Opinion
February 2, 1990
Appeal from the Monroe County Court, Celli, J.
Present — Dillon, P.J., Denman, Green, Lawton and Davis, JJ.
Judgment unanimously affirmed. Memorandum: Defendant contends that the trial court abused its discretion in refusing to accept her plea and in refusing to sever her trial from that of a codefendant. Neither claim has merit. "It is well settled that a defendant has no absolute right to have his plea accepted by the court and that the decision whether to accept a reduced plea is a matter within the court's discretion (Santobello v New York,
404 U.S. 257; People v Griffith, 43 A.D.2d 20)." (People v Manley, 103 A.D.2d 1024.) Moreover, the court always retains the power to determine the appropriate sentence (People v Farrar, 52 N.Y.2d 302). Here, the record fully establishes the basis for the court's refusal to adhere to a previously negotiated sentence agreement.
It was also a proper exercise of discretion to deny defendant's motion for a separate trial. Where, as here, "proof against the defendants is supplied by the same evidence, only the most cogent reasons warrant a severance" (People v Bornholdt, 33 N.Y.2d 75, 87, cert denied sub nom. Victory v New York, 416 U.S. 905). Defendant failed to offer any compelling reason to support her motion (see, People v Coelho, 124 A.D.2d 1007).
We have reviewed the record and find that the evidence was legally sufficient to support the verdict, and the verdict was not against the weight of the evidence (see, People v Bleakley, 69 N.Y.2d 490). We also conclude that defendant's attorney provided meaningful representation (see, People v Lane, 60 N.Y.2d 748; People v Baldi, 54 N.Y.2d 137).
The remaining issues raised by defendant are not preserved for appellate review (CPL 470.05), and do not merit review in the interest of justice (CPL 470.15).