People v. Vriner

203 Citing cases

  1. People v. Taylor

    237 Ill. 2d 356 (Ill. 2010)   Cited 132 times
    Raising conflict-of-interest claim on direct review did not preclude the raising of that same claim in a postconviction petition, where postconviction claim was supported by information outside the trial record

    Defendant claims the evidence established that he was denied his constitutional right to conflict-free representation when Prusak jointly represented defendant and Lowell. The sixth and fourteenth amendments to the United States Constitution guarantee the right to effective assistance of counsel. Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335, 343-44, 64 L. Ed. 2d 333, 343-44, 100 S. Ct. 1708, 1715-16 (1980); People v. Mahaffey, 165 Ill. 2d 445, 456 (1995); People v. Vriner, 74 Ill. 2d 329, 337 (1978). A criminal defendant's sixth amendment right to effective assistance of counsel includes the right to conflict-free representation.

  2. U.S. ex Rel. Vriner v. Hedrick

    500 F. Supp. 977 (C.D. Ill. 1980)   Cited 2 times

    A jury convicted the petitioner in the Circuit Court of Champaign County, Illinois of unlawful use of weapons and of armed violence. His conviction was affirmed by the Illinois Appellate Court, 53 Ill. App.3d 1105, 15 Ill.Dec. 30, 373 N.E.2d 124 (1977), and by the Illinois Supreme Court, 74 Ill.2d 329, 24 Ill.Dec. 530, 385 N.E.2d 671 (1978). The United States Supreme Court denied certiorari.

  3. People v. Collins

    106 Ill. 2d 237 (Ill. 1985)   Cited 2,501 times
    Finding traditional reasonable doubt standard applicable to an "appellant's claim of evidentiary sufficiency in sex offense cases."

    A criminal conviction will not be set aside unless the evidence is so improbable or unsatisfactory that it creates a reasonable doubt of the defendant's guilt. ( People v. Vriner (1978), 74 Ill.2d 329, 342; People v. Manion (1977), 67 Ill.2d 564, 578; People v. Bybee (1956), 9 Ill.2d 214, 221.) Although the testimony of an accomplice is viewed with suspicion ( People v. Baynes (1981), 88 Ill.2d 225, 232; People v. Todaro (1958), 14 Ill.2d 594, 602), we have repeatedly held that it is sufficient to sustain a conviction if it satisfies the jury of the defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt ( People v. Farnsley (1973), 53 Ill.2d 537, 544-45; People v. Coleman (1971), 49 Ill.2d 565, 573; People v. Wollenberg (1967), 37 Ill.2d 480, 484-85; People v. Hansen (1963), 28 Ill.2d 322, 332-33).

  4. People v. Nelson

    82 Ill. 2d 67 (Ill. 1980)   Cited 39 times
    Noting that the court had "declined to adopt a per se rule that attorneys in a public defender's office are members of an entity" and instead said that "where the question of conflict of interest arises `a case-by-case inquiry is contemplated whereby it is determined whether any facts peculiar to the case preclude the representation of competing interests by separate members of the public defender's office'"

    Although it has been determined both by the United States Supreme Court and this court that joint representation of codefendants is not per se violative of constitutional guarantees of effective assistance of counsel (see Glasser v. United States (1942), 315 U.S. 60, 86 L.Ed. 680, 62 S.Ct. 457; Holloway v. Arkansas (1978), 435 U.S. 475, 55 L.Ed.2d 426, 98 S.Ct. 1173; People v. Precup (1978), 73 Ill.2d 7; People v. Durley (1972), 53 Ill.2d 156), the question has arisen repeatedly whether particular cases involving joint representation of codefendants involve defenses so antagonistic as to create a conflict of interest. (See, e.g., People v. Vriner (1978), 74 Ill.2d 329; People v. Echols (1978), 74 Ill.2d 319; People v. Berland (1978), 74 Ill.2d 286; People v. Precup (1978), 73 Ill.2d 7; People v. Durley (1972), 53 Ill.2d 156; People v. Johnson (1970), 46 Ill.2d 266; People v. Robinson (1969), 42 Ill.2d 371; People v. Ware (1968), 39 Ill.2d 66; People v. McCasle (1966), 35 Ill.2d 552.) The question to be addressed in cases where codefendants are jointly represented by one attorney or entity is whether there was an "`actual conflict of interest manifested at trial.'"

  5. People v. Johnson

    239 Ill. App. 3d 1064 (Ill. App. Ct. 1992)   Cited 21 times
    In Johnson, 239 Ill.App.3d at 1076, the defendant was convicted of aggravated criminal sexual assault after presenting a defense that the victim had consented.

    Turner, 128 Ill.2d at 561, 539 N.E.2d at 1205. Similarly, in People v. Vriner (1978), 74 Ill.2d 329, 385 N.E.2d 671, cert. denied (1979), 442 U.S. 929, 61 L.Ed.2d 296, 99 S.Ct. 2858, the court found no error in a prosecutor's statement that he personally believed the defendant was guilty when the defense counsel had argued that even the prosecution was not persuaded beyond a reasonable doubt. ( Vriner, 74 Ill.2d at 344, 385 N.E.2d at 677.)

  6. People v. Sanders

    209 Ill. App. 3d 366 (Ill. App. Ct. 1991)   Cited 23 times
    Holding that in the first stage of the proceedings a petitioner must set forth facts which show the denial of a constitutional right

    The sixth and fourteenth amendments to the United States Constitution guarantee the right of effective assistance of counsel. ( Cuyler v. Sullivan (1980), 446 U.S. 335, 343, 64 L.Ed.2d 333, 343, 100 S.Ct. 1708, 1715; People v. Vriner (1978), 74 Ill.2d 329, 337, 385 N.E.2d 671, 674.) The assistance of counsel means "assistance which entitles an accused to the undivided loyalty of his counsel and which prohibits the attorney from representing conflicting interests or undertaking the discharge of inconsistent obligations."

  7. People v. Lasley

    158 Ill. App. 3d 614 (Ill. App. Ct. 1987)   Cited 25 times

    • 4 We find defendant's argument to be without merit. It is for the jury to evaluate the credibility of the witnesses and the reliability of their testimony. ( People v. Vriner (1978), 74 Ill.2d 329, 342, 385 N.E.2d 671, cert. denied (1979), 442 U.S. 929, 61 L.Ed.2d 296, 99 S.Ct. 2858; People v. Easter (1981), 102 Ill. App.3d 974, 980, 430 N.E.2d 612.) Although the trial court denied defendant's motions, it allowed the defense to recall Courts as a witness before the jury and question him regarding his earlier fabricated testimony. The Lloyd jury heard Courts admit his earlier misstatements as well as his involvement in the crime.

  8. People v. Cartalino

    111 Ill. App. 3d 578 (Ill. App. Ct. 1982)   Cited 29 times
    In People v. Cartalino (1982), 111 Ill. App.3d 578, 591-92, 444 N.E.2d 662, the court held that the sentence of natural life imprisonment could not be imposed solely on the basis of the seriousness of the offense without weighing defendant's rehabilitative potential.

    The failure to convict one codefendant does not raise a reasonable doubt as to the guilt of the other codefendant unless it is demonstrated that the evidence against both defendants is identical in all respects. ( People v. Vriner (1978), 74 Ill.2d 329, 343, 385 N.E.2d 671; People v. Stock (1974), 56 Ill.2d 461, 465, 309 N.E.2d 19. See Annot., 22 A.L.R. 3d 717 (1968).

  9. People v. Gregory

    391 N.E.2d 779 (Ill. App. Ct. 1979)   Cited 3 times

    The State responds that no conflict, in fact, developed in the course of trial since Gregory testified in support of the alibi defense as to both defendants. • 1 It is undisputed that the sixth and fourteenth amendments to the United States Constitution guarantee the right of effective assistance of counsel which is denied if defendants whose interests are in conflict are required to be represented by the same attorney. ( People v. Vriner, 74 Ill.2d 329, 337 (1978).) Moreover, if a conflict in fact exists the requirement of joint representation over timely objection requires reversal without a showing of prejudice. ( Holloway v. Arkansas, 435 U.S. 475, 488, 55 L.Ed.2d 426, 437, 98 S.Ct. 1173, 1181 (1978).

  10. People v. Nichols

    70 Ill. App. 3d 748 (Ill. App. Ct. 1979)   Cited 8 times
    Holding that "the standards for competency to stand trial and sanity at the time of the offense are different and that a finding as to competency does not necessarily answer the question whether a defendant was sane at an earlier time"

    Such was the case here. • 2 Although joint representation of codefendants is not a per se violation of the right to effective assistance of counsel ( Holloway v. Arkansas (1978), 435 U.S. 475, 55 L.Ed.2d 426, 98 S.Ct. 1173) and a conflict of interests among codefendants is not inherent in joint representation situations merely by virtue of such representation ( People v. Vriner (1978), 74 Ill.2d 329, 385 N.E.2d 671; People v. Berland (1978), 74 Ill.2d 286, 385 N.E.2d 649), our supreme court has recognized two distinct situations which entitle a defendant to prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel because of joint representation of codefendants. People v. Vriner (1978), 74 Ill.2d 329, 337-42.