See Griffin v. City of Canon City, 147 Colo. 15, 362 P.2d 200 (1961); Phillips v. City of Odessa, 287 S.W.2d 518 (Tex Civ App 1956); Annotation, 18 ALR2d 1255, 1258 (1951). Although there is no Oregon case directly holding that quo warranto is the exclusive remedy to challenge a de facto annexation, quo warranto has been required in Oregon in other areas of public law: State ex rel Hallgarth v. School Dist. No. 23, 179 Or. 441, 172 P.2d 655 (1946) (de facto school district); Northern Pac. Ry. Co. v. John Day Irr. Dist., 106 Or. 140, 211 P. 781 (1923) (de facto irrigation district); Tyree v. Crystal District Improvement Co., 64 Or. 251, 253, 126 P. 605 (1913) (de facto improvement district); Bennett Trust Co. v. Sengstacken, 58 Or. 333, 352, 113 P. 863 (1911) (de facto port district). The extent to which these limitations on the right to contest a municipal annexation are recognized in Oregon is left in doubt by Portland General Electric Co. v. City of Estacada, 194 Or. 145, 241 P.2d 1129 (1952).
The validity of a de facto corporation cannot be collaterally attacked. State ex rel. v. School District No. 23, 179 Or. 441, 461, 172 P.2d 655; Northern Pac. Ry. Co. v. J. Day Irr. Dist., 106 Or. 140, 159, 211 P. 781, and Oregon cases there cited; Tyree v. Crystal Dist. Imp. Co., 64 Or. 251, 126 P. 605; Bennett Trust Co. v. Sengstacken, 58 Or. 333, 113 P. 863; School District v. School District, 34 Or. 97, 55 P. 98; 1 McQuillin, Municipal Corporations 3d ed 597, § 3.51; 62 CJS, Municipal Corporations, 177, § 66; 37 Am Jur, Municipal Corporations, 649, § 32; Annotation, 13 ALR2d 1282. School District v. School District, supra, was a mandamus proceeding in which the defendant sought to raise the question of the legality of the creation or organization of the plaintiff school district.
30 per acre. Whatever may be said of the stockholders as between themselves who actually participated in this gratuitous disposition of the prima facie obligations of the company, it cannot affect the plaintiff who never received any part of them. The case alluded to, in which it was sought to declare the Crystal District Improvement Company to be a void concern and to enjoin the issuance of its bonds, is Tyree v. Crystal District Improvement Company, 64 Or. 251 ( 126 P. 605). The matter directly decided on appeal and final decree was that the existence of a de facto corporation cannot be attacked collaterally by injunction.
The burning was of an incendiary nature; the fire started in the jammed dumb-waiter shaft, the appellant had the opportunity to start the fire as he was the last person present in the steak house, his intentions were indicated by his statements before the fire with reference to certain fire insurance and other matters; the appellant had a motive because he claimed the business was losing money and was in debt and told his business neighbor to let the place burn as he was collecting insurance; he was not upset and offered a bribe to the fire chief to make a good report of the fire and he threatened to kill Fowler if he did not go along with him in the matter. (See People v. Stark, 16 Cal.App.2d 467, 468-469 [ 60 P.2d 595]; People v. White, 19 Cal.App. 555, 556-557 [126 P. 505]; People v. Miller, 41 Cal.App.2d 252, 254-256 [ 106 P.2d 239]; People v. Roganovich, 77 Cal.App. 158, 160-161 [ 246 P. 132]; People v. Freeman, 135 Cal.App.2d 11, 12-15 [ 286 P.2d 565]; People v. Arnold, 53 Cal.App.2d 11, 12-13 [ 127 P.2d 285]; People v. Burrows, 119 Cal.App.2d 766, 768 [ 260 P.2d 137]; People v. Richard, 101 Cal.App.2d 631, 636-638 [ 225 P.2d 938].) However, upon considering the appellant's second contention, we believe that it is well taken and that he is entitled to a new trial.