Similarly, the indictment charging defendant with aggravated criminal sexual assault states that "during the commission of the offense of kidnaping [he] knowingly and by the threat of force, committed an act of sexual penetration with Marlene Lindemann." To the extent that the proofs and the acts relied upon to sustain these convictions are the same, this case is like People v. Williams (1986), 143 Ill. App.3d 658. In Williams, the Appellate Court for the First District, citing King, accepted the defendant's argument that his conviction for armed violence should be vacated since the armed violence conviction and a second conviction for armed robbery arose out of the same physical act.
Multiple convictions based on a single act cannot stand where a defendant is convicted of more than one offense if some are lesser included offenses. ( People v. Williams (1986), 143 Ill. App.3d 658, 665, 493 N.E.2d 362.) In order to be classified as a lesser included offense, all the elements must be included within the greater offense or there must be a less culpable mental state.
The court must also find that the public record was properly recorded and maintained. People v. Williams (1986), 143 Ill. App.3d 658, 663, 493 N.E.2d 362, 366. β’ 12 The statute further provides that the Secretary of State may prepare certified copies of records in his office and that these copies "shall be admissible in any proceeding in any court in like manner as the original thereof."
β’ 7 Defendant argues that the State failed to prove the truck was stolen where Harold Duke of Duke and Riley, the owner of the vehicle, did not testify that the truck had been stolen. In People v. Williams (1986), 143 Ill. App.3d 658, 493 N.E.2d 362, this court held that the identification of a stolen vehicle by its vehicle identification number was sufficient to sustain a conviction for possession of a stolen vehicle. At trial here, police officer Starr testified that he ran a check on the vehicle identification number for the truck defendant abandoned along the expressway.
The trial court heard testimony that the defendant stabbed the victim in the back and also struck her in the face. These actions constituted separate physical acts even though they were closely related, and, thus, both convictions were proper. People v. Nelson (1985), 130 Ill. App.3d 304, 310-11, 474 N.E.2d 23; see also People v. Dixon (1982), 91 Ill.2d 346, 355-56, 438 N.E.2d 180; People v. Myers (1981), 85 Ill.2d 281, 288-89, 426 N.E.2d 535; People v. Hutson (1985), 138 Ill. App.3d 553, 557-58, 486 N.E.2d 259; People v. Jones (1984), 128 Ill. App.3d 842, 846, 471 N.E.2d 590; People v. Post (1982), 109 Ill. App.3d 482, 490-92, 440 N.E.2d 631. But see People v. Ellis (1986), 143 Ill. App.3d 892, 493 N.E.2d 739; People v. Williams (1986), 143 Ill. App.3d 658, 665-66, 493 N.E.2d 362; People v. Hope (1986), 142 Ill. App.3d 171, 175-76, 491 N.E.2d 785; People v. Baity (1984), 125 Ill. App.3d 50, 465 N.E.2d 622. β’ 4 We emphasize that the case now before us is distinguishable factually from other cases that found multiple convictions improper where the prosecutor's intent, as gleaned from the charging instrument, was to treat the defendant's conduct as a single act. (See, e.g., People v. Ellis (1986), 143 Ill. App.3d 892, 895, 493 N.E.2d 739; People v. Williams (1986), 143 Ill. App.3d 658, 666, 493 N.E.2d 362; People v. Baity (1984), 125 Ill. App.3d 50, 54, 465 N.E.2d 622.)
As noted, defendant invites this court to apply a six-factor test that has developed in our appellate court in cases that postdate Dixon. See, e.g.,People v. Crum, 183 Ill.App.3d 473, 490-91, 131 Ill.Dec. 843, 539 N.E.2d 196 (1989); People v. Williams, 143 Ill.App.3d 658, 665-66, 97 Ill.Dec. 699, 493 N.E.2d 362 (1986), People v. Horne, 129 Ill.App.3d 1066, 1074-75, 85 Ill.Dec. 97, 473 N.E.2d 465 (1984). The test is a culmination of points gleaned from various Illinois cases.
As noted, defendant invites this court to apply a six-factor test that has developed in our appellate court in cases that postdate Dixon. See, e.g., People v. Crum, 183 Ill. App.3d 473, 490-91 (1989); People v. Williams, 143 Ill. App.3d 658, 665-66 (1986), People v. Horne, 129 Ill. App.3d 1066, 1074-75 (1984). The test is a culmination of points gleaned from various Illinois cases.
The appellate court enunciated this test in People v. Baity (1984), 125 Ill. App.3d 50, and has applied it in several subsequent decisions. ( E.g., People v. Crum (1989), 183 Ill. App.3d 473, 490-91; People v. Williams (1986), 143 Ill. App.3d 658, 665; People v. Horne (1984), 129 Ill. App.3d 1066, 1074-75.) The Baity court gleaned these factors from various Illinois cases.
A positive identification need not be based upon perfect conditions for observation, nor does the observation have to be prolonged. People v. Williams, 143 Ill.App.3d 658, 662 (1986). Given the eyewitnesses' detailed testimony, they each had ample opportunity to view defendant during the incident.
A positive identification need not be based upon perfect conditions for observation, nor does the observation have to be of a prolonged nature. People v. Williams, 143 Ill.App.3d 658, 662 (1986). ΒΆ 35 Defendant argues Diers did not have the opportunity to view him during the incident because his testimony conflicted with Ferrier's regarding which man escorted them to the sidewalk.