Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Kern County, No. BF129279A, Michael B. Lewis and John S. Somers, Judges.
Judge Somers presided over appellant’s motion to suppress. Judge Lewis presided over appellant’s change of plea and sentencing hearings.
Elizabeth Campbell, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Kamala D. Harris, Attorney General, Dane R. Gillette, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Michael P. Farrell, Assistant Attorney General, Kathleen A. McKenna, Doris Calandra and William K. Kim, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
OPINION
Before Wiseman, Acting P.J., Gomes J., and Kane, J.
INTRODUCTION
Appellant, Demetric Omar Watson, is appealing his nolo contendere plea to possession of cocaine for sale, a violation of Health and Safety Code section 11351. Watson’s sole contention on appeal is that his motion to suppress evidence pursuant to Penal Code section 1538.5 was improperly denied. We disagree and affirm the judgment.
Unless otherwise noted, all further references are to the Penal Code.
FACTS
On September 7, 2009, Sergeant Scott Thatcher and two additional officers of the Bakersfield Police Department conducted an undercover patrol in an area known for its narcotics activity. During the patrol, the officers visited a local motel due to a number of complaints regarding narcotics activity during the preceding several months.
While in the parking lot of the motel Thatcher observed Watson standing by an open motel room door. Thatcher made contact with Watson by nodding his head. Watson nodded back at Thatcher and began walking toward the officers’ van. As Watson neared the van, two uniformed police officers jumped out of the back of the van and attempted to contact him. Watson uttered an expletive and ran into the open door of his motel room. The officers chased after him, ordered him to stop, and identified themselves as police.
Thatcher is an expert on narcotics. He states that a head nod is significant in that it is consistent with a potential buyer’s interest in engaging in a narcotics transaction.
The officers followed Watson into his motel room. Once inside, the officers witnessed Watson attempting to hide something down the front of a young woman’s pants. The baggie he was attempting to hide fell onto the floor in plain view of the officers. It was later determined that the baggie contained 7.5 grams of cocaine base broken up into 22 individual packages. A small digital scale, razor blade and additional baggies were also discovered in the motel room.
Watson moved to suppress the evidence seized on the grounds that the warrantless entry into the motel room violated his Fourth Amendment right against unreasonable search or seizure. After the court denied his motion, Watson pled no contest to one count of violating Health and Safety Code section 11351.
Watson asserts the officers lacked probable cause for arrest, and further, that there were no exigent circumstances justifying the warrantless entry into the motel room.
DISCUSSION
“The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause....” (U.S. Const., 4th Amend.)
“There is probable cause to arrest when the facts known to the arresting officer would lead a person of ordinary care and prudence to believe and conscientiously entertain an honest and strong suspicion that an individual is guilty of a crime.” (People v. Lewis (1980) 109 Cal.App.3d 599, 608.)
In evaluating the reasonableness of the officer’s conduct, the trial court is vested with the power to judge witness credibility, resolve testimonial conflicts, weigh evidence, and draw factual inferences. (People v. Needham (2000) 79 Cal.App.4th 260, 265.) We will uphold the trial court’s factual findings if they are supported by substantial evidence, but we independently review the application of the relevant law to the facts in determining whether the officers’ actions were reasonable under the circumstances. (People v. Alvarez (1996) 14 Cal.4th 155, 182.)
Watson notes that an individual’s presence in an area of expected criminal activity, even when accompanied by flight, is not enough to give rise to probable cause warranting arrest. However, a defendant’s presence in an area known for heavy narcotics trafficking, coupled with his flight upon seeing the officers, has been found to support a reasonable articuable basis for suspecting that criminal activity is afoot. (Illinois v. Wardlow (2000) 528 U.S. 119, 124-125.) As a defendant has no right to resist a lawful detention, reasonable cause to detain becomes probable cause to arrest when the suspect refuses to comply with the officer’s demands to stop. (See People v. Lloyd (1989) 216 Cal.App.3d 1425, 1429 (Lloyd); People v. Abes (1985)174 Cal.App.3d 796, 807.)
As Watson correctly asserts, the probable cause for arrest could not come from merely the head nod. Instead, the totality of the circumstances—Watson’s head nod, the area in which he was contacted, his immediate flight upon seeing the police, and his refusal to obey an officer’s command to stop—provided the officers with probable cause to believe that Watson was committing a crime.
In addition to probable cause to effect Watson’s arrest, exigent circumstances were also necessary to support the warrantless entry into the motel room.
“‘[A] warrantless entry by the police into a residence is at least presumptively unreasonable and therefore unlawful.’ (People v. Williams (1988) 45 Cal.3d 1268, 1297.) As the United States Supreme Court has explained: ‘In terms that apply equally to seizures of property and to seizures of persons, the Fourth Amendment has drawn a firm line at the entrance to the house. Absent exigent circumstances, that threshold may not reasonably be crossed without a warrant.’ (Payton v. New York (1980) 445 U.S. 573, 590.) The constitutional protection afforded to the homeowner applies with equal force to a guest in a hotel room. (Stoner v. California (1964) 376 U.S. 483, 490.)”
(People v. Bennett (1998) 17 Cal.4th 373, 384.)
“[W]arrants are generally required to search a person’s home or his person unless ‘the exigencies of the situation’ make the needs of law enforcement so compelling that the warrantless search is objectively reasonable under the Fourth Amendment.” (Mincey v. Arizona (1978) 437 U.S. 385, 393-394.) “There is no ready litmus test for determining whether such circumstances exist ….” (People v. Ramey (1976)16 Cal.3d 263, 276.) “As a general rule, the reasonableness of an officer’s conduct is dependent upon the existence of facts available to him at the moment of the search or seizure which would warrant a man of reasonable caution in the belief that the action taken was appropriate.” (People v. Block (1971) 6 Cal.3d 239, 244.)
An exigent circumstance for the purpose of conducting a “warrantless entry” into a dwelling exists when the police are in “hot pursuit” of a fleeing felon. In United States v. Santana (1976) 427 U.S. 38, 40, the police went to arrest an individual standing outside of her home. As the police neared, Santana ran inside, and the police followed. Santana challenged the warrantless entry into her home as a Fourth Amendment violation. (Id. at p. 42.) The United States Supreme Court upheld the entry, stating: “a suspect may not defeat an arrest which has been set in motion in a public place … by the expedient of escaping to a private place.” (Id. at p. 43.) Further, the duration of the flight is irrelevant as “[t]he fact that the pursuit here ended almost as soon as it began did not render it any the less a “hot pursuit” sufficient to justify the warrantless entry into Santana’s house.” (Ibid.)
Lloyd is directly applicable. In Lloyd, a law enforcement officer attempted to initiate a traffic stop. (Lloyd, supra, 216 Cal.App.3d at p. 1427.) The suspect did not stop, but instead drove to his home and stepped out of his car. Lloyd then walked into his house, despite the officer identifying himself and demanding that Lloyd stop. Other officers entered into the house to retrieve Lloyd. (Ibid.) The court found that the officer had the authority to detain Lloyd for the traffic infractions (for the purposes of issuing a ticket), and Lloyd’s conduct, in walking away from the officer, provided the officer with probable cause to arrest him. Under the circumstances, the entry into the house to retrieve the suspect was a “hot pursuit” and thus lawful. (Id. at p. 1429.)
Similarly, in People v. Abes, supra, 174 Cal.App.3d at p. 796, the police were called to an apartment building to investigate PCP activity. While there, the officer noticed a strong smell of ether coming from an apartment. As ether is very flammable, the officer began evacuating the building. When defendant Luna was ordered to evacuate, she paused, looked at the officer, and ran into the apartment. The court held that a suspect does not have the right to evade a lawful arrest, and further, that Luna’s flight at the approach of a police officer was indicative of guilt. (Id. at p. 805.) The court concluded Luna’s suspicious actions, combined with the totality of the circumstances, created probable cause necessary for her arrest. (Id. at p. 807.)
Another occupant from Luna’s apartment was being arrested for being under the influence of PCP, and Luna herself appeared to be under the influence of PCP.
Watson’s refusal to stop rendered him in “hot pursuit” by the officers. The record indicates that the officers had a reasonable suspicion to detain Watson. (Illinois v. Wardlow, supra, 528 U.S. 119 at p. 124.) Watson refused to comply with the officers’ commands, providing probable cause to affect the arrest. Watson’s subsequent flight into the motel room during a hot pursuit constitutes an exigent circumstance which operates as an exception to the general rule that warrantless arrests within the home are unreasonable. Finally, “[i]t is clear that a suspect may not defeat a detention or arrest which is set in motion in a public place by fleeing to a private place. [Citation.]” (Lloyd, supra, 216 Cal.App.3d at p. 1430; see United States v. Santana, supra, 427 U.S. 38, 42-43.) Thus, the officers’ entry into the motel room was lawful.
The motion to suppress the evidence was properly denied.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.