Opinion
06-03-2024
The PEOPLE of the State of New York, Respondent, v. Roger WIGGINS, Defendant-Appellant.
JULIE CIANCA, PUBLIC DEFENDER, ROCHESTER (DAVID R. JUERGENS OF COUNSEL), FOR DEFENDANT-APPELLANT. SANDRA DOORLEY, DISTRICT ATTORNEY, ROCHESTER (NANCY GILLIGAN OF COUNSEL), FOR RESPONDENT.
Appeal from a judgment of the Supreme Court, Monroe County (Charles A. Schi- ano, Jr., J.), rendered April 1, 2019. The judgment convicted defendant upon his plea of guilty of murder in the second degree.
JULIE CIANCA, PUBLIC DEFENDER, ROCHESTER (DAVID R. JUERGENS OF COUNSEL), FOR DEFENDANT-APPELLANT.
SANDRA DOORLEY, DISTRICT ATTORNEY, ROCHESTER (NANCY GILLIGAN OF COUNSEL), FOR RESPONDENT.
PRESENT: LINDLEY, J.P., MONTOUR, OGDEN, DELCONTE, AND HANNAH, JJ.
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
It is hereby ORDERED that the judgment so appealed from is unanimously reversed on the law, the plea is vacated, the motion seeking to suppress evidence obtained from defendant’s cellular phone is granted, and the matter is remitted to Supreme Court, Monroe County, for further proceedings on the indictment.
[1] Memorandum: Defendant appeals from a judgment convicting him upon his plea of guilty of murder in the second degree (Penal Law § 125.25 [1]). As defendant contends and the People correctly concede, defendant did not validly waive his right to appeal. Supreme Court’s oral colloquy mischaracterized the waiver as an absolute bar to the taking of an appeal (see People v. Thomas, 34 N.Y.3d 545, 565-566, 122 N.Y.S.3d 226, 144 N.E.3d 970 [2019], cert denied — U.S. —, 140 S.Ct. 2634, 206 L.Ed.2d 512 [2020]; People v. Davis, 188 A.D.3d 1731, 1731, 136 N.Y.S.3d 638 [4th Dept. 2020], lv denied 37 N.Y.3d 991, 152 N.Y.S.3d 415, 174 N.E.3d 355 [2021]) and, although the record establishes that defendant executed a written waiver of the right to appeal, the written waiver did not cure the defects in the oral colloquy (see Davis, 188 A.D.3d at 1732, 136 N.Y.S.3d 638).
[2] Contrary to defendant’s further contention, the court properly refused to suppress his statements to the police inasmuch as defendant "did not clearly communicate a desire to cease all questioning indefinitely" (People v. Caruso, 34 A.D.3d 860, 863, 822 N.Y.S.2d 825 [3d Dept. 2006], lv denied 8 N.Y.3d 879, 832 N.Y.S.2d 491, 864 N.E.2d 621 [2007]; see People v. Flowers, 122 A.D.3d 1396, 1397, 996 N.Y.S.2d 458 [4th Dept. 2014], lv denied 24 N.Y.3d 1219, 4 N.Y.S.3d 607, 28 N.E.3d 43 [2015]) and thus did not make an "‘unequivocal and unqualified’ " assertion of his right to remain silent (People v. Zacher, 97 A.D.3d 1101, 1101, 948 N.Y.S.2d 509 [4th Dept. 2012], lv denied 20 N.Y.3d 1015, 960 N.Y.S.2d 359, 984 N.E.2d 334 [2013]; see People v. Young, 153 A.D.3d 1618, 1619, 61 N.Y.S.3d 752 [4th Dept. 2017], lv denied 30 N.Y.3d 1065, 71 N.Y.S.3d 15, 94 N.E.3d 497 [2017], reconsideration denied 31 N.Y.3d 1123, 81 N.Y.S.3d 383, 106 N.E.3d 766 [2018], cert denied — U.S. —, 139 S.Ct. 84, 202 L.Ed.2d 56 [2018]; People v. Cole, 59 A.D.3d 302, 302, 873 N.Y.S.2d 603 [1st Dept. 2009], lv denied 12 N.Y.3d 924, 884 N.Y.S.2d 705, 912 N.E.2d 1086 [2009]).
[3–5] Finally, defendant contends that the court erred in denying his motion seeking to suppress evidence seized from his cellular phone during the execution of a search warrant. Defendant asserts that the search warrant lacked particularity. We agree. A search warrant must be "specific enough to leave no discretion to the executing officer" (People v. Gordon, 36 N.Y.3d 420, 429, 142 N.Y.S.3d 440, 166 N.E.3d 514 [2021] [internal quotation marks omitted]). To meet the particularity requirement, a search warrant must (1) "identify the specific offense for which the police have established probable cause," (2) "describe the place to be searched," and (3) "specify the items to be seized by their relation to designated crimes" (United States v. Galpin, 720 F.3d 436, 445-446 [2d Cir. 2013] [internal quotation marks omitted]; see People v. Saeli [appeal No. 1], 219 A.D.3d 1122, 1124, 195 N.Y.S.3d 335 [4th Dept. 2023]; see generally People v. Madigan, 169 A.D.3d 1467, 1468, 93 N.Y.S.3d 511 [4th Dept. 2019], lv denied 33 N.Y.3d 1033, 102 N.Y.S.3d 516, 126 N.E.3d 166 [2019]). Here, the search warrant authorized and directed the police to search for, inter alia, "cellular phones (including contents)" located in defendant’s vehicle. Significantly, the search was not restricted by reference to any particular crime. Thus, the search warrant failed to meet the particularity requirement and left discretion over the search to the executing officers (see People v. Melamed, 178 A.D.3d 1079, 1081, 116 N.Y.S.3d 659 [2d Dept. 2019]; see generally Gordon, 36 N.Y.3d at 429, 142 N.Y.S.3d 440, 166 N.E.3d 514). The search warrant states that an affidavit from a police investigator provided the basis for the finding of probable cause for the search. Although that affidavit contained information about the crime and defendant’s exchange of text messages with the victim before the crime, the mere mention in a search warrant of an affidavit or application "does not save the warrant from its facial invalidity" where the search warrant contains no language incorporating that document (Melamed, 178 A.D.3d at 1083, 116 N.Y.S.3d 659 [internal quotation marks omitted]; see Groh v. Ramirez, 540 U.S. 551, 557-558, 124 S.Ct. 1284, 157 L.Ed.2d 1068 [2004]; United States v. George, 975 F.2d 72, 76 [2d Cir. 1992]). We therefore conclude that the court should have granted the motion.
Consequently, we reverse the judgment, vacate the plea, grant defendant’s motion seeking to suppress evidence obtained from defendant’s cellular phone, and remit the matter to Supreme Court for further proceedings on the indictment.