Opinion
D083886
08-13-2024
THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. DOMONIQUE JANETTE WILLIAMS, Defendant and Appellant.
John L. Staley, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant. Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Assistant Attorney General, Kathryn Kirschbaum and Collette C. Cavalier, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of San Diego County, Super. Ct. No. SCE332601, David M. Gill, Judge.
John L. Staley, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Assistant Attorney General, Kathryn Kirschbaum and Collette C. Cavalier, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
BUCHANAN, J.
Since 2016, Dominique Janette Williams has been committed to the State Department of State Hospitals under the statutory scheme governing violent offenders with mental health disorders (OMHD's). (Pen. Code,§ 2960 et seq.) She now appeals from a 2024 order recommitting her for another one-year term after a bench trial. Her sole argument on appeal is that her waiver of the right to jury trial was not knowing, voluntary, and intelligent. We disagree and affirm the order.
OMHD prisoners were previously referred to as mentally disordered offenders or MDO's, but the Legislature changed the terminology in 2019. (People v. McCray (2023) 98 Cal.App.5th 260, 264, fn. 1 (McCray).)
All further statutory references are to the Penal Code.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
In 2013, Williams pled guilty to battery by gassing (§ 243.9, subd. (a)) and resisting an executive officer (§ 69) for an incident that occurred when she attempted to spit on jail deputies. She was sentenced to two years in prison. On her plea form, she gave up the right to jury trial, and her attorney signed a statement indicating he had personally read and explained the entire contents of the plea form to her and concurred in the plea and waiver of constitutional rights. At the plea hearing, Williams confirmed that she was giving up the constitutional rights listed on the form. Her attorney also confirmed on the record that Williams was making a knowing and intelligent waiver of her constitutional rights, and the court made a finding to that effect. In other earlier criminal cases, Williams had pled guilty seven times between 2006 and 2011, including to a felony assault.
In 2016, after Williams completed her prison term, the court committed her to the state hospital as an OMHD. Her commitment was repeatedly extended for one-year terms beginning in 2018. The record does not reflect whether Williams had a jury trial for her initial commitment or the first few recommitments, but she waived her right to jury trial for the 2021, 2022, and 2023 recommitment proceedings.
In November 2023, the prosecution filed another petition for recommitment. On February 5, 2024, Williams was present by video for a hearing on the matter. Her attorney began the hearing by stating: "At this time, your Honor, Ms. Williams would be requesting a bench trial. We cleared the date of March the 5th. Ms. Williams just needs to waive her right to a jury and in-person appearance." The following exchange then occurred on the record:
"THE COURT: Okay. Ms. Williams, your attorney has indicated you would like to have your trial decided by a judge instead of a jury; is that correct?
"THE DEFENDANT: Yes.
"THE COURT: You have the right to a trial by jury where all 12 jurors would need to agree upon a verdict unanimously. Do you understand that right?
"THE DEFENDANT: Yes.
"THE COURT: And you are giving up that right and agreeing to have your trial decided by a judge instead of a jury?
"THE DEFENDANT: Yes.
"THE COURT: Do the People also waive jury trial.
"[THE PROSECUTOR]: Yes, your Honor.
"THE COURT: Then the minutes will reflect that both parties have waived jury trial."
The court then took a separate waiver of Williams's right to be personally present for the trial and confirmed that she was giving up that right and agreeing to participate in the trial by video conference from the state hospital. The court set the matter for trial on March 5, 2024.
At trial, the prosecution presented testimony from three mental health professionals at Patton State Hospital. They testified that Williams suffers from schizoaffective disorder, bipolar type, and substance abuse disorders. Her symptoms include hearing voices, paranoia, and olfactory hallucinations. She takes antipsychotic medications, mood stabilizers, and antidepressants. Dr. Jason Rowden, a staff psychologist, used the HCR-20 violence risk evaluation tool to assess whether Williams posed a substantial risk of physical harm to others if released. He concluded that Williams continues to represent a substantial danger of physical harm to others due to her severe mental disorder. When not hospitalized, she has a history of not taking her medications and lapsing into criminal behavior. She had engaged in aggressive or violent behavior in the hospital in 2016, 2017, and 2019. Dr. Kaiser Sultana, a psychiatrist, agreed that Williams would pose a substantial danger if released.
Dr. Azhar Abdullah, another psychiatrist from Patton State Hospital, testified as a witness for Williams. According to Dr. Abdullah, Williams was an ideal patient. She accepted her diagnosis, had insight into her illness, participated in programs, and never refused medication. Dr. Abdullah nevertheless agreed there was a risk Williams would become dangerous if she stopped taking her medications.
Williams also testified on her own behalf. She agreed with her diagnosis, but believed her medications kept her stable. She wanted to be released from the hospital and would obtain her medications from the pharmacist if released.
After the trial, the court issued an order finding that Williams was still suffering from a severe mental disorder that was not in remission or could not be kept in remission without treatment, and she represented a substantial danger of physical harm to others. Accordingly, the court recommitted her to Patton State Hospital for another year.
DISCUSSION
Williams contends that her waiver of the right to jury trial was not knowing, intelligent, and voluntary. An OMHD has a right to jury trial in recommitment proceedings. (§ 2972, subds. (a)(1)-(2).) A waiver of this right must be knowing, intelligent, and voluntary. (People v. Blackburn (2015) 61 Cal.4th 1113, 1124-1126; McCray, supra, 98 Cal.App.5th at p. 271.) A waiver is knowing and intelligent if it is made with full awareness of the nature of the right and the consequences of abandoning it. (People v. Sivongxxay (2017) 3 Cal.5th 151, 166 (Sivongxxay).) It is voluntary if it was the product of a free and deliberate choice, rather than intimidation, coercion, or deception. (Ibid.)
Whether the defendant has made a knowing, intelligent, and voluntary waiver of the right to jury trial "must depend upon the unique circumstances of each case." (Sivongxxay, supra, 3 Cal.5th at p. 166.) Courts have "not mandated any specific method for determining whether a defendant has made a knowing and intelligent waiver of a jury trial in favor of a bench trial." (Id. at p. 167.) "We instead examine the totality of circumstances." (Ibid.) Where the relevant facts are undisputed, this is a question of law which we review de novo. (People v. Vargas (1993) 13 Cal.App.4th 1653, 1660.)
Our Supreme Court has emphasized "the value of a robust oral colloquy in evincing a knowing, intelligent, and voluntary waiver of a jury trial." (Sivongxxay, supra, 3 Cal.5th at p. 169.) Specifically, the high court has recommended "that trial courts advise a defendant of the basic mechanics of a jury trial in a waiver colloquy, including but not necessarily limited to the facts that (1) a jury is made up of 12 members of the community; (2) a defendant through his or her counsel may participate in jury selection; (3) all 12 jurors must unanimously agree in order to render a verdict; and (4) if a defendant waives the right to a jury trial, a judge alone" will make the decision. (Ibid.)
At the same time, however, the high court has eschewed "any rigid formula or particular form of words that a trial court must use in taking a jury waiver." (Sivongxxay, supra, 3 Cal.5th at p. 169; see also id. at p. 170 ["we emphasize that our guidance is not intended to limit trial courts to a narrow or rigid colloquy"].) "Ultimately, a court must consider the defendant's individual circumstances and exercise judgment in deciding how best to ensure that a particular defendant who purports to waive a jury trial does so knowingly and intelligently." (Id. at p. 170; see also People v. Morelos (2022) 13 Cal.5th 722, 753-754 (Morelos).)
Based on the totality of circumstances, we conclude that Williams's waiver of the right to jury trial was knowing, intelligent, and voluntary. It appears she had already discussed the matter with her attorney before the February 25, 2024 hearing, when her attorney began by notifying the court that Williams "would be requesting a bench trial" and "just needs to waive her right to a jury and in-person appearance." After confirming with Williams that she wished to have the matter decided by a judge instead of a jury, the court then advised her that she had a right to a trial by jury with 12 jurors and that all 12 jurors would need to agree upon a verdict unanimously. Williams indicated that she understood and again confirmed that she was giving up her right to jury trial and agreeing to have the matter decided by a judge instead.
Williams had prior experience with the criminal justice system, having pled guilty to misdemeanors or felonies eight times before she was committed as an OMHD. Although we do not have a record of the first seven guilty pleas, she would have had to waive her right to a jury trial each time. For the most recent offense, the record affirmatively reflects that she waived her right to jury trial when she pled guilty in 2013; her defense counsel at the time represented that she was doing so knowingly and intelligently; and the court made a finding that her waiver of constitutional rights was knowing and intelligent. And before waiving her right to jury trial for the recommitment proceeding in 2024, Williams had similarly waived her right to jury trial (while represented by counsel) for at least three prior OMHD recommitment proceedings in 2021, 2022, and 2023. (Cf. Morelos, supra, 13 Cal.5th at pp. 757-758 [relying on the fact that defendant's desire to waive jury trial was expressed on multiple occasions].)
Williams contends that her waiver was invalid because the trial court failed to give her two of the advisements recommended by the Supreme Court in Sivongxxay: (1) that she had a right to participate in jury selection, and (2) that the jurors would be drawn from the community. But the Supreme Court has "never suggested that the failure to advise on" any of these specific points "renders a jury waiver unknowing and unintelligent." (Morelos, supra, 13 Cal.5th at p. 755, fn. 3; see also People v. Jones (2018) 26 Cal.App.5th 420, 430 ["The Supreme Court and the Courts of Appeal have consistently concluded that the failure of a trial court to provide a specific advisement does not mean there was not a knowing, intelligent, and voluntary waiver"].) In Morelos, for example, the Supreme Court found a jury trial waiver to be knowing and intelligent even though the defendant was not advised that (1) he could participate in jury selection, (2) a jury must be unanimous, (3) the jurors would be drawn from the community, or (4) a judge alone would decide guilt in a bench trial. (Morelos, at pp. 750-759; see also People v. Weaver (2012) 53 Cal.4th 1056, 1072-1074 [failure to advise defendant of his right to participate in jury selection did not render his jury waiver invalid].)
If anything, the advisement the trial court gave to Williams provided more information about the nature of a jury trial than the advisements given in Morelos. In Morelos, the court advised a self-represented capital defendant that he had a right to a jury trial, that the jury would be comprised of 12 individuals, and that the jury would determine both the guilt and penalty phases. (Morelos, supra, 13 Cal.5th at pp. 751-752.) Emphasizing that there is no rigid formula or particular words that must be used for a valid waiver, the Supreme Court concluded based on the totality of circumstances that the defendant's waiver of jury trial was knowing and intelligent. (Id. at p. 759.) Here, the trial court's advisement similarly informed Williams that she had a right to jury trial, that the jury would be comprised of 12 jurors, and that the jury would make the decision at trial. But it also went beyond Morelos by informing Williams that the jury would have to be unanimous.
Williams relies heavily on the decision in McCray, supra, 98 Cal.App.5th 260. There, the court "outsourced to [defense] counsel the task of ensuring McCray fully understood what he was giving up" (id. at p. 274) by allowing defense counsel to voir dire McCray on the subject (id. at pp. 269270). In "perfunctory questioning of McCray on the topic of his right to jury trial" (id. at p. 273), defense counsel reminded him of a prior conversation they had regarding McCray's" 'right to have a jury listen to the evidence in this case and make the decision on whether or not [he] need[ed] more treatment at the hospital'" and that McCray had decided to" 'waive [his] right to a jury'" and" 'have the judge listen to the evidence and make the decision'" (id. at p. 269). McCray confirmed on the record that he understood he had" 'a right to have a jury but that [he was] waiving that right in order to have the judge make the decision.'" (Id. at pp. 269-270.) Neither defense counsel nor the court advised McCray of any attributes of a jury or jury trial, including that a jury is comprised of 12 individuals or that the jury must be unanimous. The Court of Appeal concluded that the record did not demonstrate a knowing and intelligent waiver of the right to jury trial because it did not show that McCray was advised of the significance or features of a jury trial or the differences between a bench trial and a jury trial. (Id. at pp. 273-274, 276.)
In contrast to McCray, the trial court here conducted the waiver inquiry itself, and it advised Williams that she had a right to a trial by jury with 12 jurors and that all 12 jurors would need to agree upon a verdict unanimously. The record further reflects Williams understood she was agreeing to have a judge decide the matter rather than a jury comprised of 12 jurors. We agree that it would have been preferable for the trial court to advise Williams of her right to participate in jury selection and that the jurors would be drawn from the community, as the Supreme Court has recommended. (Sivongxxay, supra, 3 Cal.5th at p. 169.) We nevertheless conclude that the record demonstrates Williams's waiver of her right to jury trial for the 2024 recommitment proceeding was made with full awareness of the nature of the right and the consequences of abandoning it and was the product of a free and deliberate choice. (Morelos, supra, 13 Cal.5th at pp. 750-759.)
DISPOSITION
The recommitment order is affirmed.
WE CONCUR: IRION, Acting P. J., CASTILLO, J.