money in a sting operation involving a police officer pretending to be drunk); In re George B., 228 Cal.App.3d 1088, 279 Cal.Rptr. 388, 390-91 (1991) (upholding charge of grand theft "from the person" where the juvenile stole groceries from a shopping cart the victim was pushing toward her car in the parking lot); see also In re Jesus O., 40 Cal.4th 859, 55 Cal.Rptr.3d 523, 152 P.3d 1100, 1101 (2007) (upholding charge requiring theft to be "from the person of another" where, intending to steal something from the victim, the juvenile assaulted him, causing the victim to drop his cell phone, which the juvenile picked up and kept: "When someone, intending to steal, causes property to become separated from the victim’s person, then gains possession of the property, the theft is from the person."). The dissent cites three cases it claims reject larceny from the person under circumstances our interpretation of NRS 205.270 would support: Willis v. State, 480 So.2d 56 (Ala. Crim. App. 1985) ; People v. Warner, 801 P.2d 1187 (Colo. 1990) ; and People v. Washington, 155 A.D.2d 634, 548 N.Y.S.2d 48 (1989). From a common law perspective, these cases appear to involve false-pretenses crimes, where a defendant uses fraud to obtain both title and possession of money or property, not larceny, and so are inapposite.

Other courts have found that deceiving a victim into handing over property does not constitute a taking from the person of another. See Willis v. State, 480 So. 2d 56, 57-58 (Ala. Crim. App. 1985) (holding that the defendant's cashing a check for which he had requested a stop payment was not a taking from the person); People v. Warner, 801 P.2d 1187, 1188, 1191-92 (Colo. 1990) (holding that deliberately shortchanging a cashier through a rapid series of money transactions did not constitute "theft from the person"); State v. Harrison, 373 A.2d 680, 682-84 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1977) (indicating that tricking a victim into giving the defendant a handkerchief filled with money would not constitute a taking from the person); People v. Washington, 548 N.Y.S. 2d 48, 49 (App. Div. 1989) (emphasis added) (holding that using deceit to obtain the victim's money did not constitute a taking from the person because the victim "voluntarily handed $20 to the defendant hoping to receive two 'dimes' of cocaine in return"); Commonwealth v. Monroe, 678 A.2d 1208, 1210-14 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1996) (holding that a handkerchief scheme similar to that discussed in Harrison did not constitute a taking from the person), overruled in part on other grounds by Commonwealth v. Lord, 719 A.2d 306, 308 (Pa. 1998). NRS 205.270(1) presents an even stronger basis for vacating the instant j

"Theft by deception as set forth in subsection 18-4-401(1)(a) requires proof that the victim relied on a swindler's misrepresentations, which caused the victim to part with something of value." Id. (citing People v. Warner, 801 P.2d 1187, 1189-90 (Colo. 1990)). The relevant portion of COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-4-401 states:

” Id. (citing People v. Warner, 801 P.2d 1187, 1189-90 (Colo.1990)).

The first inquiry is to look to the plain language of the statute. People v. Warner, 801 P.2d 1187, 1190 (Colo. 1990). Section 11-51-125(3), C.R.S., provides, in pertinent part:

See People v. Norman, 703 P.2d 1261 (Colo.1985); People v. Warner, 801 P.2d 1187 (Colo.1990). Similar standards apply to the pleading and proof of actual fraud under Section 523(a)(2) and (a)(4).

See People v. Norman, 703 P.2d 1261 (Colo.1985); People v. Warner, 801 P.2d 1187 (Colo.1990). Similar standards apply to the pleading and proof of actual fraud under Section 523(a)(2) and (a)(4).

See People v. Norman, 703 P.2d 1261 (Colo. 1985); People v. Warner, 801 P.2d 1187 (Colo. 1990). Similar standards apply to the pleading and proof of actual fraud under Section 523(a)(2) and (a)(4).

Where theft is premised on deception under Section 18-4-401, C.R.S., the requisite mental state, an intent to defraud, must be established by proof that intentional misrepresentations were made to the victim which caused him to part with something of value in reliance on those misrepresentations. See People v. Norman, 703 P.2d 1261 (Colo. 1985); People v. Warner, 801 P.2d 1187 (Colo. 1990). Similar standards apply to the pleading and proof of actual fraud under Section 523(a)(2) and (a)(4).

¶13 To prove the element of deception, the prosecution must prove that the defendant made a misrepresentation, which is "a false representation of a past or present fact," and that "the victim parted with something of value in reliance upon [the defendant's] misrepresentation[ ]." People v. Prendergast , 87 P.3d 175, 185 (Colo. App. 2003) ; see People v. Warner , 801 P.2d 1187, 1189–90 (Colo. 1990) (stating that theft by deception "requires proof that [the defendant's] misrepresentations caused the victim to part with something of value and that the victim relied upon the swindler's misrepresentations" (quoting People v. Terranova, 38 Colo.App. 476, 563 P.2d 363, 368 (1976) )). ¶14 Theft offenses are classified based on the value of the stolen items. § 18-4-401(2).