Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County Super. Ct. No. LA051675, Martin Herscovitz, Judge.
Patrick Morgan Ford, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, and Law Offices of Patrick Morgan Ford for Defendant and Appellant.
Edmund G. Brown, Jr., Attorney General, Dane R. Gillette, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Pamela C. Hamanaka, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Kenneth N. Sokoler and Robert M. Snider, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
MALLANO, Acting P. J.
Jesse Whitley appeals from the judgment entered upon revocation of his probation. He contends the evidence was insufficient to support the finding that he had violated probation.
BACKGROUND
In March 2006, defendant entered a negotiated plea of guilty to possession of cocaine and admitted a prior conviction of possession of cocaine for the purpose of sale. He was placed on three years’ formal probation under Proposition 36. The following September, probation was revoked and reinstated. In November, Proposition 36 probation was terminated. In April 2007, a formal violation hearing was conducted.
At the violation hearing, Rebecca Millan testified that in the late morning hours of January 10, 2007, she was shopping at a market at Woodman Avenue and Roscoe Boulevard, with her purse in her shopping cart. Upon arriving home after paying for the groceries and transferring them to her car, Millan realized that her purse was not with her. Millan returned to the market, arriving 10 to 15 minutes after she first left, but was unable to locate her purse. She next saw the purse later that evening when it was brought to her residence by a police officer.
Police Officer Rufo Amores testified that about 6:30 p.m. that day, he and his partner were on routine patrol near Woodman Avenue and Saticoy Street when they conducted a traffic stop of a vehicle that did not have a front license plate. Defendant, who was the driver, was asked if he was on probation or parole and answered in the affirmative. Defendant then consented to a search of the vehicle and of his person. The search yielded credit cards in Millan’s name.
Amores’s testimony continued that when he asked defendant about the credit cards, defendant appeared nervous and responded that he got them from his aunt. Amores said that he could find out if the cards had been reported lost or stolen, at which point defendant claimed that he got the purse from a friend or a homeless person (Amores could not remember which) in a nearby trailer park. Defendant further stated that Millan’s purse was at his residence. Amores then called the residence (with a telephone number provided by defendant) and spoke with defendant’s nephew. Amores asked the nephew if he could bring the purse to where the traffic stop had taken place, which was close by. Defendant’s nephew did so. The purse was empty. Millan later identified it as hers.
Defendant also took the officers to the trailer park where he said he got the purse. Amores knew that “[a] lot of parolees live [at the trailer park], a lot of narcotics activity.” Before locating the trailer from which defendant said he got the purse, Amores spoke with his supervisor. The supervisor said the police department “had low units that night” and that defendant could be arrested based on the investigation that had already been conducted.
Defendant’s nephew testified in defendant’s behalf that a homeless woman had brought a purse to defendant’s house in the early afternoon on the day in question. Defendant was at home but asleep at the time. The nephew saw the woman going through the purse and removing things like a wallet and credit cards, which she took with her when she left.
Based on the foregoing evidence, the trial court found defendant to be in violation of probation for “failure to obey all laws, and violating Penal Code section 496, and Penal Code section 485, appropriation of lost property.” Defendant was sentenced to three years eight months in state prison.
DISCUSSION
Defendant contends that the evidence was insufficient to support the finding of probation violation. We disagree.
The standard of proof applicable to finding a violation of probation is preponderance of the evidence. (People v. Rodriguez (1990) 51 Cal.3d 437, 446–447.) But as with sufficiency-of-the-evidence review of a conviction found beyond a reasonable doubt, “where the trial court was required to resolve conflicting evidence, review on appeal is based on the substantial evidence test. Under that standard, our review is limited to the determination of whether, upon review of the entire record, there is substantial evidence of solid value, contradicted or uncontradicted, which will support the trial court’s decision. In that regard, we give great deference to the trial court and resolve all inferences and intendments in favor of the judgment. Similarly, all conflicting evidence will be resolved in favor of the decision.” (People v. Kurey (2001) 88 Cal.App.4th 840, 848–849, fns. omitted.)
The elements of the crime of receiving stolen property in violation of Penal Code section 496 are “(1) that the particular property was stolen, (2) that the accused received, concealed or withheld it from the owner thereof, and (3) that the accused knew the property was stolen. [Citations.]” (People v. Vann (1974) 12 Cal.3d 220, 224; accord, In re Anthony J. (2004) 117 Cal.App.4th 718, 728.)
On appeal, defendant posits logically possible scenarios by which these elements would not have been satisfied. For example, because Millan did not know how she became separated from her purse, the purse could have been merely lost and innocently recovered, rather than stolen. And given evidence that the purse arrived at defendant’s house while he was asleep, defendant could have been unaware of how it was acquired.
To accept defendant’s hypotheses would require this court to reweigh the evidence and reassess the credibility of the witnesses, thereby violating the rules of appellate review. (See People v. Bolin (1998) 18 Cal.4th 297, 333; People v. Hayes (2006) 142 Cal.App.4th 175, 179.) It was within the province of the trial court to disregard the far-fetched testimony of defendant’s nephew and focus on the suspicious circumstances of defendant’s possession of Millan’s cards and purse, as well as defendant’s nervousness and change of story about how he acquired these items. (See People v. Bloyd (1987) 43 Cal.3d 333, 347; People v. Grant (2003) 113 Cal.App.4th 579, 596.) Based on the evidence presented, the court could rationally conclude by a preponderance of the evidence that defendant had received stolen property. Accordingly, even without considering the trial court’s alternative bases for finding the probation violation, defendant’s contention of insufficient evidence must be rejected.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
We concur: VOGEL, J., ROTHSCHILD, J.