People v. Washington

14 Citing cases

  1. People v. Bell

    49 Cal.3d 502 (Cal. 1989)   Cited 530 times
    Finding it was “far from clear” that a 5 percent absolute disparity was sufficient

    . . . (24a) The clear intent of the Legislature in adopting the weapons control act was to limit as far as possible the use of instruments commonly associated with criminal activity [citation] and, specifically, `to minimize the danger to public safety arising from the free access to firearms that can be used for crimes of violence.' ( People v. Scott, 24 Cal.2d 774, 782 [ 151 P.2d 517].)" ( People v. Washington (1965) 237 Cal.App.2d 59, 66 [ 46 Cal.Rptr. 545].) The law presumes the danger is greater when the person possessing the concealable firearm has previously been convicted of felony, and the presumption is not impermissible.

  2. People v. Doherty

    67 Cal.2d 9 (Cal. 1967)   Cited 88 times
    In Doherty the California supreme court relied on a refutation of the contrary position, rather than an affirmative reasoning.

    However, it contains no more than that which defendant made orally; it is cumulative, merely duplicating and reiterating the earlier statement lawfully obtained ( People v. Ford, 234 Cal.App.2d 480, 494 [ 44 Cal.Rptr. 556]), and its admission does not require automatic reversal. ( People v. Washington, 237 Cal.App.2d 59, 65 [ 46 Cal.Rptr. 545]; People v. Cully, 236 Cal.App.2d 769, 778 [ 46 Cal.Rptr. 644]; People v. Sheridan, 236 Cal.App.2d 667, 671 [ 46 Cal.Rptr. 295].) When viewed in the light of the overwhelming evidence of guilt, the written statement appears to have had but little significance and could not have resulted in prejudice to defendant.

  3. People v. Mills

    6 Cal.App.4th 1278 (Cal. Ct. App. 1992)   Cited 27 times
    In Mills, the court affirmed the defendant's conviction for being a felon in possession of a shotgun even though at the time of his prior offense and sentencing, a convicted felon was barred only from carrying concealed firearms.

    . . . The clear intent of the Legislature in adopting the weapons control act was to limit as far as possible the use of instruments commonly associated with criminal activity [citation] and, specifically, "to minimize the danger to public safety arising from the free access to firearms that can be used for crimes of violence." ( People v. Scott, 24 Cal.2d 774, 782 [ 151 P.2d 517].)' ( People v. Washington (1965) 237 Cal.App.2d 59, 66 [ 46 Cal.Rptr. 545].) The law presumes the danger is greater when the person possessing the concealable firearm has previously been convicted of felony, and the presumption is not impermissible.

  4. People v. Dubose

    42 Cal.App.3d 847 (Cal. Ct. App. 1974)   Cited 11 times

    The clear function and purpose of the Dangerous Weapons Control Act, of which section 12021 is a part, is to "`minimize the danger to public safety arising from the free access to firearms that can be used for crimes of violence.'" ( People v. Washington, 237 Cal.App.2d 59, 66 [ 46 Cal.Rptr. 545]). This strong governmental interest clearly outweighs the almost frivolous "burden" suffered by a convicted felon denied the "right" to carry a concealable weapon.

  5. People v. Evans

    40 Cal.App.3d 582 (Cal. Ct. App. 1974)   Cited 3 times
    In Evans the court held at the outset that the theory of self-defense was irrelevant inasmuch as the defendant had armed himself prior to the shooting incident, noting that what had occurred in that case was "the very thing the Legislature was seeking to prevent... `" to minimize the danger to publicsafety arising from the free access to firearms that can be usedfor crimes of violence.

    The incident that occurred here is the very thing the Legislature was seeking to prevent. As stated in People v. Washington (1965) 237 Cal.App.2d 59, 66 [ 46 Cal.Rptr. 545]: "Penal Code, section 12021, is part of the legislative scheme originally promulgated in 1917 (Stats.

  6. People v. Berry

    260 Cal.App.2d 654 (Cal. Ct. App. 1968)   Cited 3 times
    In People v. Berry, 260 Cal.App.2d 654, 67 Cal.Rptr. 315 (1968), the officers examined an acetylene torch in a red pickup within two miles of the place where a torch had been used in a burglary.

    ( People v. Rollins, 65 Cal.2d 681, 683 [ 56 Cal.Rptr. 293, 423 P.2d 221].) Moreover, the questioning was purely investigatory ( People v. Jacobson, 63 Cal.2d 319, 328 [ 46 Cal.Rptr. 515, 405 P.2d 555]; People v. Washington, 237 Cal.App.2d 59 [ 46 Cal.Rptr. 545]; People v. Shawver, 235 Cal.App.2d 859, 861-862 [ 45 Cal.Rptr. 767]) and no objection was made to the introduction of the evidence at the hearing, an acknowledgment that trial counsel was satisfied that the evidence was admissible. ( People v. Doherty, 67 Cal.2d 9, 14-15 [ 59 Cal.Rptr. 857, 429 P.2d 177]; People v. Sanchez, 239 Cal.App.2d 51, 55 [ 48 Cal.Rptr. 424].) The judgment is affirmed.

  7. People v. Jones

    255 Cal.App.2d 163 (Cal. Ct. App. 1967)   Cited 7 times

    The inquiry was of an investigative nature, the sole purpose thereof being to determine whether in fact a crime had been committed. (See People v. Washington, 237 Cal.App.2d 59, 64 [ 46 Cal.Rptr. 545] .) Except for the admission that an act of intercourse had occurred, the answers given by the defendant were of an exculpatory character in that he stated that the intercourse had been with the woman's consent and in that he explained that her apparent unconsciousness was due to overindulgence in the use of wine. But, even assuming that there was a violation of the Escobedo-Dorado rule, the trial court could reasonably draw the inference that such inquiry had no appreciable effect with respect to the officer's decision to arrest the defendant.

  8. People v. Gosman

    252 Cal.App.2d 1004 (Cal. Ct. App. 1967)   Cited 2 times

    [4] The statements made by the defendant prior to January 5 were exculpatory and were made while the investigation was a general inquiry into an unsolved crime and while defendant was being afforded an opportunity to explain his activities during the evening of the murder. (See United States v. Konigsberg (3d Cir. 1964) 336 F.2d 844, 853; People v. Cotter, 63 Cal.2d 386, 393 [ 46 Cal.Rptr. 622, 405 P.2d 862]; People v. Lewis, 244 Cal.App.2d 325, 330 [ 53 Cal.Rptr. 108]; People v. Washington, 237 Cal.App.2d 59, 63-64 [ 46 Cal.Rptr. 545]; People v. Ford, 234 Cal.App.2d 480, 491-494 [ 44 Cal.Rptr. 556].) The court did not err in receiving evidence of those statements.

  9. People v. Webb

    243 Cal.App.2d 179 (Cal. Ct. App. 1966)   Cited 3 times

    [2] Also as to Webb, even though he was under arrest, the burglary was still an unsolved crime and Officer Bishondon's inquiry was a part of his investigation into the theft of the furs from Robinson's; his questions of Webb were legitimate steps in this investigation. ( People v. Washington, 237 Cal.App.2d 59, 64-65 [ 46 Cal.Rptr. 545]; People v. Ford, 234 Cal.App.2d 480, 491-494 [ 44 Cal.Rptr. 556]; People v. Davis, 235 Cal.App.2d 214, 227 [ 45 Cal.Rptr. 297].) Webb, however, denied any complicity in the burglary and volunteered the fact that he had been called in to help sell the furs.

  10. Elder v. Board of Medical Examiners

    241 Cal.App.2d 246 (Cal. Ct. App. 1966)   Cited 20 times

    The Supreme Court of this state has recently reviewed the meaning of addict as applied for the purpose of commitment ( People v. Victor (1965) 62 Cal.2d 280, 301-305 [ 42 Cal.Rptr. 199, 398 P.2d 391]), and as used in a statute prohibiting the operation of a motor vehicle by one addicted to the use of narcotics or certain dangerous drugs. ( People v. O'Neil (1965) 62 Cal.2d 748, 752-756 [ 44 Cal.Rptr. 320, 401 P.2d 928]; and see also People v. Washington (1965) 237 Cal.App.2d 59, 65-68 [ 46 Cal.Rptr. 545]; People v. Davis (1965) 234 Cal.App.2d 847, 852 [ 44 Cal.Rptr. 825]; McMurtry v. State Board of Medical Examiners (1960) 180 Cal.App.2d 760, 769 [ 4 Cal.Rptr. 910]; and People v. Jaurequi (1956) 142 Cal.App.2d 555, 561 [ 298 P.2d 896].) The requisites of addiction are said to be (1) emotional dependence on the drug in the sense that the user experiences a compulsive need to continue its use, (2) a tolerance to its effects which leads the user to require larger and more potent doses, and (3) physical dependence so that the user suffers withdrawal symptoms if he is deprived of his dosage.