Opinion
July 3, 1997
Appeal from the Supreme Court, Onondaga County, Brunetti, J.
Present — Green, J. P., Lawton, Doerr, Balio and Boehm, JJ.
Executive Law § 259-i (3) (c) (iii) provides that an alleged parole violator be given notice of the parole violation and preliminary hearing "within three days of the execution of the warrant". The purpose of the three-day rule is to provide an alleged parole violator with adequate notice of the time, date and place of the preliminary parole revocation hearing, and to inform the alleged parole violator of the basis for the violation and of his rights in connection with the hearing to enable him to prepare. Failure to comply with the three-day rule, however, does not directly affect the right to be restored to parole, unlike the failure to comply with Executive Law § 259-i (3) (c) (i) and (f) (i) ( see, Matter of White v. New York State Div. of Parole, 60 N.Y.2d 920, 922; People ex rel. Gonzalez v. Dalsheim, 52 N.Y.2d 9; People ex rel. Melendez v. Warden, 214 A.D.2d 301, 303).
Although the notice here was served one day after the statutory three-day period, the preliminary hearing was held in a timely manner. Petitioner did not request an adjournment to prepare for the hearing or contend that he lacked adequate notice of the basis for the parole violation. Nor does petitioner contend that he was prejudiced by the one-day delay. Under the circumstances, we conclude that the one-day delay does not require dismissal of the parole violation warrant and petitioner's restoration to parole. (Appeal from Judgment of Supreme Court, Onondaga County, Brunetti, J. — Habeas Corpus.)