Accordingly, defendant was properly sentenced as a third striker. (People v. Williams (2002) 99 Cal.App.4th 696, 700-701 (Williams) [a true finding of one prior conviction allegation supports imposition of sentence under two enhancement allegations when both enhancements are based on the same prior conviction].) 1. Background
A jury found him guilty of the robbery offense and found true the enhancement allegations. We grant the People's request to take judicial notice of the appellate record in case No. C036925, as well as this court's prior opinion in People v. Williams (2002) 99 Cal.App.4th 696 (Williams), affirming defendant's convictions in case No. SF00-079. (Evid. Code, §§ 452, subd. (d), 459, subd. (a).)
Thus, when the jury found true the allegation that Washington "suffered the following prior conviction in Case BA324564 . . . and that a term was served in prison for that offense," the jury must have found that Washington had previously been convicted of first degree burglary. People v. Williams (2002) 99 Cal.App.4th 696 (Williams), though not identical to this case, is instructive. There the People alleged the defendant suffered five prior serious felony convictions under section 1170.12, and two prior serious felony convictions under section 667, subdivision (a).
It does not. In People v. Williams (2002) 99 Cal.App.4th 696 (Williams), the Third Appellate District addressed an issue similar to the present case. There, a jury found true the allegation the defendant suffered a prior strike conviction for burglary.
However, neither party cited the dispositive case on this issue. In People v. Williams (2002) 99 Cal.App.4th 696, 699-700, the court faced the same situation as is presented in this case: "The information charged defendant with two prior serious felony conviction enhancements under section 667, subdivision (a).
Before reaching the merits of this claim, we must address the circumstance that, as both parties acknowledge, the trial court failed to make an express finding as to whether the prior offense constituted a serious or violent felony. Respondent relies on People v. Clair (1992) 2 Cal.4th 629 (Clair), People v. Chambers (2002) 104 Cal.App.4th 1047 (Chambers), and People v. Williams (2002) 99 Cal.App.4th 696 (Williams) in arguing that by doubling appellants sentence under the three strikes law, the trial court made an implied finding that the prior offense constituted a serious or violent felony. Under the circumstances of this case, we reject respondents claim.
The question posed by defendant is whether a jury's finding that the defendant sustained a prior conviction for the purposes of one sentencing statute permits the court to impose the sentencing enhancement under another sentencing statute based on the same prior conviction.In People v. Williams (2002) 99 Cal.App.4th 696 (Williams), the defendant challenged his prior serious felony conviction enhancement where the jury returned a verdict finding true the prior serious felony allegation under one enhancement provision but failed to return a verdict form for the enhancement alleged under another provision. (Id. at pp. 699-700.)
(§§ 667, subd. (c), 1170.12, subd. (a); see People v. Garrett (2001) 92 Cal.App.4th 1417, 1433.) A separate finding must be made as to each prior conviction. (§ 1158; People v. Williams (2002) 99 Cal.App.4th 696, 700.) C. The evidence that appellant suffered multiple prior strike convictions was overwhelming.
Additionally, with respect to sentence enhancements, a criminal defendant has the right to have a jury determine factual issues relating to the prior conviction, but legal questions, such as whether a prior conviction qualifies as a strike offense, are questions of law for the trial court to resolve. (People v. Williams (2002) 99 Cal.App.4th 696, 700-701; People v. Navarette (2016) 4 Cal.App.5th 829, 844.) Thus, while petitioner's admission that he suffered a prior conviction for violation of section 186.22 may have resolved the factual issue of whether he suffered a conviction under that section, it did not resolve the legal question of whether the record of his conviction was sufficient to show that it qualified as a strike.
This contention has no merit. A defendant has a statutory right to a jury trial to "'determine only whether he or she "'suffered'" the alleged prior conviction,'" (Epps, supra, 25 Cal.4th at p. 23), not the legal effect of that conviction, such as whether the prior conviction constituted a strike (People v. Kelii (1999) 21 Cal.4th 452, 455-456) or whether the prior conviction is subject to the five-year serious felony enhancement under section 667, subdivision (a) (People v. Williams (2002) 99 Cal.App.4th 696, 700-701). Instead, these legal questions "are matters to be determined by the court."