Defendant's assertion that his plea was not knowing and voluntary is belied by the record. The record reveals nothing to support the conclusion other than that defendant's plea was knowing and voluntary (see, People v. Dashnaw, 260 A.D.2d 658, 688 N.Y.S.2d 268, lv denied 93 N.Y.2d 968; People v. Faulkner, 259 A.D.2d 905, lv denied 93 N.Y.2d 924; People v. Williams, 237 A.D.2d 644, 645, lv denied 90 N.Y.2d 866). The decision to permit a defendant to withdraw his guilty plea rests within the discretion of the trial court and a hearing should be granted only in rare circumstances (see, People v. Hunter, 246 A.D.2d 913, 914;People v. De Gaspard, 170 A.D.2d 835, 837, lv denied 77 N.Y.2d 994). Defendant's protestations of innocence unsubstantiated by any evidence other than his conclusory assertions are plainly insufficient to support a motion to withdraw a plea of guilty (see, People v. Gibson, 261 A.D.2d 710, 711, 691 N.Y.S.2d 195, 196; People v. Paulk, 142 A.D.2d 754,appeal dismissed 72 N.Y.2d 960). Defendant's motion contains no factual allegations upon which it can be said that County Court abused its discretion in refusing to allow defendant to withdraw his plea of guilty. Likewise, we find that the plea agreement was sufficiently precise in terms of the required cooperation from defendant. The record leaves little doubt that defendant understood the requiremen

Defendant was subsequently resentenced in accordance with the plea bargain and now appeals. With respect to his guilty plea, defendant challenges both the denial of his motion to withdraw the plea and the sufficiency of the allocution as to the crime of burglary in the second degree (Penal Law § 140.25). Initially, we note that defendant entered a knowing, intelligent and voluntary guilty plea and waiver of the right to appeal (see, People v. Faulkner, 259 A.D.2d 905, 686 N.Y.S.2d 896, 896-897; People v. Williams, 237 A.D.2d 644, 645, lv denied 90 N.Y.2d 866). The transcript of the plea proceedings discloses that defendant, while represented by counsel, was advised of his rights and the consequences of pleading guilty and communicated his understanding to the court. Defendant further indicated that he had not been threatened, coerced or pressured in any way into entering into the plea, nor was he under the influence of alcohol, controlled substances or medication. Defendant contends that he was under "extreme pressure" at the time of the plea owing to the lack of adequate time to consider the plea offer, minimal contact with his attorney and the influence of his mother.

Defendant then brought several unsuccessful motions seeking to vacate the judgment of conviction on various grounds including duress and misrepresentation. This appeal ensued. Initially, we conclude that defendant entered a knowing, intelligent and voluntary plea and waived his right of appeal ( see, People v. Williams, 237 A.D.2d 644, 645, lv denied 90 N.Y.2d 866). Notably, defendant responded appropriately during the court proceedings by acknowledging, inter alia, that he understood the ramifications of his plea and waiver and that he was entering the guilty plea voluntarily ( see, People v. Dewer, 243 A.D.2d 984, 985, lv denied 91 N.Y.2d 924). As for defendant's challenge to the factual sufficiency of his plea, the fact that he admitted entering a "bungalow colony" to steal items instead of stating that he entered a specific bungalow dwelling for this purpose does not negate the propriety of his plea. Turning to defendant's challenge to the legality of his sentence, an issue that survives his waiver of the right to appeal ( see, People v. Callahan, 80 N.Y.2d 273, 280; People v. Pabon, 224 A.D.2d 721, 721-722), we are unpersuaded by defendant's contention that he was improperly sentenced as a second felony offender.

The pleas were entered with the express understanding that defendant would waive his right to appeal. At sentencing, County Court denied defense counsel's request for an additional mental competency hearing and sentenced defendant as a second felony offender in accordance with the plea agreements. Contrary to defendant's contention on appeal, we conclude that defendant entered a knowing, intelligent and voluntary guilty plea and waiver of appeal ( see, People v. Williams, 237 A.D.2d 644, 645, lv denied 90 N.Y.2d 866). Defendant behaved and responded appropriately during the court proceedings. He acknowledged that he had not taken any drugs or medication, that he was in good health, that he understood the proceedings and that he wished to plead guilty. He also acknowledged that he understood the ramifications of his plea and waiver of his right to appeal and that he was entering the guilty plea voluntarily.

In addition, we find the agreed-upon sentence to be neither harsh nor excessive in light of defendant's extensive criminal history and find no reason to disturb it in the interest of justice, despite the fact that his terminal illness was unknown to County Court ( see, People v Shuman, 213 A.D.2d 902, lv denied 86 N.Y.2d 741). Finally, we are unpersuaded that County Court abused its discretion in denying defendant's CPL article 440 motion without a hearing inasmuch as the issues raised in defendant's moving papers — ineffective assistance of counsel, coercion, off the record promises and the erroneous status of his health — could be decided on the basis of the record and he has failed to set forth facts sufficient to demonstrate his entitlement to relief ( see, People v. Alstin, 239 A.D.2d 790; People v. Williams, 237 A.D.2d 644). Cardona, P.J., Mercure, Peters and Spain, JJ., concur.

Nor are we persuaded that County Court improvidently exercised its discretion by denying defendant's CPL 440.10 motion without a hearing. Initially, as it is clear that the motion could be decided on the basis of the record and defendant's submissions, no hearing was required (see, People v. Satterfield, 66 N.Y.2d 796, 799; People v. Williams, 237 A.D.2d 644; People v. Santiago, supra, at 658). In addition, our review of the evidence discloses nothing to support the claim that defendant was unduly coerced or that his former counsel's trial preparation was legally insufficient.

Defendant has failed to offer any support for his claim that he was on medication at the time of his plea, let alone that as a result of his failure to receive it he did not understand the nature of the charge to which he was pleading guilty or the rights he was giving up by doing so. SeePeople v. Williams , 237 AD2d 644, 645 (3d Dept. 1997). In fact, defendant's responses during the allocution belie this assertion, as they were "entirely suitable and pertinent."

As enunciated by the Court of Appeals in People v. Cooks ( 67 NY2d 100, 103), the rationale supporting the mandatory dismissal provisions of CPL 440.10[a]-[d] reflects the intention of the Legislature to prevent defendants from utilizing CPL 440.10 as a substitute vehicle for direct appeal where they were in a position to raise an issue on appeal in the first instance, but failed to do so (CPL 440.10[c]). Consequently, in order for the defendant to overcome the presumption of regularity which is conferred upon a judgment of conviction, he must demonstrate that he seeks to establish facts which are beyond the record ( see, People v. Perez, 198 AD2d 540, 541), and which, if proven, would entitle him to vacatur of the judgment of conviction entered against him ( see, People v. Williams, 237 AD2d 644, lv. denied 90 NY2d 866, citing People v. Smith, 227 AD2d 655, lv. denied 88 NY2d 994). As the defendant's instant application is based solely upon his claim that his imposed sentence was not consistent with the Court's sentence promise upon which he relied when he entered his guilty plea in this case, all pertinent facts concerning the defendant's claim appear on the record of the proceedings in a manner sufficient to have permitted adequate review upon appeal.

When an appeal is pending on issues of law, in order for a defendant to overcome the presumption of regularity which is conferred upon a judgment of conviction and bring a 440.10 motion, he must demonstrate that he seeks to establish facts which are beyond the record, which, if proven, would entitle him to vacatur of the judgment of conviction entered against him. People v Perez, 198 AD2d 540, 541 [3rd Dept 1993]; People v Williams, 237 AD2d 644 [3rd Dept 1997]; People v Smith, 227 AD2d 655 [3rd Dept], lv denied, 88 NY2d 994. Defendant has made no such claims.