Opinion
A163371
09-18-2023
THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. STEPHEN LAMONT WILLIAMS, Defendant and Appellant.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
(San Mateo County Super. Ct. No. SC031443A)
BOWEN, J. [*]
In 1994 and 1995, juries convicted defendant Stephen Lamont Williams of the second degree murders of Marlon Reyes and Jerry Mahan, among other crimes. This court affirmed his convictions in a nonpublished opinion. (People v. Williams (Jan. 28, 1997, A070533 (Williams).) In 2018, the Legislature enacted Senate Bill No. 1437 (2017-2018 Reg. Sess.) (Senate Bill 1437), which altered liability for murder under the theories of felony murder and natural and probable consequences. The bill also established a procedure for eligible defendants to petition for resentencing under former Penal Code section 1170.95, now renumbered as section 1172.6. (Stats. 2022, ch. 58, § 10.) Williams filed a petition for relief under former section 1170.95 alleging that he was convicted of two second degree felony murders and could no longer be convicted of murder because of Senate Bill 1437's changes to the law. The trial court summarily denied the petition on the basis that Williams failed to make a prima facie showing of entitlement to relief because the record showed he was the actual killer. In reaching this conclusion, the trial court impliedly rejected Williams's argument that the jury was instructed on a second degree felony murder theory.
All statutory references are to the Penal Code unless otherwise specified.
On appeal, Williams contends that the order denying the petition must be reversed because the jury was instructed via CALJIC 8.51 that it could convict him of second degree felony murder without finding that he personally acted with malice. We reject Williams's reading of the record. Rather, because we conclude that the record of conviction in this case demonstrates that Williams is ineligible for relief as a matter of law, we affirm.
I. BACKGROUND
The underlying facts are not disputed. With minor, nonsubstantive changes, we take this factual summary from our prior opinion in this matter. (Williams, supra, A070533.) Because we are focused here on the Reyes murder, we limit our factual recitation to evidence relevant to that issue. On January 4, 2022, we granted Williams's request that we take judicial notice of the record in his direct appeal. We thus also draw from that record as well as the record related to Williams's resentencing petition.
By information filed July 12, 1993, Williams was charged with the murder of Marlon Reyes (§ 187, subd. (a), count 1); the murder of Jerry Mahan (§ 187, subd. (a), count 2); the premeditated attempted murder of Kristi S. (§§ 664, 187, subd. (a), count 3); attempted robbery of Mahan (§§ 664, 211, count 4); robbery of Kristi S. (§ 211, count 5); kidnapping of Kristi S. for sex crimes (§§ 207, 208, subd. (d), count 6); attempted sodomy of Kristi S. (§§ 664, 286, subd. (c), count 7); sodomy of Kristi S. (§ 286, subd. (c), count 8); rape of Kristi S. (§ 261, subd. (a)(2), count 9); forcible oral copulation involving Kristi S. (§ 288a, subd. (c), count 10); and possession of a firearm in violation of probation (§ 12021, subd. (d), count 11).
Additionally, counts 1 through 10 alleged personal use of a firearm. (§§ 1203.06, subd. (a)(1), 12022.5, subd. (a).) Count 1 alleged a multiple murder special circumstance. (§ 190.2, subd. (a)(3).) Count 2 alleged the special circumstances that Mahan had been murdered in the commission of counts 4 through 10. (§ 190.2, subds. (a)(17)(i)-(iv) &(vi).) Counts 1 through 3 alleged discharge of a firearm at an occupied motor vehicle causing death or great bodily injury to another. (§ 12022.5, subd. (b).) Counts 3 through 10 alleged infliction of great bodily injury. (§§ 12022.7, 12022.8.) Finally, Counts 8 through 10 alleged kidnapping for a sex offense (§ 667.8, subd. (a)) and use of a firearm in a sex offense (§ 12022.3, subd. (a)).
On September 9, 1994, the court severed counts 1 and 11 (the Reyes case) from counts 2 through 10 (the Mahan case).
The following is among the evidence adduced at the first trial, which involved the Reyes murder:
On the night of April 29, 1992, Reyes left his home in San Jose and traveled to East Palo Alto to purchase rock cocaine. Not long after midnight, he was killed by a shotgun blast to the neck and chest while seated in his car. When the police arrived at the scene of the shooting at around 1:30 a.m., Reyes was found slumped in the driver's seat. The car was resting on the sidewalk of Michigan Avenue with the headlights on and the engine still running. (See Williams, supra, A070533.)
On the night Reyes was shot, Derick Robertson was present on Michigan Avenue with Williams, Corbett Bowers, Theodore Bryant, Tracy Smith, Corey McGee, and others, many of whom dealt crack cocaine. The area was notorious for drug sales and shootings. Bowers and Williams were close friends and partners in drug trafficking. (See Williams, supra, A070533.)
Robertson testified that he smoked cocaine given to him by Bowers. Williams, who had also smoked cocaine and was" 'tripping,'" inexplicably became angry with Robertson and said," 'I want to fight you.'" Robertson ignored Williams, who subsequently calmed down. Later that night, Williams was observed by Robertson in possession of a sawed-off shotgun with a pistol grip. Robertson saw Reyes's car appear on Michigan Avenue and stop. He, along with Smith and Bryant, approached Reyes to sell him" 'fake'" cocaine. Smith made the sale and Reyes left. Five to ten minutes later, Reyes returned and complained that he" 'wanted something real.'" Williams suddenly appeared and told Reyes to" 'get out of here.'" As Reyes began to slowly pull away, Williams shot him through the window of the car. The car jumped the curb and ran into the side of a house. Robertson immediately ran from the scene of the shooting. As he was still running a few blocks away, he saw Williams driving a small car and flagged him down. In the car, Robertson told Williams he was "crazy;" Williams did not respond. (See Williams, supra, A070533.)
During the investigation of the shooting, Robertson was arrested on unrelated charges. He advised officers that Williams was responsible for the shooting of Reyes. He later gave the officers a statement and agreed to testify at Williams's trial in exchange for immunity and assistance with various charges pending against him. The immunity agreement resulted in a county jail term, probation, and participation in a rehabilitation program for Robertson instead of a state prison sentence. (See Williams, supra, A070533.)
Bowers testified, also pursuant to a grant of immunity, that he and Williams were close friends in early 1992; in fact, he then lived in Williams's home. They often sold rock cocaine together on the streets throughout East Palo Alto, always armed with guns. They were both subject to search and seizure conditions, so they stored their weapons in a duffel bag at the house of one of Williams's friends. The guns later" 'came up missing,'" and thereafter they had only a sawed-off shotgun and a nine millimeter pistol, which they kept at Williams's house. (See Williams, supra, A070533.)
On the night Reyes was shot, Bowers and Williams were selling rock cocaine on Michigan Avenue; Williams was carrying the 12-gauge sawed-off shotgun in his pants. Bowers's car, a Dodge Challenger, was parked nearby. Williams became upset after he" 'got shortchanged a couple of times'" in drug transactions that evening. He said to Bowers:" 'The next person who comes through trying to gaffle is going to catch a hot one,'" meaning he would shoot anyone who tried to cheat him. (See Williams, supra, A070533.)
When Reyes appeared in his car later that night on Michigan Avenue, he was approached by several people, including Williams. Bowers was" 'down the street,'" but noticed a" 'commotion going on'" around the car; he heard Williams's voice near the driver's door. As everyone else backed away, Williams" 'went into his jacket,'" retrieved a" 'stick-like object,'" and pointed it into the car. The car began to slowly pull away as Williams jogged alongside the driver's door. Bowers saw a flash and heard a blast, after which the car veered off the street and into a fence. Williams ran to Bowers with the shotgun in his hand; Bowers advised Williams to throw the gun under a car but did not see if he did so. They fled in opposite directions when the police arrived, later meeting at Williams's house. Williams was not upset, and merely said" 'he was tired of being gaffled.'" He also mentioned that he put the sawed-off shotgun in the" 'regular spot'" under the house. When they returned to the scene of the shooting a few days later, Williams observed," 'that's where it happened at,'" and" 'started laughing.'" (See Williams, supra, A070533.)
In January of 1993, while in custody awaiting trial for armed robbery charges in Santa Clara County, Bowers was contacted by the police about the shooting of Reyes. He refused to" 'tell on someone that's like a brother'" to him. Later, he reconsidered and, in an attempt to" 'work a deal or something,'" falsely told the police that someone named Reggie Powell had done the shooting. Upon investigation, the police told Bowers that his implication of Powell was" 'fictitious,'" and that witnesses placed him and Williams at the scene of the shooting. (See Williams, supra, A070533.)
In late January, Bowers entered a negotiated guilty plea to second degree robbery with use of a gun in exchange for the promise of a five-year prison term. He was then advised by an officer investigating the Reyes shooting that" 'no one was willing to give him anything'" for his inaccurate identification of Powell as the killer, and his" 'five year offer'" in the robbery case was" 'getting shaky'" because he was perceived to be" 'playing games with the authorities.'" Bowers was also told that the police were" 'getting ready to press charges'" against him and Williams in the Reyes case. (See Williams, supra, A070533.)
Bowers felt" 'threatened,'" so in early February, he sent a letter to the investigating officers stating that he" 'had information about'" Williams. In a subsequent meeting with the officers, to avoid incriminating himself, Bowers fallaciously claimed that he was at home when Reyes was shot, and that Williams admitted the shooting of Reyes to him after it occurred. When, at a second meeting, Bowers was confronted with information from other witnesses that he was present when the shooting occurred, he acknowledged to the officers that he actually saw Williams commit the crime. (See Williams, supra, A070533.)
Bowers entered into an immunity agreement which absolved him from any criminal consequences for the Reyes shooting. He was also promised assistance in any criminal cases pending against him. His sentence in the Santa Clara County robbery case was subsequently reduced from five to three years. (See Williams, supra, A070533.)
Smith testified at trial that he too was at the scene of the shooting of Reyes, selling cocaine and" 'bunk'" (fake cocaine). Williams was also present. When a" 'burgundy colored Buick'" arrived, Smith approached the driver and sold him" 'some bunk.'" As Smith was leaving a few minutes later to avoid any confrontation with the driver, from about a block away he saw the car return and stop on Michigan Avenue, whereupon a few people, perhaps one of them Williams, advanced upon it. Smith heard a gunshot and looked over his shoulder to" 'see what was going down.'" The car veered off the side of the road and up onto the curb. McGee came up to him and said that" 'the dude just got shot, let's go.'" Smith did not see Williams shoot Reyes. (See Williams, supra, A070533.)
Contrary to his testimony at trial, however, Smith previously had told the police that immediately after the shooting he saw Williams standing near the car with a sawed-off shotgun in his hands. According to Smith, his perception and memory were impaired at that time due to drug abuse. Smith further testified that he implicated Williams in the shooting to protect himself. (See Williams, supra, A070533.)
McGee was a partner and good friend of Smith. On the night of the shooting, he was selling cocaine on Michigan Avenue. McGee noticed the victim's car arrive, leave, and then return. According to McGee, Williams was one of the people who approached the driver when he returned. McGee" 'walked back to where'" he had been standing, then heard a shot, ducked, and saw "people running" and the car crash into a fence. He and Smith fled, as did Williams and Bowers. Smith told McGee that he had not seen the shooting. (See Williams, supra, A070533.)
Bryant, known on the street as" 'T-Bone,'" was" 'hanging out'" and" 'using drugs'" with his friends on Michigan Avenue on the night of April 29, 1992. Williams was present, wearing a long coat and carrying a sawed-off shotgun. Williams and Bowers were selling cocaine. An hour or two before Reyes was shot, Williams and Robertson briefly argued. Williams remained angry and said," 'I am going to fuck somebody up tonight.'" Bryant was unable to get any cocaine, so he walked around a corner into a field to smoke a cigarette. Suddenly, he heard the" 'boom'" of a" 'big gun,'" and then observed Smith run by him. Smith yelled that the" 'fool,'" referring to Williams, had just shot someone. (See Williams, supra, A070533.)
Two days after the shooting, during an attempted traffic stop by a Menlo Park police officer, a red Geo was abandoned and" 'two Black males'" fled on foot over a fence. A loaded sawed-off shotgun and empty shell casing were found on the floorboard of the car. Bowers's thumbprint was discovered on the rear view mirror. Lerisa Collins, who lived in a house at the scene of the Reyes shooting, recognized the red Geo as a" 'crack rental car'" driven by Williams and Bowers. She often saw Williams and Bowers selling drugs in front of her house; Collins also told the police that Williams always carried a shotgun with him. The shotgun shells and wadding seized from the red Geo were of the same brand, type, manufacturing characteristics, and size as the shots recovered from the body of Reyes. (See Williams, supra, A070533.)
B. Jury Instructions, Closing Arguments, Verdict & Sentencing
1. Jury Instructions
The trial court instructed the jury generally in this case that it should consider the instructions as a whole and that not all of the instructions were necessarily applicable. (CALJIC Nos. 1.01, 17.31.) It gave standard instructions with respect to murder, declaring that: murder requires malice (CALJIC No. 8.10); malice can either be express or implied (CALJIC No. 8.11); first degree murder requires express malice along with premeditation and deliberation (CALJIC No. 8.20); and second degree murder includes murder where there is an intent to kill but not premeditation or deliberation (CALJIC No. 8.30). Malice is express when there is a manifested intent to kill. It is implied when the killing resulted from an intentional act the natural consequences of which are dangerous to human life and "[t]he act was deliberately performed with knowledge of the danger to, and with conscious disregard for, human life." The trial court further instructed: "In the crime charged in Count One, namely murder, First Degree and the lesser crime of Second Degree murder, there must exist a union or joint operation of act or conduct and a certain specific intent in the mind of the perpetrator. Unless such specific intent exists the crime to which it relates is not committed. [¶] The specific intent required is included in the definition of the crime set forth elsewhere in these instructions." (CALJIC No. 3.31, italics added.) Finally, the court emphasized that while the mental state with which an act is done may be shown by the surrounding circumstances, the jury could convict of second degree murder only if "the proved circumstances are not only (1) consistent with the theory that the defendant had the required mental state but (2) cannot be reconciled with any other rational conclusion." (CALJIC No. 2.02.) No instructions were given with respect to the natural and probable consequences or felony-murder doctrines.
The court then turned to manslaughter, instructing that manslaughter is an unlawful killing without malice and may be voluntary or involuntary. (CALJIC No. 8.37.) The jury was next instructed that involuntary manslaughter was the unlawful killing of a human being without malice and without an intent to kill. And "unlawful" for purposes of involuntary manslaughter was defined for the jury to include a killing which occurred "[d]uring the commission of a misdemeanor which is inherently dangerous to human life, namely, the offense of exhibiting a firearm (Penal Code Section 417)." (CALJIC No. 8.45.). The court went on to instruct regarding the elements of misdemeanor exhibiting a firearm. Finally, the court instructed the jury with CALJIC No. 8.51, which distinguishes between murder and manslaughter by noting that "[i]f a person causes another's death, while committing a felony inherently dangerous to human life, the crime is murder. If a person causes another's death while committing a misdemeanor inherently dangerous to human life, the crime is manslaughter."
2. Closing Arguments
The prosecutor began his closing argument by stating that the facts of the case were clear and fairly simple: "Five people-five men either saw this man here, Stephen Williams, shoot Marlon Reyes, or they indirectly saw Stephen Williams shoot Marlon Reyes." After discussing the testimony of these individuals, the prosecutor argued that Williams was "guilty of first degree murder, plain and simple." He went on to discuss the elements of first and second degree murder, noting that both degrees of murder require malice and that "second degree murder is exactly the same as first degree murder except there is no premeditation and deliberation." After discussing the concepts of premeditation and deliberation, the prosecutor concluded: "There is no other option in this case. This is a first degree murder case."
Defense counsel's closing focused on attacking the credibility of the crucial witnesses. He argued that the evidence did not support a finding of first degree murder, and he highlighted the instruction regarding distrusting a witness who has testified falsely. In rebuttal, the prosecutor attempted to rehabilitate the credibility of his witnesses. He asked the jury to find Williams guilty of first degree murder rather than second degree murder, commenting that manslaughter was "another option that you have that's been given to you, and I didn't even make a poster board on that because that doesn't even apply. [Defense counsel] didn't even argue it."
At trial, neither side argued the case as a felony murder, and the jury was not instructed using CALJIC 8.32, which defined second degree felony murder.
3. Verdict &Sentencing
At the conclusion of the first trial in October 1994, the jury convicted Williams of the second degree murder of Reyes and found the firearm use allegations true. It also found Williams guilty of count 11, possessing a firearm in violation of probation. At the conclusion of the second trial in January 1995, the jury convicted Williams of the second degree murder of Mahan and the attempted premeditated murder of Kristi S. It also convicted Williams of robbery, kidnap for sex crimes, attempted sodomy, sodomy, rape, and forcible oral copulation with respect to Kristi S. (counts 5 through 10), finding firearm use and kidnapping for sex offense allegations true.
At sentencing on March 22, 1995, Williams was sentenced to 15 years to life, plus a five-year section 12022.5, subdivision (b) enhancement with respect to each of the second degree murder convictions (counts 1 and 2). He received life imprisonment with the possibility of parole for the attempted premeditated murder of Kristi S., along with eight years of enhancements pursuant to sections 12022.5, subdivision (b), and 12022.7 (count 3). All of the indeterminate terms were ordered to be served consecutively. In addition, Williams was sentenced to the middle term of three years for robbery (count 5), and eight year consecutive sentences for each of sodomy, rape, and oral copulation (counts 8, 9, and 10), along with four-year section 12022.3, subdivision (a) enhancements for each of counts 8 through 10. Other sentences were imposed and stayed by the trial court. As stated above, we affirmed Williams's convictions in 1997. (Williams, supra, A070533.)
C. Resentencing Petition
On April 14, 2021, Williams filed a petition to have his murder convictions vacated and to be resentenced under former section 1170.95. Specifically, Williams contended that he had been convicted twice of second-degree felony murder, was not the actual killer, and could no longer be convicted of murder due to the changes to section 188 effective January 1, 2019. Counsel was appointed for Williams on April 26, 2021. In May 2021, the prosecution filed an opposition to finding a prima facie case (and a related request for judicial notice), arguing that the record of conviction establishes that Williams was the actual killer in both murders and that the jury was never instructed with respect to second degree felony murder. Defense counsel filed a reply to the prosecution's opposition on August 18, 2021, asserting that the standard for establishing a prima facie case is low and that the trial court should not resolve factual issues at this preliminary juncture. The defense also noted that during the Reyes trial, the jury was instructed with CALJIC 8.51, which would allow the jury to arrive at a murder conviction based solely on participation in an inherently dangerous felony. The prosecution replied on August 20 that CALJIC 8.51 merely distinguishes murder from manslaughter and reiterated that the record of conviction establishes that Williams was the actual killer in both murders.
That same day, the trial court heard and denied Williams's petition for failure to state a prima facie case. Specifically, the court concluded Williams was not entitled to relief because "the records indicate he was the actual killer." This appeal followed.
II. DISCUSSION
A. Resentencing Framework & Standard of Review
Senate Bill 1437 "eliminated natural and probable consequences liability for murder as it applies to aiding and abetting[] and limited the scope of the felony-murder rule." (People v. Lewis (2021) 11 Cal.5th 952, 957 (Lewis).) Specifically, effective January 1, 2019, section 189 was amended to provide: "A participant in the perpetration or attempted perpetration of a felony listed in subdivision (a) in which a death occurs is liable for murder only if one of the following is proven: [¶] (1) The person was the actual killer. [¶] (2) The person was not the actual killer, but, with the intent to kill, aided, abetted, counseled, commanded, induced, solicited, requested, or assisted the actual killer in the commission of murder in the first degree. [¶] (3) The person was a major participant in the underlying felony and acted with reckless indifference to human life, as described in subdivision (d) of [s]ection 190.2 [the statute defining felony-murder special circumstances]." (§ 189, subd. (e).) "Except as stated in subdivision (e) of Section 189, in order to be convicted of murder, a principle of a crime shall act with malice aforethought. Malice shall not be imputed to a person based solely on his or her participation in a crime." (§ 188., subd. (a)(3).)
The Legislature also added former section 1170.95 (now section 1172.6), which creates a procedure for offenders previously convicted under a felony-murder theory, the natural and probable consequences doctrine, "or other theory under which malice is imputed to a person based solely on that person's participation in a crime" to obtain the benefits of these changes retroactively. (Former § 1170.95, subd. (a); see now § 1172.6, subd. (a).) Under the statute, individuals convicted of murder can petition for relief in the court where they were sentenced if (1) the complaint or information filed against them allowed the prosecution to proceed under a theory of felony murder, murder under the natural and probable consequences doctrine, or related theories; and (2) they were convicted of murder following a trial; and (3) they could not now be convicted of murder "because of changes to [s]ection 188 or 189." (Former § 1170.95, subd. (a); see now § 1172.6, subd. (a)(1)-(3).) In most cases where the petitioner makes a prima facie showing that he or she is entitled to relief, the court must hold an evidentiary hearing. (§ 1172.6, subd. (d)(3).)
Petitions that fail to state a prima facie case for relief, in contrast, may be rejected without holding an evidentiary hearing. (§ 1172.6, subd. (c).) In Lewis, supra, 11 Cal.5th 952, our high court held that superior courts may consider the record of conviction in determining whether a defendant has made a prima facie showing of eligibility for relief: "The record of conviction will necessarily inform the trial court's prima facie inquiry under section 1170.95, allowing the court to distinguish petitions with potential merit from those that are clearly meritless. This is consistent with the statute's overall purpose: to ensure that murder culpability is commensurate with a person's actions, while also ensuring that clearly meritless petitions can be efficiently addressed as part of a single-step prima facie review process." (Lewis, at p. 971.)
However, the Lewis Court cautioned that "the prima facie inquiry under subdivision (c) is limited." (Lewis, supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 971; id. at p. 972 ["the 'prima facie bar was intentionally and correctly set very low' "].) Thus," '[a] court should not reject the petitioner's factual allegations on credibility grounds without first conducting an evidentiary hearing.'" (Id. at p. 971.) Nor should a court "engage in 'factfinding involving the weighing of evidence or the exercise of discretion.'" (Id. at p. 972.) And, while an appellate opinion is generally to be considered part of the record of conviction, "the probative value of an appellate opinion is case specific, and 'it is certainly correct that an appellate opinion might not supply all answers.'" (Ibid.; cf. § 1172.6, subd. (d)(3) [at evidentiary hearing "[t]he court may . . . consider the procedural history of the case recited in any prior appellate opinion"].)
Nevertheless," 'if the record, including the court's own documents, "contain[s] facts refuting the allegations made in the petition," then "the court is justified in making a credibility determination adverse to the petitioner." '" (Lewis, supra, 11 Cal.App.5th at p. 971.) Thus, as we concluded in People v. Daniel (2020) 57 Cal.App.5th 666, review granted Feb. 24, 2021, S266336 and review dismissed Dec. 1, 2021, a court may properly rely upon the jury instructions given at trial to determine a defendant was not entitled to relief. (Id. at p. 676.) Similarly, in People v. Estrada (2022) 77 Cal.App.5th 941, the appellate court determined that Estrada was ineligible for resentencing as a matter of law because "[t]he record establishe[d] that Estrada was convicted of first degree murder as an aider and abettor with intent to kill." (Id. at p. 945.) In reaching this conclusion, the appellate court expressly relied on the jury instructions given in the case. (Id. at pp. 945948; accord, People v. Mancilla (2021) 67 Cal.App.5th 854, 865-868 [petitioner was ineligible for resentencing as a matter of law where he was convicted of provocative act murder, and malice aforethought-conscious disregard for life-is a necessary element of a conviction for provocative act murder, as the jury was correctly instructed].)
We independently review a trial court's determination on whether a petitioner has made a prima facie showing. (People v. Harden (2022) 81 Cal.App.5th 45, 52.)
B. The Trial Court Correctly Found No Prima Facie Case
On appeal, Williams asserts that the superior court erred in failing to issue an order to show cause and hold an evidentiary hearing with respect to his resentencing request for the Reyes murder because the jury instructions given at that trial permitted conviction of second degree murder under a felony murder theory. Williams points specifically CALJIC No. 8.51 which is entitled "Murder and Manslaughter Distinguished-Nature of Act Involved" and provides: "If a person causes another's death, while committing a felony inherently dangerous to human life, the crime is murder. If a person causes another's death while committing a misdemeanor inherently dangerous to human life, the crime is manslaughter." Williams contends that, even if the jury might have found him to be the actual killer, it still could have convicted him without finding he acted with malice based on CALJIC No. 8.51. We are not convinced.
Here, the jury convicted Williams of second degree murder and found true the allegation that, in the commission of that murder, Williams discharged a firearm at an occupied vehicle. The only basis for proceeding beyond the prima facie stage in this resentencing matter would be if Williams might have been convicted of second degree murder on the theory that he killed Reyes while engaged in an inherently dangerous felony but without express or implied malice. However, as detailed above, the jury was repeatedly instructed that it could convict Williams of second degree murder only if it found that he acted with malice aforethought. It was given definitions of express and implied malice, and, importantly, it was told that to convict of the crime of second degree murder there had to be a union of the act with the specific intent otherwise set forth in the instructions. Moreover, the jury was cautioned that, while the mental state with which an act is done may be shown by the surrounding circumstances, it could convict Williams of second degree murder only if those circumstances could not be reconciled with any other rational conclusion.
We of course presume that the jurors understood and followed these instructions. (See People v. Kerley (2018) 23 Cal.App.5th 513, 570, citing People v. Wilson (2008) 44 Cal.4th 758, 803.) Moreover, as set forth above, the prosecutor emphasized the need for a malice finding in this case for both first and second degree murder in his closing arguments. On these facts, the only rational conclusion is that the jury convicted Williams of second degree murder because he fired his shotgun into Reyes's vehicle with the mental state of either express or implied malice.
It is true that this jury was also instructed that if Williams killed Reyes without malice he could be convicted of involuntary manslaughter. Specifically, the court instructed the jury regarding the misdemeanor-manslaughter rule, with exhibiting a firearm as the predicate misdemeanor. In doing so, the court stated per CALJIC No. 8.51 that manslaughter could be distinguished from murder because manslaughter involved causing another person's death while committing an inherently dangerous misdemeanor and murder involved causing another person's death while committing an inherently dangerous felony. The only mention of manslaughter in closing arguments was when the prosecutor commented in rebuttal argument that manslaughter was "another option that you have that's been given to you, and I didn't even make a poster board on that because that doesn't even apply. [Defense counsel] didn't even argue it."
On this record, Williams's claim-that the jury somehow inferred from the brief reference to inherently dangerous felonies contained in the manslaughter instructions that it could convict him of murder without a finding of malice-is implausible at best. Even if the jury inexplicably focused on this portion of the manslaughter instructions (which was extremely unlikely given that the defense did not argue manslaughter at all in closing and the prosecutor basically told the jury manslaughter was irrelevant), it remains the case that the jury was not instructed on any predicate felony offense in the murder instructions. Further, the jury would still have had to consider the murder instructions that were given to determine the degree of murder involved. And, as stated above, those instructions made crystal clear that a conviction of second degree murder required the union of an act with either express or implied malice.
People v. DeHuff (2021) 63 Cal.App.5th 428, relied upon by Williams is easily distinguishable because, in that case, the jury was expressly instructed both on second degree implied malice murder and on second degree felony murder based upon the predicate offense of evading an officer. (Id. at p. 432.) The People conceded that the trial court erred in failing to find a prima facie case, and the question on appeal involved the appropriate remedy. (Id. at pp. 437-438.)
In sum, considering all of the instructions that were given to the jury as a whole, the closing arguments the attorneys made, and the verdicts the jury reached, we conclude that no reasonable juror could possibly have understood that guilt could have been predicated in this case upon a felony-murder theory-a theory that was not argued or even mentioned in closing argument and upon which the jury was not instructed. Rather, the record of conviction conclusively establishes-with no factfinding, weighing of evidence, or credibility determinations-that Williams was convicted of second degree murder based on a finding of malice. Under such circumstances, he is ineligible for resentencing relief as a matter of law.
While the superior court in this case rejected the petition at the prima facie stage on other grounds,"' "[n]o rule of decision is better or more firmly established by authority . . . than that a ruling or decision, itself correct in law, will not be disturbed on appeal merely because given for a wrong reason. If right upon any theory of the law applicable to the case, it must be sustained regardless of the considerations which may have moved the trial court to its conclusion." '" (People v. Turner (2020) 10 Cal.5th 786, 807.) The superior court's ruling here was sound. Given our analysis and conclusions above, we need not address Williams's contention that a second degree felony murder conviction should trigger a resentencing hearing even if the defendant was the actual killer.
III. DISPOSITION
The superior court's order denying resentencing under section 1172.6 is affirmed.
WE CONCUR: MARGULIES, ACTING, P.J., BANKE, J. A
[*] Judge of the Contra Costa County Superior Court, assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution.