People v. Walts

9 Citing cases

  1. People v. Stevens

    65 A.D.3d 759 (N.Y. App. Div. 2009)   Cited 9 times

    Defendant also claims that County Court abused its discretion by permitting the People to cross-examine her — had she chosen to testify — concerning the circumstances that led to her being previously convicted of driving while intoxicated and aggravated unlicensed operation of a motor vehicle in the third degree. These convictions, as well as the underlying acts, are indicative of defendant's willingness to place her individual interest ahead of that of society and were relevant on the issue of her credibility as a witness ( see People v Sandoval, 34 NY2d 371, 376-377; People v Walts, 267 AD2d 617, 619, lv denied 95 NY2d 859; People v Trichilo, 230 AD2d 926, 928, lv denied 89 NY2d 931). Even if we were to conclude that it was error to allow such inquiry, considering that the jury was permitted to hear a recording in which defendant sought to explain to an insurance company representative why she had initially reported the truck as stolen, "there was simply no possibility — let alone a significant probability — that [her] testimony would have led to an acquittal" ( People v Grant, 7 NY3d 421, 425; see People v Boodrow, 42 AD3d 582, 585).

  2. People v. Eaves

    15 A.D.3d 891 (N.Y. App. Div. 2005)   Cited 4 times

    We reject that contention. The showup identification procedure was reasonable under the circumstances because it was conducted in geographic and temporal proximity to the crime and was not unduly suggestive ( see People v. Brisco, 99 NY2d 596, 597; People v. Ortiz, 90 NY2d 533, 537). Also contrary to defendant's contention, County Court's Sandoval ruling does not constitute an abuse of discretion. Although many of the prior convictions concerning which the court permitted inquiry were remote in time, that "factor `becomes less determinative or guiding' in this case given defendant's [lengthy] history of nearly continuous criminal conduct" ( People v. Walts, 267 AD2d 617, 619, lv denied 95 NY2d 859). Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the People, as we must ( see People v. Contes, 60 NY2d 620, 621), we conclude that the evidence is legally sufficient to support the conviction ( see generally People v. Bleakley, 69 NY2d 490, 495). Finally, the sentence is not unduly harsh or severe.

  3. People v. Holliman

    12 A.D.3d 773 (N.Y. App. Div. 2004)   Cited 9 times

    Moreover, the confidential informant was extensively questioned, during both direct and cross-examination, about her being a paid informant, her drug use, her extensive criminal record and her receipt of favorable consideration by the investigators in certain criminal matters. Thus, the jury had ample opportunity to assess her testimony and credibility ( see e.g. People v. Holmes, 304 AD2d 1043, lv denied 100 NY2d 642; People v. Walts, 267 AD2d 617, 620, lv denied 95 NY2d 859; People v. Batista, 235 AD2d 631, 631-632, lv denied 89 NY2d 1088). We have reviewed defendant's pro se appellate arguments and reject them as being unpersuasive.

  4. People v. Coleman

    2 A.D.3d 1045 (N.Y. App. Div. 2003)   Cited 11 times

    The jury's verdict was supported by the weight of the evidence. Despite defendant's attacks on the confidential informant as a "crackhead" who made a deal with the People in exchange for her testimony, credibility determinations are reserved for the jury (see People v. Walts, 267 A.D.2d 617, 620, lv denied 95 N.Y.2d 859). While the informant's trial testimony alone was sufficient to sustain the convictions, other evidence confirmed that testimony. This was a controlled drug buy.

  5. People v. Herring

    305 A.D.2d 855 (N.Y. App. Div. 2003)   Cited 4 times

    ook, 294 A.D.2d 710, 712, lv denied 98 N.Y.2d 702), upon weighing the probative value of the conflicting inferences that may be drawn from the evidence and giving due deference to the jury's findings and its assessment of credibility issues (see People v. Soulia, 263 A.D.2d 869, 872, lv denied 94 N.Y.2d 829), we are satisfied that the jury did not fail to give the evidence the weight it should be accorded (see People v. Bleakley, 69 N.Y.2d 490, 495). And while defendant makes much of the fact that the testimony of a number of the People's witnesses is suspect due to their criminal background and their receipt of favorable treatment with regard to criminal charges against them, we need note only that such does not make their testimony incredible as a matter of law (see People v. Young, 296 A.D.2d 588, 592, lvs denied 99 N.Y.2d 536, 538, 541). Indeed, these matters were fully explored during trial, giving the jury ample opportunity to assess the witnesses' testimony and credibility (see People v. Walts, 267 A.D.2d 617, 620, lv denied 95 N.Y.2d 859). Accordingly, the judgment is affirmed. Cardona, P.J., Mercure, Carpinello and Rose, JJ., concur.

  6. People v. Pace

    305 A.D.2d 984 (N.Y. App. Div. 2003)   Cited 6 times

    We reject defendant's contention that the verdict is against the weight of the evidence. The People's case against defendant was based primarily on the testimony of a jailhouse informant, and it cannot be said that his testimony was incredible as a matter of law ( see People v. Batista, 235 A.D.2d 631, 631-632, lv denied 89 N.Y.2d 1088; People v. Black, 226 A.D.2d 1113, lv denied 88 N.Y.2d 1019). Contrary to defendant's contention, the testimony of the informant was not rendered incredible as a matter of law because he received favorable treatment for his testimony ( see People v. Walts, 267 A.D.2d 617, 620, lv denied 95 N.Y.2d 859) or because he acknowledged his own prior criminal and amoral conduct ( see Batista, 235 A.D.2d at 631-632; see also People v. Hubert, 238 A.D.2d 745, 746, lv denied 90 N.Y.2d 859, 860). Those subjects were addressed on both direct examination and cross-examination of the informant, and the jury had the opportunity to assess his testimony and credibility ( see Batista, 235 A.D.2d at 631-632).

  7. People v. Young

    296 A.D.2d 588 (N.Y. App. Div. 2002)   Cited 17 times

    Although much of the evidence linking defendant to the robbery and shooting depended upon the credibility of the testimony of Morrow, McKnight and Recard, convicted felons, our review of the record does not reveal that their testimony was manifestly untrue, physically impossible or contrary to human experience and, therefore, we will not consider the testimony incredible as a matter of law (see, People v. Wilson, 256 A.D.2d 637, 638, lv denied 93 N.Y.2d 880). Inasmuch as matters affecting the witnesses' credibility were fully explored during their testimony, the jury was in the best position to assess their credibility (see, People v. Walts, 267 A.D.2d 617, 620, lv denied 95 N.Y.2d 859) and the jury obviously credited the testimony which directly linked defendant to the robbery and shooting. Considering this testimony in the light of all the other evidence in the record, and according due deference to the jury's credibility determination (see, People v. Bleakley, 69 N.Y.2d 490, 495), we conclude that the verdict is not against the weight of the evidence (see, id.).

  8. People v. Stephanski

    286 A.D.2d 859 (N.Y. App. Div. 2001)   Cited 10 times

    We conclude that the court properly determined that defendant's statement was voluntarily made ( see, CPL 60.45; People v. Torres, 186 A.D.2d 466, lv denied 81 N.Y.2d 795), and that it therefore was admissible for impeachment purposes ( see, People v. Maerling, 64 N.Y.2d 134, 140; People v. Barnes, 239 A.D.2d 955, 955-956, lv denied 90 N.Y.2d 901). We further conclude that the court's Sandoval ruling did not constitute an abuse of discretion ( see, People v. Walts, 267 A.D.2d 617, 618-619, lv denied 95 N.Y.2d 859; People v. Trichilo, 230 A.D.2d 926, 928, lv denied 89 N.Y.2d 931). The conviction is supported by legally sufficient evidence and the verdict is not against the weight of the evidence ( see, People v. Bleakley, 69 N.Y.2d 490, 495). Defendant's contention that the court erroneously instructed the jury concerning accomplice liability is not preserved for our review ( see, CPL 470.05), and we decline to exercise our power to review it as a matter of discretion in the interest of justice ( see, CPL 470.15 [a]).

  9. People v. DiBella

    277 A.D.2d 699 (N.Y. App. Div. 2000)   Cited 18 times

    County Court further reduced the chance of prejudice to defendant by providing limiting instructions to the jury (see, People v. Rodriguez, 85 N.Y.2d 586, 591; People v. Kingsbury, 256 A.D.2d 916, 917). Accordingly, we conclude that County Court did not abuse its discretion in rendering its Sandoval determination (see, People v. Walts, 267 A.D.2d 617, 619, lv denied 95 N.Y.2d 859; People v. Brace, 259 A.D.2d 782, 783, lv denied 93 N.Y.2d 1014; People v. Ayala, supra, at 803; People v. Lynch, 209 A.D.2d 827, 827, lv denied 84 N.Y.2d 1034; cf., People v. Mitchell, 209 A.D.2d 443, 443-444). Defendant also claims a number of trial errors, but we find these arguments unavailing.