Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Stanislaus County. No. 1421187 John D. Freeland, Judge.
Deborah Prucha, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Office of the State Attorney General, Sacramento, California, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
OPINION
Before Wiseman, Acting P.J., Dawson, J., and Poochigian, J.
Pursuant to a plea bargain, appellant, Michael Jay Webster, pled no contest to auto theft with a prior auto theft conviction (Veh. Code, § 10851, subd. (a); Pen. Code, § 666.5), evading a peace officer (Veh. Code, § 2800.2, subd. (a)), and misdemeanor driving under the influence (Veh. Code, § 23152, subd. (a)). He also admitted a prior strike conviction and three prior prison term enhancements (Pen. Code, §§ 667, subd. (d), 667.5, subd. (b)). The plea was conditioned on Webster receiving a nine-year prison term.
In exchange, the prosecutor agreed to dismiss one count each of possession of metal knuckles, misdemeanor resisting a peace officer, misdemeanor possession of a syringe, and misdemeanor possession of burglary tools; and two prior prison term enhancement allegations. At sentencing, the court imposed the agreed upon sentence, awarded appropriate custody credits, and ordered Webster to pay the required restitution fines and assessments. This Wende appeal followed.
FACTS
The prosecutor recited the factual basis for the plea from the police report: Webster, who had a prior auto theft conviction in July 1998, drove a vehicle he did not own, without the owner’s consent, and with the intent to permanently deprive the owner of it. He also drove a vehicle with the intent to evade a pursuing uniformed officer in a marked patrol car with the siren and red light activated. Webster drove the vehicle in a willful and wanton manner disregarding the safety of persons and property. Finally, Webster drove the vehicle while under the influence of a drug that impaired his ability to drive safely.
The court agreed to Webster’s request to be sentenced immediately without a formal probation report. The court denied probation and imposed a nine-year prison term composed of the three-year midterm for vehicle theft, doubled to six years pursuant to the strike allegation; a concurrent two-year midterm for evading a police officer, doubled to four years pursuant to the strike conviction; a concurrent 10-day term for driving under the influence; plus one year for each of the three prior prison term enhancements.
DISCUSSION
Webster’s appointed appellate counsel has filed an opening brief that summarizes the facts, with citations to the record, raises no issues, and asks this court to independently review the record. (People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436.) Both the court and appellate counsel advised Webster of his right to file a supplemental brief within 30 days of the date of filing of the opening brief. Webster did not respond.
Almost two months after Webster was sentenced, he wrote to the trial court requesting “mercy” and a shorter prison sentence. He asked the court to strike his prior “strike” offense so he could obtain half-time credits and to strike two of his prior prison term enhancements for offenses for which he was sentenced in 1997 and 2000. He did not dispute his guilt, but had concerns about “A.D.A. issues.” He had recently been stabilized on medication for a bipolar disorder, for which he was refused treatment while in the county jail. Further, defense counsel had not been honest with him and had not carried out his requests.
Our independent review of the record discloses no reasonably arguable appellate issues. Webster’s request for a shorter sentence is not supported by any legal or factual argument that the court erred in imposing the agreed upon term. Further, the record does not support his assertion of disability issues impacting the plea agreement. The court explicitly told him that he must object to any part of the sentence imposed in the courtroom or he would waive his right to challenge his sentence on appeal. Webster objected to nothing. In addition, Webster asserted on the record that he had enough time to talk with his attorney about his case and he was pleading no contest freely and voluntarily. Finally, the court found that Webster understood the nature of his crimes, the consequences of his plea and his trial rights, and knowingly, intelligently and voluntarily waived those rights. Nothing in the record contradicts that finding.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.