People v. Walker

14 Citing cases

  1. People v. Nunn

    65 Ill. App. 3d 981 (Ill. App. Ct. 1978)   Cited 9 times

    Defense counsel objected to the giving of this instruction because it contained no requirement that, in order to find the defendant guilty, the jury should conclude defendant had knowledge he had been involved in an accident involving injury or death. The State contends the Illinois Vehicle Code (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1975, ch. 95 1/2, par. 11-401(a)) describes an absolute liability offense relying principally on People v. Walker, 18 Ill. App.3d 351, 309 N.E.2d 716. We do not agree.

  2. People v. Nunn

    77 Ill. 2d 243 (Ill. 1979)   Cited 58 times
    In People v. Nunn, 77 Ill.2d 243 (1979), we considered the severity of the possible punishment for a Class A misdemeanor while addressing whether the legislature intended that another Vehicle Code provision created absolute liability.

    Rev. Stat. 1975, ch. 38, par. 4-9) states that absolute liability may be imposed where "the statute defining the offense clearly indicates a legislative purpose" to do so. We are also referred to People v. Walker (1974), 18 Ill. App.3d 351, in which it was held that section 11-401 created an absolute-liability offense and that knowledge of the accused was not required to prove a violation of the statute. We cannot accept the People's position. Though it has been held that an amendatory change in the language of a statute creates a presumption that it was intended to change the law as it theretofore existed (see, e.g., People ex rel. Gibson v. Cannon (1976), 65 Ill.2d 366; State v. Dobry (1934), 217 Iowa 858, 250 N.W. 702), the presumption is not controlling ( Chicago Illinois Midland Ry. Co. v. Department of Revenue (1976), 63 Ill.2d 474; Roth v. Northern Assurance Co. (1964), 32 Ill.2d 40), and may be overcome by other considerations ( Bruni v. Department of Registration and Education (1974), 59 Ill.2d 6, cert. denied (1975), 421 U.S. 914, 43 L.Ed.2d 780, 95 S.Ct. 1573).

  3. People v. Becker

    315 Ill. App. 3d 980 (Ill. App. Ct. 2000)   Cited 17 times
    Affirming one of defendant's convictions for official misconduct but reversing and remanding on other counts, including armed violence, involuntary manslaughter and official misconduct, the court found that, based on the totality of the circumstances, there was "sufficient evidence to prove defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of official misconduct and armed violence"

    Lucus, 41 Ill.2d at 374. Likewise, in People v. Walker, 18 Ill. App.3d 351 (1974), the court, following the holding in Lucus, held that an Illinois statute making it a crime to leave the scene of an accident and not report it did not violate the defendant's constitutional right against self-incrimination. It further stated that such a statute was a proper exercise of the legislature's police power. Walker, 18 Ill. App.3d at 356.

  4. People v. Teschner

    76 Ill. App. 3d 124 (Ill. App. Ct. 1979)   Cited 13 times
    In People v. Teschner (1979), 76 Ill. App.3d 124, the defendant appealed his conviction of violating subsection 11-501(a) of the Illinois Vehicle Code, which at that time provided that "[n]o person who is under the influence of intoxicating liquor may drive or be in actual physical control of any vehicle within this State."

    The only intention necessary for liability for violating the automobile law is the doing of the act prohibited. People v. Van Cura (1977), 49 Ill. App.3d 157, 364 N.E.2d 564; People v. Walker (1974), 18 Ill. App.3d 351, 309 N.E.2d 716; People v. Strode (1973), 13 Ill. App.3d 697, 300 N.E.2d 323; People v. Espenscheid (1969), 109 Ill. App.2d 107, 249 N.E.2d 866. • 2, 3 The defendant seeks to distinguish the above cases on the basis that all except Walker involve the offense of driving with a revoked or improper license.

  5. Kimoktoak v. State

    584 P.2d 25 (Alaska 1978)   Cited 64 times
    Holding that criminal liability attaches to hit-and-run driver "where the state can prove by direct or circumstantial evidence that the driver actually knew of the injury or that he knew that the accident was of such a nature that one would reasonably anticipate that it resulted in injury to a person"

    See also Annot., 23 A.L.R.3d 497 (1969). Contra, People v. Walker, 18 Ill. App.3d 351, 309 N.E.2d 716, 720 (1974). Finally, we note that in Campbell, we recognized the well-established rule of statutory construction that courts should if possible construe statutes so as to avoid the danger of unconstitutionality.

  6. People v. Kokoraleis

    154 Ill. App. 3d 519 (Ill. App. Ct. 1987)   Cited 10 times

    Under the United States Supreme Court's ruling in Miranda v. Arizona (1966), 384 U.S. 436, 16 L.Ed.2d 694, 86 S.Ct. 1602, a defendant has a constitutional right to be informed that he has the right to remain silent and that he has the right to have an attorney present at any police questioning. The warnings given to a defendant need not follow a ritualistic formula ( People v. Townsend (1972), 6 Ill. App.3d 873, 286 N.E.2d 801), but must convey the concept that the defendant can have an attorney present if he so desires ( People v. Walker (1974), 18 Ill. App.3d 351, 309 N.E.2d 716). Where a defendant claims through a motion to suppress that his Miranda rights have been violated, a trial court's decision denying that motion will be overturned only where the decision is contrary to the manifest weight of the evidence. People v. Allen (1983), 116 Ill. App.3d 996, 452 N.E.2d 636.

  7. People v. Martinez

    120 Ill. App. 3d 305 (Ill. App. Ct. 1983)   Cited 10 times
    In Martinez, this court held that the trial court's preclusion of the defendant's cross-examination of the accident victim as to whether he contemplated filing a civil suit, for the purpose of showing the victim's bias, was proper because the civil suit had not yet been filed.

    Section 11-401(a) has been upheld as a legitimate exercise of the legislature's police power. ( People v. Walker (1974), 18 Ill. App.3d 351, 356, 309 N.E.2d 716.) Because of the problems and dangers inherent in the operation of automobiles, the legislature may impose reasonable conditions on their use. ( People v. Lucus (1968), 41 Ill.2d 370, 373, 243 N.E.2d 228.) As a consequence, any additional burden necessitated by performance of the statutory duties whenever an accident takes place, regardless of whether any injury is immediately apparent, is justified by the legitimate public policy promoted by the statute.

  8. People v. Ruberg

    76 Ill. App. 3d 671 (Ill. App. Ct. 1979)   Cited 5 times

    Rev. Stat. 1975, ch. 95 1/2, par. 11-401(a)). The contrary result was reached in People v. Walker (1974), 18 Ill. App.3d 351, 309 N.E.2d 716. The test for determining when a mental state is an element of a crime is set out in section 4-9 of the Criminal Code of 1961 (Ill.

  9. People v. Delay

    70 Ill. App. 3d 712 (Ill. App. Ct. 1979)   Cited 6 times
    In People v. Delay (1979), 70 Ill. App.3d 712, 388 N.E.2d 1316, the question on appeal was whether the offense of using a false name on a salvage certificate application was an absolute liability offense under the Illinois Vehicle Code (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1977, ch. 95 1/2, par. 4-105(e)).

    Further, absolute liability has even been imposed for Vehicle Code violations involving felony penalties. See, e.g., People v. White Brothers Equipment Co. (1978), 63 Ill. App.3d 445, 380 N.E.2d 396; People v. Walker (1974), 18 Ill. App.3d 351, 309 N.E.2d 716; contra, People v. Nunn (1978), 65 Ill. App.3d 981, 382 N.E.2d 1305. Beyond this general assumption regarding Vehicle Code offenses, we find the legislative history of section 4-105 to be of even greater importance.

  10. People v. Creach

    69 Ill. App. 3d 874 (Ill. App. Ct. 1979)   Cited 22 times
    Finding no Miranda violation

    In People v. Ward (1976), 37 Ill. App.3d 960, 347 N.E.2d 381, informing defendant of his right to obtain the services of a lawyer was deemed sufficient to warn him of his specific right to counsel during questioning. And in People v. Walker (1974), 18 Ill. App.3d 351, 309 N.E.2d 716, it was held that advising defendant that he had a right to an attorney and further advising him that he should obtain one was found to clearly convey to him his right to the presence of an attorney during questioning. Finally, in People v. Hoffman (1975), 32 Ill. App.3d 785, 336 N.E.2d 209, adequate advice of the right to counsel was found where defendant was told he had a right to have an attorney present before any questions were asked and was also told that he could exercise any and all of his Miranda rights at any time he wished. In the instant case, defendant was told that he had a right to the assistance of counsel before being questioned and that if he could not afford one, counsel would be appointed before questioning.