Opinion
B229801
10-03-2011
Jennifer Hansen, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant. Kamala D. Harris, Attorney General, Dane R. Gillette, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Pamela C. Hamanaka, Assistant Attorney General, Victoria B. Wilson and Steven D. Matthews, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
(Los Angeles County Super. Ct. No. BA355097)
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court for Los Angeles County. Judith L. Champagne, Judge. Affirmed.
Jennifer Hansen, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Kamala D. Harris, Attorney General, Dane R. Gillette, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Pamela C. Hamanaka, Assistant Attorney General, Victoria B. Wilson and Steven D. Matthews, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
A jury convicted Kevin Waller of possessing marijuana for sale. On appeal, Waller contends the trial court erred in failing to hold a hearing to determine whether he was competent to stand trial, and in denying his motion for Pitchess discovery. We affirm the judgment.
Pitchess v. Superior Court (1974) 11 Cal.3d 531 (Pitchess).
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
We summarize the facts in accordance with the usual rules on appeal. (People v. Virgil (2011) 51 Cal.4th 1210, 1263.) On an afternoon in April 2009, Los Angeles Police Officers Jorge Gonzalez and Victor Escobedo were assigned to work a particular location in the city based on reports of illegal narcotics-related activity in the area. The officers saw Waller standing in the street, delaying the flow of traffic as he attempted to jaywalk. The officers stopped to issue Waller a traffic citation. When they approached him, they smelled marijuana. Escobedo asked Waller why he smelled marijuana. Waller told the officers he had a "sack of weed in his pocket." Escobedo searched him. In Waller's coin pocket, Escobedo found a small plastic bag containing a substance resembling marijuana. Escobedo also found 11 other small plastic bags containing a substance resembling marijuana in Waller's right front pants pocket. In the same pocket, Escobedo found $185 in small bills. Waller did not have any paraphernalia with him to smoke or otherwise ingest the drugs. Tests later confirmed the substance in the bags was marijuana.
At the preliminary hearing, Waller said he wished to represent himself and expressed dissatisfaction with his appointed counsel. The trial court held a Marsden hearing. Waller explained he was unhappy with his attorney because she had not procured a "transcript" related to alleged police brutality he suffered when his bail bond was forfeited. The court denied Waller's Marsden motion. Waller repeated his request to represent himself. The court provided Waller with a written advisement and Faretta waiver. On the form, Waller wrote that he had previously represented himself at a 2007 parole hearing. Waller told the court he had completed two years of college in Belize. The court explained several items Waller had not initialed on the form and he indicated he understood the explanations. In response to the court's advisements regarding the disadvantages of self-representation, Waller said: "I would rather proceed myself, Ma'am, and make my own mistake. I would be the one fully accountable for my mistakes."
People v. Marsden (1970) 2 Cal.3d 118 (Marsden).
Faretta v. California (1975) 422 U.S. 806 (Faretta).
When the court warned Waller there would be no continuance and the preliminary hearing would take place as scheduled, Waller asked to have his counsel replaced. The court told Waller it had denied his Marsden motion, thus his already-appointed counsel would continue to represent him. Waller rejected this option and said he would represent himself. As the court continued its advisements, Waller stated: "It's too difficult, Ma'am. It's way difficult. [¶] . . . [¶] . . . It's way difficult. It's weighing against me, and it's a lot. I'm going through a whole lot of stuff myself right now." The court recessed so that Waller could confer with his counsel. Following the recess, Waller continued to request that he be allowed to represent himself. After giving Waller additional advisements, the court granted the self-representation request.
Waller represented himself at the preliminary hearing. He cross-examined Officer Escobedo and unsuccessfully moved to dismiss the case "due to lack of evidence." Before the trial, Waller filed numerous written motions. He continued to represent himself at trial. He actively participated in selecting the jury. He made a brief opening statement and cross-examined the police officer witnesses. He did not testify or present any evidence.
These included discovery motions; motions for the appointment of an investigator and a fingerprint expert, both of which the court granted; motions to set aside the information; a suppression motion; two Pitchess motions; a motion to dismiss based on alleged violations of Brady v. Maryland (1963) 373 U.S. 83; a motion to dismiss for lack of prosecution relating to a several-month delay in his arrest; and motions to dismiss his alleged prior strike and felony convictions. During the trial, after the court sustained numerous objections to Waller's first cross-examination, he asserted the court had deprived him of his right to question the witness and attempted to make a motion pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 170.6.
The jury found Waller guilty of possession of marijuana for sale (Health & Saf. Code, § 11359). Following a court trial at which Waller was represented by counsel, the court found true the allegations that he had suffered two prior convictions within the meaning of Penal Code section 667.5, subdivision (b), and a prior strike within the meaning of the "Three Strikes" law, Penal Code sections 667, subdivisions (b) through (i) and 1170.12, subdivisions (a) through (d). The court sentenced Waller to a prison term of six years.
All further statutory references are to the Penal Code unless otherwise noted.
DISCUSSION
I. The Trial Court Did Not Err in Failing to Hold a Competency Hearing
Waller contends the trial court should have raised doubts about his competency and ordered a competency evaluation. We find no error.
In People v. Halvorsen (2007) 42 Cal.4th 379 (Halvorsen), the California Supreme Court summarized the well-settled principles applicable to competency issues: " 'Both the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution and state law require a trial judge to suspend proceedings and conduct a competency hearing whenever the court is presented with substantial evidence of incompetence, that is, evidence that raises a reasonable or bona fide doubt concerning the defendant's competence to stand trial. (§§ 1367, 1368; [citations].) Failure to declare a doubt and to conduct a competency hearing when there is substantial evidence of incompetence requires reversal of the judgment. [Citation.]' [Citation.] Competency under federal law requires sufficient present ability to consult with one's lawyer with a reasonable degree of rational understanding and a rational and factual understanding of the proceedings against one. [Citation.] Similarly, under state law a defendant is mentally incompetent to stand trial if, as a result of mental disorder or developmental disability, he or she is unable to understand the nature of the criminal proceedings or to assist counsel in the conduct of the defense in a rational manner. (§ 1367.)" (Halvorsen, at p. 401; see also People v. Ary (2011) 51 Cal.4th 510, 517-518.)
" 'A trial court's decision whether or not to hold a competence hearing is entitled to deference, because the court has the opportunity to observe the defendant during trial. [Citations.] The failure to declare a doubt and conduct a hearing when there is substantial evidence of incompetence, however, requires reversal of the judgment of conviction. [Citations.]' [Citation.]" (People v. Lewis (2008) 43 Cal.4th 415, 525.)
The trial court in this case did not declare a doubt as to Waller's competency, thus we must determine whether there was substantial evidence of incompetence. Waller contends his incompetence was evidenced by his own behavior. For example, he points to his "incomprehensible statements" to the court, and asserts his statements that he was or could be a witness in a murder trial "demonstrat[ed] possibly delusional thinking and paranoia which may or may not have been symptomatic of more serious mental problems." Waller contends his presentation at trial consisted of "frequent interruptions and quasi-legal sounding objections during the prosecutor's questioning of the two officers who testified against him . . . . Appellant's questions of the officers offered no discernible defense to his crimes." At one point, Waller told the court he had HIV, and on appeal he suggests he "could have been suffering from a condition known as HIV-dementia which may explain his paranoia and strange behavior." (Fn. omitted.)
It is apparent from the record that Waller experienced significant difficulties in representing himself. He told the court that his English was not very good, and he even asked for an interpreter for "broken English." He struggled to make himself understood, ask legally appropriate and coherent questions, articulate legally cognizable arguments, and present an effective defense. But nothing in the record indicates he lacked an understanding of the nature of the proceedings or the ability to conduct his defense in a rational manner. He actively participated in the proceedings at each step. He filed relevant pretrial motions. He participated in a hearing on his section 1538.5 motion, including cross-examining a witness. He exercised his peremptory challenges to remove potential jurors. He explained his theory of the case in a brief opening statement: "Um, I am denying the charge, Your Honor, because I was lawfully walking down a public street. Somebody had really had these officers attack me basically." (People v. Garcia (2008) 159 Cal.App.4th 163, 170 [no substantial evidence of incompetence where defendant represented himself and took active, rational role in proceedings].)
Although Waller told the court he had completed two years of college in Belize, and also expressed concerns about being deported, he never indicated that he spoke a language other than English.
Waller was not particularly able to ask questions on cross-examination that would support a defense, but this did not betray a lack of understanding of the nature of the proceedings. Instead, his ineffectiveness appeared to arise largely from his lack of legal training, his focus on legally irrelevant points, and his difficulty with English. An example from Waller's first cross-examination at trial—the cross-examination of Officer Gonzalez—is illustrative:
"[DEFENDANT]: I was going to ask like who activity log is this?
"THE COURT: Put the documents down for a moment. [¶] Ask him whatever questions you wish to ask him about his testimony on direct examination.
"[DEFENDANT]: Officer, what was the name of your partner the date of the incident?
"A: Officer Escobedo.
"Q: Were you driving a marked police car on 4-7-09?
"A: I am sorry.
"Q: Were you driving a marked police car on 4-7-09?
"A: Yes.
"Q: Do you recall admit -- do you recall -- admit being a dual on 4-14-2010 [sic]?
"[PROSECUTOR]: I am going to object. I don't understand the question.
"THE COURT: I don't understand the question either. [¶] Could you rephrase.
"[Q]: Basically I am asking, on 4-14-2010, I am asking the defendant [sic] do he admit being driver of dual car. A marked dual car.
"THE COURT: I am sorry. The date in question is 4-7-09. What he was driving in 2010 wouldn't really be relevant. I am going to ask you to rephrase your question if you have made a mistake about the date.
"[Q]: All right. Officer, who admit driver gold color police dual on 4-14-2010 [sic]?"
The court sustained the prosecutor's objection, then spoke to the defendant out of the jury's presence. The court asked if Waller wished to reconsider having his standby counsel take over the representation, but Waller rejected this option and said he had been up all night preparing. He continued:
"[DEFENDANT]: I just want to know if the defendant have these in his person to keep going with the question and keep going. This is crip[p]led me from explaining myself, right. I would ask the court to give him my copy and I ask him stuff.
"THE COURT: I don't know what it is you are talking about. It hasn't been made clear to the court. I can't just give papers to somebody without stating the reason for it. He can't just read your documents. He needs to be responding to questions."
When the jury returned, and after an additional admonition from the court about the need for Waller to ask questions, he continued his cross-examination:
"[DEFENDANT]: Officer Gonzalez, were you driving a marked police car on 4-7-09?
"THE COURT: Was it a marked police car?
"THE WITNESS: No. It was unmarked.
"[DEFENDANT]: On 4-7-09, while going Northbound, who searched the defendant near 45th Street?
"A: My partner.
"Q: Page two of six police report. It doesn't add up.
"THE COURT: Is that a question?
"Q: Officer, don't Western Avenue got a speed limit of 35 to 40 miles per hour?
"A: I believe it is 35 miles an hour, I believe. It is a major street.
"Q: At which time partner Escobedo exit police vehicle walking towards the defendant?
"A: At which time?
"Q: Yes.
"A: When we observed the violation. Then my partner and I both exit the vehicle."
This exchange illustrates that Waller was at times incomprehensible and did not know how to question a witness as an attorney would. He sometimes confused terms, by, for example, referring to the witness as "defendant." At the same time, it appears that Waller understood the proceedings and was rationally—if ineffectually—conducting his case. He used the documents he had received in discovery such as the police report and a police activity log as a basis for his questions on cross-examination. He refreshed one witness's recollection using the preliminary hearing transcript. The nature and extent of his participation in the proceedings demonstrated that he understood their purpose. (Halvorsen, supra, 42 Cal.4th at pp. 406-407 [no substantial evidence of incompetence where defendant gave rambling, irrelevant, and offensive testimony; delivered a bizarre and incomprehensible monologue before the jury; and had been diagnosed as psychotic and bipolar; nothing suggested he "lacked a rational understanding of the roles of the judge, prosecutor, defense counsel, or jury . . . or the purpose of the proceedings"].)
Moreover, defendant's statements regarding his status as a witness or potential witness in a murder case were not substantial evidence of his incompetence. The record suggests that Waller was attempting to negotiate with the People by offering to testify in an unrelated case. It is not clear from the record that defendant's assertion that he had information related to another case was untrue. In any event, even if Waller was expressing delusional thinking that he was already a witness in a murder case, or that he had information about a murder, there was no indication that similar delusional thinking rendered him unable to rationally conduct his defense. "Substantial evidence of incompetence may arise from separate sources, including the defendant's own behavior," but "a defendant must exhibit more than bizarre, paranoid behavior, strange words, or a preexisting psychiatric condition that has little bearing on the question of whether the defendant can assist his defense counsel." (People v. Ramos (2004) 34 Cal.4th 494, 507-508.)
Waller first raised the issue by suggesting he was in protective custody. However, at a later proceeding, the parties had the following colloquy while discussing Waller's indication that he wanted to "look for a resolution": "THE DEFENDANT: Can I talk to the prosecution, please. [¶] THE COURT: You have two minutes. Right here in the courtroom. [¶] THE DEFENDANT: Did you receive the letter from the bailiff? [¶] [PROSECUTOR]: Yes. [¶] THE DEFENDANT: I am willing to testify. [¶] [PROSECUTOR]: I have nothing to do with that. [¶] THE DEFENDANT: He really tell me what he did. He brutally murdered a girl, you know. I will testify on him for a real offer to just live my life, honestly, you know. [PROSECUTOR]: I believe I understand the thrust of the defendant's request. It is not something I have any control over. It is not something that I am involved with in any way. In fact, something -- it is something way over my head. [¶] THE COURT: Is there such a case? [¶] [PROSECUTOR]: I don't know. [¶] THE COURT: Have you made any effort to verify that portion of his information? [¶] [PROSECUTOR]: Unfortunately, I don't have specific enough information to know what is going on. [¶] THE COURT: It seems to me if he was a witness in another matter that you would have been contacted by the investigators and prosecutor in that case. It doesn't sound like something that is just about to happen. [¶] [PROSECUTOR]: I don't have any information, Your Honor."
Defendant's reliance on People v. Murdoch (2011) 194 Cal.App.4th 230, is misplaced. In Murdoch, experts opined that the defendant suffered from serious or severe mental illness. The experts felt the defendant was competent so long as he continued taking prescription medication. However, he had already stopped taking his medication. (Ibid.) Shortly before the trial began, the defendant informed the court his defense would be that the prosecution witnesses were not human. (Id. at pp. 233-234.) At trial, the defendant cross-examined only one witness and asked a single question relating to his theory that the witness was not human. (Id. at p. 235.) The appellate court concluded the expert evidence and defendant's behavior should have prompted the trial court to raise a doubt about the defendant's competence. (Id. at p. 238.) In contrast, here there was no psychological or psychiatric information before the court indicating Waller suffered from a mental illness. And, unlike the defendant in Murdoch, Waller did not display completely delusional or irrational thinking. Murdoch is therefore distinguishable.
As in People v. Koontz (2002) 27 Cal.4th 1041, "defendant took an active role in pretrial proceedings and voir dire. Moreover, he questioned witnesses concerning the facts of the case . . . although his shaky grasp of the concept of legal relevancy did not well serve his cause." (Id. at p. 1065.) Defendant's attempts to present a defense fell far short of what a competent attorney would have done. However, "[t]hese deficiencies in his self-representation suggest not incompetency to stand trial but, rather, the lack of legal training common to most pro se defendants." (Ibid.) The record lacks substantial evidence demonstrating Waller was incompetent to stand trial. The trial court did not err in failing to declare a doubt as to his competency or institute competency proceedings. (Lewis, supra, 43 Cal.4th at p. 526.) II. Pitchess Motion
A. Background
Before the trial began, Waller filed a Pitchess motion. In a declaration supporting the motion he asserted:
"Defendant denies the officers's account within the arrest report written by one of the deputies. The report clearly written [sic] as a cover up of unprofessional action occurred. Mr. Waller did not have any drugs in his possession. Any drugs recovered were planted by the police. He was lawfully walking along a public street and did not have anything in his hand. He denies making any statements about having a sack of weed in his pants pocket. The police simply approached him and searched him without any lawful cause. He was sober and walking normally. Any statements or testimony to the contrary would have to be fabricated by the police."Waller declared that information produced could be used for cross-examination and impeachment purposes. Although he indicated the arrest report would be attached to the motion, no report was attached.
Following a hearing, the court denied the motion without prejudice. The deputy city attorney appearing for the police department suggested that if Waller re-filed the motion, he should include a copy of the police report to provide the date of the incident. Waller filed a second Pitchess motion containing the same descriptive statement in the supporting declaration, with the addition of the date of the incident. The trial court again denied the motion. The court found the motion procedurally defective because Waller had not attached a police report. The court also concluded Waller had not established good cause requiring disclosure of the requested discovery.
B. Analysis
As established in Pitchess and later codified in Penal Code sections 832.7 and 832.8 and Evidence Code sections 1043 through 1045, a criminal defendant may " 'compel discovery' of certain relevant information in the personnel files of police officers by making 'general allegations which establish some cause for discovery' of that information and by showing how it would support a defense to the charge against him." (Warrick v. Superior Court (2005) 35 Cal.4th 1011, 1018-1019 (Warrick).) "To initiate discovery, the defendant must file a motion supported by affidavits showing 'good cause for the discovery,' first by demonstrating the materiality of the information to the pending litigation, and second by 'stating upon reasonable belief' that the police agency has the records or information at issue. (§ 1043, subd. (b)(3).) This two-part showing of good cause is a 'relatively low threshold for discovery.' [Citation.]" (Warrick, at p. 1019.) "A trial court's ruling on a Pitchess motion is based on the trial court's sound discretion and is reviewable for abuse." (People v. Sanderson (2010) 181 Cal.App.4th 1334, 1339 (Sanderson).)
In Warrick, the California Supreme Court analyzed the good cause requirement. The court explained "the defendant must present . . . a specific factual scenario of officer misconduct that is plausible when read in light of the pertinent documents." (Warrick, supra, 35 Cal.4th at p. 1025.) In some cases, that factual scenario "may consist of a denial of the facts asserted in the police report." (Id. at pp. 1024-1025.) The defendant is not required to provide a motive for the alleged officer misconduct. (Id. at p. 1025.) Further, the defendant's factual scenario need not be credible or believable, instead it must simply be plausible: a scenario that might or could have occurred. (Id. at p. 1026.) "[A] scenario is plausible because it presents an assertion of specific police misconduct that is both internally consistent and supports the defense proposed to the charges. A defendant must also show how the information sought could lead to or be evidence potentially admissible at trial." (Ibid.)
In Warrick, the defendant was charged with possessing cocaine base for sale. (Warrick, supra, 35 Cal.4th at p. 1017.) According to the police report, police officers noticed the defendant standing next to a wall looking at a clear plastic baggie containing off-white solids. When the officers approached, the defendant fled and discarded what appeared to be numerous lumps of rock cocaine. One officer retrieved the lumps while others pursued and arrested the defendant. The defendant had an empty baggie, a small amount of cash, and three porcelain spark plug chips which one officer described as a common tool of auto thieves for smashing car windows. (Id. at p. 1016.) In the declaration supporting a Pitchess motion, defense counsel provided a different version of the events leading to the defendant's arrest. Defense counsel declared that defendant ran when the police officers got out of their patrol car because he had an outstanding parole warrant and feared arrest. As he fled, people were pushing and fighting with each other as they collected rock cocaine from the ground. Two officers retrieved some of the rocks and one told defendant he must have thrown the rocks. The defendant denied possessing or discarding rock cocaine; he said he was in the area to buy cocaine. The defendant suggested the officers did not know who discarded the cocaine and falsely claimed to have seen the defendant do so. (Id. at p. 1017.)
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Although the threshold for establishing good cause for Pitchess discovery is unquestionably low, here the trial court could reasonably conclude Waller failed to demonstrate sufficient good cause because he did not present a specific alternative factual scenario of officer misconduct. In his declaration supporting the Pitchess motion, Waller declared only: (1) he was lawfully walking along a public street; (2) he was sober and walking normally; (3) he did not have drugs in his possession; (4) he had nothing in his hand; (5) police approached him and searched him without cause; (6) he did not make any statements about having a sack of marijuana in his pants pocket; (7) he denied the officer's account in the police report; (8) any drugs recovered were planted by police; (9) the police report was written to cover up unprofessional action; and (10) any contrary testimony or statements by the police were fabrications. Waller did not offer an explanation for what he was doing in the area, other than walking down the street. He did not present a factual basis for being singled out by police. He did not provide any details regarding the police officers' alleged planting of drugs, such as when or how the police planted the drugs. Did the officers plant 12 bags of marijuana on Waller's person as they searched him? Or did they search his pockets, find them empty, and produce the drugs at a different time? Waller also offered no alternative explanation for the $185 police reported they found in his pocket; indeed, he did not mention the money at all in his declaration.
Two cases decided after Warrick are instructive. People v. Thompson (2006) 141 Cal.App.4th 1312 (Thompson), also involved drug charges. According to the police report, six police officers witnessed an undercover officer conduct a drug transaction with the defendant. The undercover officer was wearing a wire. Two detectives monitored the wire. Another officer found money in the defendant's possession and a different officer confirmed it was the buy money. (Id. at p. 1317.) In a Pitchess declaration, the defendant's counsel asserted the officers did not recover any buy money from the defendant, and the defendant did not offer or sell drugs to the undercover officer. Counsel further declared that police stopped the defendant and, once they realized he had a criminal record, they fabricated the alleged events and used drugs already in their possession, falsely claiming the drugs belonged to the defendant. (Thompson, at p. 1317.) The trial court denied the Pitchess motion.
On appeal, the court concluded the defendant had not made a sufficient showing of good cause because his explanation did "not present a factual account of the scope of the alleged police misconduct, and [did] not explain his own actions in a manner that adequately support[ed] his defense." (Thompson, supra, 141 Cal.App.4th at p. 1317.) While the defendant denied he possessed cocaine or received the buy money, he did not "state a non-culpable explanation for his presence in an area where drugs were being sold, sufficiently present a factual basis for being singled out by the police, or assert any 'mishandling of the situation' prior to his detention and arrest. Counsel's declaration simply denied the elements of the offense charged." (Ibid.)
The Thompson court's reasoning regarding the requirement of an alternate version of facts is applicable here. Waller's declaration supporting the motion did little more than deny the account in the police report. The denial in this case did not constitute a specific factual scenario of officer misconduct. Waller did not offer an alternate version of the facts regarding his presence at the scene of the arrest. Nor did he offer a specific version of facts showing police misconduct, in the sense that he did not explain the alleged planting of 12 bags of marijuana, or the money reportedly found in his possession.
In Sanderson, supra, 181 Cal.App.4th 1334, the appellate court followed the reasoning of Thompson and concluded the defendant did not establish good cause requiring disclosure of Pitchess discovery. The defendant was charged with making criminal threats. (Sanderson, supra, at p. 1336.) According to a police report, two police officers heard the defendant make threats while he was on speakerphone. (Id. at p. 1338.) The defendant sought personnel records for the two officers relating to dishonesty and falsified police reports. (Ibid.) In a declaration supporting the Pitchess motion, defense counsel declared the defendant denied making the threatening statements as recounted in the police report. (Sanderson, supra, at p. 1338.) The trial court denied the motion. The appellate court affirmed, noting the defendant simply denied making the statement attributed to him. He did not deny making the telephone call in question and failed to present an alternate version of the facts regarding the reason and nature of the telephone call with the victims. The court concluded "the trial court acted within its discretion to the extent that it made a 'common sense' determination that defendant's version of events was not plausible 'based on a reasonable and realistic assessment of the facts and allegations.' [Citation.]" (Id. at p. 1341.) Unlike the defendant in Warrick, the defendant in Sanderson did not present a specific factual scenario of police misconduct. (Sanderson, supra, at p. 1342.)
Similarly in this case, the trial court could reasonably conclude Waller did not present an alternative specific factual scenario sufficient to warrant Pitchess discovery. His account of the incident that led to his arrest did not explain what he was doing in the area of the arrest besides "lawfully walking along a public street." He did not provide any details to explain how or when the bags of marijuana were allegedly planted on him. And he provided no explanation for the money the police reportedly found on his person. We cannot say the trial court abused its discretion in finding Waller failed to show good cause for the requested Pitchess discovery.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
BIGELOW, P. J. We concur:
RUBIN, J.
GRIMES, J.