Opinion
C041100.
7-31-2003
THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. JOSEPH LOUIS WALKER, Defendant and Appellant.
A jury convicted defendant Joseph Louis Walker of reckless driving with intent to elude a pursuing peace officer (Veh. Code, § 2800.2, subd. (a)) and assault with a deadly weapon, an automobile (Pen. Code, § 245, subd. (a)(1); further undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code). In a bifurcated proceeding, the jury found that he had served a prior prison term. (§ 667.5, subd. (b).) Defendant was sentenced to state prison for five years.
On appeal, defendant contends (1) the trial court erred by failing to order a second competency hearing, and (2) his trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance by failing to request a second hearing. We shall affirm the judgment.
FACTS
On June 9, 2000, at approximately 6:45 p.m., Sacramento County Sheriffs Deputy Bankie was on patrol in uniform in a marked car in the vicinity of Clover Manor and 37th Avenue. He saw two cars stopped next to each other in the middle of the street. The two drivers appeared to be conversing. As Bankie approached the cars, one of them, a 1972 Mercury Cougar, accelerated. The Cougars rear tires broke traction and it almost struck a parked car. Bankie activated his emergency lights and siren and began to pursue the Cougar, which accelerated through a residential area. The Cougar failed to stop at four stop signs and several stoplights, and reached speeds up to 80 miles per hour. The pursuit continued for four to five miles through residential areas, endangering several children and pedestrians and causing several near collisions.
At 65th Street and Lemon Hill Avenue, the Cougar was forced to stop behind a stopped Pontiac at a stoplight. In an attempt to flee from Deputy Bankie, the Cougar pushed the Pontiac 7 to 10 feet into the intersection, again causing a near collision. The Cougar then accelerated on Lemon Hill Avenue, reaching speeds over 100 miles per hour. Bankie decreased his speed because he felt it was too dangerous to continue the pursuit, which had forced at least 20 cars to take action to avoid colliding with the Cougar. Eventually, the Cougar spun out of control and crashed into a chain link fence. Defendant got out of the Cougar, ignored Bankies orders to stop, fled over a fence and escaped.
Deputy Bankie contacted the Cougars registered owner, who stated that she had lent the car to "Joe Walker," who resided in the Meadowview area. Bankie located defendants photograph in the police computer.
DISCUSSION
Defendant contends new evidence arose during his trial and sentencing, which raised serious doubt about his competence. Thus, his trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance by failing to request, and the trial court erred by failing to order, a second competency hearing to consider the new evidence. Because the record fails to disclose substantial evidence of defendants mental incompetence, both claims fail.
Background
On June 27, 2001, before the preliminary examination, defendants then-counsel, Keith Staten, expressed a doubt about his clients competence. ( § 1368.) The trial court suspended proceedings and appointed S. Miles Estner, M.D., and Janice Y. Nakagawa, Ph.D., who conducted competence evaluations.
Dr. Nakagawa stated in her July 18, 2001, report that defendant had, in the past, "evidenced some psychiatric symptomatology." However, "in the present assessment, he does not evidence a mental disorder or any developmental disability presently that would preclude him from being able to understand the nature of the criminal proceedings or to assist counsel in conducting a defense in a rational manner."
Dr. Estner stated in his July 22, 2001, report that defendant was "currently able to understand the proceedings being taken against him," was "capable of cooperating rationally with defense counsel, and could technically represent himself in a rational manner, in that he seems to be able to rationally waive right to representation."
On October 11, 2001, defendant waived jury trial on the issue of competency and the trial court found him to be competent.
On October 26, 2001, defendants trial counsel asked to be relieved of his appointment because he had "taken a position with the State." Defendant responded that he wished to represent himself and did not "need another lawyer." Defendant later added, "I want to do my own legal work, and I dont need no one else trying to do or take anything from me without — that I dont feel I can trust. And I dont trust this system, police. And if I have to bring that up, thats the whole point of me going pro per, figure out for myself." The trial court advised defendant regarding self-representation, and he indicated that he understood the admonition. (See Faretta v. California (1975) 422 U.S. 806 [45 L. Ed. 2d 562, 95 S. Ct. 2525].)
On February 4, 2002, defendant appeared before a different trial judge. This colloquy ensued:
"THE COURT: All right. Mr. Walker, you represent yourself in this matter?
"THE DEFENDANT: What are you talking about? Didnt I have an attorney last time?
"THE COURT: This case here before me today.
"THE DEFENDANT: What case?
"THE COURT: The case with the twenty-eight hundred, evading the police officer.
"THE DEFENDANT: I have been through that shit already.
"THE COURT: Do you represent yourself?
"THE DEFENDANT: No. Why the fuck am I gonna represent myself?"
Thereafter, defendant refused to accept discovery in his case and the trial court ordered the bailiff to place the discovery envelope under defendants arm.
Two days later, defendant was brought before the same judge and refused to communicate with the court. The court rescinded his pro per status and appointed Laurence Walton to represent him. At the conclusion of the hearing, the trial court held defendant in contempt for his previous disruptions and outbursts in court and sentenced him to five days of incarceration.
On April 9, 2002, the date set for trial, defendant appeared and expressed his dissatisfaction with Walton. Defendant was nonspecific and merely stated, "Walton aint been doing his job." The trial court tried but failed to explain to defendant that a potential plea bargain could reduce his potential maximum state prison exposure. The court then took a recess and asked Walton to explain the situation to defendant. The attempt to resolve the case did not succeed.
Jury trial regularly commenced on April 10, 2002. That afternoon, the trial court tried to explain to defendant the ramifications of waiving his right to jury trial as to the prior convictions. After defendant professed not to understand the courts explanation, the court directed Walton to explain the matter to defendant.
At the end of the day on April 10, 2002, Walton indicated that defendant wished to waive his right to jury trial as to the prior convictions. When the trial court questioned defendant to confirm that this was his desire, defendant stated, "to go to trial. Yeah, Im taking it to [the] jury and then I dont want my past being brought up." Following an unsuccessful discussion with defendant, the court determined that there was no waiver of jury trial as to the priors, absent an "unequivocal waiver" from defendant.
During jury deliberations on April 11, 2002, the trial court again attempted to explain the ramifications of defendants waiver of right to trial by jury as to the prior convictions. Defendant responded, "I dont understand that."
Thereafter, the trial court presided over a jury trial as to defendants prior convictions.
At sentencing on May 6, 2002, defendant twice indicated that he did not understand the proceedings. At one point, he told the trial court, "I dont understand nothing youre talking about." Defendant later stated he did not understand the courts advisement of his appeal rights.
This exchange ensued:
"THE DEFENDANT: I have a problem remembering what you — what you are saying.
"THE COURT: Yeah, I know that. So, what is it that youre not understanding? You have to file your notice of appeal within 60 days from todays date if you want to appeal.
"THE DEFENDANT: Did I want to appeal? How can I appeal it if I dont have a chance to go to the law library in this County?
"THE COURT: Well, it can be filed by your attorney.
"THE DEFENDANT: How can I file something with an attorney when Im locked down most of the time?
"THE COURT: He can file it. All you have to do is tell him.
"THE DEFENDANT: How can he file something if I dont talk with him? I cant call him because Im on lock down all of the time.
"THE COURT: He can come over, see you?
"THE DEFENDANT: I dont know. What can he do? If hes an attorney, he should be able to do whatever the law states.
"THE COURT: Yes. If you want to appeal, then Ill have him file it within 60 days, signed by him. That will start the process. [P] Okay?
"THE DEFENDANT: Nah, it aint okay.
"THE COURT: Well, all you have to do is tell your attorney that you want to appeal, and Ill have him file it.
"THE DEFENDANT: How can I tell him anything? I dont talk to him.
"THE COURT: Hes sitting right next to you.
"THE DEFENDANT: I tell him to come up there, he dont come up there. If I dont have a chance to talk with him in person, through yall confidential booths, I — I wont be able to see him. . . .
"THE COURT: Well, Mr. Walton, maybe you should go up, pay a visit to your client.
"[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Yes, your Honor."
Analysis
"A defendant is incompetent to stand trial when he suffers a mental disorder or developmental disability rendering him unable to understand the nature of the criminal proceedings or to assist counsel in the conduct of a defense in a rational manner. [Citations.] As a matter of due process, the trial court is required to conduct a section 1368 hearing to determine a defendants competency whenever substantial evidence of incompetence has been introduced. [Citations.] Substantial evidence is evidence that raises a reasonable doubt about the defendants competence to stand trial. [Citations.]" (People v. Frye (1998) 18 Cal.4th 894, 951-952, 959 P.2d 183.)
"`When a competency hearing has already been held and the defendant has been found competent to stand trial, . . . a trial court need not suspend proceedings to conduct a second competency hearing unless it "is presented with a substantial change of circumstances or with new evidence" casting a serious doubt on the validity of that finding. [Citations.] [Citations.]" (People v. Jones (1997) 15 Cal.4th 119, 149-150, 931 P.2d 960, overruled on other grounds in People v. Hill (1998) 17 Cal.4th 800, 823, fn. 1, 952 P.2d 673; see People v. Medina (1995) 11 Cal.4th 694, 734, 906 P.2d 2.)
On appeal, the "trial judges ruling regarding whether a competency hearing is required should be given great deference. "An appellate court is in no position to appraise a defendants conduct in the trial court as indicating insanity, a calculated attempt to feign insanity and delay the proceedings, or sheer temper." [Citation.]" (People v. Weaver (2001) 26 Cal.4th 876, 953.)
Defendant claims the trial court had an obligation to initiate a second competency hearing because there was new evidence of his incompetence since the contrary finding on October 11, 2001. He relies on evidence that he refused to accept discovery, made disruptive outbursts, refused to communicate with the court, expressed unspecified dissatisfaction with his attorney, claimed entitlement to bail or release on his own recognizance, claimed not to understand a proposed plea bargain, repeatedly claimed not to understand his right to waive jury trial on the prior convictions, claimed not to understand the sentencing proceedings, and claimed not to understand his appeal rights and the procedure for perfecting an appeal.
Defendants argument requires us to appraise the foregoing acts as indicating incompetence, rather than as displays of "sheer temper" or "calculated attempts to feign [incompetence] and delay the proceedings." (People v. Weaver, supra, 26 Cal.4th at p. 953.) Our standard of review precludes us from doing so. Rather, we must give "great deference" to the trial court judges who observed defendants behavior and impliedly found that it was not sufficient to raise a reasonable doubt about his continued competence. (Ibid.) The record amply supports this implied finding. (See People v. Marshall (1997) 15 Cal.4th 1, 33, 931 P.2d 262 ["More is required than just bizarre actions or statements by the defendant to raise a doubt of competency"].)
Defendant claims there was "far more" evidence of incompetence than his bizarre actions and statements. We disagree.
Dr. Nakagawa reported that "available information" contained "references to serious mental impairments from about 1990 to 1995." Defendant had received psychiatric treatment at two facilities during that period. According to the probation report, he had also received psychiatric treatment in 1993. However, defendants psychiatric history from 1993 to 1995 did not prevent Dr. Nakagawa from concluding that he was competent in July 2001. His subsequent bizarre behavior does not cast "a serious doubt" on the validity of Nakagawas conclusion (People v. Jones, supra, 15 Cal.4th at pp. 149-150) unless we construe it most favorably to him, i.e., as neither feigned nor the result of sheer temper. This we cannot do. (People v. Weaver, supra, 26 Cal.4th at p. 953.)
The probation report indicates that, between the October 2001 finding of competence and the April 2002 commencement of trial, defendant was involved in eight incidents of insubordination and disobedience in jail. As noted, this court is in no position to determine whether those insubordinate and disobedient acts reflect actual or feigned incompetence, or unchecked temper. (People v. Weaver, supra, 26 Cal.4th at p. 953.) The probation report did not raise a reasonable doubt as to defendants incompetence.
In a separate argument, defendant claims his trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance by failing to request a second competence hearing. He notes that, after the trial court was unsuccessful in explaining to defendant his potential state prison exposure, the court asked Walton to meet and confer with defendant. Rather than reconvene in 35 to 40 minutes, as it had anticipated, the court remained in recess until the next day. However, nothing in the record explains this delay, and nothing suggests that Waltons interaction with defendant should have alerted Walton that defendant was incompetent. Rather, Walton could have rationally believed that defendants conduct resulted from feigned incompetence or unchecked temper, as opposed to genuine incompetence.
"`"[If] the record on appeal sheds no light on why counsel acted or failed to act in the manner challenged[,] . . . unless counsel was asked for an explanation and failed to provide one, or unless there simply could be no satisfactory explanation," the claim on appeal must be rejected. [Citations.] A claim of ineffective assistance in such a case is more appropriately decided in a habeas corpus proceeding. [Citations.]" (People v. Mendoza Tello (1997) 15 Cal.4th 264, 266-267, 933 P.2d 1134.)
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
We concur: DAVIS, Acting P.J., KOLKEY, J.