Opinion
5-18-0438
09-28-2022
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. JOHN F. WELLS, Defendant-Appellant.
This order was filed under Supreme Court Rule 23 and is not precedent except in the limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(1).
Appeal from the Circuit Court of Jefferson County. No. 17-CF-34 Honorable Jerry E. Crisel, Judge, presiding.
JUSTICE BARBERIS delivered the judgment of the court. Justices Wharton and Vaughan concurred in the judgment.
ORDER
BARBERIS JUSTICE.
¶ 1 Held: We affirm defendant's conviction and sentence for first degree murder where: (1) the trial court did not abuse its discretion in its evidentiary rulings; (2) defendant received the effective assistance of counsel; and (3) defendant received an appropriate sentence.
¶ 2 Defendant, John F. Wells, appeals his conviction and sentence for first degree murder, arguing that (1) the trial court of Jefferson County deprived him of a fair trial by barring certain evidence, which prevented him from presenting a complete defense; (2) defense counsel's errors deprived him of the effective assistance of counsel at trial and sentencing; (3) his 70-year prison sentence violated the proportionate penalties clause of the Illinois Constitution (Ill. Const. 1970, art. I, § 11) due to defendant's youth, personal culpability, and rehabilitative potential; and (4) the court abused its discretion in imposing an excessive sentence. We affirm.
¶ 3 I. Background
¶ 4 The State charged defendant and a codefendant, Lekedrieon Russell, by information with numerous offenses for conduct stemming from an alleged attempted robbery that occurred on January 20, 2017, which resulted in the shooting death of Deandray Jackson. A grand jury subsequently returned a 31-count indictment against defendant, Russell, and five additional codefendants, Lamar Williams, Curtis Devan Jr., Tony Feggins, Dantrez Brown, and Jarron Liddell. The grand jury indicted defendant on five counts of first degree murder, three of which alleged alternative theories of intentional, knowing, and strong probability (see sections 9-1(a)(1), (a)(2) of the Criminal Code of 2012 (720 ILCS 5/9-1(a)(1), (a)(2) (West 2016))). These three counts carried a mandatory firearm enhancement that added a minimum of 25 years of imprisonment to the sentence pursuant to the Unified Code of Corrections (730 ILCS 5/5-8-1(a)(1)(d)(iii) (West 2016)). The fourth and fifth counts alleged theories of felony murder (720 ILCS 5/9-1(a)(3) (West 2016)) with differing underlying predicate felonies, attempt robbery (id. §§ 8-4(a), 18-1(a)) and conspiracy (to commit robbery) (id. §§ 8-2(a), 9-1(a)(3)). Two additional counts alleged the underlying predicate felonies, both Class 3 felonies.
¶ 5 The indictment charged each codefendant with four counts-two counts of first degree murder, on theories of accountability and felony murder, and one count each of attempt robbery and conspiracy to commit robbery. Additionally, in separate cases, the State charged Deon Frazier, Gerrodo Forest, and Z.P. (a minor) as additional codefendants.
The precise charges are unclear as the charging instruments regarding these three codefendants are not contained in the record on appeal.
¶ 6 A. Pretrial Motions
¶ 7 Prior to trial, defendant filed a motion in limine, titled defendant's motion in limine #6. The motion sought introduction of evidence in support of an alternate suspect defense, including evidence of a prior shooting involving codefendant Williams and an ammunition box tray containing Williams's fingerprint. Specifically, defendant sought to introduce evidence pertaining to a July 17, 2016, "occurrence" involving two codefendants, Devan Jr. and Williams, which resulted in the State charging Williams with, and Williams later pleading guilty to, reckless discharge of a firearm.
¶ 8 Defendant alleged the evidence would show that Williams fired multiple shots at Travontae Cain near 1014 South 12th Street in Mt. Vernon, Illinois, on July 17, 2016. Defendant alleged that a witness saw Devan Jr. and Williams in the area at the time of the shooting, and that another witness saw the shooter "jog" west towards the residence of Devan Jr.'s mother, Kim Fowler, located at 1007 South 12th Street. Defendant also alleged that Cain informed police that Williams shot at him with a "bulky frame" handgun. Defendant asserted that there was "a substantial and meaningful link" between the shooting and Jackson's murder, given that both involved Williams and Devan Jr. and occurred in close proximity to Fowler's residence.
¶ 9 Defendant also sought to introduce an ammunition box tray containing Williams's fingerprint. In support, defendant alleged the evidence would show that Williams's fingerprint was found on an ammunition box tray inside of a Blazer 9-millimeter ammunition box that law enforcement discovered while searching through trash from Fowler's residence that was placed at the curb prior to Jackson's murder. According to defendant, both local law enforcement and an Illinois State Police (ISP) forensic scientist concluded that Williams's fingerprint matched the fingerprint found on the ammunition box tray. Defendant further alleged that law enforcement collected 13 spent shell casings of Blazer 9-millimeter ammunition at the scene of Jackson's murder and seized 6 spent Blazer brand 9-millimeter shell casings near the back door of Fowler's residence on January 31, 2017. Defendant alleged that an ISP forensic scientist concluded that the same gun ejected the 13 shell casings found at the scene of Jackson's murder and 4 of the 6 shell casings found near the back door of Fowler's residence. Defendant asserted that this evidence showed it was more probable that Williams shot Jackson.
The record reveals that Williams's fingerprint was actually found on an Hornady ammunition box tray that law enforcement discovered while searching Fowler's residence following Jackson's murder. Defense counsel and the State both mistakenly believed the fingerprint was found on the box of Blazer ammunition discovered in Fowler's trash prior to Jackson's murder. Defense counsel and the State later discovered the mistake and brought it to the trial court's attention at trial, as addressed later in this order.
¶ 10 The State objected to defendant's motion in limine and requested that the trial court bar defendant from presenting such evidence at trial. The State argued that the evidence failed "to link the alternate suspect to the current crime in any meaningful way." The State noted that the shooting and Jackson's murder involved different caliber firearms and different alleged motives-a robbery motive in the murder of Jackson and a gang or turf-related motive in the shooting of Cain. The State also noted that Williams pled guilty to reckless discharge of a firearm, which was unrelated to the "intentional" crimes committed against Jackson.
¶ 11 The trial court addressed defendant's motion in limine #6, along with the State's objection, at a pretrial hearing. At the hearing, the State argued that the court should bar evidence of the shooting and ammunition box tray containing Williams's fingerprint because the evidence was "too remote and too speculative" to link Williams to Jackson's murder. The State tendered a ballistics lab report, which showed that a .40-caliber handgun was used in the shooting and that a 9-millimeter handgun was used in Jackson's murder. Defense counsel argued that both events involved "multiple gunshots" from a gun "of a similar caliber" and occurred within four to five blocks of Fowler's residence less than a year apart. Defense counsel also stated that the shooting and Jackson's murder involved Fowler's son, Devan Jr., and Williams, and resulted in Williams pleading guilty to a gun charge. Defense counsel argued that fingerprint evidence would establish that the caliber of ammunition used in the shooting was also used in Jackson's murder.
¶ 12 The following discussion occurred between the trial court and the State regarding the fingerprint evidence:
"THE COURT: And Williams's fingerprints were on a tray that had-
MR. FEATHERSTUN [(THE STATE)]: Williams's-
THE COURT:-for ammo that was the same kind of ammo that was used in the murder?
MR. FEATHERSTUN: Found in the trash the morning before the murder.
* * *
MR. FEATHERSTUN: There is no ammunition. It's an empty tray and an empty box of ammunition, and his fingerprints are on the ammunition tray.
THE COURT: Got it.
MR. FEATHERSTUN: There's no evidence about when that was put there.
THE COURT: Right."
¶ 13 At the conclusion of the hearing, the trial court denied defendant's motion in limine. The court found that the evidence showed "some remote connection" but the connection was too remote to allow the evidence at trial. The court further expressed that the evidence "would do nothing more than send the jury down a rabbit hole that it probably shouldn't go down."
¶ 14 Defendant next filed a motion to suppress an involuntary statement he made to police during a recorded interview on February 8, 2017. At the hearing on the motion to suppress, the State called Detective Justin Haney of the Mt. Vernon Police Department to testify concerning defendant's February 8, 2017, interview. The State then played the DVD recording of the interview in open court. After reviewing the DVD recording and considering arguments of counsel, the trial court denied defendant's motion to suppress.
¶ 15 Shortly thereafter defendant filed a motion in limine, titled motion in limine #1, seeking to bar certain portions of defendant's February 8, 2017, recorded interview. The State later agreed to redact portions of the interview that defendant contested. The court granted defendant's motion in limine #1 without objection from the State.
¶ 16 B. Jury Trial
¶ 17 On February 13, 2016, the trial court severed defendant's trial from the codefendants, and defendant's case proceeded to jury selection. Prior to the presentation of evidence, the State made an oral motion to enter a nolle prosequi on the count of first degree murder premised on felony murder with the underlying predicate of conspiracy (to commit robbery) and on the underlying conspiracy count, which the trial court granted without objection.
¶ 18 In its opening statement, the State presented a detailed overview of its case. According to the State, the evidence would show that the victim, Jackson, brought several jars of cannabis from California to Mt. Vernon, Illinois. On January 20, 2017, Feggins, Z.P., Russell, Frazier, and Forest discussed robbing Jackson of the cannabis. Russell and Z.P. retrieved a gun from Williams and located Jackson at Jykeece Oliver's house. Russell, Z.P., Forest, and Frazier devised a plan to storm the house and rob Jackson at gunpoint but they "chickened out" after encountering a locked screen door. The four immediately ran to the vicinity of 18th Street and Conger, in front of Leon Kemmerling's house, and returned the gun to Williams. Defendant, Liddell, Brown, and Devan Jr. were also present in front of Kemmerling's house. Jackson left Oliver's house with a bag containing the cannabis and walked toward 18th Street and Conger, where he encountered the group of men. Jackson, unaware that four of the men were the "would-be home invaders," recognized some of the men in the group and began shaking their hands. Russell then attempted to wrestle the bag of cannabis from Jackson, but Jackson held on to the bag and made "a run for it." Russell, Z.P., Forest, and Frazier gave chase.
¶ 19 The State also claimed the evidence would show that defendant, armed with a 9-millimeter handgun, joined the chase and ran into an alley where he fired 13 shots at Jackson. One of the shots struck Jackson, who was running down the alley with his back toward defendant. Jackson continued to run, veering to the right and following a chain link fence until he collapsed. Jackson later died from the injury.
¶ 20 In his opening statement, defense counsel told the jurors that the case centered on whether defendant was part of the robbery that occurred at 18th and Conger and whether defendant shot Jackson. Defense counsel stated that the State's lay witnesses were criminals who cut "life-altering" deals with the State. Defense counsel claimed that the State's witnesses' "stories" changed depending on the audience and day. Defense counsel also stated, in pertinent part, as follows:
"MR. VAUGHN [(DEFENSE COUNSEL)]: There will be physical evidence and forensic evidence that one bullet took the life of *** Jackson, *** there will be physical evidence and forensic evidence that all of those shots fired at Mr. Jackson, some 13, all of them came from the same gun, but the only physical evidence you will hear linking any person-any person to the shooting of *** Jackson is *** evidence of a fingerprint.
The evidence you will hear is that there's fingerprint evidence seized by law enforcement where a latent print was found, and an expert will testify to this from the [ISP].
That piece of evidence turned up on, of all things, an empty ammunition container that was found a few blocks from the scene, and what's telling about this situation is that that same ammunition container matches the make and the caliber of the bullet that took the life of *** Jackson.
What makes this evidence even more interesting is that empty ammunition container that has the fingerprint on it-it was seized not after the shooting of *** Jackson but before by law enforcement who were investigating another case.
That ammunition container *** went to the [ISP] Lab, *** and the evidence will show that prior to that fingerprint test, which was a match for *** Williams, that prior to
that, *** Williams was not much interested in cooperating with the authorities in this case or assisting in the investigation of this case, but that changed after that fingerprint evidence was revealed by the [ISP] Lab.
With the presentation of the State's case, the State will attempt to show you that this ammunition container I speak of does not have a direct connection with this case but rather has an indirect connection with this case.
***
After this ammunition container came back matching the fingerprint of *** Williams, then *** Williams told law enforcement that [defendant] here was the shooter in the case. [Williams was] starting to feel the heat, and he decides he's going to cooperate, and that's if *** Williams testifies.
***
If [Williams] chooses to testify and if Mr. Williams testifies consistent with his most recent statement to the police, he will reveal that at the time of the robbery he was in possession of a 9mm firearm, the same caliber that took the life of *** Jackson."
¶ 21 Smith Willis Moore III, Jackson's uncle, testified that Jackson travelled by bus from California to Mt. Vernon, arriving on January 19, 2017. Moore III testified that Jackson brought cannabis with him from California.
¶ 22 Jykeece Oliver, an acquaintance of Jackson, testified that Jackson arrived at her home at 4:30 p.m. on January 20, 2017. Approximately 20 to 25 minutes after Jackson arrived, Oliver locked the screen door and heard someone grab the door handle as she walked away. She looked out the door and observed two unknown individuals running away. Jackson informed Oliver that he was uncomfortable staying there, so he grabbed his duffel bag and left her house.
¶ 23 Multiple law enforcement officials testified regarding their involvement in the investigation of Jackson's murder. Officer Jeremy Osborn of the Mt. Vernon Police Department testified that he responded to a call about multiple reports of gunshots near 18th Street at approximately 6 p.m. on January 20, 2017. While in route, the dispatcher notified Officer Osborn that there was a man with a gunshot wound on the ground behind 19th Street. Upon arrival, Officer Osborn located a black duffel bag on the ground near a chain link fence behind 19th Street. As Officer Osborn approached the bag, he observed an unresponsive black male lying on the ground near the bag. Officer Osborn immediately called for emergency medical services (EMS). Shortly thereafter, Officer Justin Osborn (Officer Jeremy Osborn's twin brother) of the Mt. Vernon Police Department, Chief Deputy Clint Taylor of the Jefferson County Sheriff's Department, and EMS arrived. EMS transported the unresponsive male to a local hospital. Officer Jeremy Osborn left the scene to obtain a search warrant for the duffel bag at approximately 9:15 p.m.
¶ 24 Chief Deputy Taylor testified that he and two or three officers from the Mt. Vernon Police Department, including Sergeant Robert Brands, walked down an alley north of the crime scene, where they discovered spent shell casings and observed bullet holes in a nearby building. Chief Deputy Taylor reported the discovery to the on-scene detectives.
¶ 25 Sergeant Brands testified that he responded to the call of shots fired on January 20, 2017. Upon arrival, Sergeant Brands instructed responding officers to secure the area where the shell casings were found and to secure the area surrounding the victim and duffel bag. Sergeant Brands notified Detective Captain Jeff Bullard of the Mt. Vernon Police Department of Jackson's murder.
¶ 26 Officer Andrew Meyers of the Mt. Vernon Police Department testified that he drove to the local hospital to check on the victim's status. After a nurse informed Officer Meyers that the victim died, Officer Meyers collected various items from the victim's hospital room, including a wallet containing an identification card. Officer Meyers learned Jackson's identity from the identification card. Officer Meyers placed Jackson's wallet and identification card in a plastic bag, which he later relinquished to Jefferson County Coroner Roger Hayse.
¶ 27 Special Agent Minckler, an ISP crime scene investigator (CSI), testified that he arrived at the murder scene at approximately 7:40 p.m. Special Agent Minckler identified and confirmed the accuracy of several crime scene photographs, including photographs depicting the back plates of the 13 shell casings found at the scene. Special Agent Minckler determined that all of the casings found at the scene were "9[-]mm Blazer Luger." Special Agent Minckler later transported the duffel bag found at the crime scene to the Mt. Vernon Police Department to conduct a search of the bag's contents. During the search, he found three glass mason jars containing suspected cannabis, a digital scale, and numerous personal items. The parties admitted a stipulation that confirmed the glass mason jars contained cannabis, along with an attached ISP forensic lab report.
¶ 28 Detective Haney of the Mt. Vernon Police Department testified that he assisted in the investigation of Jackson's murder. On January 23, 2017, Detective Haney received a "Crime Stoppers" tip that Devan Jr. and Williams might have been involved. That same day, Detective Haney received a report that Leon Kemmerling may have information concerning Jackson's murder. Detective Haney interviewed Kemmerling and learned that defendant, Brown, and Z.P., may have been involved in Jackson's murder. Detective Haney interviewed Z.P. on January 23, 2017, and January 24, 2017. During the first interview, Z.P. claimed that defendant, Devan Jr., Williams, Forest, Russell, and Frazier had information about Jackson's murder. During the second interview, Z.P. stated that Russell, Devan Jr., and Liddell were present at the time of Jackson's murder.
¶ 29 Detective Haney testified that he showed Kemmerling photographic lineups on January 30, 2017. Kemmerling identified Russell and Forest as present during Jackson's murder. Law enforcement arrested Russell following Kemmerling's identification on January 30, 2017. Detectives Haney and Victor Koontz conducted two interviews with Russell. In the first interview, Russell stated that he was present at Jackson's murder along with defendant, Williams, Devan Jr., and Liddell. Russell also stated that Feggins had some involvement but was not present at the time of Jackson's murder. In the second interview, Russell identified a photograph of Frazier and indicated that Frazier was his brother.
¶ 30 Detective Haney testified that he contacted Frazier, who agreed to a recorded interview on February 7, 2017. During the interview, Frazier stated that defendant, Williams, Russell, and Liddell were involved in Jackson's murder. Frazier, unlike Russell, did not state that Devan Jr. was involved.
¶ 31 The State and defense counsel offered a stipulation of Verizon records custodian through Detective Haney regarding defendant's cell phone use and location at the time of the offense. Haney testified that on January 20, 2017, at approximately 5:21 p.m., defendant's cell phone communicated with a cell phone tower near the intersection of 10th and Broadway in Mt. Vernon. At 6:03 p.m., defendant's cell phone communicated with a cell phone tower in the area of the 2300 block of Veterans. Jackson's murder occurred at approximately 5:45 p.m.
¶ 32 Detective Haney testified that he conducted a recorded interview with defendant on February 8, 2017. Detective Haney identified the DVD recording of the defendant's interview for the jury. Defense counsel agreed to its admission and publication "[s]ubject to previous court ruling." The DVD recording was admitted into evidence and played for the jury.
¶ 33 Detectives Haney and Koontz next interviewed Forest on March 8, 2017. Thereafter, Z.P., Frazier, and Williams each agreed to interviews. Detective Haney used information obtained during Williams's interview to attain various search warrants, including warrants to search individual cell phone and Facebook records belonging to defendant, Williams, and Feggins. The parties stipulated to the admission of these records into evidence at trial.
¶ 34 On cross-examination, Detective Haney testified that Z.P.'s text messages revealed that Z.P. requested to purchase a firearm from Williams. On redirect, Detective Haney recounted that Williams responded to Z.P. with a text stating that he knew someone with an SKS assault rifle but "no clip." On recross-examination, Detective Haney testified that the text messages concerning the SKS rifle were exchanged on January 19, 2017.
¶ 35 Prior to calling its next witness, the State made an oral motion in limine, seeking to bar evidence of the Hornady ammunition box containing the tray with Williams's fingerprint, as well as photographs of other ammunition that detectives found during a consensual search of the Fowler residence on January 31, 2017. Outside the presence of the jury, the State advised the trial court that both parties were under a mistaken belief that the Blazer 9-millimeter ammunition box found in the trash pulled from the Fowler residence before Jackson's murder contained Williams's fingerprint. The State reminded the court that law enforcement recovered 13 spent shells of Blazer 9-millimeter ammunition at the crime scene on January 20, 2017, and later recovered 6 spent shells of Blazer 9-millimeter ammunition outside of Fowler's residence on January 31, 2017. The State proffered that an ISP forensic scientist, who was a tool mark expert, would testify that the same weapon fired the 13 spent shells recovered from the scene and 4 of the 6 shells found at Fowler's residence. For that reason, the State argued that "the only ammunition relevant" to the case was the Blazer ammunition used to kill Jackson.
¶ 36 In response, defense counsel asserted that the State was likely to present evidence showing a connection between defendant and Fowler's residence, where law enforcement found various brands of ammunition boxes during the search conducted on January 31, 2017. According to defense counsel, "it's the Hornady ammunition and it's the Blazer ammunition and the Blazer box *** found beneath the bed" belonging to defendant's girlfriend, Breanna Devan.
¶ 37 Defense counsel, in an attempt to clarify the record, admitted that he mistakenly asserted in motion in limine #6 that Williams's fingerprints were found on a Blazer 9-millimeter ammunition box tray discovered in Fowler's trash before Jackson's murder on January 20, 2017. Defense counsel stated that he confused Mt. Vernon Police Department Exhibit 24, which was a photograph of the Hornady ammunition box and ammunition box tray with the fingerprint, and Mt. Vernon Police Department Exhibit 29, which was a photograph of the Blazer 9-millimeter ammunition box found near Breanna's bed. Defense counsel stated, "My fault. It was an error joined with the State ***."
¶ 38 Contrary to the State's arguments, defense counsel argued that he should be allowed to present evidence that Williams had a connection with some of the evidence found at Fowler's residence. When the trial court asked where defense counsel would draw the line, defense counsel responded as follows:
"I think where you draw the line is ammunition. *** [T]he connection between the Fowler residence and our case are the four ejected shells that Detective Smith found near the back door that are the same as fired [January 20, 2017] down on the alley, and if the State's allowed to bring in all of this evidence that casts [defendant] in a bad light with respect to the Fowler residence, at the very least, we should be able to say, 'Well, hey, some of the contraband found down there has a connection with Lamar Williams,' and I stand by what I told the jury during my opening statement, and that's this.
Based on the most recent interview between Lamar Williams and law enforcement that [has] been provided to me in discovery, Lamar Williams told the police that at the time of the occurrence, he [was] at or near the scene and he [was] in possession of a 9[-]mm gun of the same type that ejected those shells or-or are the same type as those four shells found near the back door of the Fowler residence."
¶ 39 In response, the State reiterated that the evidence showed only Blazer 9-millimeter ammunition was used to shoot Jackson. The Stated argued that there was "no connection, other than Lamar Williams's fingerprint on unrelated ammunition in a box, you know, to the Fowler residence, and for that matter, there's no connection whatsoever between Hornady 9[-]mm ammunition and this particular homicide." Lastly, the State argued that to be relevant, there would have to be a connection between the Hornady ammunition and Jackson's murder.
¶ 40 The trial court, without objection from the State, reviewed Mt. Vernon Police Department Detective Captain Bullard's supplemental narrative report which described in detail the evidence found and seized during the January 31, 2017, search of Fowler's residence. Defendant's Exhibit C listed the following seized evidence: (1) six spent 9-millimeter Blazer shell casings (found near the rear door of the residence); (2) Blazer 9-millimeter ammunition box holding one "remaining" round (found at the foot of Breanna's bed); (3) a .40-caliber round (found in a jewelry box on Fowler's bedroom dresser); (4) a .45-caliber round (found in a drawer in Fowler's bedroom dresser); (5) 16, 9-millimeter rounds (found in a desk drawer in the dining room); (6) a cardboard box containing a Hornady Critical Defense 9-millimeter ammunition box with 17 rounds; and (7) a Armscor USA ammunition box with 25 Armscor .45-caliber rounds (found in Breanna's bedroom closet).
¶ 41 After considering the parties' arguments and exhibits, the trial court granted the State's motion in limine. The court stated that it failed to see the relevance in "a box of Hornady ammunition found 11 days after the shooting in a house next to which were found some spent ammo that they believe came out of the same gun that fired the ammo that killed *** Jackson." Given the lack of connection to the purported murder weapon, the court found that evidence of the Hornady ammunition box with Williams's fingerprint would confuse the jury.
¶ 42 Following the trial court's ruling, the State called Officers Aaron Weidemann and Kevin Jackson of the Mt. Vernon Police Department, who testified regarding their involvement in the "trash pull" conducted at Fowler's residence on January 20, 2017. Officer Weidemann testified that he pulled the trash from Fowler's residence at approximately 3 a.m. and transported the trash to the police station where the narcotics divisions searched it for evidence of illegal drug activity. Officer Jackson testified that he and Detective Koontz searched the trash pulled from Fowler's residence. During the search, Officer Jackson found an empty Blazer ammunition box and a Victoria's Secret order form listing Breanna's name and Fowler's address. Both items were admitted into evidence and published to the jury without objection.
¶ 43 The State next called Assistant Chief Page and Detective Smith, who testified regarding their involvement in the search of Fowler's home and surrounding area on January 31, 2017. Assistant Chief Page testified that defendant was not present during the search. Detective Smith testified that he found six spent shell casings near the back door and a Blazer 9-millimeter ammunition box containing one live 9-millimeter round next to a bed in a bedroom. The bottom of the live round was marked "9[-]mm Lugar." The Blazer ammunition box and the live round were admitted into evidence and published to the jury without objection.
¶ 44 Detective Captain Bullard testified that he responded to the scene of Jackson's murder and assisted with the subsequent investigation. Detective Captain Bullard explained that detectives obtained several suspects' Facebook and cell phone records, which revealed their involvement in an attempted home invasion at Oliver's house shortly before Jackson's murder. After receiving information from the probation department that defendant resided at Fowler's residence, detectives contacted Breanna and obtained consent to search the residence for defendant. Fowler also gave detectives verbal permission to search her residence for ammunition. During the search, detectives found six spent 9-millimeter shell casings near the back door of the residence and a Blazer ammunition box at the foot of Breanna's bed. Detectives also found various personal items belonging to defendant inside of a tote on the front porch, including a citation issued to defendant, defendant's clothing, and his social security card.
¶ 45 Detective Jeremy Reichert, who was the crime scene technician for the Mt. Vernon Police Department, testified that he was unable to locate any fingerprints on the empty box of Blazer ammunition found in the trash pulled from the Fowler residence or the box of Blazer ammunition containing one live round found near Breanna's bed.
¶ 46 Defense counsel requested to make a formal offer of proof outside the jury's presence, which the trial court granted without objection. Defense counsel asked Detective Reichert questions concerning his examination of the Hornady ammunition box found during the search conducted on January 31, 2017. Detective Reichert explained that he tested the Hornady ammunition box and each of the 17 live rounds found inside of the box for fingerprints. Detective Reichert located a print on the ammunition box tray during the process, which he photographed and put in the Automated Fingerprint Identification System (AFIS). The AFIS indicated that the print was a likely match to Williams's fingerprint. Detective Reichert submitted the Hornady ammunition box and the live rounds, Williams's fingerprint, and the photographs to the ISP forensic lab for further testing. An ISP forensic scientist later opined that the fingerprint on the Hornady ammunition box matched Williams's fingerprint.
¶ 47 At the start of the next day of trial, the State made an oral motion in limine to bar the defense from eliciting testimony regarding the sentencing range for first degree murder from the State's witnesses who planned to testify pursuant to a plea agreement. In response, defense counsel asserted that there were "at least two witnesses whose case under the plea agreement, the charge of first degree murder, will be dismissed if they testify truthfully and consistent with the proffer." After additional discussion, the following exchange took place between defense counsel and the trial court:
"MR. VAUGHN [(DEFENSE COUNSEL)]: I still-left unanswered is may I ask-this case suggests I can do this. The question I want to ask is, what is your expectation [of what] will result from having the charge of murder dismissed under the plea agreement.
THE COURT: And what would you expect a witness to answer?
MR. VAUGHN: What's in their mind. What their belief is. What they bargained for with the State. This is a contract with the State.
THE COURT: Well, I don't want anything coming out like well, I am going to get 40 years and not 50, or I'm going to get 30 and not 50, I'm going to get 20 and not 50 or 20 and not 40. I don't want that. I think that's violating-the issue of punishment, I think that's inappropriate."The court further clarified that it was not opposed to a witness testifying that he or she accepted the plea agreement to avoid getting more prison time, but the court did not want the witness testifying that he or she accepted the plea agreement to avoid natural life or a 60-year sentence. Thus, the court barred testimony regarding the number of years the witnesses expected to receive had they been convicted of first degree murder.
¶ 48 The State then called Russell, who testified that he was serving a prison sentence for attempted home invasion and unlawful use of a firearm as part of a plea agreement. Russell agreed the plea agreement provided that a murder charge would be dismissed if he testified truthfully at defendant's trial.
¶ 49 Russell testified that he was at Feggins's home with Forest, Frazier, Feggins, and Z.P. on January 20, 2017. Russell explained that he had no blood relation to Frazier, but he considered Frazier a brother to him because they were both raised by Russell's mother. After Feggins observed Jackson walk by his house carrying a duffel bag, Feggins informed the group that Jackson's bag contained weed and money. Z.P. tried to persuade Russell to join him in robbing Jackson. Feggins advised that Russell and Z.P. would need a gun.
¶ 50 Russell and Z.P. left the house together with the intention of catching Jackson to beat him and take his duffel bag. While they were trying to catch up to Jackson, defendant pulled up in his car. After Russell and Z.P. entered defendant's car, defendant drove down the block. Z.P. asked defendant for a gun, but defendant refused and indicated there was a plan. Based on defendant's remark, Russell understood that defendant planned to rob Jackson. Russell and Z.P. exited defendant's car at the intersection of 18th and Conger and continued their attempt to catch Jackson. Russell observed defendant stop his car by Jackson and watched the two men shake hands.
¶ 51 Russell later observed Jackson enter Z.P.'s cousin's house on 17th Street. Russell and Z.P. walked back to 18th Street, where they obtained a gun from Williams. Russell and Z.P. then walked back to 17th Street, but Z.P. indicated that he could not rob his cousin's house. Russell gave Z.P. a ski mask, and Z.P. handed Russell the gun. Forest and Frazier then joined Russell and Z.P. outside of Z.P.'s cousin's house. When Russell, armed with the gun, attempted to open the screen door to the house, somebody shut the front door. Z.P., Forest, and Frazier ran away, so Russell followed suit.
¶ 52 Russell, Z.P., Forest, and Frazier ran back to 18th Street, where Z.P. returned the gun to Williams. Approximately 30 to 45 minutes later, "people just started migrating to 18th." At that time, the group consisted of seven individuals-Russell, Z.P., Forest, Frazier, Liddell, Devan Jr., and defendant. Jackson exited Z.P.'s cousin's house and walked toward the group. As Jackson started shaking hands with the individuals in the group, Russell "ran up on him" and tried to take Jackson's bag. Russell and Jackson fought and wrestled for the bag. Frazier joined Russell in attempting to take the bag from Jackson, but Jackson broke free and ran to a nearby alley. Russell and Frazier, followed by Forest and Z.P., chased after Jackson. Russell heard gunshots coming from the alley, so he grabbed Frazier to keep him from entering the alley. Russell and Frazier stood by the corner of a red brick building, where Russell saw defendant firing a gun. Russell and Frazier fled.
¶ 53 On cross-examination, Russell acknowledged that he was close friends with Frazier and Williams. He considered Frazier a brother to him and Williams his "God cousin." Russell admitted that he lied to police during his earlier interviews. Russell claimed that there was no plan to rob Jackson, and that "[i]t just happened." Russell was unfamiliar with the caliber of gun used during the attempted home invasion but acknowledged that the gun belonged to Williams. Russell explained that he looked around the corner of the building and saw defendant firing shots down the alley. At that time, Russell observed Devan Jr. next to defendant.
¶ 54 Defense counsel also asked Russell several questions about his plea agreement on cross-examination. Russell explained that the plea agreement included a dismissal of the first degree murder charges in exchange for his "truthful" testimony against defendant. Russell's sentence for the attempted home invasion was 15 years in prison, and he expected to serve 7½ years. Russell agreed that the State would decide if he testified truthfully.
¶ 55 On redirect, the State asked if it was true that Russell informed police that defendant shot Jackson during the first interview. Russell responded in the affirmative without objection from defense counsel. The State next asked Russell if he shot and killed Jackson, and Russell responded no. On recross-examination, Russell acknowledged that his involvement would be considered felony murder under Illinois law.
¶ 56 The State next called Frazier, who also testified as part of a plea agreement. Frazier summarized the plea agreement as requiring his cooperation in the investigation of the murder of Jackson "in order to get my murder [charge] reduced to attempt home invasion." Frazier explained that he entered an open plea to attempt home invasion and attempt robbery, and no promises were made as to sentencing.
¶ 57 Frazier testified that he went to Feggins's house with Russell and Frazier on January 20, 2017. While there, Frazier, Feggins, Forest, Russell, and Z.P. discussed robbing Jackson after Jackson walked by Feggins' house carrying a bag. They all agreed to send Russell and Z.P. to rob Jackson, but Feggins stated that they needed a gun. Russell and Z.P. left the house. After about 30 minutes, Forest and Frazier left the house to check on Russell and Z.P. They found Russell and Z.P. in front of a nearby house and learned that Jackson was inside of the house. Russell, Z.P., Forest, and Frazier concocted a plan to enter the house and rob Jackson.
¶ 58 During the attempted robbery, Frazier and Russell approached the front door of the house. Russell pulled on the screen door, but it was locked and made a loud sound. Russell saw someone inside walking toward the door, so Frazier and Russell ran from the house to 18th Street, where they ended up "bumping into [defendant]." Russell asked defendant if he had a gun, and defendant responded in the affirmative. Defendant showed the gun, and Frazier saw that the gun was a 9-millimeter. Defendant refused to give Russell the gun, stating that "he was using his gun that night." Frazier, Russell, Forest, and defendant walked to the corner of 18th Street, where they met Devan Jr., Williams, Liddell, and Brown.
¶ 59 On cross-examination, Frazier admitted that defendant did not take part in planning the attempted home invasion or the attempted robbery of Jackson. Frazier admitted that he repeatedly told detectives that he did not know who shot Jackson during his initial interview.
¶ 60 When defense counsel asked Frazier about the plea agreement, Frazier explained that he was going to get his murder charge reduced to home invasion. Defense counsel then asked, "What do you expect from the State in exchange for your testimony today?" Frazier replied, "To get the murder reduced to home invasion." The State objected when defense counsel then asked "[a]nd that means years and years; doesn't it?" The trial court sustained the objection and instructed the jury to disregard the question. Upon further questioning by defense counsel, Frazier expressed that he expected to receive a prison sentence for the attempted home invasion of between 4 and 15 years, and he expected to serve only half of his sentence. Frazier also expected to receive a concurrent prison sentence of between two and five years for the attempted robbery.
¶ 61 On redirect, Frazier explained that he lied to police during the initial interviews because he did not want to be a witness to a murder. Frazier acknowledged that he told the police during the second interview that defendant shot Jackson.
¶ 62 The State then called Devan Jr., who was serving a prison sentence for obstructing justice as part of a plea agreement. Devan Jr. explained that, pursuant to the plea agreement, his first degree murder charge was dismissed and would not be reinstated if he testified truthfully at defendant's trial. Devan Jr. also confirmed that he had prior felony conviction in 2010 for aggravated discharge of a firearm.
¶ 63 Devan Jr. then testified regarding the events surrounding Jackson's murder. Prior to the murder, Devan Jr. was at 18th Street and Conger with Williams, Brown, Russell, Frazier, Z.P., Liddell, Forest, and defendant. Jackson approached the group carrying a black bag. Russell tried to take Jackson's black bag, and the two men started "scuffling." Frazier, Forest, and Z.P. joined Russell in his efforts to steal the bag from Jackson, but Jackson "still would not give the bag up." Jackson broke free and ran south toward Perkins Street.
¶ 64 Devan Jr., Liddell, Williams, and defendant stood near the fire hydrant on 18th Steet and Conger. When defendant saw Jackson running through the alley, defendant ran toward Conger and turned down the alley. Devan Jr. observed defendant standing in the alley shooting in the direction of Jackson. After Jackson's murder, defendant fled the scene and Devan Jr. had no further contact with defendant that day. The next day, on January 21, 2017, Devan Jr. and defendant discussed Jackson's murder at a mutual friend's house. Defendant told Devan Jr. that he was only trying to scare Jackson.
¶ 65 On cross-examination, Devan Jr. acknowledged that Williams frequented Fowler's home in late 2016 through early 2017. Devan Jr. admitted that during an interview with police on May 19, 2017, he stated that others had insinuated he was the shooter because he had given instructions to "fall back," or to "lay low and not be seen." Devan Jr. further acknowledged advising police that he spent most of January 20, 2017, with Williams and that he was present with Williams when the fight with Jackson started. Devan Jr. clarified that defendant was not involved in the fight with Jackson. Devan Jr. denied seeing Williams with a firearm, and he denied seeing Williams hand a firearm to either Russell, Z.P., or Frazier on January 20, 2017.
¶ 66 The State next called an ISP expert in firearm ballistics and tool mark identification, who testified that the 13 spent Blazer brand 9-millimeter shell casings recovered from the scene of Jackson's murder were fired from the same firearm. The ISP expert concluded that four of the six spent Blazer brand 9-millimeter shell casings recovered from the rear area of Fowler's house on January 31, 2017, were shot from the same firearm used in Jackson's murder, but that the remaining two shells were shot from a different firearm.
¶ 67 Fowler testified that she lived with her daughter, Breanna Devan, and Breanna's two daughters on 12th Street. Defendant and Williams frequently visited Fowler's residence. Defendant occasionally stayed overnight with Breanna. Fowler recalled that defendant spent the night at her house on January 19, 20, and 21, 2017. Defendant kept a jacket in Breanna's bedroom, which Fowler gave to detectives. Fowler testified that defendant asked her to take his jacket to the dry cleaners where she worked following Jackson's murder.
¶ 68 The State recalled Detective Haney to testify regarding certain statements made by Russell and Devan Jr. during their interviews with police. Before the State asked Detective Haney about Russell and Devan Jr.'s previous statements, the trial court read Illinois Rule of Evidence 613(c) (eff. Oct. 15, 2015) to the jury. When the State asked whether Russell identified defendant as the shooter in the first interview, Detective Haney responded in the affirmative. When the State asked whether Frazier identified defendant as the shooter during the second interview, Detective Haney responded in the affirmative. Detective Haney added that Frazier described a gray jacket that was worn by defendant at the time of Jackson's murder, which was corroborated by surveillance video from the morning of Jackson's murder.
At that time, Rule 613(c) provided as follows: "A prior statement that is consistent with the declarant-witness's testimony is admissible, for rehabilitation purposes only and not substantively as a hearsay exception or exclusion, when the declarant testifies at the trial or hearing and is available to the opposing party for examination concerning the statement, and the statement is offered to rebut an expressed or implied charge that: (i) the witness acted from an improper influence or motive to testify falsely, if that influence or motive did not exist when the statement was made; or (ii) the witness's testimony was recently fabricated, if the statement was made before the alleged fabrication occurred."
¶ 69 Detective Haney next testified about defendant's cell phone records. Detective Haney identified the exchange of text messages between defendant's phone and Jackson's phone at 5:37 p.m. and a text message sent from defendant's phone at 5:50 p.m., five minutes after Jackson's murder, with no reply from Jackson.
¶ 70 Detective Haney testified that he reviewed defendant's phone calls from the Jefferson County Justice Center on February 12, 13, and 15, 2017. Detective Haney recognized the receiving parties to defendant's jail calls as Makayla Ford, Devan Jr., and Savon Cummings. The State provided the jury with a transcript of defendant's call and an audio recording was played. Relevant to this appeal, in the call to Ford, defendant stated that if nine people are on the case and one person says another committed the offense, and the other people said they did not see anything, a jury would not find the single witness credible. In another call, defendant stated that Russell was next door to him and that he better not let defendant catch him because he was going to "knock his ass out." In another call, defendant told Cummings to visit Russell and tell Russell to "just be quiet." Defendant specified that he was talking about Russell and said: "And then if you try to testify, bro, that shit is really going to kill you right there. That shit really is going to kill you."
¶ 71 At the close of the State's evidence, defense counsel motioned for a directed verdict on all counts. The trial court denied defendant's motion.
¶ 72 Defendant opted not to testify in his own defense. The defense rested without presenting evidence.
¶ 73 In closing, the State argued that the evidence demonstrated defendant's guilt of first degree murder for three reasons. First, the eyewitnesses' testimonies indicated that defendant was the shooter. Second, the physical evidence corroborated the eyewitnesses' testimonies, and third, defendant displayed a consciousness of guilt in his interviews, recorded jail phone calls, and actions.
¶ 74 In closing, defense counsel addressed the comments made during his opening statement that Williams's fingerprint was on an ammunition box tray seized prior to Jackson's murder. Defense counsel stated the following:
"DEFENSE COUNSEL: Now, earlier this week during my opening statement, I made about-a comment about Lamar Williams and certain evidence. And if you have already forgotten about that comment, that's great. But I feel compelled to tell you that when I made that comment, I made a mistake. Nobody's fault but mine. Stop the presses. The lawyer makes an admission in open court that he made a mistake in the case. My fault. All I ask, all I ask is that you do not hold that mistake that I made against my client, [defendant]. That's all I ask. This case isn't about me. And I am going to move on."
¶ 75 Then, defense counsel argued that the State's case centered on the word of three young men charged with felony murder. Defense counsel highlighted the conflicts and discrepancies between the testimonies of Frazier, Russell, and Devan Jr. Defense counsel further highlighted the fact that the three men testified against defendant in exchange for a favorable plea agreement. Defense counsel argued that Devan Jr. and Williams frequented the residence.
¶ 76 During deliberations, the jury requested, and the trial court provided, "a transcript of jail phone calls." The jury subsequently returned a verdict of guilty for the offense of first degree murder. The jury determined that defendant personally discharged the firearm that proximately caused Jackson's death. Additionally, the jury found defendant guilty of the offense of attempt robbery. The jury determined that during the offense of first degree murder, defendant was armed with a firearm.
¶ 77 On April 12, 2018, defendant filed a motion for new trial, claiming numerous trial errors. Following a hearing, the trial court denied defendant's motion for new trial.
¶ 78 C. Sentencing
¶ 79 On September 10, 2018, the trial court conducted the sentencing hearing. The parties agreed that the minimum sentence was 20 years on the first degree murder conviction plus the firearm enhancement of 25 years, totaling 45 years.
¶ 80 Following arguments of counsel, the trial court stated that it considered the presentence investigation report (PSI), the trial evidence, the victim impact statement from the victim's fiancée, Jakilyn Otero, and the attorneys' arguments. The court further stated that a sentence over the minimum was warranted because this case involved "a robbery attempt, illicit drugs, some sort of a plan," followed by evasion, and defendant had "something of a history of criminal activity." The court noted that both Jackson and defendant were young men, and that even the minimum term would require defendant to spend "a greater part of [his] life" in prison. The court noted that the sentence imposed was "necessary to deter others." The court sentenced defendant to 70 years in prison, 45 years on the murder conviction and the 25-year firearm enhancement. Defendant later filed a motion to reconsider sentence, which was denied. Defendant filed a timely appeal.
¶ 81 On June 4, 2020, defendant's appellate counsel moved to supplement the record with the live round of ammunition admitted at trial. Appellate counsel indicated a desire to discuss markings on the live round as compared to the testimony describing the round. We denied the motion to supplement the record. Thereafter, the State filed a motion to strike portions of defendant's brief referencing the live round of ammunition, which this court ordered taken with the case.
¶ 82 II. Analysis
¶ 83 On appeal, defendant raises numerous issues relating to preserved and unpreserved errors, which he raises under the auspices of ineffective assistance of counsel. First, he argues that the trial court improperly excluded certain evidence, resulting in a denial of his constitutional right to present a complete defense. Second, he contends that defense counsel erred in multiple respects, resulting in a denial of his right to effective assistance of counsel. Finally, defendant raises alternative issues concerning his 70-year sentence. Specifically, he contends that his sentence is excessive and disproportionate, and that he was denied effective assistance of counsel at sentencing. We address defendant's contentions in turn.
¶ 84 Before turning to the merits, we address the State's motion to strike portions of defendant's opening brief, which we ordered taken with the case. The State requested that this court strike certain portions of defendant's opening brief containing references to material outside the record on appeal. Specifically, the State complained that, despite this court's order denying the motion to supplement the record, appellate counsel referenced markings on the live round in support of a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. In response, appellate counsel argued that striking those portions of defendant's brief would deny counsel a full and fair opportunity to present the underlying facts supporting defendant's constitutional claim of ineffective assistance of counsel.
¶ 85 The Illinois Supreme Court Rules require the statement of facts and argument in an appellant's brief, including the reply brief, contain appropriate reference to the corresponding pages of the record relied on. Ill. S.Ct. R. 341(h)(6), (7) (eff. Oct. 1, 2020). The supreme court rules are not "mere suggestions" but instead "have the force of law and are to be construed in the same manner as statutes." In re Denzel W., 237 Ill.2d 285, 294 (2010). Illinois Supreme Court Rule 375(a) (eff. Feb. 1, 1994) allows a reviewing court to strike a party's brief, or portion thereof, if that party or an attorney for that party willfully fails to comply with the appeal rules (see also Gruby v. Department of Public Health, 2015 IL App (2d) 140790, ¶ 12 ("A party's brief that fails to substantially conform to the pertinent supreme court rules may justifiably be stricken.")).
¶ 86 Here, the record shows that an officer testified to recovering a Blazer 9-millimeter ammunition box containing one live round marked with "9[-]mm Lugar" under Breanna's bed. Appellate counsel asserted in the opening brief that, based on her outside inspection of the State's exhibit, the round contained two markings, "9[-]mm Luger" and "F.C.," and that the officer's testimony did not "fully and accurately detail the exhibit." Given our denial of defendant's request to supplement the record, the exhibit containing the live round is not contained in the record on appeal. Contrary to supreme court rules, appellant counsel's statement concerning the live round's "F.C." markings references matters outside the record. Accordingly, we grant the State's motion and strike those portions of defendant's briefs and decline to consider defendant's argument that defense counsel was ineffective for failing to elicit testimony of the "F.C." marking at trial. We now turn to the merits.
¶ 87 A. Preserved Errors
¶ 88 We consider whether the trial court abused its discretion by excluding evidence of: (1) Williams's involvement in the July 17, 2016, shooting, (2) Williams's fingerprint on the Hornady ammunition box tray found at Fowler's residence, and (3) other non-Blazer ammunition and boxes found at Fowler's residence. As an initial matter, the parties dispute the appropriate standard of review concerning our review of the trial court's evidentiary rulings. Defendant first acknowledges that, typically, a trial court's decision to bar evidence is reviewed only for an abuse of discretion. People v. Cruz, 162 Ill.2d 314, 331 (1994) ("Evidentiary rulings are within the sound discretion of the trial court and will not be disturbed on review unless the trial court has abused its discretion."). However, in the present case, defendant argues that we should apply a de novo standard because "the issue entails review of both the trial court's rulings and defense counsel's actions," and that ineffective assistance of counsel claims are reviewed de novo. Conversely, arguing that the court exercised its discretion in ruling to exclude this evidence, the State maintains that the standard of review applicable to the trial court's evidentiary rulings is abuse of discretion. We agree with the State.
¶ 89 It is well settled that a criminal defendant is constitutionally guaranteed a meaningful opportunity to present a complete defense. Holmes v. South Carolina, 547 U.S. 319, 324 (2006); People v. Burgess, 2015 IL App (1st) 130657, ¶ 133; People v. McCullough, 2015 IL App (2d) 121364, ¶ 104; U.S. Const., amends. VI, XIV; Ill. Const. 1970, art. I, § 8. In general, the standard of review for determining if an individual's constitutional rights have been violated is de novo. People v. Hale, 2013 IL 113140, ¶ 15. However, the United States Constitution permits a trial court to exclude evidence that is only marginally relevant, unduly prejudicial, confusing, or misleading. Holmes, 547 U.S. at 326-27. "The trial court has the power and discretion to exclude evidence offered by the defense in a criminal case on the basis of irrelevancy without infringing on an accused's constitutional right to present a defense." People v. Brewer, 2013 IL App (1st) 072821, ¶ 51.
¶ 90 Additionally, at least two appellate courts have found that "when a party claims he was denied his constitutional right to present a complete defense due to improper evidentiary rulings, the standard of review is abuse of discretion." Burgess, 2015 IL App (1st) 130657, ¶ 133; see also People v. Whitfield, 2017 IL App (2d) 140878, ¶ 106. That standard also applies to motions in limine and the scope of cross-examination. Burgess, 2015 IL App (1st) 130657, ¶ 134. A trial court abuses its discretion when no reasonable person would take the view adopted by the court. Id. Further, the trial court's ruling will not be overturned unless the abuse of that discretion led to manifest prejudice against the defendant. Id.
¶ 91 We find the abuse of discretion standard applies in the present case for several reasons. First, the record demonstrates that the trial court specifically evaluated the strength of the evidence defendant sought to admit against the State's evidence. In excluding the evidence, the trial court concluded that evidence of the shooting and ammunition box tray containing Williams's fingerprint was too speculative and likely to confuse the jury. The court specifically expressed its belief that the evidence "would do nothing more than send the jury down a rabbit hole that it probably shouldn't go down." Thus, in rendering its decision, the trial court was not required to interpret the general rules of admissibility of evidence, but rather was required to evaluate the competing evidence. Moreover, defendant does not present a constitutional challenge to the well-established rules governing admissibility of evidence, but rather challenges the trial court's assessment considering the facts of the present case. We also find it noteworthy that defendant primarily presents arguments against the court's factual determinations and reasoning, rather than against the constitutionality of the admission of evidence rules. Therefore, we will apply an abuse of discretion standard.
¶ 92 Turning to the merits, we consider whether the trial court abused its discretion by excluding evidence of: (1) Williams's involvement in the July 17, 2016, shooting, (2) Williams's fingerprint on the Hornady ammunition box tray found at Fowler's residence, and (3) other non-Blazer ammunition and boxes found at Fowler's residence. Defendant argues that these evidentiary rulings prevented him from presenting his alternate suspect theory that Williams was the shooter in Jackson's murder. The State argues that the court did not abuse its discretion by excluding this evidence because it was too remote and speculative to connect Williams to the crime. We agree with the State.
¶ 93 While it is true that a defendant may attempt to prove that someone else committed the crime with which he was charged, that right is not without limitations. People v. Lewis, 165 Ill.2d 305, 341 (1995). "Such evidence is admissible only if a close connection can be demonstrated between the third person and the commission of the offense." People v. Wilson, 271 Ill.App.3d 943, 948 (1995). The right to present a defense does not include the right to introduce irrelevant evidence, meaning evidence having little probative value due to remoteness, uncertainty, or its speculative nature. People v. Enis, 139 Ill.2d 264, 282 (1990). "Generally, evidence is relevant if it tends to make the existence of any fact in consequence more or less probable than it would be without the evidence." People v. Beaman, 229 Ill.2d 56, 75-76 (2008).
¶ 94 Here, we cannot say that the trial court abused its discretion by excluding evidence of the shooting. The court could have reasonably concluded that such evidence was too remote and speculative, given the notable differences between the shooting and Jackson's murder. Defendant does not assert, and the record fails to show, any meaningful connection between Cain and Jackson. Additionally, there is nothing in the record showing similar motives for the shooting and Jackson's murder. In contrast, the record shows that the shooting was gang-related, while Jackson's murder was in furtherance of a purported failed robbery attempt. Additionally, the record reveals that different handguns were used in the two events, a .40-caliber in the shooting and a 9-millimeter in Jackson's murder. The record also shows that approximately three times as many rounds were fired in Jackson's murder.
¶ 95 Although defendant points to some common facts connecting Williams to both events, the trial court could have reasonably concluded that those facts only established "some remote connection" to Jackson's murder. Based on the foregoing, we cannot conclude that the court abused its discretion by excluding the evidence of the shooting.
¶ 96 We also cannot conclude that the trial court abused its discretion by excluding evidence pertaining to Williams's fingerprint on the ammunition box tray recovered during the search of Fowler's residence. The record shows that the Hornady ammunition box tray with Williams's fingerprint contained 17 rounds of Hornady 9-millimeter ammunition, rather than the Blazer ammunition used in Jackson's murder. Moreover, law enforcement recovered the Hornady ammunition box 11 days after Jackson's murder. Additionally, law enforcement found the Hornady ammunition box inside of a cardboard box containing other non-Blazer brands of ammunition in Breanna's bedroom closet.
¶ 97 Because the evidence showed only that Williams touched the ammunition box tray in the Fowler residence at some unknown time-either before or after the murder-the trial court could have reasonably found the evidence was too remote and speculative to support defendant's alternate suspect theory. Thus, we cannot conclude that the court abused its discretion by excluding Williams's fingerprint evidence.
¶ 98 For similar reasons, we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by excluding the other non-Blazer brand ammunition boxes found at Fowler's residence. In so concluding, we reject defendant's argument that the jury could have concluded from this evidence that defendant, if he had armed himself at Fowler's home, had "not necessarily" armed himself with Blazer ammunition. Evidence of defendant's access to other types of ammunition provides no exculpatory value and has no bearing on the question of whether defendant or Williams murdered Jackson. Additionally, the evidence was not relevant to the question of whether defendant or Williams shot Jackson. The court could have reasonably concluded that evidence of multiple brands of ammunition not used in Jackson's murder would confuse the jury.
The State contends this issue is forfeited, because defendant failed to include the issue concerning the exclusion of non-Blazer ammunition and boxes in his posttrial motion. In contrast, defendant argues that the issue is preserved, because defendant's posttrial motion referenced the Hornady ammunition box tray bearing Williams's fingerprint and "specifically referred the trial court to the report of the proceedings wherein the parties addressed these issues together." Under these circumstances, defendant argues that the issue is sufficiently preserved. Alternatively, defendant argues that we should review this issue under the plain-error doctrine. "A defendant is not entitled to review of a claimed error unless he has made a timely objection at trial and raised the issue in a posttrial motion." People v. Leach, 2012 IL 111534, ¶ 60. However, we note that forfeiture is a limitation on the parties, not the courts. People v. Inman, 2014 IL App (5th) 120097, ¶ 11. We find the arguments closely related and therefore will consider the merits. See Leach, 2012 IL 111534, ¶ 61 ("we may exercise our discretion to review an otherwise forfeited issue when it is inextricably intertwined with other issues properly before the court").
¶ 99 To summarize, the court could have reasonably found the shooting, Williams's fingerprint, and other non-Blazer brand ammunition too remote and speculative for admission at trial. Accordingly, we decline to find an abuse of discretion or a constitutional violation in the trial court's exclusion of this evidence.
¶ 100 Next, defendant argues that the prosecution should not have been permitted to admit the jail calls referencing Z.P., a nonspecific alibi, and references to defendant as a criminal. The State argues that defendant's assertion that he had an alibi was a false exculpatory statement and admissible to show consciousness of guilt. In support, the State points to People v. Milka, 211 Ill.2d 150, 181 (2004) ("A false exculpatory statement is 'probative of a defendant's consciousness of guilt.' "). We agree with the State and find that the jail calls were properly admitted demonstrating consciousness of guilt.
It is not clear whether defendant raises this issue under the ineffective assistance of counsel. Defendant merely argues that the phone calls "should have been excluded and instead both exacerbated the other improper evidence, confused the jury, and unduly prejudiced" the defense. Yet, defendant raises this issue the under the umbrella of ineffective assistance of counsel. Moreover, defense counsel made attempts to exclude jail phone call evidence, where such calls were the subject of both pretrial and posttrial motions. It cannot be reasonably argued that defense counsel provided the ineffective assistance of counsel where defense counsel filed motions to exclude the evidence. Despite this confusion, we review this issue for an abuse of discretion, because a trial court's decision to bar evidence is reviewed only for an abuse of discretion. Cruz, 162 Ill.2d at 331 ("Evidentiary rulings are within the sound discretion of the trial court and will not be disturbed on review unless the trial court has abused its discretion.").
¶ 101 In the jail calls, defendant voiced his plan for everyone to keep silent. Defendant referenced an alibi in his first phone conversation but ultimately did not present an alibi at trial. Defendant also claimed that he knew nothing about Jackson's murder during his interview with police, but the phone calls established that defendant was, in fact, at the scene. The trial court properly allowed this as evidence of defendant's consciousness of guilt. We cannot say the court abused its discretion in allowing this evidence.
¶ 102 B. Unpreserved Errors-Ineffective Assistance of Counsel
¶ 103 We next consider defendant's numerous issues related to ineffective assistance of counsel, which we address in turn. Initially, we note that defendant forfeited review of his claim that the State made improper closing arguments. Defendant argues that the State undermined the burden of proof and attempted to shift the burden; however, defense counsel did not object to the State's argument, nor did he raise it in a posttrial motion. Defendant does not raise the claim as plain error, and he fails to specifically argue that counsel was ineffective for failing to object to the State's closing argument. Rather, defendant merely argues that the State engaged in burden shifting. As such, we find this issue forfeited. See People v. Sebby, 2017 IL 119445, ¶ 48 ("To preserve a purported error for consideration by a reviewing court, a defendant must object to the error at trial and raise the error in a posttrial motion. [Citation.] Failure to do either results in forfeiture.").
We remind the parties that Illinois Supreme Court Rule 341 sets forth requirements for appellate briefs. Ill. S.Ct. R. 341 (eff. Oct. 1, 2020). Rule 341(h)(7) provides that the argument portion of the appellant's brief "shall contain the contentions of the appellant and the reasons therefor, with citation of the authorities and the pages of the record relied on." Ill. S.Ct. R. 341(h)(7) (eff. Oct. 1, 2020). "A reviewing court is entitled to the benefit of clearly defined issues with pertinent authority cited and a cohesive legal argument. *** The appellate court is not a depository in which an appellant may dump the entire matter of argument and research." Wing v. Chicago Transit Authority, 2016 IL App (1st) 153517, ¶ 11. Arguments that are not supported by citations to legal authority do not meet the requirements of Rule 341(h)(7) and are procedurally defaulted on appeal. Wing, 2016 IL App (1st) 153517, ¶ 11; Ill. S.Ct. R. 341(h)(7) (eff. Oct. 1, 2020) (points not argued are forfeited on appeal).
¶ 104 Turning to the issues properly before us, defendant argues that defense counsel provided ineffective assistance of counsel by (1) erroneously promising the jury in opening statements that Williams's fingerprint was on the Blazer 9-millimeter ammunition box tray found in the trash at the Fowler residence in the early morning hours before Jackson's murder; (2) failing to file a motion to exclude the Blazer 9-millimeter ammunition box, either before or during trial; (3) failing to object to the State's introduction of Russell and Frazier's prior consistent statements; (4) failing to object to testimony from Williams, Z.P., and a "Crime Stoppers" tipster, who offered police defendant's name even though none of them testified at trial; (5) failing to object to defendant's allegedly unredacted police interrogation video; and (6) failing to point out Devan Jr.'s felony case that was dropped pursuant to his plea or object to the prosecution's argument that Devan Jr. had nothing to do with the murder. We address each argument in turn.
¶ 105 Our review of ineffective assistance of counsel claims is guided by the standards set forth in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984), and adopted by our supreme court in People v. Albanese, 104 Ill.2d 504, 526 (1984). To succeed on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel under the Strickland standard, one must show both that (1) counsel's representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness (deficient performance prong) and (2) a reasonable probability exists that, but for the error, the result would have been different (prejudice prong). People v. Manning, 241 Ill.2d 319, 326-27 (2011). A defendant must satisfy both prongs of the Strickland test to succeed on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. People v. Evans, 209 Ill.2d 194, 220 (2004). Thus, defendant's failure to establish either deficient performance or prejudice will be fatal to the claim. People v. Richardson, 189 Ill.2d 401, 411 (2000).
¶ 106 To establish deficiency under the first prong of the Strickland test, defendant must overcome the strong presumption that the complained-of action or inaction might have been the product of counsel's sound trial strategy. Manning, 241 Ill.2d at 327. The reviewing court must evaluate counsel's performance from her perspective at the time rather than "through the lens of hindsight." People v. Perry, 224 Ill.2d 312, 344 (2007). An evaluation of counsel's actions cannot extend into matters involving the exercise of judgment, strategy, or trial tactics. People v. Penrod, 316 Ill.App.3d 713, 722 (2000). "Reviewing courts should hesitate to second-guess counsel's strategic decisions, even where those decisions seem questionable." Manning, 241 Ill.2d at 335.
¶ 107 To establish prejudice, "defendant must show that counsel's deficient performance rendered the result of the trial unreliable or the proceeding fundamentally unfair." Richardson, 189 Ill.2d at 411. If defendant's claim can be disposed of on the basis that he suffered no prejudice, then a court should not decide whether counsel's performance was deficient. People v. Villanueva, 382 Ill.App.3d 301, 308 (2008).
¶ 108 "[A] defendant is entitled to a fair trial, not a perfect one." People v. Easley, 192 Ill.2d 307, 344 (2000). Likewise, the right to the effective assistance of counsel refers to competent, not perfect, representation. Id.; People v. Stewart, 104 Ill.2d 463, 492 (1984). Only the most egregious of tactical or strategic blunders may provide a basis for a violation of a defendant's right to the effective assistance of counsel (People v. Kubik, 214 Ill.App.3d 649, 661 (1991)), such as when defense counsel's chosen strategy was so unsound that counsel completely failed to conduct any meaningful adversarial testing (People v. Reid, 179 Ill.2d 297, 310 (1997)). We review ineffective assistance of counsel claims de novo. People v. Tolefree, 2011 IL App (1st) 100689, ¶ 25.
¶ 109 First, we consider whether defense counsel was ineffective for informing the jury during opening statement that Williams's print was on an ammunition box tray seized prior to the murder. Defendant notes that both the State and defense counsel later admitted that they mistakenly believed Williams's fingerprint was on the empty Blazer 9-millimeter ammunition box found in Fowler's trash, whereas Williams's print was found on the half-full Hornady 9-millimeter box seized from Breanna's closet.
¶ 110 Defense "counsel's failure to provide promised testimony is not ineffective assistance per se." People v. Manning, 334 Ill.App.3d 882, 892 (2002). Defendant must show that counsel's decisions were unreasonable and that there was a reasonable probability that an error affected the outcome of the proceeding. Id.
¶ 111 In the instant case, the record is clear that defense counsel operated under a mistaken impression of the evidence. During the jury trial, outside the presence of the jury, defense counsel stated that he wished to clarify the record. Defense counsel admitted that he mistakenly asserted in his February 8, 2018, motion in limine that there was an evidence match between evidence seized at Fowler's residence and Williams. According to defense counsel, he confused Mt. Vernon Police Department Exhibits 24 and 29. Exhibit 24 contained a photograph of the Hornady ammunition box containing an unidentified fingerprint. The ISP forensic lab subsequently verified that it was Williams's fingerprint on the Hornady ammunition box. Exhibit 29, on the other hand, was a photograph of the Blazer 9-millimeter ammunition box. Defense counsel stated, "My fault. It was an error joined with the State ***."
¶ 112 Thus, the record demonstrates that there was no strategic reason for counsel's opening statement. Rather, the record reflects that defense counsel operated under a mistaken impression of the evidence. Such a mistake was unreasonable, where careful review of the lab reports and exhibits demonstrated the location of the box which contained Williams's fingerprint. Therefore, we consider whether the error was so serious that, absent the error, the result of the proceeding would have been different. People v. Schlager, 247 Ill.App.3d 921, 932 (1993). We find the result would remain the same.
¶ 113 Defendant relies on People v. Briones, 352 Ill.App.3d 913 (2004), and People v. Baines, 399 Ill.App.3d 881 (2010), in support of his position that counsel's mistake constitutes reversible error. We find these cases factually distinguishable from the instant cause.
¶ 114 In Briones, 352 Ill.App.3d at 918, this court concluded that defense counsel's failure to call the defendant to testify, after promising that the defendant would "testify to the truth," constituted deficient performance. Moreover, this court determined that the defendant was prejudiced by counsel's errors. Id. In Briones, the defendant argued that his counsel was deficient because she set the defense up to be discredited by promising the jury that the defendant would testify to the truth and, inexplicably, failing to call him. Id. This court agreed, noting that the promise of a particular type of testimony creates an expectation in the minds of its jurors, particularly when a jury is promised to hear the defendant's story directly from the defendant his or herself. Id.
¶ 115 Similarly, in Baines, 399 Ill.App.3d at 894, the First District determined that defense counsel rendered ineffective assistance of counsel in his pursuit of a misidentification defense, where counsel failed to learn the facts behind the victim's misidentification of another individual as one of three attackers, failed to establish with clarity during cross-examination of the victim that law enforcement had exonerated the individual, and failed to adequately impeach the victim who maintained that the exonerated man was one of the attackers. The First District determined that the State's case was "weak," and therefore determined that the defendant was prejudiced by defense counsel's deficient performance. Id. at 899.
¶ 116 Here, unlike Briones and Baines, the evidence of defendant's guilt was significant. Three eyewitnesses, Devan Jr., Russell, and Frazier, testified that they saw defendant shoot Jackson as he fled the robbery attempt. The testimony established that defendant possessed a 9-millimeter handgun shortly before Jackson's murder took place. Surveillance footage demonstrated that defendant wore a gray jacket, which was later recovered by law enforcement. A neighbor, Leon Kemmerling, identified defendant as present in the group he saw at the corner of 18th and Conger. Moreover, defendant's cell phone data placed him at the scene. Finally, physical evidence corroborated the witnesses' testimonies, specifically, the 13, 9-millimeter casings found at the crime scene. The casings were found in the area where the witnesses observed Jackson's murder.
¶ 117 In addition, circumstantial evidence demonstrated defendant's guilt, including his interview with law enforcement and jail recorded phone calls. Defendant, who commonly stayed overnight at Fowler's residence, had access to the type of ammunition used to kill Jackson, as demonstrated by the empty 9-millimeter Blazer box found in Fowler's trash, and a second 9-millimeter Blazer box found under Breanna's bed on January 31, 2017. Additionally, law enforcement found four 9-millimeter Blazer casings fired by the murder weapon in Fowler's yard. This evidence created a link between the murder weapon and the home in which defendant stayed.
¶ 118 Moreover, despite the mistaken promise, defense counsel presented evidence that Williams had close ties to Russell and Devan Jr. Defense counsel also presented evidence that Z.P. tried to purchase a firearm from Williams the day before the murder. As such, defense counsel's mistaken promise in opening statements did not prevent counsel from pursuing the strategy that defendant was not the shooter.
¶ 119 Given the weight of this evidence, the results of the proceeding would not have been different but for counsel's mistake. Therefore, we find that counsel's mistake was unreasonable; however, defendant was not prejudiced by the error.
¶ 120 Next, we consider whether defense counsel was ineffective by not moving to suppress the Blazer 9-millimeter ammunition box found in Fowler's trash. Defendant seemingly contends that he was prejudiced by the admission of the ammunition box because it was seized in an unrelated narcotics investigation, where law enforcement recovered the box in a trash pull. We disagree.
¶ 121 A defendant's claim that his counsel was ineffective is judged under the standard set forth by the Supreme Court in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984), requiring a defendant to demonstrate that (1) his attorney's representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness and (2) "a reasonable probability exists that, but for counsel's errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different." People v. Peterson, 2017 IL 120331, ¶ 79. "A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome of the proceeding." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id. Additionally, "[a] failure by the defendant to satisfy either prong of the Strickland standard precludes a finding of ineffective assistance of counsel." Id.
¶ 122 We find that, even assuming counsel's performance was deficient, defendant cannot establish the second Strickland prong. In this case, defendant fails to show that a motion to suppress would have been meritorious or that there was a reasonable probability that the outcome of the trial would have been different if the Blazer ammunition box had been suppressed. This is particularly true where the circumstances of the trash pull were minimal and nonspecific. Law enforcement pulled the trash from Fowler's residence and transported it to the police station where the narcotic divisions searched it for evidence of illegal drug activity.
¶ 123 As discussed above, the State presented strong evidence of defendant's guilt, not only through convincing circumstantial evidence, but also through physical evidence, eyewitness statements, and testimony of individuals who were familiar with defendant. Therefore, a reasonable probability does not exist that, but for defense counsel's alleged failure to file a motion to suppress, the result of the underlying proceedings would have been different. In other words, considering the evidence presented at trial, the alleged error by defendant's attorney did not undermine confidence in the outcome of the trial.
¶ 124 Next, we consider whether defense counsel provided ineffective assistance of counsel by failing to object to the State's introduction of Russell and Frazier's prior consistent statements. Defendant argues that the statements were inadmissible, and the prosecution improperly used the prior consistent statements of Russell and Frazier throughout trial, and counsel failed to object to their use. We disagree.
¶ 125 To establish deficient performance by counsel, a "defendant must overcome the strong presumption that the challenged action or inaction may have been the product of sound trial strategy." People v. Sturgeon, 2019 IL App (4th) 170035, ¶ 83. "As a general rule, trial strategy encompasses decisions such as what matters to object to and when to object." People v. Pecoraro, 144 Ill.2d 1, 13 (1991).
¶ 126 Generally, statements made prior to trial for the purpose of corroborating trial testimony are inadmissible. People v. Cuadrado, 214 Ill.2d 79, 90 (2005). An exception to this rule applies when it is suggested that the witness recently fabricated the testimony or had a motive to testify falsely, and the prior statement was made before the motive to fabricate arose. Id.
¶ 127 Here, the admission of the testimony was proper because, on cross-examination, defense counsel questioned Russell and Frazier about their pretrial testimony practice with the State. Those questions attempted to demonstrate recent fabrication and a motive to lie. There was no error in admitting the statements because the testimony was admissible under the exception to the general bar on such statements. See id. Moreover, this constituted sound trial strategy, where defense counsel sought testimony related to Russell and Frazier's motive to lie.
¶ 128 Because admission of the statements does not constitute error, defense counsel was not ineffective for failing to object. Without error, there is no deficient performance. As such, we hold that defendant failed to show that he received ineffective assistance of counsel.
¶ 129 Next, we consider whether counsel was ineffective for failing to object to the allegations of nontestifying witnesses. Specifically, defendant argues that defense counsel allowed the State to improperly bolster its case with allegations of nontestifying codefendants, Williams, Z.P., and a tipster, who gave the police defendant's name. The State contends that the defense conceded that defendant was one of the nine people at or near the corner of 18th and Conger, and as such, evidence from nontestifying witnesses constituted cumulative evidence on an undisputed matter. We agree with the State.
¶ 130 Again, defendant cannot establish the second Strickland prong, where the State presented strong evidence of defendant's guilt through convincing circumstantial evidence, eyewitness testimony, and testimony of individuals familiar with defendant. People v. Bull, 185 Ill.2d 179, 203 (1998) (if a reviewing court finds that a defendant claiming ineffective assistance of counsel did not suffer prejudice, it need not decide whether counsel's performance was constitutionally deficient). As explained in detail above, reasonable probability does not exist that, but for the failure to object to the allegations of Williams and Z.P., the result of the underlying proceedings would have been different. As such, we hold that defendant failed to show that he received ineffective assistance of counsel.
¶ 131 Next, we consider whether defense counsel was ineffective for failing to object to the admission of an allegedly unredacted police interrogation video of defendant. Defendant argues that the errors were magnified by the admission of defendant's police interrogation without the agreed-upon redactions. We disagree.
¶ 132 Here, during pretrial, the trial court granted defendant's motion in limine #1 without objection from the State, barring introduction of certain statements made by defendant in his police recorded interview, including defendant's invocation of his right to remain silent. The State admitted and published the video. Defense counsel did not object but stated: "Subject to previous court ruling, your Honor." The State played the video.
¶ 133 Defendant claims that the jury heard suppressed police statements, but no invocation of defendant's right to remain silent. However, the record demonstrates that the State played the video subject to court ruling. Moreover, on appeal, the State filed a motion to supplement the record with a joint stipulation of defense counsel, who agree that the video was played subject to the court ruling. Nothing in the record demonstrates that the State played the police interrogation without agreed-upon redactions. Therefore, we reject this argument.
¶ 134 Defendant additionally argues that counsel should have challenged the video, because defendant may not have been talking about Jackson's murder in the video. This argument is purely speculative, and the jurors were in the best position to weigh the evidence.
¶ 135 Therefore, where the record rebuts this argument, there is no error. As such, we hold that defendant failed to show that he received ineffective assistance of counsel.
¶ 136 Finally, we consider whether defense counsel provided ineffective assistance of counsel during his impeachment of Devan Jr. Defendant argues that defense counsel was ineffective where counsel erroneously failed to point out Devan Jr.'s additional felony case that the State dropped pursuant to his plea and failed to object to the State's argument that Devan Jr. had nothing to do with the murder, despite leveraging that charge to secure his testimony. We disagree.
¶ 137 To establish deficient performance by counsel, a "defendant must overcome the strong presumption that the challenged action or inaction may have been the product of sound trial strategy." Sturgeon, 2019 IL App (4th) 170035, ¶ 83. "As a general rule, trial strategy encompasses decisions such as what matters to object to and when to object." Pecoraro, 144 Ill.2d at 13. Specifically, defendant argues that counsel should have impeached Devan Jr. with Jefferson County case No. 16-CF-100. The record lacks information about this charge, nor was the issue raised before the trial court. Even considering the issue on the merits, counsel's potentially strategic choice to examine Devan Jr. on the terms of his plea agreement and not on an unrelated charge dismissed before trial was reasonable, because no bias would be inferred from it.
¶ 138 Moreover, there is no reasonable probability that the jury, knowing that two counts of murder, attempt robbery, and conspiracy to commit robbery charges, awaited Devan Jr. if he testified untruthfully, would have viewed his testimony more skeptically if it had known that an unrelated Class 4 felony drug possession charge was recently dismissed. Therefore, defendant fails to show that he was prejudiced by defense counsel's failure to impeach Devan Jr. with the drug possession charge, where the additional felony case would not have impacted the outcome of the proceedings.
¶ 139 C. Cumulative Error
¶ 140 Next, we address defendant's cumulative error allegation. Defendant argues that the cumulative effect of his counsel's ineffectiveness and the trial court's erroneous admission of evidence requires reversal. We disagree.
¶ 141 "[W]here errors are not individually considered sufficiently egregious for an appellate court to grant the defendant a new trial, but the errors, nevertheless, create a pervasive pattern of unfair prejudice to the defendant's case, a new trial may be granted on the ground of cumulative error." People v. Sims, 2019 IL App (3d) 170417, ¶ 55; see also People v. Blue, 189 Ill.2d 99, 139, (2000) (finding each alleged error in the case cast "doubt upon the reliability of the judicial process" and "[c]umulatively, *** created a pervasive pattern of unfair prejudice to defendant's case"). "There generally is no cumulative error where the alleged errors do not amount to reversible error on any individual issue." People v. Green, 2017 IL App (1st) 152513, ¶ 118.
¶ 142 In this case, the alleged errors identified by defendant were either not errors or insignificant considering the strong evidence presented against him. Therefore, none of his claimed errors, either alone or taken together, entitle him to a new trial. See People v. Caffey, 205 Ill.2d 52, 118 (2001)(concluding that where "no error occurred at all, or any error that may have occurred did not rise to the level of plain error," "[a] defendant is not entitled to a new trial on the basis of cumulative error"); Perry, 224 Ill.2d at 356 (finding a cumulative-error analysis unnecessary where the defendant's ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claims had been rejected on the basis "that counsel's performance was not deficient or, even if deficient, did not result in prejudice under Strickland"). Here, having found that none of the errors alleged by defendant constituted reversible error, there is no cumulative error. See Green, 2017 IL App (1st) 152513, ¶ 118.
¶ 143 D. Sentencing
¶ 144 Finally, we consider whether defendant's 70-year prison sentence violated the proportionate penalties clause of the Illinois Constitution (Ill. Const. 1970, art. I, § 11) due to defendant's youth, personal culpability, and rehabilitative potential, and whether the court abused its discretion in imposing an excessive sentence.
¶ 145 Here, defendant was undoubtedly not a juvenile when the murder in this case occurred. At the time of the offense, defendant was 20 years old. Accordingly, Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460, 489 (2012), and its progeny is inapplicable to this case. Succinctly stated, this case does not involve a juvenile offender.
¶ 146 Additionally, defendant contends that this court should remand for a hearing pursuant to People v. Harris, 2018 IL 121932, ¶¶ 54-61. We disagree. This court has repeatedly held that as-applied youth-based sentencing challenges are not available to defendants who were direct participants in a crime and who were 20 years old or older at the time of the offense (and, therefore, "was not a teenager on the cusp between a juvenile and adult"). People v. White, 2020 IL App (5th) 170345, ¶ 28; see also People v. Green, 2020 IL App (5th) 170462, ¶ 42. As such, Harris is inapplicable in this case, where defendant was 20 years old and a direct participant in this crime.
¶ 147 We next turn to defendant's excessive sentence claim. Defendant argues that his sentence was excessive and unconstitutionally disproportionate to his personal culpability and rehabilitative potential. We disagree.
¶ 148 The power to reduce a sentence should be exercised cautiously and sparingly, and we will not alter a defendant's sentence unless the trial court abused its discretion. People v. Alexander, 239 Ill.2d 205, 212 (2010). A trial court abuses its discretion where the sentence is considerably at variance with the spirit and purpose of the law or manifestly disproportionate to the nature of the offense. Id. When the defendant's sentence is within the statutory limits, there is a rebuttable presumption that the sentence is appropriate. People v. Gooch, 2014 IL App (5th) 120161, ¶ 8. Defendant's sentencing range was 20 to 60 years, with a 25-year firearm enhancement. Defendant received a sentence of 45 years, plus the 25-year enhancement, for a total sentence of 70 years. The evidence demonstrated that defendant fired 13 shots at a fleeing victim during the commission of an attempted robbery, ultimately killing the victim. A 45-year sentence was well within the range of 20 to 60 years, and the trial court expressly noted that it "gave a great deal of thought to this sentencing, probably more than average." This sentence falls within statutory limits.
¶ 149 Finally, defendant seemingly suggests that systemic racism played a role in his sentencing hearing. However, nothing in the record supports this argument, nor was the issue raised in defendant's postsentencing motion. Under the circumstances of this case, and given the trial court's broad discretion in sentencing, we find that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in sentencing the defendant to 70 years in prison. For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the defendant's sentence.
¶ 150 III. Conclusion
¶ 151 In sum, we affirm defendant's conviction and sentence for first degree murder where: (1) the trial court made proper evidentiary rulings; (2) defendant was not prejudiced by counsel's mistake in opening statements nor the State's comments in closing statements, and defense counsel otherwise provided effective assistance of counsel; and (3) defendant received an appropriate sentence.
¶ 152 Affirmed.