We are not persuaded, as defendant was directly warned of the consequences of using drugs while on furlough, as well as of failing to appear for sentencing, and it is undisputed that he violated these conditions (seePeople v. Straight, 106 A.D.3d 1190, 1191–1192, 964 N.Y.S.2d 755 [2013] ; comparePeople v. Criscitello, 123 A.D.3d 1235, 1236–1237, 998 N.Y.S.2d 525 [2014] ). Given his many prior convictions and probation violations, we do not find any extraordinary circumstances or an abuse of discretion warranting a reduction of the enhanced sentence in the interest of justice, notwithstanding his drug addiction and most unfortunate suicide attempt (seePeople v. Paneto, 112 A.D.3d 1230, 1231–1232, 976 N.Y.S.2d 745 [2013], lv denied 23 N.Y.3d 1023, 992 N.Y.S.2d 806, 16 N.E.3d 1286 [2014] ; People v. Potter, 54 A.D.3d 444, 445, 862 N.Y.S.2d 650 [2008] ; People v. Walker, 30 A.D.3d 823, 824, 817 N.Y.S.2d 730 [2006] ). Defendant further contends that County Court erroneously directed him to pay restitution to an individual who was not a victim of the crime to which he pleaded guilty.
By failing to appear at the scheduled sentencing, defendant violated the terms of the plea agreement and County Court was no longer bound by the agreed-upon sentence ( see People v Figgins, 87 NY2d 840, 841). Notwithstanding defendant's proffered excuse for his absence, we find that the court was justified in imposing the enhanced sentence ( see id.; People v Thomas, 56 AD3d 815, 816). To the extent that defendant challenges the enhanced sentence as harsh and excessive, the record reveals no abuse of discretion or any extraordinary circumstances to warrant a reduction of the sentence in the interest of justice ( see People v Favor, 49 AD3d 915, 916; People v Walker, 30 AD3d 823, 823-824). Ordered that the judgment is affirmed.
As the record reflects that defendant clearly was apprised that County Court would not be bound by the agreed-upon sentence should defendant fail to appear on the scheduled sentencing date, County Court granted a brief adjournment in an effort to secure defendant's presence prior to sentencing him in absentia and defendant's proffered excuses for his failure to appear are both unsupported and unpersuasive, we conclude that the enhanced sentence imposed was justified ( see People v Flanders, 53 AD3d 866; People v Favor, 49 AD3d 915). To the extent that defendant, who has two prior convictions for driving while intoxicated and a demonstrated history of substance abuse, contends that the enhanced sentence was harsh and excessive, our review of the record fails to disclose either an abuse of discretion or the existence of extraordinary circumstances warranting a reduction of the sentence in the interest of justice ( see People v Shaw, 51 AD3d 1062, 1063, lv denied 10 NY3d 964; People v Walker, 30 AD3d 823). Ordered that the judgment is affirmed.
We affirm. County Court clearly had the right to impose an enhanced sentence ( see id.). Inasmuch as defendant failed to tender a valid excuse for failing to comply with the conditions of his release, the imposition of the enhanced sentence was justified ( see People v Walker, 30 AD3d 823; People v Marshall, 25 AD3d 876, 877, lv denied 6 NY3d 850). Defendant's remaining contention, that the enhanced sentence imposed is harsh and excessive and should be reduced in the interest of justice, is not properly before us in light of his valid and unchallenged waiver of the right to appeal ( see People v Hopkins, 46 AD3d 1107, 1108; People v Marshall, 25 AD3d at 877; People v Holmes, 306 AD2d 889, lv denied 100 NY2d 621). Ordered that the judgment is affirmed.
We affirm. As defendant was clearly warned that County Court would not be bound by the promised sentence in the plea agreement if he failed to appear on the scheduled sentencing date, we find that the enhanced sentence was justified ( see People v Favor, 49 AD3d 915, 915; People v Conklin, 35 AD3d 1034, 1035; People v Walker, 30 AD3d 823, 823; People v Hines, 286 AD2d 987, 987, lv denied 97 NY2d 683; People v Diaz, 264 AD2d 879, 880, lv denied 94 NY2d 879). Defendant's remaining contentions have been examined and found unpersuasive.
While this right may be waived ( see People v Stroman, 36 NY2d 939, 940), where "a defendant fails to appear at sentencing, he or she may be deemed to have waived the right to be present only if the defendant was previously advised of the consequences of failing to appear at sentencing" ( People v Syrell, 42 AD3d 947, 947-948; see People v Smith, 68 NY2d 725, 726-727; People v Torra, 8 AD3d 751, 751; see generally People v Parker, 57 NY2d 136, 140-141). Here, although County Court informed defendant that he could be subject to an enhanced sentence if he failed to appear for sentencing, the court did not specifically articulate that sentencing could proceed in his absence ( compare People v Bennett, 42 AD3d 813, 814; People v Walker, 30 AD3d 823, 823; People v Torra, 8 AD3d at 751-752; People v Stevens, 159 AD2d 662, 662, lv denied 76 NY2d 796). Moreover, even where a defendant is found to have waived the right to be present at sentencing, proceeding with sentencing in absentia is not automatically authorized; rather "the trial court must exercise its sound discretion upon consideration of all appropriate factors, including the possibility that defendant could be located within a reasonable period of time" ( People v Parker, 57 NY2d at 142; see People v Syrell, 42 AD3d at 948; People v Ramos, 139 AD2d 850, 851)