Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Contra Costa County Super. Ct. No. 050808014
Richman, J.
Counsel for defendant and appellant Valerius Walters has asked this court independently examine the record in accordance with People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436, to determine if there are any arguable issues that require briefing. Defendant was informed of his right to file a supplemental brief, but he elected not to do so. We have conducted that review, conclude there are no arguable issues, and affirm.
Following a preliminary examination, defendant was charged by information with a single count of possessing heroin, in violation of Health and Safety Code section 11350, subdivision (a).
Defendant filed a motion to suppress evidence pursuant to Penal Code section 1538.5, on the ground that the heroin he was accused of possessing was discovered during the course of an illegal search and seizure.
The motion was the subject of a special hearing conducted on September 9, 2008. The trial court heard testimony from two Contra Costa County deputy sheriffs. Their testimony, viewed most favorably to the trial court’s denial of defendant’s motion (People v. Davis (2005) 36 Cal.4th 510, 528-529), showed the following:
On the afternoon of September 1, 2007, Deputies Patchin and Shiells were members of team of law enforcement personnel investigating suspected drug activity in an area of Richmond known for that form of illegality. Patchin was “conducting surveillance of two individuals that we previously arrested for narcotics sales and monitoring them to see if they were indeed engaging in hand-to-hand transactions.”
After observing five such transactions, one of which resulted in an arrest for heroin possession, Patchin observed a red Pontiac drive up. A shirtless defendant got out of the vehicle and approached one of the individuals being watched, whom Patchin had previously arrested for selling controlled substances. The suspected dealer accepted currency from defendant in exchange for “a small object” that defendant “rolled around in the palm of his hand as if he were inspecting it.” Patchin believed he had observed a sale of narcotics. Patchin observed defendant “put the item into the crotch area of his pants” and reenter the Pontiac, which then left the area.
After receiving this information, including the license number of the Pontiac, Deputy Shiells immediately stopped the vehicle. A shirtless defendant was the sole occupant. Shiells handcuffed defendant for possessing narcotics, and advised him of his rights in accordance with Miranda v. Arizona (1966) 384 U.S. 436. Shiells asked if defendant “had anything illegal on him.” Defendant replied, “Look, I’m a heroin addict, and I have a piece of heroin by my balls.” After defendant was secured in Shiells’s vehicle, defendant “reached down into his pants and pulled out a small black piece of heroin.” Shiells then arrested defendant.
In arguing his motion, defendant did not dispute that there was reasonable suspicion to detain, only that there was not sufficient probable cause to arrest. The trial court denied defendant’s motion to suppress, concluding that “I do find there was probable cause.”
Immediately after his motion was denied, defendant changed his plea to no contest. He waived arraignment and preparation of a sentencing report by the probation officer, whereupon imposition of sentence was suspended and he was placed on probation for two years, upon specified conditions.
Defendant filed a timely notice of appeal. We appointed counsel for defendant, and advised that he could file a supplemental brief if he believed there were arguable issues. Defendant did not do so.
The denial of defendant’s suppression was not error. The record provides an ample basis from which the trial court—and this court—could conclude that the deputies had probable cause to arrest defendant.
Defendant was at all times represented by competent counsel who safeguarded defendant’s interests.
The change of defendant’s plea complied with the formalities required by Boykin v. Alabama (1969) 395 U.S. 238 and In re Tahl (1969) 1 Cal.3d 122.
There was no abuse of discretion in admitting defendant to probation, and none of the conditions of his probation were inappropriate.
The order of probation is affirmed.
We concur: Haerle, Acting P.J., Lambden, J.