Opinion
C099959
08-12-2024
THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. WILLIAM JOSEPH WELLS, Defendant and Appellant.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Super. Ct. No. 23FE007911.
EARL, P. J.
Defendant William Joseph Wells attempted to run over his estranged wife, T.W., with his car but injured a bystander instead. A jury found Wells guilty of two counts of assault with a deadly weapon and found true an enhancement allegation that he personally inflicted great bodily injury. The trial court imposed an aggregate term of seven years in state prison. On appeal, Wells contends the trial court prejudicially abused its discretion by admitting evidence of prior domestic violence against T.W. pursuant to Evidence Code section 352. Concluding there is no reversible error, we affirm the judgment.
Undesignated statutory references are to the Evidence Code.
FACTUAL BACKGROUND
In May 2023, Wells and T.W. were married, but estranged, when Wells showed up at T.W.'s apartment, uninvited. Even though she was surprised to see him, T.W. got into Wells's car with him. T.W. sat in the back seat as Wells drove around for a few minutes before they started arguing, at which point T.W. got out of the car and walked toward a bus stop. Wells proceeded to drive in close proximity to T.W. while they continued to argue. Suddenly, Wells yelled, "Just watch." T.W. heard tires screech, looked up, and saw Wells driving his car toward her at approximately 20 to 30 miles an hour. T.W. quickly jumped back and Wells narrowly missed hitting T.W., but ran into a bystander. Wells got out of the car and fled the scene. The bystander suffered numerous fractured bones, including his leg, ribs, and nasal bone.
An amended information charged Wells with one count of attempted murder (Pen. Code, §§ 664/187, subd. (a)), one count of assault with a deadly weapon against T.W. (id., § 245, subd. (a)(1)), and one count of assault with a deadly weapon against the bystander with an attendant great bodily injury enhancement (id., § 12022.7, subd. (a)).
Prior to trial, the People moved to introduce prior acts of domestic violence incidents by Wells pursuant to Evidence Code section 1109, including conduct in December 2018, July 2022, and December 2022, and prior corporal injury convictions (Pen. Code, § 273.5) sustained in 2011 and 2020. The People's motion included details of the prior domestic violence incidents.
Wells also filed motions in limine, which included an objection to the admission of the prior conduct evidence. Wells argued that such evidence was irrelevant (§§ 210, 350); likely to confuse the jury, unduly prejudice him, and involve undue consumption of time (§ 352); and was inadmissible "other crimes" evidence (§ 1101).
At a pretrial hearing, the trial court indicated that it reviewed both the People's and Wells's motions in limine. The trial court granted the People's motion to introduce the prior domestic violence incidents and prior convictions, noting that section 1109 "is a statutorily mandated rule of evidence."
Defense counsel argued for reconsideration of this ruling prior to the start of evidence. He argued the December 2018 incident was more prejudicial than probative since it was more remote than the other incidents and was only a verbal argument. The People argued that the incident was probative because it illustrated the relationship between Wells and T.W. They argued that in previous interactions with law enforcement, T.W. had told law enforcement that she had not been assaulted, when in fact she had. The People believed that T.W. would minimize Wells's actions in her testimony before the jury, or recant her prior statements regarding the instant offenses.
The trial court ruled evidence of the December 2018 incident admissible only if T.W. testified that she had not previously lied to law enforcement about whether Wells had assaulted her. The trial court did not change its ruling permitting evidence of the conduct in July and December of 2022. However, the trial court excluded evidence of the 2011 prior conviction because it was over 10 years old. Considering the 2020 prior conviction, the trial court noted it was "allowable under [section] 1109 unless under [section] 352 grounds it shouldn't come in." The trial court explained that it "falls squarely within [section] 1109 [when] it's relevant and probative [and] more probative than it is prejudicial." The trial court then ruled the December 2020 conviction admissible.
At trial, T.W. testified to the prior acts of abuse. She testified that "[t]he entire relationship [between her and Wells] was filled with physical abuse." T.W. testified that in July 2022, she and Wells were arguing, and he hit her across the face with a metal coffee mug. T.W. suffered four cracked teeth, a broken cheekbone, a broken nose, and cuts to her lips. In December 2022, she and Wells were homeless and living separately "on the streets." T.W. went to Wells's tent because she wanted to feel safe. Wells was angry that she sought him out, told her to get out of his tent, and kicked her in the face approximately 12 times. T.W. admitted that she had previously lied to law enforcement, saying Wells had not previously assaulted her when in fact he had.
The jury found Wells guilty of assault with a deadly weapon against T.W. and assault with a deadly weapon against the bystander. It also found true the allegation that he personally inflicted great bodily injury upon the bystander. As the jury could not reach a verdict on the attempted murder charge, the trial court declared a mistrial as to that count. The trial court sentenced Wells to an aggregate term of seven years: the midterm of three years for assault with a deadly weapon against the bystander, plus three years for the attendant great bodily injury enhancement, and one year (one-third midterm) for assault with a deadly weapon against T.W.
DISCUSSION
On appeal, Wells argues the trial court prejudicially erred and abused its discretion by admitting evidence of the prior uncharged domestic violence incidents in two ways. First, the trial court erred when it failed to perform any analysis under section 352 by "automatically admit[ting] the evidence based on its character as domestic violence evidence." Second, even assuming the court implicitly exercised its discretion, the trial court nonetheless erred by failing to exclude the evidence altogether or at least "sanitize" some of the details from it because the prior incidents were dissimilar to the instant offenses. Specifically, the trial court should have at least excluded "inflammatory details about the extent of [T.W.'s] injuries and unnecessary specifics about how she sustained those injuries."
I
Legal Background and Standard of Review
Evidence of prior criminal acts is ordinarily inadmissible to show a defendant's propensity to commit such acts. (§ 1101.) This general rule is subject to exceptions, however, one of which is in cases involving domestic violence. (§ 1109.) Section 1109, in effect," 'permits the admission of defendant's other acts of domestic violence for the purpose of showing a propensity to commit such crimes.'" (People v. Brown (2011) 192 Cal.App.4th 1222, 1233.) The admission of prior acts as propensity evidence encompasses both charged and uncharged acts. (See, e.g., People v. Falsetta (1999) 21 Cal.4th 903, 917-918.)
The admissibility of such evidence, however, is still subject to the trial court's analysis pursuant to section 352, of whether the probative value of the evidence is substantially outweighed by the probability the evidence will consume an undue amount of time or create a substantial danger of undue prejudice, of confusing the issues, or of misleading the jury. (§§ 352, 1109, subd. (a)(1); People v. Brown, supra, 192 Cal.App.4th at p. 1233.)" 'The principal factor affecting the probative value of an uncharged act is its similarity to the charged offense.'" (People v. Hollie (2010) 180 Cal.App.4th 1262, 1274.) And "undue prejudice," as used in section 352, does not mean evidence that is harmful to the defendant's case." '" '[T]he prejudice which exclusion of evidence under . . . section 352 is designed to avoid is not the prejudice or damage to a defense that naturally flows from relevant, highly probative evidence. "[A]ll evidence which tends to prove guilt is prejudicial or damaging to the defendant's case. The stronger the evidence, the more it is 'prejudicial.' The 'prejudice' referred to in . . . section 352 applies to evidence which uniquely tends to evoke an emotional bias against the defendant as an individual and which has very little effect on the issues." '" '" (People v. Fruits (2016) 247 Cal.App.4th 188, 205.)
The court enjoys broad discretion in making this determination, and the court's exercise of discretion will not be disturbed on appeal except upon a showing that it was exercised in an arbitrary, capricious, or patently absurd manner that resulted in a manifest miscarriage of justice. (People v. Mora and Rangel (2018) 5 Cal.5th 442, 480.) "In determining whether the trial court abused its discretion, we must focus on what the court was made aware of at the time it ruled on the motion, not on evidence that came out or circumstances that took place during the trial." (People v. Fruits, supra, 247 Cal.App.4th at p. 208.) Further, as a general rule" 'a trial court is presumed to have been aware of and followed the applicable law.'" (People v. Stowell (2003) 31 Cal.4th 1107, 1114.)" '[A] court need not expressly weigh prejudice against probative value or even expressly state that it has done so, if the record as a whole shows the court was aware of and performed its balancing function under . . . section 352.'" (People v. Lewis (2009) 46 Cal.4th 1255, 1285.)
II Analysis
1. Section 352
Wells argues that the trial court abused its discretion by failing to conduct a section 352 analysis. We disagree. We presume that the trial court weighed the probative value and potential for undue prejudice of all the evidence that the People sought to admit under section 1109. (§ 664; People v. Stowell, supra, 31 Cal.4th at p. 1114.)
At the pretrial hearing, the trial court indicated that it reviewed the People's and Wells's motions in limine, both of which referenced section 352. The People's motion requested the trial court admit the prior domestic violence incidents under section 1109, which explicitly requires that the trial court conduct a section 352 analysis. "Except as provided in subdivision (e) or (f), in a criminal action in which the defendant is accused of an offense involving domestic violence, evidence of the defendant's commission of other domestic violence is not made inadmissible by Section 1101 if the evidence is not inadmissible pursuant to Section 352." (§ 1109, italics added.) In addition, Wells's motion specifically argued that admission of evidence of the prior domestic violence offenses would unduly prejudice him under section 352. Thus, the trial court was aware of its balancing function under section 352.
Further, when Wells requested the court reconsider its ruling regarding the admission of other evidence of prior domestic violence incidents before jury selection, the trial court explicitly stated that such evidence was only admissible under section 1109 if it was not inadmissible under section 352. Demonstrating its understanding of the section 352 analysis, the trial court said the evidence "falls squarely within [section] 1109 [when] it's relevant and probative [and] more probative than it is prejudicial." Also, after hearing both sides argue the probative value of the December 2018 incident, the trial court ruled to allow evidence only if T.W. testified she had never lied to law enforcement. The trial court did not unconditionally admit evidence of every domestic violence incident, indicating that it weighed the probative value and potential for prejudice of each prior incident. Therefore, we interpret the trial court's statements that section 1109 preempted Wells's objections to the admission of the prior domestic violence incidents and that section 1109 "is a statutorily mandated rule of evidence" to mean that it found their probative value was not substantially outweighed by their potential for undue prejudice.
2. Admissibility of the Evidence
Next, Wells argues that even if the trial court conducted a section 352 analysis, it abused its discretion by not excluding evidence of the prior incidents altogether or at least sanitizing some of the details. We conclude that it was not arbitrary, capricious, or patently absurd for the trial court to admit the evidence of the prior incidents in their entirety. Contrary to Wells's assertions, there are key similarities between the July 2022 and December 2022 incidents and current offenses, and those similarities increased the prior incidents' probative value. The evidence of both prior incidents indicated Wells and T.W. were arguing when he physically assaulted T.W. in the heat of the moment, using whatever he had immediately available to him to injure her: a metal cannister; his fists, feet, and elbow; or his car. The prior incidents illustrate that Wells reacts impulsively and violently when he and T.W. argue, making the probative value of the prior conduct higher in determining whether he committed the instant offenses.
Further, any prejudicial impact from the evidence of the prior incidents naturally flowed from their relevance and high probative value. Though harmful to Wells's case, the evidence did not uniquely tend to evoke more of an emotional bias against Wells than the instant offenses. In fact, the attack at issue here was more egregious. Here, Wells drove his car directly at T.W. at a high rate of speed, while she was walking on a public street. Wells's actions resulted in severe injuries, including several broken bones, to an innocent bystander. Neither hitting T.W. in the face with a metal cannister once nor punching, kicking, and elbowing her in the head were more violent or caused more physical injury than that. We thus conclude the trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting evidence of the July 2022 and December 2022 incidents.
As to Wells's argument that the trial court should have at least sanitized the "inflammatory details" concerning the injuries that T.W. suffered and what caused her injuries, we conclude that he has forfeited this claim. Our conclusion is based on the California Supreme Court's decision in People v. Thomas (2023) 14 Cal.5th 327. In Thomas, the defendant challenged "the admission of any evidence related to [a prior act] both in the trial court and in [the Supreme Court], [but] he did not raise any specific objection to particular testimony or pieces of evidence." (Id. at p. 366.) When the trial court ruled that evidence related to the prior act was admissible, it therefore did not "parse the proffered testimony to determine the potential for undue prejudice nor did it consider how particular testimony might be tailored to avoid alleged undue prejudice." (Ibid.) The Supreme Court explained that "it was not incumbent on the trial court to undertake such an endeavor absent a specific objection and request from counsel." (Ibid.) Further, a general objection to the admission of any evidence of a prior act does not preserve a claim as to specific pieces of the evidence. (Id. at pp. 366-367.) Here, defense counsel made a blanket objection to the admission of the prior incidents but did not raise any specific objections to certain details or pieces of evidence in the trial court. Thus, Wells's claim that the trial court should have sanitized certain details from the evidence is forfeited on appeal.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
We concur: HULL, J., FEINBERG, J.