The defendant was not entitled to suppression of a statement he made to law enforcement officials following his arrest and before he was advised of his Miranda rights (see Miranda v Arizona, 384 US 436). After a detective succinctly and accurately answered the defendant's inquiry if he was under arrest or being brought in for questioning, the defendant asked, "How could you arrest me without the gun?" The Supreme Court properly determined that the inculpatory statement was not prompted by the functional equivalent of custodial interrogation, and thus, was not subject to suppression (see Rhode Island v Innis, 446 US 291, 300-301; Miranda v Arizona, 384 US 436; People v Davis, 32 AD3d 445; People v Harrison, 251 AD2d 681, 682; People v West, 237 AD2d 315; People v Pryor, 194 AD2d 749; cf. People v Tavares-Nunez, 87 AD3d 1171). Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution (see People v Contes, 60 NY2d 620, 621), we find that it was legally sufficient to establish the defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.

After a detective succinctly and accurately answered the defendant's inquiry if he was under arrest or being brought in for questioning, the defendant asked, “How could you arrest me without the gun?” The Supreme Court properly determined that the inculpatory statement was not prompted by the functional equivalent of custodial interrogation, and thus, was not subject to suppression (see Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291, 300–301, 100 S.Ct. 1682, 64 L.Ed.2d 297; Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694; People v. Davis, 32 A.D.3d 445, 821 N.Y.S.2d 217; People v. Harrison, 251 A.D.2d 681, 682, 677 N.Y.S.2d 794; People v. West, 237 A.D.2d 315, 654 N.Y.S.2d 390; People v. Pryor, 194 A.D.2d 749, 600 N.Y.S.2d 81; cf. People v. Tavares–Nunez, 87 A.D.3d 1171, 930 N.Y.S.2d 589). Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution (see People v. Contes, 60 N.Y.2d 620, 621, 467 N.Y.S.2d 349, 454 N.E.2d 932), we find that it was legally sufficient to establish the defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.

e even if the defendant was in custody and unwarned ( People v. Rivers, 56 N.Y.2d at 480, 453 N.Y.S.2d 156, 438 N.E.2d 862, quoting People v. Stoesser, 53 N.Y.2d 648, 650, 438 N.Y.S.2d 990, 421 N.E.2d 110; see People v. Maerling, 46 N.Y.2d 289, 302–303, 413 N.Y.S.2d 316, 385 N.E.2d 1245; People v. Dunn, 195 A.D.2d at 244, 607 N.Y.S.2d 689). For a statement to fall within that category, “the spontaneity has to be genuine and not the result of inducement, provocation, encouragement or acquiescence, no matter how subtly employed” ( People v. Maerling, 46 N.Y.2d at 302–303, 413 N.Y.S.2d 316, 385 N.E.2d 1245; see People v. Rivers, 56 N.Y.2d at 479, 453 N.Y.S.2d 156, 438 N.E.2d 862). While a police officer's brief response to a defendant's query as to the basis of an arrest, or similar inquiry, often does not amount to the functional equivalent of interrogation ( see e.g. People v. Davis, 32 A.D.3d 445, 445–446, 821 N.Y.S.2d 217; People v. Harrison, 251 A.D.2d 681, 682, 677 N.Y.S.2d 794; People v. West, 237 A.D.2d 315, 654 N.Y.S.2d 390; People v. Pryor, 194 A.D.2d 749, 749–750, 600 N.Y.S.2d 81), here, considering the totality of the circumstances leading up to the defendant's statement, we cannot say that, viewed objectively, the statement was genuinely “self-generated” and not the product of “an external cause” ( see People v. Stoesser, 53 N.Y.2d at 650, 438 N.Y.S.2d 990, 421 N.E.2d 110). The defendant was told by Detective Echeverria that he “needed” to speak to him, and was twice told that they would not speak until they reached the detective's office.

For a statement to fall within that category, "the spontaneity has to be genuine and not the result of inducement, provocation, encouragement or acquiescence, no matter how subtly employed" ( People v Maerling, 46 NY2d at 302-303; see People v Rivers, 56 NY2d at 479). While a police officer's brief response to a defendant's query as to the basis of an arrest, or similar inquiry, often does not amount to the functional equivalent of interrogation ( see e.g. People v Davis, 32 AD3d 445, 445-446; People v Harrison, 251 AD2d 681, 682; People v West, 237 AD2d 315; People v Pryor, 194 AD2d 749, 749-750), here, considering the totality of the circumstances leading up to the defendant's statement, we cannot say that, viewed objectively, the statement was genuinely "self-generated" and not the product of "an external cause" ( see People v Stoesser, 53 NY2d at 650). The defendant was told by Detective Echeverria that he "needed" to speak to him, and was twice told that they would not speak until they reached the detective's office.

Further, "not every comment made by a police officer in response to an inquiry by the defendant can be said to constitute interrogation, merely because it is followed by an incriminating statement from the defendant" ( People v Rivers, 56 NY2d at 479). This is especially true where an unwarned defendant, in custody, inquires as to the reason for his or her arrest, an officer states the reason, and defendant utters an incriminating response ( e.g. People v Harrison, 251 AD2d 681; People v West, 237 AD2d 315; People v Hylton, 198 AD2d 301; People v Pryor, 194 AD2d 749). There is no indication that defendant's statement was prompted by questioning, subtle maneuvering, compulsion other than that normally attendant to the conditions of custody, or any other official conduct "which could reasonably have been expected to evoke a declaration" (People v Baliukonis , 35 AD3d 626, 627).

The factual findings and credibility determinations of the Supreme Court following a suppression hearing are entitled to great deference on appeal and will not be disturbed unless clearly unsupported by the record ( see People v Tissiera, 22 AD3d 611). Here, the Supreme Court properly found that the defendant's spontaneous statement, made after a police officer arrested him but before Miranda warnings ( see Miranda v Arizona, 384 US 436) were administered, was not triggered by any police conduct which could reasonably have been expected to evoke a declaration from him ( see People v Rivers, 56 NY2d 476, 480; People v West, 237 AD2d 315). Additionally, the Supreme Court properly determined that the defendant's statements after the Miranda warnings were administered were voluntarily made after he knowingly and intelligently waived his Miranda rights ( see Miranda v Arizona, supra; People v Williams, 62 NY2d 285, 289). The defendant's claim that his convictions are legally repugnant with one another is unpreserved for appellate review ( see People v Graham, 307 AD2d 935; People v Mayo, 277 AD2d 397) and, in any event, this claim is without merit as the jury could have found that the defendant intended to cause physical injury while recklessly creating a grave risk that death would ensue from his actions ( see People v Trappier, 87 NY2d 55, 59).

Here, the grand juror's question sought to elicit information relating to the credibility of the young victim, a collateral issue "more appropriately reserved for presentation to the petit jury than to the Grand Jury" ( People v Ramajit, 203 AD2d 488, 490; see People v Suarez, supra at 862). On this record, there is no basis upon which to conclude that the prosecutor's response was improper or that it impaired the integrity of the grand jury proceeding ( see People v Van Dyke, 214 AD2d 468; see also People u West, 237 AD2d 315).

ORDERED that the judgment is affirmed. Contrary to the defendant's contention, his spontaneous statement, made after a police officer arrested him but before Miranda warnings (see Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436), were given, was not triggered by any police conduct which could reasonably have been anticipated to evoke a declaration from him (see People v. Lynes, 49 N.Y.2d 286, 295; People v. West, 237 A.D.2d 315; People v. Webb, 224 A.D.2d 464). The hearing court acted within its discretion in determining that the court-appointed certified interpreter was competent (see People v. Hubbard, 184 A.D.2d 781; People v. Catron, 143 A.D.2d 468). There was no proof that any serious error in translation occurred during the hearing that would warrant a reversal (see People v. Rolston, 109 A.D.2d 854; cf. People v. Pavao, 59 N.Y.2d 282).

Here, although the defendant was not subjected to express questioning, the Court finds that the exchange between Officer Papadopoulos and the defendant was not "self-generated" or made without any external prompting.In People v. West, 237 A.D.2d 315 [2d Dept 1997], the defendant asked the detective why he was being arrested. When the detective replied, "I think you know," the defendant said, "You know, for the robbery with the two other guys?

A court is required to examine all the facts and circumstances in determining whether questioning or conduct of a police officer "was designed to elicit information;" if so, the defendant's right to counsel was violated. See People v. West, 237 AD2d 315 (2nd Dept. 1997). Officer Wiley did not "deliberately elicit" the statement the People seek to admit.