Opinion
D075174
04-30-2020
THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. PHILLIP JAMES WELLS, Defendant and Appellant.
Britton Donaldson, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant. Xavier Becerra, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Julie L. Garland, Assistant Attorney General, Robin Urbanski and Yvette M. Martinez, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. (Super. Ct. No. SCD275622) APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of San Diego County, Kenneth K. So, Judge. Affirmed. Britton Donaldson, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant. Xavier Becerra, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Julie L. Garland, Assistant Attorney General, Robin Urbanski and Yvette M. Martinez, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
Phillip James Wells appeals from the trial court's order revoking his probation based on a finding that he violated certain conditions of his probation, including that he have no contact with his wife (Wife), who was the victim of one of the crimes to which he pled guilty. After terminating Wells's probation, the trial court sentenced Wells to prison for a term of four years, which was premised on his guilty plea to one count of robbery (Pen. Code, § 211) and one count of assault by means likely to produce great bodily injury (§ 245, subd. (a)(4)).
We refer to Wells's wife as "Wife" rather than by her name to protect her privacy. The record indicates that in mid-2018, Wife was in the process of divorcing Wells, but we use the term "Wife" for the purposes of our discussion based on the parties' marital status at the time of the relevant proceedings.
Unless otherwise indicated all further statutory references are to the Penal Code.
Wells contends that the trial court prejudicially abused its discretion at the probation revocation hearing because it improperly admitted documentary evidence of Wells's contact with Wife, in that Wife did not testify at the hearing to authenticate the documents. Wells also claims that the documentary evidence contained improperly admitted hearsay. We conclude that Wells's arguments lack merit, and we accordingly affirm the order revoking probation.
I.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
A. The Charges Against Wells, His Guilty Plea, and the Order Granting Probation
In a third amended complaint, Wells was charged with 22 counts arising out of, among other things, a robbery of a gas station and incidents of domestic violence against Wife. On April 25, 2018, appellant pled guilty to robbery (§ 211) and assault by means likely to produce great bodily injury (§ 245, subd. (a)(4)). The probation officer's report describes the facts upon which the robbery and assault counts were based as follows: "In this matter, [Wells] donned a mask, used a machete, and robbed the Shell Gas Station clerk of $300.00. He fled the scene. Subsequently, officers responded to the defendant's residence [in] reference [to] an assault wherein the defendant pushed his wife while their children were present. He demanded her cellular telephone, covered her mouth, and pulled her back into the residence. He further threatened to kill her and all of her relatives if she called for police."
Specifically, the third amended information charged Wells with one count of robbery (§ 211), two counts of making a criminal threat (§ 422), two counts of battery on a significant other (§ 243, subd. (e)(1)), one count of attempting to dissuade a witness from reporting a crime (§ 136.1, subd. (b)(1)), one count of false imprisonment (§ 236), one count of failing to appear while on bail (§ 1320.5), nine counts of violation of a domestic violence protective order (§ 166, subd. (c)(1)), one count of providing false information to a peace officer (§ 148.9, subd. (a)), one count of resisting an officer (§ 148, subd. (a)(1)), one count of possessing a controlled substance (Health & Saf. Code, § 11377, subd. (a)), and one count of possessing narcotics paraphernalia (id., § 11364). At the plea hearing, the information was amended to include a charge of assault by means likely to produce great bodily injury (§ 245, subd. (a)(4)).
On May 23, 2018, Wells was placed on formal probation for four years. The order granting formal probation contained numerous conditions, including, as relevant here, a requirement that Wells (1) not knowingly contact or attempt to contact Wife (Condition 10j); (2) obey all laws (Condition 6a); and (3) report to his probation officer within 72 hours of any release from custody (Condition 6i). In addition, the trial court issued a protective order requiring that Wells have no contact with Wife.
On August 7, 2018, Wells was released from custody and transferred to a residential drug treatment program. B. The Probation Officer's Report of Wells's Rearrest for Probation Violations
On September 4, 2018, Wells's probation officer filed a report with the trial court stating that Wells had been rearrested on August 29, 2018, for violating the conditions of his probation. As relevant here, the probation officer's report alleged violations of Condition 10j, Condition 6a and Condition 6i.
Condition 6a, which required Wells to obey all laws, was alleged to have been violated when Wells failed to follow the protective order prohibiting all contact with Wife. The probation officer's report also alleged a violation of the probation condition requiring that Wells complete a program of residential treatment. However, the People did not pursue that allegation in the trial court, as Wells was still participating in the residential treatment program when he was rearrested.
Specifically, the probation officer stated that she had been contacted by the Los Angeles Police Department with information that Wells had made more than 50 attempts to contact Wife, both by mail sent to the address of Wife's friend and by Facebook Messenger communications sent directly to Wife's account. The probation officer received copies of the letters and screenshots of the Facebook Messenger communications from the Los Angeles Police Department, some of which she attached to the report. The probation officer also stated that Wells had not checked in with her after being released to the residential drug treatment program, even though he had access to a cellphone to do so.
Some of the Facebook Messenger screenshots attached to the probation officer's report depict messages from Wells's own account, as the sender is identified with Wells's full name and his photo. The content of those messages also indicate they are from Wells to Wife. For example, one message references the couple's marriage and children, stating "You want to divorce . . . . Just take one last look into my daughters['] eyes and make your decision."
The other Facebook Messenger communications attached to the probation officer's report are from account holders with the name "Stephen Carpenter" or "Romero Sadder." Those communications also contain strong indications that they are from Wells to Wife. A message from Romero Sadder references the couple's children, stating "I miss you and the girls so much. . . . I just want to be a father. And whatever you want me to be in your life." Similarly, a message from Stephen Carpenter states, "Wow[,] ten years[,] 4 beautiful lives we bring to earth together . . . . And it means nothing to you? . . . I love all of you so much."
Some of the Facebook messenger screenshots are undated. Some of them show a date of August 18, 21 or 22, but do not indicate the year. Messages from all three accounts refer to Wife by her name.
The letters attached to the probation officer's report also appear to be sent by Wells to Wife after he was granted probation in May 2018. The first letter appears to be a postcard with a postmark of July 10, 2018, and is addressed to Wife by her first name. The return address indicates "Your Loverboy" as the sender, and it is signed with a stylized version of Wells's initials, "PJW." The second letter does not have a legible postmark or a legible sender. It is addressed to Wife by her first name and contains references to divorce paperwork and the couple's children. The third letter has a postmark from July 2018, although the exact date is illegible. It is unclear whether the photo in the record depicts an envelope covered with writing (apparently consisting of religious quotes) or whether it is a postcard. The letter is addressed to "Babe" at the same address as the other two letters. The probation officer's report also attaches several pages of hand written communication which, based on their content, appear to be from Wells to Wife, as they reference the couple's children and their marriage, and one page is signed with Wells's stylized initials. The probation officer's report does not make clear whether those pages were included in any of the postmarked envelopes included in the record. C. Trial Court Proceedings on the Probation Violations
On September 7, 2018, the trial court summarily revoked Wells's probation and set a date for an evidentiary hearing regarding the probation violations. At the evidentiary hearing, the People presented the testimony of two probation officers: Officer Becerra who was assigned as Wells's probation officer until shortly before the hearing, and Officer Simone, who was newly assigned to the matter.
As Officer Becerra testified, after she received the letters and the Facebook Messenger screenshots from the Los Angeles Police Department, she reviewed them and spoke to Wife. According to Officer Becerra, Wife "explained . . . her fear and her concern for the numerous contacts" from Wells, which Wife reported "caused her great worry and fear."
Officer Becerra testified that when she spoke with Wells on August 29 after his arrest, he did not deny any of the contact with Wife, and was "extremely transparent." As Officer Becerra described her conversation with Wells, "he explained to me that he had every intention of being with his family. He loved his wife. He elaborated on how they had been together for ten years. He flip-flopped back and forth between the love of his wife and wanting to be with her and the . . . need to see his children."
Officer Becerra testified, "I explained to him why he was going into custody because of his contact with [Wife]. He did not deny any of that contact." In her report to the trial court about Wells's rearrest, Officer Becerra stated that when she spoke with Wells upon arresting him he "admitted he has attempted to contact [Wife] via Facebook messenger and even tried to direct the undersigned as to where the dialog would be located on his phone" and "talked freely about . . . his correspondence with [Wife] despite the Criminal Protective Order." However, at the evidentiary hearing on the probation violations, the prosecutor failed to elicit specific testimony from Officer Becerra regarding Wells's exact admissions to her as to his contact with Wife. The prosecutor also did not seek to enter into evidence the portion of Officer Becerra's probations officer's report that set forth the details of what Wells told her. Accordingly, the most that Officer Becerra testified regarding Wells's admission to her regarding his contact with Wife was that Wells "did not deny any of that contact" and that he "confirmed" the contact.
Officer Simone testified that she spoke with Wife on the day before the hearing. Wife explained to Officer Simone that Wells had been contacting her "constantly" when he was out of custody. Wife was "very distraught" and was crying during the phone call with Officer Simone. As Wife told Officer Simone, she was "trying to put it behind her," and it would be an emotional hardship if she were to testify at the hearing on Wells's probation violations.
At the hearing, the People sought to admit into evidence all of the documentation that had been attached to the probation officer's report, consisting of the letters sent by Wells and the screenshots of the Facebook Messenger communications. Defense counsel objected to the admission of those documents. He argued that the documents had not been properly authenticated. According to defense counsel, the documents could only be authenticated through the testimony of Wife, who received them, but Wife had not appeared to testify. To the extent Wife's hearsay statements to the probation officers about receiving the documents were being used to authenticate them, defense counsel objected that the admission of Wife's hearsay statements violated his right to confrontation as it applies in probation revocation hearings. Although acknowledging that hearsay statements of an out-of-court declarant may be admitted in a probation revocation hearing if the court finds good cause for admitting hearsay statement by someone who is unavailable as that term is defined in applicable case law, defense counsel contended that the People had not established that Wife was unavailable. As defense counsel argued, "if the Court finds that [Wife] is not deemed unavailable, then her—every testimony—every bit of testimony by either Officer Becerra or [Officer Simone], concerning the statements of [Wife] should be struck, and, therefore, these documents have no foundation."
The trial court ruled that Wife was unavailable, providing good cause for admitting her hearsay statements into evidence through the testimony of the probation officers. The trial court also observed that "[i]n many respects" the screenshots of the Facebook Messenger communications were "self-authenticating." The trial court therefore overruled defense counsel's objection to the admission of the documentary evidence of Wells's attempts to contact Wife, and it received those documents into evidence.
Based on the evidence before it, the trial court found that Wells violated Condition 10j, Condition 6a and Condition 6i, and it formally revoked Wells's probation. The trial court sentenced Wells to four years in prison. Wells appeals from the order formally revoking his probation.
II.
DISCUSSION
Wells contends that the order revoking his probation should be reversed because the trial court erroneously admitted into evidence the Facebook Messenger screenshots and the letters that showed Wells's attempts to contact Wife. Specifically, Wells presents two grounds on which the messages and letters should have been excluded from evidence. First, Wells contends that the People presented insufficient admissible evidence to authenticate the messages and letters because the authentication of those documents depended on inadmissible hearsay statements made by Wife to the probation officers. Second, Wells contends that the messages and letters themselves contained hearsay which should have been excluded from evidence because that hearsay did not contain sufficient indicia of reliability. We consider each argument in turn. A. The Messages and Letters Were Properly Authenticated by the Admission of Wife's Out-of-Court Statements
For ease of reference, we will refer to the Facebook Messenger screenshots and the letters, on a collective basis, as "the messages and letters."
We first turn to Wells's contention that the messages and letters were improperly admitted because they were authenticated by hearsay statements that Wife made to the probation officers.
1. Standard of Review
We apply an abuse of discretion standard in reviewing the trial court's ruling admitting the messages and letters, as well in reviewing the trial court's ruling admitting Wife's hearsay statements to the probation officers that authenticated those documents. (People v. Shepherd (2007) 151 Cal.App.4th 1193, 1198 (Shepherd) ["A trial court's decision to admit or exclude evidence in a probation revocation hearing will not be disturbed on appeal absent an abuse of discretion"]; People v. Abrams (2007) 158 Cal.App.4th 396, 400 (Abrams) ["We review rulings on whether hearsay was improperly admitted at a [probation] violation hearing for abuse of discretion"].)
2. Authentication of a Writing
"Authentication of a writing, . . . is required before it may be admitted in evidence. ([Evid. Code,] §§ 250, 1401.) Authentication is to be determined by the trial court as a preliminary fact ([id.] § 403, subd. (a)(3)) and is statutorily defined as 'the introduction of evidence sufficient to sustain a finding that it is the writing that the proponent of the evidence claims it is' or 'the establishment of such facts by any other means provided by law' ([id.] § 1400)." (People v. Goldsmith (2014) 59 Cal.4th 258, 266.) The foundation for authenticity "requires that there be sufficient evidence for a trier of fact to find that the writing is what it purports to be, i.e., that it is genuine for the purpose offered. [Citation] Essentially, what is necessary is a prima facie case." (Id. at p. 267.) " '[A] writing can be authenticated by circumstantial evidence and by its contents.' " (People v. Landry (2016) 2 Cal.5th 52, 87.) For example, " '[a] writing may be authenticated by evidence that the writing refers to or states matters that are unlikely to be known to anyone other than the person who is claimed by the proponent of the evidence to be the author of the writing.' " (Ibid., quoting Evid. Code, § 1421.) " 'As long as the evidence would support a finding of authenticity, the writing is admissible. The fact conflicting inferences can be drawn regarding authenticity goes to the document's weight as evidence, not its admissibility.' " (Goldsmith, at p. 267.)
In the trial court, Wells objected to the admission of the messages and letters on the ground that the People did not lay a sufficient foundation to establish their authenticity. As he does on appeal, Wells appeared to acknowledge in the trial court that Wife's statement to the probation officers that Wells was contacting her "constantly" and "numerous" times would be sufficient to authenticate the messages and letters if Wife had been present in the courtroom and subject to cross-examination. However, Wells argued in the trial court and continues to maintain on appeal that because Wife was not present to testify, her statements as related by the probation officers were inadmissible hearsay, and therefore no admissible evidence authenticated the messages and letters. As Wells argues, "[t]he probation officer's testimony that [Wife] received the messages and letters is hearsay. [Wife's] testimony is essential to laying the foundation for the messages and letters." According to Wells, "[w]ithout [Wife's] acknowledgement to receipt of the messages and letters as told to the probation officers, the messages and letters would not have come into evidence."
The trial court overruled Wells's objection on two grounds. First, it concluded that due to Wife's unavailability, the admission of Wife's hearsay statements to the probation officers did not violate Wells's constitutional right of confrontation. Second, the trial court observed that, even without Wife's statements, the messages and letters were self-authenticating "[i]n many respects." As we will explain, we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in determining that Wife was unavailable to testify, and therefore it properly found good cause to admit Wife's hearsay statements into evidence to authenticate the messages and letters. Because the trial court only briefly commented on the issue of whether the messages and letters were self-authenticating and did not identify which messages and letters it was referencing, we need not, and do not, consider the issue of self-authentication of the messages and letters.
3. The Trial Court Did Not Err in Finding Good Cause to Admit Wife's Statements to the Probation Officers That Authenticated the Messages and Letters
The question of whether Wife's hearsay statements to the probation officers were admissible to authenticate the messages and letters depends on the unique rules regarding the admission of testimonial hearsay evidence in probation revocation hearings. The Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment does not apply in probation revocation hearings. (People v. Gomez (2010) 181 Cal.App.4th 1028, 1039 (Gomez); People v. Stanphill (2009) 170 Cal.App.4th 61, 78; People v. Johnson (2004) 121 Cal.App.4th 1409, 1411.) "[T]he Sixth Amendment confrontation clause applies only to 'criminal prosecutions,' and a probation revocation hearing is not a 'criminal prosecution.' " (Stanphill, at p. 78.) Instead, as applicable here, a "[p]robationer['s] limited right to confront witnesses at revocation hearings stems from the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, not from the Sixth Amendment." (Johnson, at p. 1411, italics added.)
In a probation revocation hearing, the defendant's "confrontation rights, however, are not absolute, and where appropriate, witnesses may give evidence by ' "affidavits, depositions, and documentary evidence" ' " that would not otherwise be admissible in a criminal trial. (Abrams, supra, 158 Cal.App.4th at p. 400.) In a probation revocation hearing different rules apply to the admission of documentary hearsay evidence and testimonial hearsay evidence. When the hearsay evidence is documentary in nature, its admission will be consistent with the defendant's right to due process if the court finds sufficient "indicia of reliability." (People v. Maki (1985) 39 Cal.3d 707, 715-717 (Maki).) However, when the hearsay evidence is testimonial in nature, the evidence may be admitted consistent with the due process clause if there is "good cause" for its admission. (People v. Arreola (1994) 7 Cal.4th 1144, 1159 (Arreola).) The good cause requirement applies both to the admission of an unavailable declarant's prior in court testimony, as well as other types of out-of-court statements by the declarant, such as the out-of-court statements by Wife that are at issue here. (Arreola, at p. 1159 [requiring "a showing of good cause before a defendant's right of confrontation at a probation revocation hearing can be dispensed with by the admission of a preliminary hearing transcript in lieu of live testimony"]; Shepherd, supra, 151 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1201-1202 [in a probation revocation hearing, the good cause standard also applies to "a witness's live testimony regarding a declarant's out-of-court statements"].)
Assuming that the statements that Wife made to the probation officers about receiving the messages and letters from Wells qualify as testimonial hearsay evidence for the purpose of the due process analysis, those hearsay statements were admissible at Wells's probation revocation hearing if the People established good cause to admit them. The standard for assessing good cause for the admission of testimonial hearsay evidence in a probation revocation hearing is set forth in Arreola: "The broad standard of 'good cause' is met (1) when the declarant is 'unavailable' under the traditional hearsay standard (see Evid. Code, § 240), (2) when the declarant, although not legally unavailable, can be brought to the hearing only through great difficulty or expense, or (3) when the declarant's presence would pose a risk of harm (including, in appropriate circumstances, mental or emotional harm) to the declarant." (Arreola, supra, 7 Cal. 4th at pp. 1159- 1160.) Further, "in determining the admissibility of the evidence on a case-by-case basis, the showing of good cause that has been made must be considered together with other circumstances relevant to the issue, including the purpose for which the evidence is offered (e.g., as substantive evidence of an alleged probation violation, rather than, for example, simply a reference to the defendant's character); the significance of the particular evidence to a factual determination relevant to a finding of violation of probation; and whether other admissible evidence, including, for example, any admissions made by the probationer, corroborates the former testimony, or whether, instead, the former testimony constitutes the sole evidence establishing a violation of probation." (Arreola, at p. 1160.)
Based on the facts before it, the trial court concluded that Wife was unavailable because she would be mentally or emotionally harmed if required to be present, and it accordingly found good cause to admit Wife's hearsay statements into evidence at the probation revocation hearing. As we will explain, the trial court's ruling was not an abuse of discretion. As Arreola states, one way that the "broad standard of 'good cause' is met" is by showing that "the declarant's presence would pose a risk of harm (including, in appropriate circumstances, mental or emotional harm) to the declarant." (Arreola, supra, 7 Cal. 4th at pp. 1159-1160.) The evidence at the hearing showed that Wife was under considerable emotional distress due to Wells's attempts to contact her. As Officer Simone testified, when she spoke with Wife on the day before the hearing, Wife was "very distraught" and was crying. Officer Simone specifically stated that Wife told her that she was "trying to put it behind her" and that it would be an emotional hardship if she were to testify at the hearing on Wells's probation violations. Officer Becerra testified that Wife said Wells had "caused her great worry and fear." The trial court also knew that Wife had relocated out of San Diego County to a confidential location with the assistance of a victim's advocate program because of the harassment she had experienced from Wells, and that the crime to which Wells pled guilty involved an incident in which Wells threatened to kill Wife and all of her relatives. Based on all of those facts, the trial court was well within its discretion to find that it would pose a risk of harm of mental or emotional harm if Wife was required to attend the probation revocation hearing and be in the physical presence of Wells for the purpose of confirming that she received the messages and letters from Wells.
The trial court stated, "I find that she's unavailable. I find that she's frightened. I think the evidence indicates that she wants to get on with her life. That she does not want to be contacted by the defendant."
Moreover, in making a determination of whether there was good cause to admit hearsay statements in light of a witness's unavailability, Arreola directs a trial court to weigh other factors, including "whether other admissible evidence, including, for example, any admissions made by the probationer, corroborates the [testimonial hearsay evidence], or whether, instead, the [testimonial hearsay evidence] constitutes the sole evidence establishing a violation of probation." (Arreola, supra, 7 Cal.4th at p. 1160.) Here, there was good cause to admit Wife's statements that Wells sent the messages and letters to her because those statements were corroborated with Wells's own admissions. Specifically, as Officer Becerra testified, Wells did not deny that he had contacted Wife in violation of the protective order, and he was "extremely transparent," explaining that he intended to be with Wife and his children.
In sum, we conclude that the trial court did not err in finding good cause under the applicable due process standards to admit Wife's out-of-court statements to the probation officers confirming that she had received the messages and letters from Wells. As Wife's hearsay statements were properly admitted into evidence, there was an ample foundation for the trial court to conclude that the messages and letters were properly authenticated. B. There Is No Merit to Wells's Challenge to the Admission into the Evidence of the Messages and Letters on the Ground That They Contain Hearsay Lacking in Sufficient Indicia of Reliability
Wells's second challenge to the admission into evidence of the messages and letters is based on the rules governing the circumstances under which documentary hearsay evidence may be admitted in a probation revocation hearing. As we have explained, consistent with the requirements of due process, hearsay contained in documents may be admitted at a probation revocation hearing if the court finds that the hearsay contained therein possesses sufficient "indicia of reliability." (Maki, supra, 39 Cal.3d at pp. 715-717.) When the admission of hearsay is at issue in a probation revocation hearing, "[d]ocumentary evidence must be accompanied by reasonable indicia of reliability to be admissible." (Gomez, supra, 181 Cal.App.4th at p. 1034.) Wells argues that "the Facebook messages and letters are not records . . . prepared in the due course of business" and they "are not reports . . . that were prepared specifically for the hearing. They are personal conversations. . . . They should not be admitted because they do not bear sufficient indicia of reliability." As we will explain, this argument fails for several reasons.
First, as we understand Wells's appellate argument, he is challenging the admission of the messages and letters not just because they were improperly authenticated as he argued in the trial court, but because even if properly authenticated, they contained hearsay that was not admissible. Specifically, he contends that under the requirements of Maki, supra, 39 Cal.3d at pages 715 to 717, the hearsay in those documents should not have been admitted into evidence because it did not bear sufficient indicia of reliability. Wells did not raise that objection in the trial court. Wells's sole objection to the admission of the messages and letters in the trial court was that they could only be authenticated by Wife's testimony, which itself was inadmissible. In the trial court, Wells failed to identify any hearsay in the messages and letters that he contended should have been excluded as inadmissible hearsay.
"[W]hen an objection is made to proposed evidence, the specific ground of the objection must be stated. The appellate court's review of the trial court's admission of evidence is then limited to the stated ground for the objection. . . . 'What is important is that the objection fairly inform the trial court, as well as the party offering the evidence, of the specific reason or reasons the objecting party believes the evidence should be excluded, so the party offering the evidence can respond appropriately and the court can make a fully informed ruling.' " (People v. Abel (2012) 53 Cal.4th 891, 924, citations omitted.) " '[T]he "defendant's failure to make a timely and specific objection" on the ground asserted on appeal makes that ground not cognizable.' " (People v. Partida (2005) 37 Cal.4th 428, 434.) Wells's objection in the trial court based on lack of authentication of the messages and letters did not alert the court that he was challenging the admission of those documents based on the hearsay content of the documents themselves. Therefore, the argument is not preserved for appeal.
Second, even were we to consider Wells's argument that the messages and letters contained improperly admitted hearsay, we would reject the argument on the merits for two reasons. For one thing, the messages and letters were not admitted by the People for any hearsay purpose, and Wells has not identified any hearsay statement contained in those documents that he contends should not have been admitted. " 'Hearsay evidence' is evidence of a statement that was made other than by a witness while testifying at the hearing and that is offered to prove the truth of the matter stated." (Evid. Code, § 1200, subd. (a), italics added.) However, the value of the messages and letters to the People's case was not the truth of anything stated by Wells in those documents. Instead, it was the mere existence of the messages and letters themselves that gave them value in proving that Wells violated the conditions of his probation. In addition, even if Wells could identify some statements in the messages and letters that he contends should have been excluded from evidence because they were offered for the truth of the matter asserted, that argument would fail because all of the statements made in the messages and letters were made by Wells himself. "Evidence of a statement is not made inadmissible by the hearsay rule when offered against the declarant in an action to which he is a party." (Evid. Code, § 1220.) "[T]he exception applies to all statements of the party against whom they are offered." (People v. Rodriguez (2014) 58 Cal.4th 587, 637.) Thus, any statement appearing in the messages and letters would be properly admissible for the truth of the matter asserted because all of those statements authored by Wells and would be offered against him in the probation revocation proceeding.
In his appellate briefing, Wells also discusses the trial court's finding that he violated Condition 6i by failing to report to his probation officer within 72 hours of being released from custody into the residential drug treatment program. Specifically, Wells contends that, for several reasons, the violation of Condition 6i alone would not have justified an order revoking his probation, so that in the event we agree with him that the trial court prejudicially erred in admitting evidence relating his attempts to contact Wife in violation of Conditions 6a and 10j, we should reverse the order formally revoking Wells's probation or should at least remand to the trial court to determine the appropriate order. Because we find no merit to Wells's contention that the trial court erred with respect to the evidence admitted to support its finding that Wells violated Conditions 6a and 10j, we need not, and do not, address Wells's arguments with respect to Condition 6i. --------
DISPOSITION
The order formally revoking Wells's probation is affirmed.
IRION, J. WE CONCUR: BENKE, Acting P. J. HUFFMAN, J.