Opinion
A158822
08-10-2020
THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. JEREMIAH WALKER, Defendant and Appellant.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. (Alameda County Super. Ct. No. 173408)
"In 2018, the Legislature passed and the Governor signed into law Senate Bill No. 1437 (2017-2018 Reg. Sess.) (Senate Bill 1437), legislation that prospectively amended the mens rea requirements for the offense of murder and restricted the circumstances under which a person can be liable for murder under the felony-murder rule or the natural and probable consequences doctrine. (Stats. 2018, ch. 1015.)" (People v. Lamoureux (2019) 42 Cal.App.5th 241, 246 (Lamoureux).) Senate Bill 1437 added Penal Code section 1170.95, which authorizes a defendant previously convicted of felony murder or murder under a natural and probable consequences theory to file a petition seeking vacation of the conviction and resentencing.
All undesignated statutory references are to the California Penal Code.
Section 1170.95, subd. (a) provides: "(a) A person convicted of felony murder or murder under a natural and probable consequences theory may file a petition with the court that sentenced the petitioner to have the petitioner's murder conviction vacated and to be resentenced on any remaining counts when all of the following conditions apply: "(1) A complaint, information, or indictment was filed against the petitioner that allowed the prosecution to proceed under a theory of felony murder or murder under the natural and probable consequences doctrine. "(2) The petitioner was convicted of first degree or second degree murder following a trial or accepted a plea offer in lieu of a trial at which the petitioner could be convicted for first degree or second degree murder. "(3) The petitioner could not be convicted of first or second degree murder because of changes to Section 188 or 189 made effective January 1, 2019." --------
Appellant Jeremiah Walker (Appellant) was charged with murder following a robbery during which his co-defendant shot and killed the victim. Pursuant to a negotiated disposition with the prosecutor, Appellant entered a no contest plea to voluntary manslaughter and was sentenced to 14 years and 8 months in state prison. In January 2019, following the enactment of Senate Bill 1437, Appellant filed a petition for resentencing under section 1170.95, seeking to vacate his voluntary manslaughter conviction. The trial court denied Appellant's resentencing petition, concluding section 1170.95 did not apply to defendants convicted of manslaughter. Subsequently, Appellant filed a timely notice of appeal. Appellant argues he is entitled to resentencing under section 1170.95 because he "accepted a plea offer in lieu of a trial at which the petitioner could be convicted for first degree or second degree murder." We disagree.
Decisions of the California courts of appeal have uniformly concluded that the relief provided by section 1170.95 is limited to defendants convicted of murder. (See, e.g., People v. Paige (2020) 51 Cal.App.5th 194 [First District]; People v. Cervantes (2020) 44 Cal.App.5th 884 [Second District]; People v. Lopez (2019) 38 Cal.App.5th 1087, review granted Nov. 13, 2019, S258175 [Second District]; People v. Turner (2020) 45 Cal.App.5th 428 [Fourth District]; People v. Sanchez (2020) 48 Cal.App.5th 914 [Fourth District]; People v. Flores (2020) 44 Cal.App.5th 985 [Fourth District].) In Paige, Division Two of this court considered and rejected each of Appellant's contentions. Paige held that the explicit reference to "murder" in the introductory clause of section 1170.95, subdivision (a) limits qualifying persons to those who have been convicted of murder. (Paige, at p. 202.) Further, the extensive discussion of the legislative history of Senate Bill 1437 in several decisions confirms that the statute's focus was on targeting the unfairness of the felony murder rule only as it relates to murder convictions. (See, e.g., Paige, at p. 202; Cervantes, at p. 887; Turner, at pp. 436-438.)
Based on the plain language of the statute and its legislative history, we follow other decisions of the California courts of appeal in holding that section 1170.95 applies only to defendants convicted of murder, not manslaughter.
DISPOSITION
The trial court's order is affirmed.
/s/_________
SIMONS, J. We concur. /s/_________
JONES, P.J. /s/_________
NEEDHAM, J.