People v. Wick

4 Citing cases

  1. People v. Wick

    107 Ill. 2d 62 (Ill. 1985)   Cited 93 times
    Holding unconstitutional Ill. Rev. Stat. 1981, ch. 38, par. 20-1.1

    Rev. Stat. 1981, ch. 38, par. 20-1.1(a)(3)) and sentenced to six years' imprisonment. The appellate court reversed the conviction ( 121 Ill. App.3d 94), concluding that the aggravated-arson statute is an unreasonable and arbitrary exercise of the State's police power, which violates the guarantee of due process in article I, section 2 of the Illinois Constitution (Ill. Const. 1970, art. I, sec. 2). The appeal is here as a matter of right under Rule 317 (87 Ill.2d R. 317).

  2. State v. Fox

    130 Idaho 385 (Idaho Ct. App. 1997)   Cited 3 times
    Refusing to consider whether an arson statute was unconstitutionally vague or over-broad where the defendant had failed to raise the issue before the trial court

    1993 Idaho Sess. Laws, ch. 107, § 5, p. 275. Although we acknowledge that several courts in other jurisdictions have held similar statutes unconstitutional, see e.g. People v. Wick, 121 Ill.App.3d 94, 76 Ill.Dec. 587, 458 N.E.2d 1387 (1984); State v. Dennis, 80 N.M. 262, 454 P.2d 276 (App. 1969); State v. Spino, 61 Wn.2d 246, 377 P.2d 868 (1963), this issue was not properly raised below. Constitutional issues generally will not be considered by an appellate court if raised for the first time on appeal. State v. McAway, 127 Idaho 54, 60, 896 P.2d 962, 968 (1995).

  3. Kaltsas v. City of North Chicago

    160 Ill. App. 3d 302 (Ill. App. Ct. 1987)   Cited 10 times

    When considering whether a statute violates due process in exercising police powers of the State, the standard is whether the statute is reasonably designed to remedy ills which the legislature has determined to be a threat to public health, safety, and general welfare. People v. Wick (1984), 121 Ill. App.3d 94, aff'd (1985), 107 Ill.2d 62. Plaintiffs argue that the right to elective franchise is a fundamental right, and that therefore they are entitled to a hearing before that right can be impaired. ( Board of Regents v. Roth (1972), 408 U.S. 564, 33 L.Ed.2d 548, 92 S.Ct. 2701.) While section 2-3-5a does require a hearing on the question of whether the statutory criteria have been met, plaintiffs argue that such a hearing is insufficient because the consent requirement is not in issue at the hearing.

  4. People v. Schwartz

    135 Ill. App. 3d 629 (Ill. App. Ct. 1985)   Cited 15 times
    Finding defendant fit to stand trial despite amnesia where defense psychiatrist's testimony indicated that the defendant understood the proceedings against him, the roles of courtroom personnel, and could effectively communicate with his lawyer and make trial decisions

    Ill. Rev. Stat. 1983, ch. 38, par. 1005-2-4. Defendant raises four issues for our review: (1) whether the trial court's finding that defendant's amnesia as to the events on the day of the offenses did not preclude him from effectively establishing the defense of insanity so that he was fit to stand trial, was error; (2) whether the defendant's conviction for aggravated arson must be reversed under our decision in People v. Wick (1984), 121 Ill. App.3d 94, 458 N.E.2d 1387, which declared unconstitutional the same subsection of the aggravated arson statute under which defendant was convicted here; (3) whether the State failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant was sane when he started the fire so that his conviction for aggravated arson and arson must be reversed; and (4) whether defendant's conviction for arson must be vacated if this court affirms his conviction for aggravated arson, as the two offenses are based on the same conduct. It is only necessary to set forth the proceedings below relevant to the issues raised on appeal. Prior to trial, defendant requested and was granted a hearing to determine his fitness to stand trial pursuant to section 104-11 of the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963 (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1981, ch. 38, par. 104-11).