d 43, 48-49; People v. Root (1985) 172 Cal.App.3d 774, 778; People v. Hamilton (1985) 168 Cal.App.3d 1058, 1066; Patingv. Board of Medical Quality Assurance (1982) 130 Cal.App.3d 608, 616; People v. De Caro (1981) 123 Cal.App.3d 454, 465, footnote 7; In re D.M.G. (1981) 120 Cal.App.3d 218, 224, footnote 6; People v.Thomas (1980) 112 Cal.App.3d 980, 985; and People v. Lionberger (1986) 185 Cal.App.3d Supp. 1, 3.

( Id . at p. 449, 262 Cal.Rptr.3d 629, 463 P.3d 824.) The Supreme Court in Hart, supra , 9 Cal.5th at page 449, 262 Cal.Rptr.3d 629, 463 P.3d 824 analogized the Keenan invoices to the documents at issue in People v. Goodall (1982) 131 Cal.App.3d 129, 143, 182 Cal.Rptr. 243 and People v. Williams (1992) 3 Cal.App.4th 1535, 1542, 5 Cal.Rptr.2d 372, in which the Courts of Appeal held that documents identifying the defendant (including correspondence, receipts, and licenses) recovered from dwellings were nonhearsay evidence that the defendants resided at the dwellings. The Hart court observed, "In Goodall and Williams the documents were relevant regardless of their truth.

It is settled that a defendant's Fourth Amendment rights are not infringed solely because the state was allowed to introduce damaging evidence recovered from a third person's property, even if that search was unlawful. (Rakas, supra, 439 U.S. at p. 134.) To prevail on a motion to suppress, a defendant bears the burden to prove he had a legitimate expectation of privacy in the particular area searched or the property seized. (Id. at p. 143; People v. Valdez (2004) 32 Cal.4th 73, 122; People v. Williams (1992) 3 Cal.App.4th 1535, 1539.)

In any case, even if the registration card did not meet the strict requirements of section 1280, it was relevant for a non-hearsay purpose: The fact that the vehicle contained a document purporting to identify defendant as the owner is circumstantial evidence that he used the truck and exercised dominion and control over both the truck and the items within it. (See People v. Williams (1992) 3 Cal.App.4th 1535, 1543 [utility bill with defendant's name on it, even without an address, would be circumstantial evidence that person resided in apartment where bill found]; People v. Goodall (1982) 131 Cal.App.3d 129, 142 [even without considering lease, rent receipt, and other documents in defendant's name for the truth of matter stated therein, jury could infer items would not be there unless defendant had some dominion and control over residence]; see People v. Rushing (1989) 209 Cal.App.3d 618, 622 [presence of documents in defendant's name in dresser of room where he was sleeping was evidence he had right to exercise dominion and control over apartment where cocaine was found].) Defendant points out that the trial court did not instruct the jury to consider the photographs only for a non-hearsay purpose, and the prosecutor argued in his closing statement that the truck was registered to defendant.

"Evidence of the defendant's possessory interest in the items seized, without more, is insufficient to demonstrate that expectation of privacy. [Citation.] Similarly, evidence of the defendant's 'mere legitimate presence on the searched premises by invitation or otherwise is insufficient in itself to create a protectable expectation.' [Citation.] Instead, the court must look to the totality of the circumstances, including '"'whether the defendant has a [property or] possessory interest in the thing seized or the place searched; whether he has the right to exclude others from that place; whether he has exhibited a subjective expectation that it would remain free from governmental invasion, whether he took normal precautions to maintain his privacy and whether he was legitimately on the premises.'"'" (People v. Williams (1992) 3 Cal.App.4th 1535, 1539.) No Reasonable Expectation of Privacy