4, neither Chief Justice Harrison nor Justice Rathje identify what it is about this brief that causes them to react to it so harshly when briefs that are just as bad, if not worse, have been accepted and the merits of the appeal have been reached. See, e.g., People ex rel. Carter v. Touchette, 5 Ill.2d 303 (1955); People v. Stork, 305 Ill. App.3d 714 (1999); Eickmeyer v. Blietz Organization, Inc., 284 Ill. App.3d 134 (1996); Luttrell v. Panozzo, 252 Ill. App.3d 597 (1993); In re Marriage of Forbes, 251 Ill. App.3d 133 (1993); Geers v. Brichta, 248 Ill. App.3d 398 (1993); Roberts v. Dow Chemical Co., 244 Ill. App.3d 253 (1993); First National Bank v. Loffelmacher, 236 Ill. App.3d 690 (1992); Zadrozny v. City Colleges, 220 Ill. App.3d 290 (1991); Gallo v. Henke, 107 Ill. App.3d 21 (1982); People v. Willett, 44 Ill. App.2d 545 (1976). After reviewing the State's brief and the relevant case law in this area, I believe that it is "possible for the court to determine the questions or issues sought to be raised."

In deciding whether the trial judge abused his discretion, Chumbley stated two factors of controlling importance: (1) the defendant's conduct during probation; and (2) the sentence imposed by the trial judge. People v. Chumbley (1982), 106 Ill. App.3d 72, 76, 435 N.E.2d 811, 814, citing People v. Stufflebean (1979), 73 Ill. App.3d 801, 804, 392 N.E.2d 414, 417; People v. Willett (1976), 44 Ill. App.3d 545, 552, 358 N.E.2d 657, 664. • 3 When a defendant is admitted to probation and probation is subsequently revoked, the court may sentence the defendant to any sentence which would have been appropriate for the original offense.

The State argues, and the appellate court held, that "time served on probation" cannot include the period following issuance of a warrant or summons, since the probation period is tolled. (See People v. Willett (1976), 44 Ill. App.3d 545, 552; People v. Washington (1975), 28 Ill. App.3d 812, 814-15; People v. Houston (1975), 27 Ill. App.3d 834, 838.) Any other result, it is urged, would encourage defendants against whom revocation petitions have been filed to delay the proceedings or to flee and then return after the probationary period expired, thus receiving credit for the entire term of probation.

While there is a divurgence of authority in this area, we believe that the better rule is that probation should not be revoked on a minor technical violation of probation. See, e.g., Shaw v. State, 391 So.2d 754 (Fla.App. 1980) (jailed probationer did not have to formally notify officer of move because officer had constructive notice); Kotowski v. State, 344 So.2d 620 (Fla.App. 1977) (evicted probationer did not have to notify officer before move); Robertson v. Maggio, 341 So.2d 366 (La. 1976) (probation not revoked for delay in reporting change of address); Aguilar v. State, 542 S.W.2d 871 (Tex.App. 1976) (probation not revoked for traveling outside state without consent of court, which was required, when officer consented); but see, People v. Thrash, 80 Cal.App.3d 898, 146 Cal.Rptr. 32 (1978) (probation revoked for traveling outside the state without permission); People v. Willett, 44 Ill. App.3d 545, 358 N.E.2d 617 (1976) (probation revoked for taking trip late then when permission was given); see also ABA Standards for Criminal Justice, pp. 18-515-16 (2nd ed. 1980). We conclude that there was no reversible error on the part of the trial court and consequently affirm its judgment.

"The determination to terminate probation rests within the discretion of the trial court, and, absent a showing that the court's determination was against the manifest weight of the evidence, this court will not disturb the trial court's ruling." ( People v. Prusak (1990), 200 Ill. App.3d 146, 149, 558 N.E.2d 696, 698; see also People v. Willett (1976), 44 Ill. App.3d 545, 550, 358 N.E.2d 657, 662; In re B.R.J. (1985), 133 Ill. App.3d 542, 545, 478 N.E.2d 1206, 1208.) The appellate court affirmed the trial court's revocation of probation in B.R.J., where the defendant failed to report to the probation office on two occasions, failed to report to at least three public service work sites, and performed only 9 out of 75 required hours of public service work.

• 2 A reviewing court will disturb a finding that the conditions of probation have been violated only when it is contrary to the manifest weight of the evidence. ( People v. Willet (1976), 44 Ill. App.3d 545, 358 N.E.2d 657.) The defendant claims he looked for work repeatedly, but he admitted he had not done so recently. He also failed to apply at the local job service agency.

The purpose of Rule 604(d) would not be served by its application to this case. This result is a necessary corollary of the rule emergent from the decisions in People v. Nordstrom (1966), 73 Ill. App.2d 168, 219 N.E.2d 151, appeal dismissed (1967), 37 Ill.2d 270, 226 N.E.2d 19, People v. Fleming (1974), 23 Ill. App.3d 221, 318 N.E.2d 518, People v. Willett (1976), 44 Ill. App.3d 545, 358 N.E.2d 657, and this court's decision in People v. Gregory (1973), 16 Ill. App.3d 204, 305 N.E.2d 549, that a defendant may not attack the validity of his original conviction on an appeal from a judgment revoking probation. • 2 We next consider the first issue raised by the defendant, whether he is entitled to sentencing credit for time served on probation.

An abuse of discretion will be found to exist if the sentence imposed is greatly at variance with the purpose and spirit of the law or greatly disproportionate to the nature of the crime. ( People v. Willett (1976), 44 Ill. App.3d 545, 551, 358 N.E.2d 657.) At the time of sentencing, the court stated that it had considered the factors in mitigation contained in section 5-5-3.1 of the Unified Code of Corrections (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1981, ch. 38, par. 1005-5-3.1), and found none of those factors present in the instant case.

First, the defendant's conduct during probation, and secondly, the sentence imposed by the trial judge. (See People v. Stufflebean (1979), 73 Ill. App.3d 801, 804, 392 N.E.2d 414, 417; People v. Willett (1976), 44 Ill. App.3d 545, 552, 358 N.E.2d 657, 664.) The defendant, as previously indicated, was before the court on the second probation violation, had admitted to lying to his probation officer, and had admitted to using cannabis on a daily basis during his period of probation.

The trial judge sees the defendants and is in a better position to appraise them and evaluate the likelihood of their rehabilitation. ( People v. Willett (1976), 44 Ill. App.3d 545, 358 N.E.2d 657.) Defendants' sentences will not be disturbed absent an abuse of discretion by the trial court.