See, e.g., Carey v. State, 715 P.2d 244, 248 (Wyo. 1986); State v. DeBaere, 356 N.W.2d 301, 304-05 (Minn. 1984); Williams v. State, 95 Nev. 830, 603 P.2d 694, 696-97 (1979); People v. Oliphant, 399 Mich. 472, 250 N.W.2d 443, 450-52 (1976); State v. Smith, 216 Kan. 265, 530 P.2d 1215, 1219 (1975); Hunt v. State, 233 Ga. 329, 211 S.E.2d 288, 290 (1974); State v. Hill, 104 Ariz. 238, 450 P.2d 696, 697 (1969); People v. Weis, 120 Ill. App.3d 597, 76 Ill.Dec. 18, 458 N.E.2d 157 (1983); O'Neal v. State, 170 Ga. App. 637, 318 S.E.2d 66, 67 (1984); Youngblood v. Sullivan, 52 Or. App. 173, 628 P.2d 400, 401-02 rev. denied, 291 Or. 368, 634 P.2d 1347 (1981); Commonwealth v. Rough, 275 Pa. Super. 50, 418 A.2d 605, 612 (1980); People v. Lighthart, 62 Ill. App.3d 720, 19 Ill.Dec. 739, 741, 379 N.E.2d 403, 405 (1978); Fisher v. State, 57 Ala. App. 310, 328 So.2d 311, 318 reh'g. denied, 295 Ala. 401, 328 So.2d 321 (1976); State v. Gainey, 32 N.C. App. 682, 233 S.E.2d 671, 672-73 rev. denied, 292 N.C. 732, 235 S.E.2d 786 (1977); People v. Gray, 259 Cal.App.2d 846, 851-53, 66 Cal.Rptr. 654 (1968); Williams v. State, 110 So.2d 654, 661-62 (Fla.), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 847, 80 S.Ct. 102, 4 L.Ed.2d 86 (1959). See also Underhill, Criminal Evidence § 206 (6th Ed. 1979 supp.)
This court has previously found that deviate sexual assault inherently contains an element of detention of the victim and, thus, a defendant convicted of deviate sexual assault and unlawful restraint was entitled to have his unlawful restraint conviction reversed as a lesser included offense. ( People v. Weis (1983), 120 Ill. App.3d 597, 601; see also People v. Kim (1986), 148 Ill. App.3d 191, 199; People v. Wrice (1986), 140 Ill. App.3d 494, 501; People v. Young (1983), 115 Ill. App.3d 455, 468-70.) In Young, this court observed:
In an analogous context, the court in People v. Smalley (1976), 43 Ill. App.3d 600, 602, 357 N.E.2d 93, 95, ruled that although the requirement that the threat be communicated was not specified in the offense of rape, "in the rape context the communication of a threat of force is inherent in the use of force." The Smalley court held that intimidation was the lesser included offense of rape. Since the only distinction between rape and deviate sexual assault lies in the nature of the sexual violations involved ( People v. Weis (1983), 120 Ill. App.3d 597, 458 N.E.2d 157), Smalley is persuasive support for the conclusion that intimidation is the lesser included offense of deviate sexual assault. Intimidation also requires that the offender intend to cause another to perform an act; deviate sexual assault requires that the offender compel another to perform an act of deviate sexual conduct.
20(a)(1) (West 2016)). See People v. Weis, 120 Ill.App.3d 597, 600 (1983) (reasoning that the defendant's previous mistreatment of the victim "was relevant to show the principal fact in issue, whether the victim had consented, by evidence showing the extent to which the prior relationship of the parties had deteriorated"). ¶ 70 Second, the State had to explain some fawning text messages that Garcia sent Cortes after he sexually assaulted her: text messages such as"' [y]ou make me happy, '" " 'thank you, '" and"' [y]ou made me feel like I was in heaven.'"
r pattern which is manifested in the crime charged, and thus make it more probable that [the victim] was telling the truth about what had happened"; the defendant's behavior pattern also tended "to rebut the defense theory that the attack described by [the victim] was too senseless to be credible"); Williams v. State, 110 So.2d 654, 661-62 (Fla. 1959) (where defendant alleged that he got into the backseat of woman's car because he thought it was his brother's car and he wanted to take a nap, trial court properly admitted evidence that, on a previous occasion, in the same parking lot, defendant was found in the backseat of another woman's car and claimed that he sat in the backseat because he thought it was his brother's car and he wanted to take a nap); O'Neal v. State, 170 Ga.App. 637, 318 S.E.2d 66, 67 (1984) (noting that "there must be sufficient similarity between the independent crime and the offense charged that proof of the former tends to prove the latter") (citation omitted); People v. Weis, 120 Ill.App.3d 597, 76 Ill.Dec. 18, 458 N.E.2d 157, 159-60 (1983) (in trial for sexual assault of his former girlfriend, defendant's prior assaultive behavior against girlfriend admitted to demonstrate the unlikelihood of consent in light of the evidence showing how their relationship had deteriorated); People v. Lighthart, 62 111. App.3d 720, 19 Ill.Dec. 739, 379 N.E.2d 403, 405 (1978) (where defendant claimed sex was consensual, prior conviction for attempted rape "was probative of defendant's mental state and was properly admitted") (citation omitted); State v. Smith, 216 Kan. 265, 530 P.2d 1215, 1219 (1975) (where defendant abducted neighbor, brought her to his apartment, raped her, then shot victim's husband when he came to her aid, prior offenses in which defendant was convicted of an assault with a gun upon a man who was shot several times and a felonious assault with the intent to rape a female companion were properly admitted where defenses asserted were self-defense as to the murder charge and consent as to the rape charge); State v. Gain
Since the testimony was elicited on cross-examination, we also find that the sister's testimony, now complained of as hearsay, was competent evidence. People v. Weis (1983), 120 Ill. App.3d 597, 458 N.E.2d 157. • 5 Defendant next contends that he was denied effective assistance of counsel at trial because trial counsel failed to investigate complainant's psychiatric records; presented a farcical closing argument admitting defendant's guilt; and improperly cross-examined complainant's sister.