A conviction generally under WMC 6-3-1(A), thus, does not categorically qualify as a CIMT.See People v. Warner, 801 P.2d 1187, 1188-89 (Colo. 1990) (explaining, in a case addressing theft by deception from a person, Colo. Rev. Stat. ยง 18-4-401(1)(a), (5), that Colorado's current theft statute, id. ยง 18-4-401, incorporates the common-law offenses of larceny, embezzlement, false pretenses, and confidence games); People v. Sharp, 104 P.3d 252, 254-58 (Colo. Ct. App. 2004) (stating, in holding that there was sufficient evidence to support a conviction for theft under Colo. Rev. Stat. ยง 18-4-401(1)(b), by knowingly using, concealing, or abandoning "the thing of value in such manner as to deprive the other person permanently of its use or benefit," that jury can infer intent to deprive another permanently of the use of benefits of a thing of value from defendant's conduct and the circumstances of the case). The Colorado case on which Lucio-Rayos relies, People v. Quick, 713 P.2d 1282, 1285-89 (Colo.
In People v. Warner, 801 P.2d 1187 (Colo. 1990), the defendant argued that his actions did not constitute theft from the person. The defendant had utilized a series of short-change transactions to steal money from a cashier.
"Theft by deception as set forth in subsection 18-4-401(1)(a) requires proof that the victim relied on a swindler's misrepresentations, which caused the victim to part with something of value." Id. (citing People v. Warner, 801 P.2d 1187, 1189-90 (Colo. 1990)). The relevant portion of COLO. REV. STAT. ยง 18-4-401 states:
To discern legislative intent, we should look first to the statutory language. See People v. Warner, 801 P.2d 1187 (Colo. 1990). Section 17-22.
To discern legislative intent, a court should look first to the statutory language. People v. Warner, 801 P.2d 1187 (Colo. 1990). Words and phrases should be given effect according to their plain and ordinary meaning.