money in a sting operation involving a police officer pretending to be drunk); In re George B., 228 Cal.App.3d 1088, 279 Cal.Rptr. 388, 390-91 (1991) (upholding charge of grand theft "from the person" where the juvenile stole groceries from a shopping cart the victim was pushing toward her car in the parking lot); see also In re Jesus O., 40 Cal.4th 859, 55 Cal.Rptr.3d 523, 152 P.3d 1100, 1101 (2007) (upholding charge requiring theft to be "from the person of another" where, intending to steal something from the victim, the juvenile assaulted him, causing the victim to drop his cell phone, which the juvenile picked up and kept: "When someone, intending to steal, causes property to become separated from the victim’s person, then gains possession of the property, the theft is from the person."). The dissent cites three cases it claims reject larceny from the person under circumstances our interpretation of NRS 205.270 would support: Willis v. State, 480 So.2d 56 (Ala. Crim. App. 1985) ; People v. Warner, 801 P.2d 1187 (Colo. 1990) ; and People v. Washington, 155 A.D.2d 634, 548 N.Y.S.2d 48 (1989). From a common law perspective, these cases appear to involve false-pretenses crimes, where a defendant uses fraud to obtain both title and possession of money or property, not larceny, and so are inapposite.

A conviction generally under WMC 6-3-1(A), thus, does not categorically qualify as a CIMT.See People v. Warner, 801 P.2d 1187, 1188-89 (Colo. 1990) (explaining, in a case addressing theft by deception from a person, Colo. Rev. Stat. § 18-4-401(1)(a), (5), that Colorado's current theft statute, id. § 18-4-401, incorporates the common-law offenses of larceny, embezzlement, false pretenses, and confidence games); People v. Sharp, 104 P.3d 252, 254-58 (Colo. Ct. App. 2004) (stating, in holding that there was sufficient evidence to support a conviction for theft under Colo. Rev. Stat. § 18-4-401(1)(b), by knowingly using, concealing, or abandoning "the thing of value in such manner as to deprive the other person permanently of its use or benefit," that jury can infer intent to deprive another permanently of the use of benefits of a thing of value from defendant's conduct and the circumstances of the case). The Colorado case on which Lucio-Rayos relies, People v. Quick, 713 P.2d 1282, 1285-89 (Colo.

Colorado is among the substantial majority of states that have consolidated the crimes of larceny, embezzlement, and theft under false pretenses in a single crime of theft. See People v. Warner, 801 P.2d 1187, 1189 (Colo. 1990); Colorado Legislative Council, Report to the Gen. Assembly of 1965, Research Publication No. 98, at 33 comment (1964); see generally Wayne R. LaFave, Substantive Criminal Law, § 19.8 at 140-48 (2nd ed. 2003). According to this statute, a person commits the crime of theft when he knowingly obtains or exercises control over anything of value of another without authorization or by threat or deception, and in addition he either intends to permanently deprive the other person of its use or benefit; demands a consideration to which he is not legally entitled to return it; or uses, conceals, or abandons it with the intent to, or at least the knowledge that his conduct will, permanently deprive the other person of its use or benefit.

Id. Rather, it enacted the theft from the person of another provision "to cover those situations that would otherwise constitute robbery, but for the lack of force, threats, or intimidation," People v. Warner , 801 P.2d 1187, 1191 (Colo. 1990) (footnote omitted), thus showing that it contemplated that "force" has the same meaning in both statutes. ¶ 21 And, because the General Assembly intended that both statutes use the same definition of "force," the jury's findings that Delgado both took "by the use of force" and "by means other than the use of force" for the same act negate each other.

Other courts have found that deceiving a victim into handing over property does not constitute a taking from the person of another. See Willis v. State, 480 So. 2d 56, 57-58 (Ala. Crim. App. 1985) (holding that the defendant's cashing a check for which he had requested a stop payment was not a taking from the person); People v. Warner, 801 P.2d 1187, 1188, 1191-92 (Colo. 1990) (holding that deliberately shortchanging a cashier through a rapid series of money transactions did not constitute "theft from the person"); State v. Harrison, 373 A.2d 680, 682-84 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1977) (indicating that tricking a victim into giving the defendant a handkerchief filled with money would not constitute a taking from the person); People v. Washington, 548 N.Y.S. 2d 48, 49 (App. Div. 1989) (emphasis added) (holding that using deceit to obtain the victim's money did not constitute a taking from the person because the victim "voluntarily handed $20 to the defendant hoping to receive two 'dimes' of cocaine in return"); Commonwealth v. Monroe, 678 A.2d 1208, 1210-14 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1996) (holding that a handkerchief scheme similar to that discussed in Harrison did not constitute a taking from the person), overruled in part on other grounds by Commonwealth v. Lord, 719 A.2d 306, 308 (Pa. 1998). NRS 205.270(1) presents an even stronger basis for vacating the instant j

In People v. Warner, 801 P.2d 1187 (Colo. 1990), the defendant argued that his actions did not constitute theft from the person. The defendant had utilized a series of short-change transactions to steal money from a cashier.

Relatedly, in a thorough analysis of the Colorado theft statute at issue here, the Colorado Supreme Court recognized that "[t]he invasion of the victim's person presents an element of danger absent in other theft offenses." People v. Warner, 801 P.2d 1187, 1191 (Colo. 1990). That "danger" is the potential for violent confrontation between thief and victim.

"Theft by deception as set forth in subsection 18-4-401(1)(a) requires proof that the victim relied on a swindler's misrepresentations, which caused the victim to part with something of value." Id. (citing People v. Warner, 801 P.2d 1187, 1189-90 (Colo. 1990)). The relevant portion of COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-4-401 states:

” Id. (citing People v. Warner, 801 P.2d 1187, 1189-90 (Colo.1990)).

The first inquiry is to look to the plain language of the statute. People v. Warner, 801 P.2d 1187, 1190 (Colo. 1990). Section 11-51-125(3), C.R.S., provides, in pertinent part: