People v. Watt

4 Citing cases

  1. People v. Watt

    84 N.Y.2d 948 (N.Y. 1994)   Cited 24 times

    Defendant was convicted of various criminal sexual acts involving infants at the day care center where he worked and lived. The Appellate Division dismissed the indictments, with leave to resubmit, concluding the time intervals specified for each criminal act were per se excessive ( 179 A.D.2d 697). The People appealed to this Court, limiting the appeal to the four counts of rape and two counts of sodomy committed during the five-month period between August 1, 1984 and December 31, 1984 involving the infant N.B. We held that a per se bar should not be applied (see, 81 N.Y.2d 772), and remitted the matter to the Appellate Division to reconsider its decision under the standard set forth in People v Morris ( 61 N.Y.2d 290).

  2. People v. Lawrence

    204 A.D.2d 969 (N.Y. App. Div. 1994)   Cited 12 times

    Present — Pine, J.P., Balio, Lawton, Davis and Boehm, JJ. Judgment unanimously modified on the law and as modified affirmed and matter remitted to Oneida County Court for further proceedings in accordance with the following Memorandum: The prosecutor's delay in turning over Rosario material (see, People v. Rosario, 9 N.Y.2d 286, rearg denied 9 N.Y.2d 908, cert denied 368 U.S. 866, rearg denied 14 N.Y.2d 876, 15 N.Y.2d 765) does not require reversal because defendant was not substantially prejudiced by that delay (see, People v. Martinez, 71 N.Y.2d 937; People v. Ranghelle, 69 N.Y.2d 56; People v. Garrett, 177 A.D.2d 1, lv denied 79 N.Y.2d 1000; People v. Harris, 130 A.D.2d 939, lv denied 70 N.Y.2d 647; cf., People v. Watt, 179 A.D.2d 697). The court did not abuse its discretion in its Sandoval ruling. Defendant's conviction of criminal possession of a controlled substance in the third degree is supported by legally sufficient evidence and is not against the weight of the evidence (see, People v. Bleakley, 69 N.Y.2d 490, 495).

  3. People v. Baghai-Kermani

    199 A.D.2d 36 (N.Y. App. Div. 1993)   Cited 7 times

    The secretary put the money and a Medicaid card in the name of David Kaye into an envelope, wrote "Ativan" on the envelope, and filled out the patient's side of a triplicate prescription form. Defendant is correct in arguing that the March 19 recording could have been used to cross examine Karp on his assertion that a secretary was on duty on March 12, and that if Karp had been impeached with respect to the March 12 transaction, that might have affected the court's evaluation, as the trier of fact, of Karp's testimony respecting the May 22, 1990 transaction (count eleven) as well. It does not follow, however, that any Rosario taint of the two counts based upon Karp's testimony should be held to spill over to the eight other counts based on transactions on different dates to other undercover shoppers (see, People v Watt, 179 A.D.2d 697, 699 [see also, at 702 (Miller, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)], revd on other grounds 81 N.Y.2d 772; People v Bugayong, 182 A.D.2d 450). We observe that the People argued in summation that "in determining the defendant's intent, we submit that the fact finder may consider the facts surrounding the issuance of all the prescriptions in this case.

  4. People v. Watt

    192 A.D.2d 65 (N.Y. App. Div. 1993)   Cited 15 times
    Noting that the "defendant's . . . living arrangements at the very place wherein the crimes were committed renders any potential alibi defense far less meaningful"

    On the defendant's appeal from the judgments convicting him of the aforementioned crimes, a majority of this Court held that the indictments upon which he was prosecuted were fatally defective because they set forth time periods during which each of the crimes were alleged to have been committed that were excessive as a matter of law, even as narrowed by the People's bill of particulars. The partial dissent stated that the five-month time periods alleged as to the crimes perpetrated against victim NB were not unreasonable as a matter of law, and were reasonably precise under the circumstances of this case so as to provide the defendant with adequate notice of the charges against him (see, People v Watt, 179 A.D.2d 697, 705-706). The People appealed from so much of the order of this Court as reversed the defendant's conviction of the crime perpetrated against the victim NB. The Court of Appeals reversed insofar as appealed from, finding that the five-month time period alleged was not unreasonable as a matter of law, but remitted the matter to this Court to consider the question of whether the five-month period was reasonable under the circumstances of this case (see, People v Watt, 81 N.Y.2d 772).