Opinion
No. 342665
02-12-2019
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. TANAKA JAYVON WELLS, Defendant-Appellant.
If this opinion indicates that it is "FOR PUBLICATION," it is subject to revision until final publication in the Michigan Appeals Reports. UNPUBLISHED Wayne Circuit Court
LC No. 11-003603-01-FC Before: JANSEN, P.J., and BECKERING and O'BRIEN, JJ. PER CURIAM.
Defendant appeals as of right his 2012 conviction of armed robbery, MCL 750.529, for which the trial court sentenced him to a prison term of 15 to 30 years. We affirm.
I. RELEVANT FACTUAL BACKGROUND
Defendant was convicted of robbing 92-year-old Julius Evans on January 22, 2011, as Evans was sitting in his car in a restaurant parking lot, counting out some money. According to Evans, a man approached him, showed him a driver's license belonging to a person named Grant Johnson, and asked him if he had seen that person. When Evans denied knowing the person, the man jumped into Evans's vehicle and took Evans's keys. After a struggle, the man took Evans's money from his pocket and asked Evans where he kept his additional money. Evans denied having any more money. During the offense, the assailant called out to a "buddy" to "come on help me, man." According to Evans, a second man ran up to Evans's vehicle, the two men grabbed Evans's money, and both men ran away through an alley. A plastic handgun was later recovered from inside Evans's vehicle. The prosecutor's theory at trial was that defendant was the person who initially approached Evans, assaulted him, and took his money.
According to a police officer, defendant voluntarily gave a statement in which he admitted obtaining Grant Johnson's identification by either robbing Johnson a few days earlier, or purchasing the identification "on the street." Defendant also admitted that he was the person who robbed Evans, using a fake handgun.
Defendant testified at trial and denied making the statements to the police. Defendant admitted being present when Evans was robbed, but claimed that it was another person, Ronnie Matthews, who robbed Evans. Defendant denied knowing that Matthews intended to rob Evans, but admitted that Matthews called for assistance during the offense, and admitted that he knew at that time that Matthews was committing a robbery and he was ready to offer whatever assistance Matthews needed. Defendant further admitted that he attempted to assist Matthews, but claimed that Matthews left Evans's vehicle before defendant got an opportunity to provide any actual assistance. Defendant admitted that he and Matthews ran off together and that the two of them split the money that was taken from Evans.
II. PLEA NEGOTIATIONS
First, defendant argues that the trial court unduly interfered in plea negotiations and improperly required him to enter pleas in other pending cases before the court would accept a plea in this case. We disagree.
A trial court's decision to reject a plea agreement is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. People v Grove, 455 Mich 439, 444; 566 NW2d 547 (1997). To the extent this issue implicates defendant's constitutional right to a trial, US Const, Am VI; Const 1963, art 1, § 20, we review constitutional issues de novo. People v Pitts, 222 Mich App 260, 263; 564 NW2d 93 (1997).
A trial court's role in plea negotiations is limited. "[J]udicial participation must be limited in order to minimize the coercive effect of such participation on the defendant, to insure the voluntariness of [a] plea, and to preserve public confidence in the judicial system." People v Killebrew, 416 Mich 189, 204-205; 330 NW2d 834 (1982). However, there is no absolute right to have a guilty plea accepted, and a court may reject a plea in exercise of sound judicial discretion. Grove, 455 Mich at 461. In addition, because courts retain discretion over sentencing, when a plea agreement includes a sentence agreement, the court is not bound to follow the agreement, but retains discretion to choose a different sentence. Killebrew, 416 Mich at 206-210. In this case, the record does not support defendant's argument that the trial court improperly interfered in plea negotiations, and the court did not abuse its discretion by rejecting a proposed plea agreement on the day of trial.
The trial court's reasons for rejecting a plea in this case were based on three primary considerations. First, the court observed that defendant had charges pending in five different cases, which were being handled by three different prosecutors and two different defense attorneys, and when the proposed plea was first mentioned there was a lack of clarity regarding the scope of the proposed plea agreement. Contrary to what defendant argues, the trial court did not refuse to accept a guilty plea in this case unless defendant entered pleas in his other pending cases. Rather, the court wanted to ensure that any agreement that was linked to pleas in other cases was made with the knowledge and consent of the attorneys in the other cases. To obtain a valid plea, "the court must ask the prosecutor or the defendant's lawyer what the terms of the agreement are and confirm the terms of the agreement with the other lawyer and the defendant." MCR 6.302(C)(2) (emphasis added). Therefore, to the extent that any plea agreement in this case was either conditioned on or tied to plea agreements in defendant's other cases, the trial court had an interest in confirming the terms of the agreement with the parties' legal representatives in defendant's other cases.
A second factor in the trial court's decision to reject the proposed plea agreement was that it was made on the day of trial. A calendar conference order dated September 14, 2011, set a trial date of January 17, 2012, and provided that "[t]he only disposition after the Final Pre-Trial Conference will be by plea of guilty as charged or trial." "[R]ejection of a tardy plea is within the discretion of the trial court." Grove, 455 Mich at 464. Here, the trial court referred to its general policy of not accepting plea agreements on the day of trial. It acknowledged that there are exceptions to this policy, but found no reason to make an exception in this case, particularly considering the lack of clarity regarding the extent to which the agreement was tied to defendant's other cases and the absence of the prosecutor assigned to defendant's other cases. Moreover, when the court later inquired about the sentencing guidelines in the context of evaluating whether the proposed sentence agreement was appropriate, the discussion prompted the discovery that the appropriate guidelines range was higher than anticipated, such that the proposed sentence agreement was below the guidelines range. The prosecutor announced that further discussions with the prosecutor's supervisor would be necessary. The court concluded that the parties were not ready, because they were still "working out the guidelines and what their positions are." These circumstances support the trial court's decision not to accept the tardy plea.
Third, the primary factor in the court's decision to reject the proposed plea appears to be its dissatisfaction with the proposed sentence agreement of 8 to 20 years. In Groves, 455 Mich at 460, our Supreme Court stated:
We hold that under Killebrew and MCR 6.302(C)(3)(a), the decision whether to accept or reject a bargained plea, on the basis of whether acceptance of the proffered plea presents an undue interference with the judge's sentencing discretion, given the facts of the individual case, is a proper exercise of the trial court's discretion.Therefore, a court is authorized to reject an entire plea agreement that includes a sentencing agreement. Id. at 455.
In this case, the trial court observed that defendant had five pending cases, four of which were robbery cases and the other a felony-murder case. Its comments indicate that it had serious concerns whether the proposed sentence agreement of 8 to 20 years was appropriate, given the number and seriousness of the pending charges defendant was facing, including a felony-murder case. Those concerns prompted a discussion of the sentencing guidelines, which in turn resulted in the realization that the guidelines range for one of the cases to be covered by the plea agreement would be 135 to 180 months, meaning that the proposed sentence agreement would be below the guidelines range. In light of that, the prosecutor stated that she would need to speak with her supervisor to further discuss the plea offer. The trial court did not involve itself in the plea negotiations beyond permissibly evaluating the impact of the proposed plea agreement on the court's sentencing discretion.
Contrary to what defendant argues, the trial court did not condition acceptance of a plea in this case on defendant entering pleas in all of his remaining cases. When the parties raised the prospect of a more global resolution of defendant's different pending cases, the court merely sought to ensure that all parties and their necessary legal representatives understood the proposed plea and that all were in agreement with it. Thereafter, at the end of the first day of trial, the prosecutor for two of defendant's cases informed the court that it would be necessary to further discuss the plea offer with her supervisor. The next day, the prosecutor in this case, who was also the prosecutor for one of defendant's other cases, informed the court that the previous plea discussions were "gone" and they were "starting from scratch." The prosecutor was now willing to allow defendant to plead guilty as charged in the instant case, with no sentence agreement, in exchange for the dismissal of defendant's other case that the prosecutor had authority over. This offer did not cover all of defendant's pending cases, but because the concern about the proposed sentence agreement was no longer an issue, the trial court was willing to allow defendant to accept the proposed agreement. The court stated, "Mr. Wells has a right. He can plead guilty as charged and the prosecutor can dismiss whatever cases they want to[.]" Defendant, however, declined to accept that plea offer.
In sum, the record does not support defendant's argument that the trial court improperly interfered in the plea negotiations. It properly involved itself in the plea discussions only to clarify the scope and terms of the plea offer, and to make sure that all parties and their necessary legal representatives were aware of the terms, and its rejection of the proposed plea agreement was based on its impact on the court's sentencing discretion and the tardiness of the plea offer, both of which were permissible bases for rejecting the plea. Given the circumstances, the court did not abuse its discretion.
III. JURY INSTRUCTIONS
Defendant next argues that the trial court erred by instructing the jury on aiding or abetting. Again, we disagree.
Jury instructions that involve questions of law are reviewed de novo. People v Gillis, 474 Mich 105, 113; 712 NW2d 419 (2006). A trial court's decision whether a jury instruction is applicable to the facts of the case is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. Id.
When a jury instruction is requested and supported by the evidence, it must be given by the court. People v Mills, 450 Mich 61, 81; 537 NW2d 909 (1995), modified 450 Mich 1212 (1995). The prosecutor's theory at trial was that defendant was the person who initially approached Evans, assaulted him, and took his money. Although defendant denied assaulting Evans and claimed that it was Matthews who committed the crime, the prosecutor argued that defendant's testimony, and other evidence, allowed the jury to find that defendant was guilty under an aiding or abetting theory. The trial court agreed and, accordingly, instructed the jury on aiding or abetting.
The elements of aiding or abetting are "(1) the crime charged was committed by the defendant or some other person; (2) the defendant performed acts or gave encouragement that assisted the commission of the crime; and (3) the defendant intended the commission of the crime or had knowledge that the principal intended its commission at the time that [the defendant] gave aid and encouragement." People v Plunkett, 485 Mich 50, 61; 780 NW2d 280 (2010).
In criminal law the phrase "aiding and abetting" is used to describe all forms of assistance rendered to the perpetrator of a crime. This term comprehends all words or deeds which may support, encourage or incite the commission of a crime. It includes the actual or constructive presence of an accessory, in preconcert with the principal, for the purpose of rendering assistance, if necessary. 22 CJS, Criminal Law, § 88(2), p 261. The amount of advice, aid or encouragement is not material if it had the effect of inducing the commission of the crime. [People v Palmer, 392 Mich 370, 378; 220 NW2d 393 (1974).]An instruction on aiding or abetting is proper "where there is evidence that (1) more than one person was involved in committing a crime, and (2) the defendant's role in the crime may have been less than direct participation in the wrongdoing." People v Bartlett, 231 Mich App 139, 157; 585 NW2d 341 (1998).
It is undisputed that defendant was present during the commission of the crime. Defendant admitted that both he and Matthews had seen Evans inside his car counting money. Although defendant claimed that Matthews committed the crime alone, defendant admitted that Matthews called for his help during the offense and defendant admitted that he responded by attempting to help because Matthews had called for him. Defendant agreed that he was "there to give whatever help was needed." Defendant further admitted that he was aware that a robbery was going on when Matthews called for him, and agreed that he was "going to the car to help him commit the robbery." Although defendant claimed that Matthews left Evans's car before defendant got there, and thus he never actually provided any assistance, Evans had testified that after the first participant called for his "buddy," the second participant ran toward the car "and then they grabbed the money and went up the alley with it."
Defendant also admitted that he received a share of the proceeds after the robbery. This evidence created a question of fact concerning the involvement of the second person, and whether the second person directly assisted in the participation of the crime. Given the evidence that the primary assailant called out for assistance from his "buddy" during the offense, following which a second person came over to join the primary assailant and then both men ran off with Evans's money and keys, the jury could have reasonably found that both men were working in concert, with the understanding that the second man was available to provide assistance if needed. Indeed, defendant acknowledged in his testimony that he was "there to give whatever help was needed," that he was aware that a robbery was going on when Matthews called for him, and that he was "going to the car to help him commit the robbery." Although defendant denied knowing that Matthews intended to rob Evans when Matthews first approached Evans's vehicle, the jury was free to disbelieve this testimony and to find otherwise in light of the evidence presented.
Even if the jury believed defendant's testimony, that it was Matthews who entered Evans's vehicle and took his money, as well as defendant's admissions at trial regarding his actions during the offense, when taken together with Evans's testimony regarding the role of the second participant, even in a light most favorable to the prosecution, the evidence was sufficient to allow the jury to find that defendant, if not a direct participant, was guilty under an aiding or abetting theory. Accordingly, the trial court did not err by instructing the jury on aiding or abetting.
Affirmed.
/s/ Kathleen Jansen
/s/ Jane M. Beckering
/s/ Colleen A. O'Brien