Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County No. FJ39333, Cynthia Loo, Temporary Judge. (Pursuant to Cal. Const., art. VI, § 21.)
Steven A. Torres, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Kamala D. Harris, Attorney General, Dane R. Gillette, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Pamela C. Hamanaka, Assistant Attorney General, Lawrence M. Daniels and Lauren E. Dana, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
ALDRICH, J.
INTRODUCTION
Defendant and appellant Wendy C. contends that the juvenile court lacked jurisdiction to issue a restitution order, because at the time the order was issued she was over 21 and the arrest warrant upon which jurisdiction rested had been recalled. We hold that the juvenile court had jurisdiction to issue the order, and we therefore affirm the judgment.
BACKGROUND
On August 18, 2006, a petition was filed under Welfare and Institutions Code section 602 alleging that Wendy C. left the scene of an accident (Veh. Code, § 20001, subd. (a)) and was an unlicensed driver (Veh. Code, § 12500, subd. (a)). The juvenile court found true the allegations in the petition on January 17, 2007 and placed Wendy C. on deferred entry of judgment (DEJ). The court declared the violation of Vehicle Code section 20001, subdivision (a), to be a felony and set the maximum time of confinement at four years, two months. Thereafter, on August 13, 2008, the parties stipulated that the amount of restitution owed to the victim was $7, 200.13.
All further undesignated statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code.
The facts underlying the petition are not relevant.
The juvenile court revoked the DEJ and issued an arrest warrant on February 18, 2008, because Wendy C. failed to appear. While the arrest warrant was pending, Wendy C. turned 21. The court recalled the arrest warrant on December 6, 2010 and issued a restitution order in the amount of $7, 200.13.
DISCUSSION
Wendy C. does not dispute that the juvenile court had jurisdiction over her while the arrest warrant was pending. She contends, however, that once the warrant was recalled, the court lost jurisdiction to issue the restitution order because she was over 21 years of age.
Section 607, subdivision (a), provides that a juvenile court may retain jurisdiction over any person who is found to be a ward or dependent child of the juvenile court until he or she turns 21, with several exceptions. The exception relevant here is a juvenile court may retain jurisdiction over any person while that person is the subject of a warrant for arrest issued under section 663. (§ 607, subd. (e).)
Wendy C. turned 21 in August 2010. Therefore, by the time of the December 6, 2010 hearing, the juvenile court’s jurisdiction hinged on the arrest warrant. But the first thing the juvenile court did at the December 6, 2010 hearing was to recall and to quash the warrant. Then, when the court said it was considering terminating the matter with an order for civil restitution, Wendy C.’s counsel objected on the ground the trial court had lost jurisdiction the moment it quashed the warrant. The court found it had not lost jurisdiction and issued the restitution order.
To find here that the juvenile court lost jurisdiction simply because it recalled and quashed the warrant at the beginning of the hearing rather than after it had issued the restitution order would elevate form over substance. It is true, as Wendy C. points out, that timing often matters; for example, a new trial motion must be made before judgment is entered. (Pen. Code, § 1182; People v. Hales (1966) 244 Cal.App.2d 507, 511.) But a court’s jurisdiction to entertain a new trial motion terminates once judgment is entered because there is a statutorily limited time in which to bring such a motion otherwise the “proceedings after judgment would be interminable, ” and there must be some point where litigation in the trial court ends and jurisdiction in the appellate court begins. (Hales, at p. 515.) A similar rationale does not apply to a situation where, as here, there is no “magic” to the sequence of events occurring within a single day at a hearing lasting a matter of minutes.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
We concur: KLEIN, P. J., KITCHING, J.