. . . (24a) The clear intent of the Legislature in adopting the weapons control act was to limit as far as possible the use of instruments commonly associated with criminal activity [citation] and, specifically, `to minimize the danger to public safety arising from the free access to firearms that can be used for crimes of violence.' ( People v. Scott, 24 Cal.2d 774, 782 [ 151 P.2d 517].)" ( People v. Washington (1965) 237 Cal.App.2d 59, 66 [ 46 Cal.Rptr. 545].) The law presumes the danger is greater when the person possessing the concealable firearm has previously been convicted of felony, and the presumption is not impermissible.
However, it contains no more than that which defendant made orally; it is cumulative, merely duplicating and reiterating the earlier statement lawfully obtained ( People v. Ford, 234 Cal.App.2d 480, 494 [ 44 Cal.Rptr. 556]), and its admission does not require automatic reversal. ( People v. Washington, 237 Cal.App.2d 59, 65 [ 46 Cal.Rptr. 545]; People v. Cully, 236 Cal.App.2d 769, 778 [ 46 Cal.Rptr. 644]; People v. Sheridan, 236 Cal.App.2d 667, 671 [ 46 Cal.Rptr. 295].) When viewed in the light of the overwhelming evidence of guilt, the written statement appears to have had but little significance and could not have resulted in prejudice to defendant.
. . . The clear intent of the Legislature in adopting the weapons control act was to limit as far as possible the use of instruments commonly associated with criminal activity [citation] and, specifically, "to minimize the danger to public safety arising from the free access to firearms that can be used for crimes of violence." ( People v. Scott, 24 Cal.2d 774, 782 [ 151 P.2d 517].)' ( People v. Washington (1965) 237 Cal.App.2d 59, 66 [ 46 Cal.Rptr. 545].) The law presumes the danger is greater when the person possessing the concealable firearm has previously been convicted of felony, and the presumption is not impermissible.
The clear function and purpose of the Dangerous Weapons Control Act, of which section 12021 is a part, is to "`minimize the danger to public safety arising from the free access to firearms that can be used for crimes of violence.'" ( People v. Washington, 237 Cal.App.2d 59, 66 [ 46 Cal.Rptr. 545]). This strong governmental interest clearly outweighs the almost frivolous "burden" suffered by a convicted felon denied the "right" to carry a concealable weapon.
The incident that occurred here is the very thing the Legislature was seeking to prevent. As stated in People v. Washington (1965) 237 Cal.App.2d 59, 66 [ 46 Cal.Rptr. 545]: "Penal Code, section 12021, is part of the legislative scheme originally promulgated in 1917 (Stats.
( People v. Rollins, 65 Cal.2d 681, 683 [ 56 Cal.Rptr. 293, 423 P.2d 221].) Moreover, the questioning was purely investigatory ( People v. Jacobson, 63 Cal.2d 319, 328 [ 46 Cal.Rptr. 515, 405 P.2d 555]; People v. Washington, 237 Cal.App.2d 59 [ 46 Cal.Rptr. 545]; People v. Shawver, 235 Cal.App.2d 859, 861-862 [ 45 Cal.Rptr. 767]) and no objection was made to the introduction of the evidence at the hearing, an acknowledgment that trial counsel was satisfied that the evidence was admissible. ( People v. Doherty, 67 Cal.2d 9, 14-15 [ 59 Cal.Rptr. 857, 429 P.2d 177]; People v. Sanchez, 239 Cal.App.2d 51, 55 [ 48 Cal.Rptr. 424].) The judgment is affirmed.
The inquiry was of an investigative nature, the sole purpose thereof being to determine whether in fact a crime had been committed. (See People v. Washington, 237 Cal.App.2d 59, 64 [ 46 Cal.Rptr. 545] .) Except for the admission that an act of intercourse had occurred, the answers given by the defendant were of an exculpatory character in that he stated that the intercourse had been with the woman's consent and in that he explained that her apparent unconsciousness was due to overindulgence in the use of wine. But, even assuming that there was a violation of the Escobedo-Dorado rule, the trial court could reasonably draw the inference that such inquiry had no appreciable effect with respect to the officer's decision to arrest the defendant.
[4] The statements made by the defendant prior to January 5 were exculpatory and were made while the investigation was a general inquiry into an unsolved crime and while defendant was being afforded an opportunity to explain his activities during the evening of the murder. (See United States v. Konigsberg (3d Cir. 1964) 336 F.2d 844, 853; People v. Cotter, 63 Cal.2d 386, 393 [ 46 Cal.Rptr. 622, 405 P.2d 862]; People v. Lewis, 244 Cal.App.2d 325, 330 [ 53 Cal.Rptr. 108]; People v. Washington, 237 Cal.App.2d 59, 63-64 [ 46 Cal.Rptr. 545]; People v. Ford, 234 Cal.App.2d 480, 491-494 [ 44 Cal.Rptr. 556].) The court did not err in receiving evidence of those statements.
[2] Also as to Webb, even though he was under arrest, the burglary was still an unsolved crime and Officer Bishondon's inquiry was a part of his investigation into the theft of the furs from Robinson's; his questions of Webb were legitimate steps in this investigation. ( People v. Washington, 237 Cal.App.2d 59, 64-65 [ 46 Cal.Rptr. 545]; People v. Ford, 234 Cal.App.2d 480, 491-494 [ 44 Cal.Rptr. 556]; People v. Davis, 235 Cal.App.2d 214, 227 [ 45 Cal.Rptr. 297].) Webb, however, denied any complicity in the burglary and volunteered the fact that he had been called in to help sell the furs.
The Supreme Court of this state has recently reviewed the meaning of addict as applied for the purpose of commitment ( People v. Victor (1965) 62 Cal.2d 280, 301-305 [ 42 Cal.Rptr. 199, 398 P.2d 391]), and as used in a statute prohibiting the operation of a motor vehicle by one addicted to the use of narcotics or certain dangerous drugs. ( People v. O'Neil (1965) 62 Cal.2d 748, 752-756 [ 44 Cal.Rptr. 320, 401 P.2d 928]; and see also People v. Washington (1965) 237 Cal.App.2d 59, 65-68 [ 46 Cal.Rptr. 545]; People v. Davis (1965) 234 Cal.App.2d 847, 852 [ 44 Cal.Rptr. 825]; McMurtry v. State Board of Medical Examiners (1960) 180 Cal.App.2d 760, 769 [ 4 Cal.Rptr. 910]; and People v. Jaurequi (1956) 142 Cal.App.2d 555, 561 [ 298 P.2d 896].) The requisites of addiction are said to be (1) emotional dependence on the drug in the sense that the user experiences a compulsive need to continue its use, (2) a tolerance to its effects which leads the user to require larger and more potent doses, and (3) physical dependence so that the user suffers withdrawal symptoms if he is deprived of his dosage.