Opinion
B161007.
7-2-2003
THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. ANITA ELAINE WATSON, Defendant and Appellant.
Sally P. Brajevich, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant. Bill Lockyer, Attorney General, Robert R. Anderson, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Pamela C. Hamanaka, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Victoria B. Wilson and J. Michael Lehmann, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
Defendant and appellant Anita Elaine Watson appeals from the judgment entered following a jury trial that resulted in her convictions for battery upon a peace officer causing injury, and battery upon a peace officer. The trial court placed Watson on probation for three years on condition she serve 90 days in county jail.
Watson contends the trial court erred by: (1) denying her motion for release of juror identifying information; and (2) instructing the jury with CALJIC No. 17.41.1. We affirm.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
1. Facts.
a. Peoples case.
Viewed in accordance with the usual rules of appellate review (People v. Rodriguez (1999) 20 Cal.4th 1, 11, 971 P.2d 618), the evidence established the following. Watsons grandson was a special education student at Henry Clay Middle School. On September 25, 2001, Watson and her grandson met with a special education trainee in the school library. At the school principals request, two uniformed Los Angeles Unified School District police officers attempted to remove Watson from the library. Officer Sharon Butler calmly introduced herself, informed Watson that she had received a complaint about her, and requested that Watson either leave the school or accompany Butler to the school office. Watson refused and remained seated. After repeating her request three or four times, Butler closed a folder of papers Watson was examining and touched Watsons elbow to guide her out of her seat. Watson became angry. She swung her arms at Butler, pushed the table, wrestled with Butler, and knocked Butler to the ground several times. Butler repeatedly requested that Watson calm down. Watson, however, remained hostile and combative. When the second officer, Gary Green, attempted to handcuff Watson, Watson hit Green in the groin with her knee and foot. Watson was eventually subdued. Neither officer choked Watson. Butler suffered injuries to her back, neck, and knee.
b. Defense case.
Watson testified in her own behalf, as follows. She claimed that Butler had grabbed her paperwork, ripping it. Green knocked the table over and placed Watson in a choke hold, causing her nearly to lose consciousness. The two officers pulled Watson in opposite directions and Green knocked her grandson across the room.
2. Procedure.
Trial was by jury. Watson was convicted of misdemeanor battery upon a peace officer (Pen. Code, § 243, subd. (b)) and felony battery upon a peace officer causing injury (§ 243, subd. (c)(2)). The trial court suspended the imposition of sentence and placed Watson on probation for three years on condition she serve 90 days in county jail. The trial court also imposed restitution fines and various probation conditions. Watson appeals.
All further undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.
DISCUSSION
1. The trial court properly denied Watsons motion for release of juror information.
Watson contends the trial court erred by denying her request for the disclosure of juror identifying information. We disagree.
a. Additional facts.
The jury began deliberations on July 16, 2002, and deliberated for approximately 40 minutes before adjourning for the day. The next morning, the foreperson sent two notes to the trial court. The first queried, "Is there a difference between resisting and battery?" The second note stated, "One juror is unwilling to debate the case. His mind is made up and no amount of debate will change it. He feels the evidence does not support the charge. Questions of provocation would justify resistance."
The trial court interviewed the jury foreperson outside the presence of the other jurors. The foreperson stated that early that morning, Juror No. 9 "said his mind is made up and that no amount of debate will change his mind" as to count 1, the charge of battery on a peace officer causing injury. Juror No. 9 had deliberated the previous day. The trial court asked, "is he refusing to discuss the case further with the other jurors?" The foreperson replied, "No . . . . hell discuss the case, but — and the particular points of the case, but he will not change the decision hes already made." According to the foreperson, Juror No. 9 had not made up his mind regarding the second count, misdemeanor battery upon an officer.
The trial court sent the foreperson back to the jury room. It stated to the parties, "It appears that we cleared up any ambiguity as to the initial communication from the foreperson. It does appear to the court that the juror is participating in deliberations."
The trial court then addressed with the parties the jurys second communication. Without objection, the jury was brought into the courtroom. The trial court explained, in response to the jurors question, that there was a difference between resisting and battery. It then advised: "What you must decide in this case is whether or not the defendant is guilty of the crime of battery on a peace officer, not whether shes guilty of any crime. You have not been instructed on any other crime. [P] As you recall, one of the elements is, in the crime of battery, the use of force or violence. [P] So you must decide whether or not beyond a reasonable doubt you are convinced that Miss Watson used force or violence on the person of either of these officers. [P] As to count 1 you must, in addition, decide whether this force or violence resulted in the infliction of an injury." The trial court then requested that the jury "return to the jury room and resume your deliberations." The court made no comment on the forepersons assertion that Juror No. 9 was not deliberating.
Approximately 45 minutes later, the jury informed the court that it had reached a verdict. The jury found Watson guilty on both counts, and, when the jury was polled, each juror individually affirmed the verdicts.
Watson subsequently filed motions for a new trial and for the disclosure of juror identifying information, on the grounds the jury may have committed misconduct. The entire basis for the motions was that, because the jury had rendered a guilty verdict approximately 45 minutes after the foreperson reported Juror No. 9s position, "counsel believes that some members of the jury may have acted improperly during deliberations and committed misconduct." The trial court denied both motions.
b. Discussion.
"The disclosure of jurors addresses and telephone numbers involves a sensitive issue" and impacts public policy concerns. (People v. Wilson (1996) 43 Cal.App.4th 839, 852; People v. Rhodes (1989) 212 Cal. App. 3d 541, 548, 261 Cal. Rptr. 1.) Code of Civil Procedure sections 237 and 206, subdivision (g), govern release of juror information following a verdict in a criminal proceeding. Section 206, subdivision (g), provides that a defendant may petition the court for access to juror names, addresses, and telephone numbers to develop a motion for a new trial or any other lawful purpose. Section 237, subdivision (b) requires the court to set the matter for hearing if the defendants petition and supporting declaration establish a prima facie showing of good cause for the disclosure of such information, but prohibits the court from doing so if a compelling countervailing interest exists.
Code of Civil Procedure section 237, subdivision (b), reads in pertinent part: "Any person may petition the court for access to these records. The petition shall be supported by a declaration that includes facts sufficient to establish good cause for the release of the jurors personal identifying information. The court shall set the matter for hearing if the petition and supporting declaration establish a prima facie showing of good cause for the release of the personal juror identifying information, but shall not set the matter for hearing if there is a showing on the record of facts that establish a compelling interest against disclosure. A compelling interest includes, but is not limited to, protecting jurors from threats or danger of physical harm. If the court does not set the matter for hearing, the court shall by minute order set forth the reasons and make express findings either of a lack of a prima facie showing of good cause or the presence of a compelling interest against disclosure."
Code of Civil Procedure section 206, subdivision (g) provides, "a defendant or defendants counsel may, following the recording of a jurys verdict in a criminal proceeding, petition the court for access to personal juror identifying information within the courts records necessary for the defendant to communicate with jurors for the purpose of developing a motion for new trial or any other lawful purpose. This information consists of jurors names, addresses, and telephone numbers. The court shall consider all requests for personal juror identifying information pursuant to Section 237."
The legislative intent behind Code of Civil Procedure section 206 is "to require the defendant show good cause for disclosure and not engage in merely a fishing expedition." (People v. Wilson, supra, 43 Cal.App.4th at p. 852.) The party seeking disclosure bears the burden of establishing good cause. (People v. Granish (1996) 41 Cal.App.4th 1117, 1131.) In order to demonstrate good cause, a defendant must make a sufficient showing "to support a reasonable belief that jury misconduct occurred." (People v. Rhodes, supra, 212 Cal. App. 3d at p. 552.) The misconduct alleged must be " of such a character as is likely to have influenced the verdict improperly. " (People v. Jefflo (1998) 63 Cal.App.4th 1314, 1322.) Good cause does not exist where the allegations of jury misconduct are speculative, conclusory, vague, or unsupported. (People v. Wilson, supra, 43 Cal.App.4th at p. 852;People v. Rhodes, supra, 212 Cal. App. 3d at pp. 553-554.) A trial courts denial of a petition to disclose juror identification information is reviewed for abuse of discretion. (People v. Jones (1998) 17 Cal.4th 279, 317, 949 P.2d 890.)
Here, the trial court properly denied Watsons motion. Watson failed to establish good cause for the release of the information. Her allegation that some jurors might have engaged in misconduct was conclusory and speculative, and was therefore insufficient to establish good cause. (People v. Wilson, supra, 43 Cal.App.4th at p. 852; People v. Jefflo, supra, 63 Cal.App.4th at p. 1322; People v. Rhodes, supra, 212 Cal. App. 3d at p. 554.) Watson cites no authority for the proposition that, if a purported "holdout" juror changes his or her mind and renders a guilty verdict, a presumption of jury misconduct arises.
The fact that a jury is hung at one point in deliberations, but later renders a verdict, does not by itself support a finding of juror misconduct or good cause to release juror identifying information. People v. Jefflo, supra, 63 Cal.App.4th at p. 1322, is instructive. In Jefflo, the defendant claimed good cause existed for the disclosure of juror identifying information because: (1) during deliberations, one of the jurors had purportedly spoken to the defendants girlfriend and stated that the jury was hung; and (2) after the verdict was rendered, defense counsel overheard a juror ask the prosecutor if " that [was] all the evidence [he] had. " (Id. at p. 1319.) The trial courts denial of the motion was affirmed on appeal. Jefflo held that these statements suggested only that at one point the jury was having trouble reaching a verdict, and that one juror might have been curious about whether evidence existed that was not presented at trial. (Id. at p. 1322.) Jefflo also noted that the jury was individually polled after returning its guilty verdict. (Ibid. )
Here, similarly, the jury was polled and all jurors, including Juror No. 9, affirmed that the verdict was theirs. The forepersons representation that Juror No. 9 would not change his mind revealed only that, at the point the foreperson spoke to the court, Juror No. 9 was unconvinced of Watsons guilt. That Juror No. 9 subsequently changed his mind does not show jury misconduct. The foreperson may have overstated or misunderstood Juror No. 9s position. Juror No. 9 may have had a sudden insight triggered by the trial courts response to the jurys question. Nothing in the record suggests that the other jurors used any improper conduct to coerce Juror No. 9. Watson therefore failed to establish good cause for the disclosure of juror information, and the trial court properly denied her request.
2. The trial court did not prejudicially err by instructing the jury with CALJIC No. 17.41.1.
The trial court instructed the jury with CALJIC No. 17.41.1. Watson contends that this instruction compromised the private and uninhibited nature of jury deliberations and encouraged the majority to impose its will on minority jurors, thereby violating her rights to juror unanimity, due process, and a jury trial, as well as jurors rights to free speech and association.
That instruction, as provided to the jury, read: "The integrity of a trial requires that jurors, at all times during their deliberations, conduct themselves as required by these instructions. Accordingly, should it occur that any juror refuses to deliberate or expresses an intention to disregard the law or to decide the case based on penalty or punishment, or any other improper basis, it is the obligation of the other jurors to immediately advise the Court of the situation."
The People contend that Watson has waived this issue because she failed to object to CALJIC No. 17.41.1 below. However, even without an objection, a defendant may challenge on appeal an instruction that affects his or her substantial rights. (& sect; 1259; People v. Hillhouse (2002) 27 Cal.4th 469, 505-506; People v. Smithey (1999) 20 Cal.4th 936, 976, fn. 7, 978 P.2d 1171; People v. Andersen (1994) 26 Cal.App.4th 1241, 1249 [to determine whether a defendants substantial rights were affected, appellate court must examine the merits of the claim at least to the extent of ascertaining whether error was prejudicial].)
Watsons claim fails on the merits, however. As Watson acknowledges, People v. Engelman (2002) 28 Cal.4th 436 held it was not error to give CALJIC No. 17.41.1. Engelman explained that CALJIC No. 17.41.1 "does not infringe upon defendants federal or state constitutional right to trial by jury or his state constitutional right to a unanimous verdict . . . ." (Id. at pp. 439-440.) Because the instruction could be misunderstood or misused, it is "inadvisable and unnecessary" for trial courts to give it in the future. (Id. at p. 445.) However, because the jury is duty-bound to follow the courts instructions and lacks the right to engage in nullification, the use of CALJIC No. 17.41.1, while inadvisable, does not violate a defendants constitutional rights. (Id. at p. 441.)
Watson complains that in this particular case, the forepersons communication with the court and the jurys subsequent guilty verdict, as discussed supra, showed that CALJIC No. 17.41.1 was misused in the fashion that concerned the Engelman court. We are unpersuaded. Whether the foreperson believed Juror No. 9 was committing misconduct is irrelevant, given that the trial court did not remove Juror No. 9. As discussed supra, Watsons contention that the other jurors "used CALJIC No. 17.41.1 to browbeat the holdout juror" is entirely speculative and insufficient to establish error or prejudice.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
We concur: KLEIN, P.J., and KITCHING, J.