Opinion
No. 347774
11-24-2020
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. NANI RENE WESLEY, Defendant-Appellant.
If this opinion indicates that it is "FOR PUBLICATION," it is subject to revision until final publication in the Michigan Appeals Reports. UNPUBLISHED Washtenaw Circuit Court
LC No. 18-000275-FH Before: REDFORD, P.J., and RIORDAN and TUKEL, JJ. PER CURIAM.
Defendant appeals by right her conviction by a jury of operating a vehicle while intoxicated (OWI), third offense, MCL 257.625(1) and (9)(c). The trial court sentenced defendant to 30 days in jail. We affirm.
I. BACKGROUND FACTS
This case arose from defendant's OWI charge for operating a vehicle on the highway while intoxicated. Before trial, defendant moved to suppress the results of a Breathalyzer test administered to defendant on the ground that the deputy made an unjustified traffic stop because she contended that a video of the stop showed that defendant did not commit a traffic code violation; and evidence obtained as a result of the traffic stop, therefore, was inadmissible at trial.
At an evidentiary hearing on defendant's motion to suppress, Deputy Jeremiah Richardson testified that he received training in the detection of intoxicated drivers, and he worked a grant detail through the state of Michigan on impaired driving enforcement on the night of the offense. Deputy Richardson stated that he saw a black Jeep merging onto the highway in front of him and observed the Jeep drive "on the white fog line on the right" of the entrance ramp to the highway before following very closely behind a minivan by "less than a car length distance." Deputy Richardson testified that the black Jeep then crossed over the fog line on the left side of the entrance ramp to immediately merge into the middle lane of the highway.
Deputy Richardson stated that the highway had a 70 miles per hour (mph) posted speed and he paced the black Jeep at 74 mph to 75 mph for about 14 seconds. Deputy Richardson also stated that he observed the vehicle briefly weave inside the middle lane from left to right, which, based upon his experience indicated "that potentially somebody could be under the influence or distracted driving." Deputy Richardson testified that he was unable to keep up with the Jeep while traveling 71 mph or 72 mph, and he ultimately had to travel about 76 mph or 77 mph to catch up to the Jeep before activating his emergency lights and initiating the traffic stop. Deputy Richardson identified defendant as the person driving the black Jeep.
The trial court admitted a dashboard camera video recording of the incident and reviewed it at the hearing. The video recorded the black Jeep driving on a curved entrance ramp to the highway and braking as it quickly approached a minivan in front of it, leaving what appeared to be less than a car's length distance between the vehicles. The video also depicted the Jeep's right side tires touch the curved, white fog line on the right side of the entrance ramp, and then the Jeep crossed the solid white line on the left side of the entrance ramp while using its left side turn signal and passing the slower-moving minivan to merge into the center lane of the highway.
The video showed Deputy Richardson following behind the black Jeep going 73 to 75 mph while keeping about the same distance between the vehicles. Deputy Richardson explained that he did not close the distance between his vehicle and the Jeep because he paced defendant's speed. The video then showed the black Jeep driving close to the dotted line on the right side of the middle lane before moving closer to the dotted line on the left side of the lane, and then back to the center of the middle lane. The video recording also showed Deputy Richardson's vehicle slowing down to 71 mph while the distance between his vehicle and the Jeep increased before he sped up to 77 mph to catch up to the Jeep. Finally, the video depicted the black Jeep's turn signal indicating the driver's intention to move into the right lane but then switched immediately to indicate a move back into the middle lane before Deputy Richardson activated his lights and initiated the traffic stop.
After hearing Deputy Richardson's testimony and watching the dashboard camera video of the incident, the trial court ruled on defendant's motion to suppress as follows:
The officer who testified, the dep—deputy testified that he has experience in detecting intoxicated driving and he's been trained in this and that's one of the things that he was doing that night. He was on impaired driving enforcement. There were a number of things that [defendant] did do correctly, which was using her blinker, you know, every time she was changing the lane, she did use her blinker.
But based on the totality of the circumstances, putting together how she was driving on or near or at some point over for a brief moment, the fog line and driving over the speed limit clearly is sufficient to stop even though it may be common that other cars drive over the speed limit and not everybody is stopped, but that doesn't mean that the officer couldn't stop her based on the speed alone.
The weaving is an indicator that he used another factor that Deputy Richard used to establish that she should be—this should be investigated further. What struck me about the video is how quickly she did come up on the van and hit her brakes and then, she moved to the right lane and there's no law against moving to
the right lane. She had her blinker on, but then, she very rapidly moved back to the left again to the center lane and there didn't seem to be any reason for doing that.The results of defendant's Breathalyzer test were admitted at trial, and the jury convicted defendant of OWI. Defendant now appeals her conviction.
So, I think all of those circumstances combined, the totality of the circumstances certainly justified the stop and the speed alone would have justified the stop, so I am satisfied that the stop was—was lawful and then, the Breathalyzer results would be admissible. So, the motion is denied.
II. ANALYSIS
Defendant argues that the trial court erred by denying her motion to suppress the admission of her Breathalyzer test results on the ground that the evidence was obtained during an unconstitutional traffic stop because no probable cause existed for the stop. We disagree.
We review a trial court's factual findings during a motion to suppress hearing for clear error, and the trial court's legal conclusions de novo. People v Roberts, 292 Mich App 492, 502; 808 NW2d 290 (2011). "A finding of fact is clearly erroneous if, after a review of the entire record, an appellate court is left with a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made." Id. (quotation marks and citation omitted). "Both the United States Constitution and the Michigan Constitution guarantee the right against unreasonable searches and seizures," and they are generally construed to provide the same protections. People v Chowdhury, 285 Mich App 509, 516; 775 NW2d 845 (2009) (quotation marks and citation omitted); see also US Const Am IV; Const 1963, art 1, § 11.
"In order to [constitutionally] effectuate a valid traffic stop, a police officer must have an articulable and reasonable suspicion that a vehicle or one of its occupants is subject to seizure for a violation of law." People v Williams, 236 Mich App 610, 612; 601 NW2d 138 (1999) (citations omitted). A traffic stop is constitutional if "there is probable cause to believe that a driver has violated a traffic law," even if the police officer's subjective intent for the stop was based on other factors. People v Kavanaugh, 320 Mich App 293, 299; 907 NW2d 845 (2017). When a traffic stop is initiated because the defendant was speeding, the stop is reasonable and based on probable cause. People v Williams, 472 Mich 308, 314; 696 NW2d 636 (2005). "Moreover, erratic driving, such as swerving within a lane and driving on the lane markers, can give rise to a reasonable suspicion of intoxication justifying an investigatory stop." People v Hyde, 285 Mich App 428, 437; 775 NW2d 833 (2009).
For example, in People v Davis, 250 Mich App 357, 363-364; 649 NW2d 94 (2002), this Court held a traffic stop proper because the police officer had probable cause to believe that the defendant violated traffic laws after observing defendant's vehicle "weaving in its lane and speeding just before being stopped." Similarly, this Court also upheld the constitutionality of a traffic stop that occurred after a police officer observed the defendant "swerving in the lane and driving on the lane markers." People v Christie, 206 Mich App 304, 309-310; 520 NW2d 647 (1994). In Christie, this Court reasoned that "fewer foundational facts are necessary to support a finding of reasonableness when moving vehicles are involved" in determining that defendant's actions were "classic indicia of an intoxicated driver." Id. at 309. This Court held that the traffic stop caused "a 'minimal intrusion' of [the] defendant's Fourth Amendment rights in light of [the] defendant's potential danger to the public." Id. at 310 (citation omitted).
In this case, evidence established that defendant drove in excess of the speed limit. Deputy Richardson testified that he paced defendant's vehicle at about 74 mph or 75 mph before initiating the traffic stop, and the dashboard camera video confirmed that Deputy Richardson drove from 73 mph to 75 mph while keeping pace with defendant's vehicle. This evidence supported the trial court's factual finding that defendant drove in excess of the posted speed limit. Therefore, the trial court did not clearly err in this regard. See Roberts, 292 Mich App at 502. Based on defendant's speeding alone, Deputy Richardson had probable cause to initiate the traffic stop, even if the speeding was only a pretext for stopping defendant to investigate a potential case of intoxicated driving. See Williams, 472 Mich at 314; Kavanaugh, 320 Mich App at 299. Consequently, the traffic stop in this case was reasonable and constitutional. See Williams, 472 Mich at 314.
Moreover, defendant admits that she briefly weaved within the middle lane of the highway and drove on the fog line on the right side of the curved entrance ramp before the traffic stop. Because "erratic driving, such as swerving within a lane and driving on the lane markers, can give rise to a reasonable suspicion of intoxication," defendant's admitted actions provided further justification for the traffic stop in this case. See Hyde, 285 Mich App at 437. Defendant's driving and speeding provided probable cause that defendant violated traffic laws or drove while intoxicated. See Davis, 250 Mich App at 363-364; Christie, 206 Mich App at 309-310. Because the traffic stop did not violate constitutional prohibitions, the trial court did not err by denying defendant's motion to suppress the evidence of her Breathalyzer test results. See Williams, 236 Mich App at 612.
Affirmed.
/s/ James Robert Redford
/s/ Michael J. Riordan
/s/ Jonathan Tukel